PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

505 VAN NESS AVENUE SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102-3298



August 29, 2014

Advice Letter 4363-E

Brian Cherry Vice President, Regulation and Rates Pacific Gas and Electric Company P.O. Box 770000 San Francisco, CA 94177

SUBJECT: Power Purchase Agreement for Procurement of an Eligible Renewable Energy Resource between 83WI 8ME, LLC and PG&E

Dear Mr. Cherry:

Advice Letter 4363-E is effective as of August 28, 2014, per Resolution E-4676 approved by the Commission on August 28, 2014.

Sincerely,

Edward Randolph

Director, Energy Division

Edward Randofoh



Brian K. Cherry Vice President Regulatory Relations Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale St., Mail Code B10C P.O. Box 770000 San Francisco, CA 94177

Fax: 415-973-7226

February 19, 2014

Advice 4363-E

(Pacific Gas and Electric Company ID U39 E)

Public Utilities Commission of the State of California

Subject: Power Purchase Agreement for Procurement of an Eligible

Renewable Energy Resource between 83WI 8ME, LLC and Pacific

Gas and Electric Company

I. Introduction

A. Purpose of the advice letter

Pacific Gas and Electric Company ("PG&E") seeks California Public Utilities Commission ("Commission" or "CPUC") approval of a power purchase agreement ("PPA") with 83WI 8ME, LLC ("Midway Solar Farm I" or "Midway I"). The PPA is for Renewables Portfolio Standard ("RPS")-eligible energy from a new photovoltaic ("PV") project to be located near Calipatria, California. The PPA has a term of 20 years and is expected to deliver 119 gigawatt hours ("GWh") per year.

PG&E requests that the Commission issue a resolution no later than September 11, 2014, approving the PPA in its entirety and containing the findings as set forth in Section VI below.

B. Identify the subject of the advice letter, including:

1. Project name

The name of the project is Midway Solar Farm I ("Midway I"). Midway I is a new 50 MW solar PV facility (the "Project").

2. Technology (including level of maturity)

The Project will use photovoltaic panels, a well-understood technology with decades of performance history, mounted on single axis trackers.

3. General Location and Interconnection Point

The Project is located within California, near the town of Calipatria, and is expected to interconnect with the Imperial Irrigation District ("IID") controlled transmission grid.

4. Owner(s) / Developer(s)

a. Name(s)

The developers and owners of the Project are 8minutenergy SPV4, LLC, a limited liability company ("LLC") which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of 8minutenergy Renewables ("8ME") LLC, a solar energy development company, and GASNA 15, LLC, a limited liability company, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Gestamp Asetym Solar, S.L. ("Gestamp"), a Madrid-based solar developer and subsidiary of Corporación Gestamp, S.L., an industrial holding company.

b. Type of entity(ies) (e.g. LLC, partnership)

See response to Section I.B.4.a. above.

c. Business Relationship (if applicable, between seller/owner/developer)

Not applicable.

5. Project background, e.g., expiring QF contract, phased project, previous power purchase agreement, contract amendment

The Project is a new 50 MW Solar PV facility.

6. Source of agreement, i.e., RPS solicitation year or bilateral negotiation

The PPA resulted from PG&E's 2012 RPS Solicitation.

7. If an amendment, describe contract terms being amended and reason for amendment

Not applicable.

C. General Project(s) Description


The Project is also described in various sections above.

Project Name	Midway Solar Farm I
Technology	Solar PV
Capacity (MW)	50 MW
Capacity Factor	27.2%
Expected Generation (GWh/Year)	119 GWh
Initial Commercial Operational Date	Expected 2016
Initial Commercial Operational Bate	Guaranteed 2020
Date contract Delivery Term begins	2020
Delivery Term (Years)	20
Vintage (New / Existing / Repower)	New facility

Location (city and state)	Near Calipatria, California
Control Area (e.g., CAISO, BPA)	Imperial Irrigation District ("IID")
Nearest Competitive Renewable Energy Zone (CREZ) as identified by the Renewable Energy Transmission Initiative (RETI) ¹	Imperial North
Type of cooling, if applicable	Not applicable

D. Project location

1. Provide a general map of the generation facility's location.



 $^{^1}$ Information about RETI is available at: $\underline{\text{http://www.energy.ca.gov/reti/}}$

2. For new projects describe facility's current land use type (private, agricultural, county, state lands (agency), federal lands (agency), etc.).

8ME/Gestamp state the Project is on previously disturbed, low productivity, private farm land and thus poses relatively low environmental impact for use as a solar farm.

E. General Deal Structure

Describe general characteristics of contract, for example:

1. Required or expected Portfolio Content Category of the proposed contract

The Project is a 50 MW solar PV facility that is expected to interconnect to the IID controlled transmission system. IID is a California balancing authority. Because the Project is an RPS-eligible generator that expects to have its first point of interconnection with the Western Electricity Coordinating Council ("WECC") transmission system within the boundaries of a California balancing authority, the RPS-eligible procurement from the Project satisfies the criteria for the portfolio content category specified in Public Utilities Code Section 399.16(b)(1)(A) (hereinafter "Portfolio Content Category One").

2. Partial/full generation output of facility

PG&E will receive all of the generation output from the Project starting June 1, 2020. The PPA is for the purchase of an as-available product ("Product").

3. Any additional products, e.g. capacity

The Product includes the energy and all ancillary products, services or attributes which are or can be produced by or associated with the Project, and includes, without limitation, Renewable Energy Credits ("RECs") and Green Attributes but excludes capacity attributes.²

4. Generation delivery point (e.g. busbar, hub, etc.)

The PPA requires the Project's energy to be delivered to either of two IID intertie points with the California Independent System Operator ("CAISO") controlled grid. The delivery point will be either of the PNodes specified by (i) COACHELV_2_N101 at the Mirage Substation, or (ii) ELCENTRO_2_N001 at the Imperial Valley Substation. The delivery market is SP-15.

5. Energy management (e.g. firm/shape, scheduling, selling, etc.)

There is no firming or shaping associated with this PPA. PG&E or its agent will be the Scheduling Coordinator for the Project.


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² As this PPA does not include capacity, the obligation in PG&E's 2012 Procurement Plan to determine import constraint from Imperial Irrigation District does not apply.

6. Diagram and explanation of delivery structure

Figure 1: Delivery Structure of the PPA



F. RPS Statutory Goals & Requirements

1. Briefly describe the Project's consistency with and contribution towards the RPS program's statutory goals set forth in Public Utilities Code §399.11. These goals include displacing fossil fuel consumption within the state; adding new electrical generating facilities within WECC; reducing air pollution in the state; meeting the state's climate change goals by reducing emissions of greenhouse gases associated with electrical generation; promoting stable retail rates for electric service; a diversified and balanced energy generation portfolio; meeting the state's resource adequacy requirements; safe and reliable operation of the electrical grid; and implementing the state's transmission and land use planning activities.

Public Utilities Code Section 399.11 states that increasing California's reliance on eligible renewable energy resources is intended to displace fossil fuel consumption within the state, promote stable electricity prices, reduce greenhouse gas ("GHG") emissions, improve environmental quality and promote the goal of a diversified and balanced energy generation portfolio. The Project is consistent with these goals because it is a new facility located in the WECC that will generate clean energy and will produce little, if any, GHG emissions directly associated with energy production.

2. Describe how procurement pursuant to the contract will meet IOU's specific RPS compliance period needs. Include Renewable Net Short calculation as part of response.

Senate Bill ("SB") 1078 established the California RPS Program, requiring an electrical corporation to increase its use of eligible renewable energy resources to twenty percent of total retail sales no later than December 31, 2017. The legislature subsequently accelerated the RPS goal to reach twenty percent by the end of 2010. In April 2011,

Governor Brown signed into law SB 2 1X. As implemented by D.11-12-020, SB 2 1X requires retail sellers of electricity to meet the following RPS procurement quantity requirements beginning on January 1, 2011:

- An average of twenty percent of the combined bundled retail sales during the first compliance period (2011-2013).
- Sufficient procurement during the second compliance period (2014-2016) that is consistent with the following formula: (.217 * 2014 retail sales) + (.233 * 2015 retail sales) + (.25 * 2016 retail sales).
- Sufficient procurement during the third compliance period (2017-2020) that is consistent with the following formula: (.27 * 2017 retail sales) + (.29 * 2018 retail sales) + (.31 * 2019 retail sales) + (.33 * 2020 retail sales).
- Thirty-three percent of bundled retail sales in 2021 and all years thereafter.

Consistent with the Energy Division Staff methodology for calculating the renewable net short ("RNS")³, PG&E provides a RNS calculation in Table 1. PG&E also provides an alternative RNS calculation (the "Alternate RNS") in Table 2. The RNS calculates the volumes that PG&E projects it will need for RPS compliance based on direction provided in the August 2, 2012 Ruling using an "expected case" scenario. The Alternate RNS provides the same calculations as the RNS but substitutes PG&E's internal long-term bundled retail sales forecast for the assumptions provided in the August 2, 2012 ALJ Ruling.

As illustrated by both scenarios, PG&E's existing RPS portfolio is expected to provide sufficient RPS-eligible deliveries to meet PG&E's RPS compliance requirements in the first compliance period (2011 – 2013). Additionally, PG&E expects to exceed the RPS procurement requirement in the second compliance period (2014 – 2016). While the RNS calculations show a slight surplus in the third compliance period, both scenarios show that if RPS-eligible projects in PG&E's portfolio perform as expected, PG&E has fairly significant incremental need beginning in 2020 (prior to applying any excess procurement from earlier compliance periods) and beyond in order to maintain a thirty-three percent RPS level. This significantly increased need in the early part of the next decade is driven primarily by a large volume of expiring contracts in that timeframe.

Deliveries to PG&E under the PPA will commence on June 1, 2020. Total deliveries from the Project are expected to average 119 GWh per year. The PPA will therefore contribute toward PG&E's RPS procurement requirements at the end of the third compliance period and beyond when PG&E has a need for new incremental deliveries of RPS-eligible power.

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³ See Administrative Law Judge's Ruling (1) Adopting Renewable Net Short Calculation Methodology (2) Incorporating the Attached Methodology into the Record, and (3) Extending the Date for Filing Updates to 2012 Procurement Plans issued on August 2, 2012.

Table 1: Renewable Net Short Calculation as of December 2013

Net Short Calculation Using PG&E Bundled Retail Sales Forecast In Near Term (2013 - 2017) and LTPP Methodology (2018 - 2030)**

Current Expected Need Scenario (Annual)
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1 RPS Target	20.0%	0.02	20.0% 21.7%	1.7% 2	23.3% 2	25.0%	27%	29% 3	31% 3	33% 33	33% 33	33% 33	33% 33%	33%	33%	33%	33%	33%	33%
2 Voluntary Margin of Over-Procurement (GWh)***	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0	0 (0	0	0	0	0	0
3 Aggregate Volumes (GWh)	14,833	14,511	7,167 2.	2,054 2	3,723 2	4,048	17,167 22,054 23,723 24,048 25,375 24,354 23,881	4,354 23		23,265 22,820 20,485 20,151 19,887 19,763 19,158 18,823 18,713	320 20,	485 20,	151 19,8	87 19,7	63 19,15	8 18,82	3 18,713	18,104	18,037
4 Annual RPS Position (%)	19.8%	19.0%					32.2% 3	31.8% 31	31.1% 30	30.2% 29.6%		5% 26.	26.5% 26.0% 25.6%	_	25.4% 24.6%	% 24.1%	6 23.9%	23.1%	23.0%
5 Gross Surplus/(Deficit) compared to Annual Targets* (GWh)	(140)	(730)					4,125 2,	2,139 1	107 (2	(2,132) (2,626)	_	(5,013) (5,397)		(5,713) (5,888)	38) (6,545)	5) (6,931)	(7,092)	(7,753)	(7,872)
6 Non-Bankable Volumes (GWh)	0	15					68	0	0	0 0		0 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7 Volumes (Banked) or Withdrawn from Bank (GWh)	0	0					(4,037) (2	(2,139) (1	(107) 2,	2,132 2,626		5,013 5,397	97 5,713	3 2,209	0 6	0	0	0	0
8 Net Surplus/(Deficit) (GWh)	(140)	(730)					68	0	0	0 0		0 0	0	(3,678)	(8) (6,545)	5) (6,937	(7,092)	(7,753)	(7,872)
9 Net Annual RPS Positions (%) with Use of Bank	19.8%	19.0%					27.1% 29.0%		1.0% 3.	31.0% 33.0% 33.0%		0% 33.	33.0% 33.0% 33.0%	% 28.3%	% 24.6%	% 24.1%	6 23.9%	23.1%	23.0%
10 Cumulative Banked Volumes (GWh)	0	0			1,	7 808'9	0,845 22	2,984 23	,091 20	6,808 20,845 22,984 23,091 20,959 18,332	32 13,.	320 7,9	13,320 7,923 2,209	0 6	0	0	0	0	0
11 Forecast Failure Rate (%) for New Projects not yet online	%0.0	%0:0	0.0%	%0.0	%0.0	%0.0	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	%0.0	%0.0 %1	%0.0 %0	%0.0 %0	%0.0 %	%0.0 %	%0.0	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
12 Forecast Failure Rate (%) for Existing Generation	0.0%	%0.0	0.1%	0.7%	0.5%	0.4%	0.0% 0.1% 0.7% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3%	0.3%	0.2% C	0.1% 0.0%	.0	1% 0	0.1% 0.1% 0.1%	% 0.15	0.1% 0.1% 0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%

Current Expected Need Scenario (Compliance Period)

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	2011 2012 2013 2014	2014 2015 2016	2017 2018 2019 2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
Compliance Period Requirement	20.0%	23.3%	30.0%	33%	33%	33%	33%	33%	33%	33%	33%	33%	33%
।4 Voluntary Margin of Over-Procurement (GWh)***	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
15 Aggregate Volumes (GWh)	46,511	978'69	96,874	22,820	20,485 20,151		19,887	19,763 1	19,158	18,823 1	18,713	18,104	18,037
RPS Position (%)			31.4%	79.6%	26.5%	26.0%	25.6%	25.4%	24.6%	24.1%	3.9%	23.1%	23.0%
77 Gross Surplus/(Deficit) (GWh)			4,239	(2,626)	(5,013)	(5,397)	(2,713)) (888'5)	6,545) ((186'9	(760′2	7,753)	(7,872)
18 Non-Bankable Volumes (GWh)			68	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19 Volumes (Banked) or Withdrawn from Bank (GWh)			(4,151)	2,626	5,013	5,397	5,713	2,209	0	0	0	0	0
20 Net Surplus/(Deficit) (GWh)			68	0	0	0	0) (829'8)	6,545) ((186'9)	(760′2	7,753)	(7,872)
21 Net RPS Positions (%)			30.0%	33.0%	33.0%	33.0%	33.0%	28.3%	24.6%	24.1%	3.9%	23.1%	23.0%
22 Cumulative Banked Volumes (GWh)		16,808	20,959	18,332	13,320	7,923	2,209	0	0	0	0	0	0
23 Forecast Failure Rate (%) for New Projects not yet online	%0	%0	%0	%0:0	%0:0	%0:0	%0:0	%0:0	%0:0	%0.0	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
24 Forecast Failure Rate (%) for Existing Generation	%0:0	0.5%	0.3%	%0:0	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%

25 Total RPS Risk Adjusted Net Short (2011-2030) (GWh)

** Assumed ammual targets are: 2011-2013 (20% ammually), 2014 (21.7%), 2015 (23.3%), 2016 (25%), 2017 (27%), 2017 (27%), 2017 (27%), 2019 (37%), and 2020 (33%). These targets are illustrative only and not enforceable.

** The 2010 LTPP sales forecast extends only from 2018 through 2020. For purposes of extending this forecast past 2020. PG&E applied a 0.2% annual growth rate to the LTPPs "Adjusted Energy Demand/Consumption" forecast in years after 2020. (This 0.2% growth rate is equal to the average growth rate seen in the LTPP forecast oner the 2016-2020 period.) The "Energy Demand/Consumption" amount was then adjusted for line losses to determine bundled retail sales.

*** PG&E considers an adequate bank of surplus RPS procurement to be a wolumany angulo of procurement. However, in accordance with Decision 13-11-024, PG&E will not seek in its 2013 RPS Solicitation to procure Portfolio Content clasgory 2 and 3 RPS products to build and maintain an adequate bank.

Table 2: Alternate Renewable Net Short Calculation as of December 2013

Net Short Calculation Using PG&E Bundled Retail Sales Forecast

Jual
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Current

ine #	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
1 RPS Target	20.0%	20.0%	, 20.0%	21.7%	23.3%	25.0%	27%	%67	31%	33%	33%	33%	33%	33%	33%	33%	33%	33%	33%	33%
2 Voluntary Margin of Over-Procurement (GWh)**	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3 Aggregate Volumes (GWh)	14,833	14,833 14,511	17,167	22,054	23,723	24,048	17,167 22,054 23,723 24,048 25,375 24,354	24,354	23,881	23,881 23,265 22,820 20,485 20,151 19,887 19,763 19,158 18,823 18,713 18,104	22,820	20,485 2	0,151	1 288'6	9,763	19,158	8,823	18,713 1		18,037
4 Annual RPS Position (%)	19.8%	19.0%					32.2%	%L'08	29.9%	29.0%	28.2%	25.1% 2	24.5% 2	23.9% 2.	23.6% 2	22.6% 2	2.0%	21.6%	20.7%	90.4%
5 Gross Surplus/(Deficit) compared to Annual Targets* (GWh)	(140)	(730)					4,125	1,370	(841)	(3,243)) (968'E)	(6,480)	(7,043) (7	(1,567) (7	(7,922) (8,827)	_	(6,423)	1) (318′6)	(10,713)	1,079)
6 Non-Bankable Volumes (GWh)	0	15					68	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7 Volumes (Banked) or Withdrawn from Bank (GWh)	0	0					(4,037)	(1,370)	841	3,243	968'8	6,480 7	7,043	712	0	0	0	0	0	0
8 Net Surplus/(Deficit) (GWh)	(140)	(730)					68	0	0	0	0	0	0	(288'9)	(27,672)	(8,827) (9	(9,423) (6	(6,815)	0,713) (1	1,079)
9 Net Annual RPS Positions (%) with Use of Bank	19.8%	19.0%					27.1%	29.0%	31.0%	33.0%	33.0%	33.0% 3	33.0% 2	24.8% 23.6%		22.6% 2	22.0%	21.6%	20.7%	.0.4%
10 Cumulative Banked Volumes (GWh)	0	0				16,808	16,808 20,845 22,215 21,374 18,131 14,235 7,755	22,215	21,374	18,131	14,235	7,755	717	0 0		0	0	0	0	0
11 Forecast Failure Rate (%) for New Projects not yet online	%0:0	%0.0	%0:0	%0:0	%0:0	%0.0	%0.0	%0'0	%0:0	%0:0	%0:0	%0:0	%0.0	0.0%	%0.0	%0:0	%0:0	%0:0	%0.0	%0.0
12 Forecast Failure Rate (%) for Existing Generation	%0:0		0.1%	0.7%	0.0% 0.1% 0.7% 0.5%	0.4%	0.4%	0.3%	0.2%	0.1%	%0:0	0.1%	0.1%	0.1% 0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	%1.0	0.1%	0.1%

Current Expected Need Scenario (Compliance Period)

	2011 2012 2013	2014 2015 2016	0100										
	2012	5017	2017 2018 2019 2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026 2	2027	2028	2029	2030
13 Compliance Period Requirement	20.0%	23.3%	30.0%	33%	33%	33%	33%	33%	33% 3	33%	33% 3	33% 3	33%
14 Voluntary Margin of Over-Procurement (GWh)**	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
15 Aggregate Volumes (GWh)	46,511	928'69	96,874	22,820	20,485	20,151	19,887 19	9,763 19	19,763 19,158 18,823 18,713	1823	_	18,104 18	18,037
16 RPS Position (%)			30.5%	28.2%	25.1%	24.5%	23.9% 2:	3.6% 2	2.6% 22	2.0% 2	1.6% 20	.7% 20	.4%
17 Gross Surplus/(Deficit) (GWh)			1,411	(3'86)	(9,480)	(7,043)	7,567) (7	(8) (776)	,827) (9,	(423)	(10)	113) (11	(640
18 Non-Bankable Volumes (GWh)			68	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
19 Volumes (Banked) or Withdrawn from Bank (GWh)			(1,323)	3,896	6,480	7,043	712	0	0	0	0	0	
20 Net Surplus/(Deficit) (GWh)			68	0	0	0	(288'9)	(8) (776)	,827) (9,	(423)	(10)	(113)	(6/0
21 Net RPS Positions (%)			30.0%	33.0%	33.0%	33.0%	24.8% 2:	23.6% 2	2.6% 22	2.0% 2	21.6% 20	20.7% 20	20.4%
22 Cumulative Banked Volumes (GWh)		16,808	18,131	14,235	7,755	712	0	0	0	0	0	0	
23 Forecast Failure Rate (%) for New Projects not yet online	%0	%0	%0	%0'0	%0'0	%0.0	0.0%	%0:0	0 %0.0	%0.0	0.0%	0.0%	%0.0
24 Forecast Failure Rate (%) for Existing Generation	0.0%	0.5%	0.3%	%0:0	%1.0	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1% 0	0.1%	0.1% 0.	0.1%	0.1%

25 Total RPS Risk Adjusted Net Short (2011-2030) (GWh)

*Assumed amusi targets are: 2011-2013 (20% ammusly), 2014 (21.7%, 2015 (23.9%), 2016 (23.9%), 2017 (27%), 2018 (29%), 2017 (27%), 3018 (29%), 3019 (31%), 3nd 2020 (33%). These targets are illustrative only and not enforceable.

** PG&E considers an adequate bank of surplis RPS procurement to be a voluntary margin of procurement. However, in accordance with Decision 13-11-024, PG&E will not seek in its 2013 RPS Solicitation to procure Portfolio Content Category 2 and 3 RPS products to build and maintain an adequate bank.

G. Confidentiality

Explain if confidential treatment of specific material is requested. Describe the information and reason(s) for confidential treatment consistent with the showing required by D.06-06-066, as modified by D.08-04-023.

In support of this Advice Letter, PG&E has provided the confidential information listed below. This information includes the PPA and other information that more specifically describes the rights and obligations of the parties. This information is being submitted in the manner directed by D.08-04-023 and the August 22, 2006, Administrative Law Judge's Ruling Clarifying Interim Procedures for Complying with D.06-06-066 to demonstrate the confidentiality of the material and to invoke the protection of confidential utility information provided under either the terms of the IOU Matrix, Appendix 1 of D.06-06-066 and Appendix C of D.08-04-023, or General Order 66-C. A separate Declaration Seeking Confidential Treatment is being filed concurrently with this Advice Letter.

Confidential Attachments:

Appendix A – Consistency with Commission Decisions and Rules and Project Development Status

Appendix B – 2012 Solicitation Overview

Appendix C1 – Independent Evaluator Report (Confidential)

Appendix D – Contract Summary

Appendix E – Comparison of the PPA to PG&E's 2012 Pro Forma Power Purchase Agreement

Appendix F – 83WI 8ME Power Purchase Agreement

Appendix G - Project's Contribution Toward RPS Goals

Public Attachment

Appendix C2 – Independent Evaluator Report (Public)

II. Consistency with Commission Decisions

A. RPS Procurement Plan

1. Identify the Commission decision that approved the utility's RPS Procurement Plan. Did the utility adhere to Commission guidelines for filing and revisions?

Conditional approval of PG&E's 2012 Renewable Procurement Plan ("2012 RPS Plan") was issued on November 14, 2012 within D.12-11-016. Consistent with the decision,

PG&E submitted a final version of its 2012 RPS Plan on November 29, 2012. In this plan, PG&E stated that it seeks to procure about 1,000 GWh in its 2012 RPS Solicitation, with a preference for long-term contracts that qualify as a Portfolio Content Category One product with initial deliveries starting in 2019-2020.

2. Describe the Procurement Plan's assessment of portfolio needs.

The goal of PG&E's 2012 RPS Plan is to procure approximately 1,000 GWh per year of RPS-eligible deliveries offering high portfolio value through new long-term contracts. In addition, based on deliveries from current projects, PG&E does not expect the need for deliveries from new projects until 2020 and beyond.

3. Discuss how the Project is consistent with the utility's Procurement Plan and meets utility procurement and portfolio needs (e.g. capacity, electrical energy, resource adequacy, or any other product resulting from the project).

The proposed PPA is consistent with PG&E's goal to procure 1,000 GWh per year in the 2012 RPS Solicitation. In addition, the Project's 2020 Initial Energy Delivery Date will satisfy PG&E's renewable energy portfolio needs which are projected for 2020 and beyond. Furthermore, because the PPA is long-term, and deliveries from the Project are expected to satisfy the criteria of Portfolio Content Category One, any deliveries in excess of PG&E's portfolio need will be bankable and available for use to satisfy future compliance period needs.

4. Describe the preferred project characteristics set forth in the solicitation, including the required deliverability characteristics, online dates, locational preferences, etc. and how the Project meets those requirements.

The PPA conforms to PG&E's Commission approved 2012 RPS Plan by delivering an average of 119 GWh per year to fill a portion of PG&E's RPS net short position. The transaction complies with the RPS program requirements, meets the portfolio needs outlined by the 2012 RPS Plan and meets the majority of the project characteristics set forth in the solicitation. Finally, the PPA is competitive when compared to the other bids submitted in PG&E's 2012 RPS Solicitation and final shortlisted offers.

5. Sales

- a) For Sales contracts, provide a quantitative analysis that evaluates selling the proposed contracted amount vs. banking the RECs towards future RPS compliance requirements (or any reasonable other options).
- b) Explain the process used to determine price reasonableness, with maximum benefit to ratepayers.

This section is not applicable because the agreement is for the purchase, not sale, of energy.

6. Portfolio Optimization Strategy

- a) Describe how the proposed procurement (or sale) optimizes IOU's RPS portfolio (or entire energy portfolio). Specifically, a response should include:
 - i. Identification of IOU's portfolio optimization strategy objectives that the proposed procurement (or sale) are consistent with.
 - ii. Identification of metrics within portfolio optimization methodology or model (e.g. PPA costs, energy value, capacity value, interest costs, carrying costs, transaction costs, etc.) that are increased/decreased as a result of the proposed transaction.
- iii. Identification of risks (e.g. non-compliance with RPS requirements, regulatory risk, over-procurement of non-bankable RPS-eligible products, safety, etc.) and constraints included in optimization strategy that may be decreased or increased due to proposed procurement (or sale).

The PPA is consistent with PG&E's objectives of achieving and maintaining RPS compliance and minimizing customer costs over time. The PPA helps to meet the objective of filling the net short RPS compliance position through the steady and moderate procurement of cost effective RPS-eligible products through long-term contracts with start dates towards the latter part of the current decade. In order to minimize the total cost impact of the RPS program to customers, Net Market Value ("NMV") and Portfolio Adjusted Value ("PAV") calculations were used to evaluate the transaction's cost for PG&E's customers relative to the forecast market benefits provided by each offer. This transaction reduces the risk of non-compliance with RPS requirements by reducing the net short RPS compliance position beginning in 2020, consistent with PG&E's portfolio needs.

Although the project is not scheduled to deliver to PG&E until 2020, the project is expected to reach commercial operation before the end of 2016 in order to leverage the Investment Tax Credit ("ITC"), which reduces the risk of the Project not being viable and further helps to minimize customer costs.

b) Description of how proposed procurement (or sale) is consistent with IOUs overall planned activities and range of transactions planned to optimize portfolio.

As stated in the 2012 RPS Plan, PG&E plans to fill the net short RPS compliance position through the steady and moderate procurement of cost effective RPS-eligible products through long-term contracts with start dates towards the latter part of the current decade. This PPA, with an initial delivery date of 2020, is consistent with this approach.

- B. Bilateral contracting if applicable
 - 1. Discuss compliance with D.06-10-019 and D.09-06-050.
 - 2. Specify the procurement and/or portfolio needs necessitating the utility to procure bilaterally as opposed to a solicitation.
 - 3. Describe why the Project did not participate in the solicitation and why the benefits of the Project cannot be procured through a subsequent solicitation.

This section is not applicable because the PPA resulted from PG&E's 2012 RPS Solicitation and not from bilateral negotiations.

C. Least-Cost, Best-Fit (LCBF) Methodology and Evaluation

1. Briefly describe IOU's LCBF Methodology and how the Project compared relative to other offers available to the IOU at the time of evaluation.

PG&E filed its 2012 RPS Shortlist Report on June 7, 2013 in Advice Letter 4238-E, a Supplement to the 2012 RPS Shortlist Report on July 10, 2013 in Advice Letter 4238-E-A, and a second Supplement to the 2012 RPS Shortlist Report on July 15, 2013 in Advice Letter 4238-E-B.

The RPS statute requires PG&E to procure the "least-cost best-fit" ("LCBF") eligible renewable resources.⁴ The LCBF decision directs the utilities to use certain criteria in their bid ranking⁵ and offers guidance regarding the process by which the utility ranks bids in order to select or "shortlist" the bids with which it will commence negotiations. PG&E's approved process for identifying the LCBF renewable resources focuses on four primary areas:

- a. Market Valuation;
- b. Portfolio Fit;
- c. Project Viability; and
- d. RPS Goals.

PG&E examined the reasonableness of the PPA using the LCBF evaluation criteria from the 2012 RPS Solicitation. The general finding is that the PPA ranked favorably compared to the other projects received in PG&E's 2012 RPS Solicitation. A more detailed discussion of PG&E's evaluation of the PPA is provided in Confidential Appendix A.

a. Market Valuation

In a "mark-to-market analysis," the present value of the bidder's payment stream is compared with the present value of the product's market value to determine the benefit

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⁴ Pub. Util. Code § 399.14(a)(2)(B).

⁵ D.04-07-029.

(positive or negative) from the procurement of the resource, irrespective of PG&E's portfolio. This analysis is based on an evaluation of the contract price in the PPA.

The transmission adder adjusts offer prices to include the cost, if any, of bringing the power from the generating facility to PG&E's network. Each bid is associated with a transmission cluster based upon the location of the facility. The costs in the CAISO interconnection study are used for bid evaluation.

PG&E's analysis of the market value and transmission adder is confidential and addressed in Confidential Appendix A.

b. Portfolio Fit

Portfolio fit considers how well an offer's features match PG&E's portfolio needs. PG&E evaluated the offer's consistency with portfolio fit as described in the 2012 RPS Plan and Protocol and filed its initial 2012 RPS Shortlist Report on June 7, 2013.

The PAV intends to more accurately reflect the value of renewable resources to PG&E customers. Specifically, the PAV methodology starts with net market value results, which reflect the value of a transaction relative to market forward curves, as an initial quantitative valuation. Additional quantitative adjustments are then made for aspects of market valuation, transmission adder, and portfolio fit described herein and for other factors that impact the value of a transaction with respect to PG&E's portfolio. Using PG&E's PAV methodology for the 2012 RPS Solicitation, the offer compared favorably to the other 2012 RPS shortlisted offers. Additional information about the PAV methodology is provided in Confidential Appendix A and Advice Letter 4238-E-B.

c. Project Viability

Project viability is based on three categories: 1) Company / Development Team, 2) Technology, and 3) Development Milestones. It is assessed by the CPUC developed Project Viability Calculator ("PVC"). The PVC is a tool for IOUs to evaluate the viability of a renewable energy project, relative to all other projects that bid into the California utilities' RPS solicitations. The PVC uses standardized categories and criteria to quantify a project's strengths and weaknesses in key areas of renewable project development.

PG&E's analysis of Project Viability and PVC score are confidential and can be found in Confidential Appendix A.

d. RPS Goals

PG&E assesses this offer's consistency with and contribution to California's goals for the RPS program and this offer's support of PG&E's supplier diversity goals (collectively "RPS Goals"). The RPS Goals assessment considers non-quantitative factors, legislative findings, and declarations that increase California's reliance on renewable energy, consistency with the CPUC's Water Action Plan, Executive Order S-06-06 which established a goal the state would meet twenty percent of its renewable energy needs with electricity produced from biomass, and supplier diversity.

2. Indicate when the IOU's Shortlist Report was approved by Energy Division.

The 2012 Shortlist Report was approved by Resolution E-4631 on December 19, 2013.

- D. Compliance with Standard Terms and Conditions (STCs)
 - 1. Does the proposed contract comply with D.08-04-009, D.08-08-028, and D.10-03-021, as modified by D.11-01-025?

The Commission set forth standard terms and conditions to be incorporated into contracts for the purchase of electricity from eligible renewable energy resources in D.04-06-014 and D.07-02-011, as modified by D.07-05-057 and D.07-11-025. These terms and conditions were compiled and published in D.08-04-009. Additionally, the non-modifiable term related to Green Attributes was finalized in D.08-08-028 and the non-modifiable terms related to RECs were finalized in D.10-03-021, as modified by D.11-01-025. The non-modifiable standard terms and conditions in the PPA conform exactly to the "non-modifiable" terms set forth in Attachment A of D.08-04-009, as modified be D.08-08-028 and by Appendix C of D.10-03-021, as modified by D.11-01-025.

2. Using the tabular format, provide the specific page and section number where the RPS non-modifiable STCs are located in the contract.

The locations of non-modifiable terms in the PPA are indicated in the table below:

Non-Modifiable Term	Contract Section Number	Contract Page Number
STC 1: CPUC Approval	1.45	5
STC 2: Green Attributes and RECs		
Definition of Green Attributes	1.119	12 - 13
Conveyance of Green Attributes	3.2	32
STC 6: Eligibility	10.2(b)	58
STC 17: Applicable Law	10.12	65
STC REC 1: Transfer of RECs	10.2(b)	58
STC REC 2: WREGIS Tracking of RECs	3.1(k)(viii)	29

3. Provide a redline of the contract against the utility's Commission-approved pro forma RPS contract as Confidential Appendix E to the filed advice letter. Highlight modifiable terms in one color and non-modifiable terms in another.

A redline comparison of the PPA with PG&E's 2012 Pro Forma PPA is provided in Confidential Appendix E.

E. Portfolio Content Category Claim and Upfront Showing (D.11-12-052, Ordering Paragraph 9)

1. Describe the contract's claimed portfolio content category.

As described in Section I.E.1 and in further detail below, the PPA satisfies the upfront showing required for Portfolio Content Category One.

2. Explain how the procurement pursuant to the contract is consistent with the criteria of the claimed portfolio content category as adopted in D.11-12-052.

SB 2 1X, which is codified at Public Utilities Code Sections 399.11, and following, established three portfolio content categories that apply to RPS-eligible generation associated with RPS procurement contracts signed after June 1, 2010. D.11-12-052 requires that IOUs make an upfront showing related to the categorization of each proposed RPS procurement transaction. Specifically, for approval of contracts meeting the criteria of Portfolio Content Category One, an IOU may show the RPS-eligible generator has its first point of interconnection with the WECC transmission system within the boundaries of a California balancing authority area.

The Project meets the upfront showing required for Portfolio Content Category One because it is an in-state RPS-eligible renewable resource that expects to have its first point of interconnection with the WECC transmission system within IID, a California balancing authority. Therefore, the RPS-eligible procurement from the Project satisfies the criteria for Portfolio Content Category One adopted in D.11-12-052.

3. Describe the risks that the procurement will not be classified in the claimed portfolio content category.

There is no known risk that the electric power would not be categorized as Portfolio Content Category One.

- 4. Describe the value of the contract to ratepayers if:
 - 1. Contract is classified as claimed
 - 2. Contract is not classified as claimed

The value of the PPA, as described and assessed in this Advice Letter, is based on the assumption that the procurement meets the criteria of Portfolio Content Category One. If the PPA is not classified as Portfolio Content Category One, its value to PG&E and its customers could, under certain limited scenarios, be lower. For example, if PG&E (i) exceeds the applicable portfolio balance requirements set forth in Public Utilities Code Section 399.16(c)(2); and (ii) has excess procurement in that compliance period, D.12-06-038 would require any RECs from the Project exceeding the portfolio balance requirements to be deducted from the surplus.

5. Use the table below to report how the procurement pursuant to the contract, if classified as claimed, will affect the IOU's portfolio balance requirements, established in D.11-12-052.

Per PG&E's 2012 Preliminary Annual 33 percent RPS Compliance Report, amended and filed on November 15, 2013, PG&E's current Portfolio Balance Requirements are listed in the table below.

Forecast of Portfolio Balance Requirements	Compliance Period 2 (2014- 2016)	Compliance Period 3 (2017- 2020)
PCC 1 Balance Requirement		
$CP \ 2 = 65\%$ of RECs applied to proc	urement quantity requirer	nent
CP 3 = 75% of RECs applied to proc	urement quantity requirer	nent
Quantity of PCC 1 RECs		
(under contract, not including proposed contract)	13,598 GWh	26,374 GWh
Quantity of PCC 1 RECs from proposed contract		
	0	73 GWh
Quantity of PCC 2 RECs		
	0	0
Quantity of PCC 2 RECs		
(under contract, not including proposed contract)	0	0
Quantity of PCC 2 RECs from proposed contract		
	0	0
PCC 3 Balance Limitation	<u>.</u>	<u>.</u>
CP 2 = 15% of RECs applied to proc	urement quantity requirer	nent
CP 3 = 10% of RECs applied to proc	urement quantity requirer	nent
Quantity of PCC 3 RECs		
(under contract, not including proposed contract)	0^6	0^7
Quantity of PCC 3 RECs from proposed contract		
	0	0

 $^{^6}$ PG&E has 34.5 GWh under contract pursuant to three PCC3 REC purchase agreements that are not yet effective because they are pending CPUC approval.

⁷ PG&E has 46 GWh under contract pursuant to three PCC3 REC purchase agreements that are not yet effective because they are pending CPUC approval.

F. Long-Term Contracting Requirement

D.12-06-038 established a long-term contracting requirement that must be met in order for an IOU to count RPS procurement from contracts less than 10 years in length ("short-term contracts") toward RPS compliance.

- 1. Explain whether or not the proposed contract triggers the long-term contracting requirement.
- 2. If the long-term contracting requirement applies, provide a detailed calculation that shows the extent to which the utility has satisfied the long-term contracting requirement. If the requirement has not yet been satisfied for the current compliance period, explain how the utility expects to satisfy the quantity by the end of the compliance period to count the proposed contract for compliance.

In D.12-06-038, the Commission adopted a threshold standard pursuant to SB 2 1X that requires load serving entities to sign long-term contracts in each compliance period equal to at least 0.25 percent of their expected retail sales over that same compliance period. The proposed PPA is a long-term twenty-year contract that does not trigger the minimum quantity requirement set forth in D.12-06-038.

- G. Tier 2 Short-term Contract "Fast Track" Process if applicable
 - 1. Is the facility in commercial operation? If not in commercial operation, explain the IOU's basis for its determination that commercial operation will be achieved within the required six months.
 - 2. Describe and explain any contract modifications to the Commission-approved short-term pro forma contract.

PG&E is not submitting the PPA under the "Fast Track" process.

H. Interim Emissions Performance Standard

In D.07-01-039, the Commission adopted a greenhouse gas Emissions Performance Standard (EPS) which is applicable to electricity contract for baseload generation, as defined, having a delivery term of five years or more.

1. Explain whether or not the contract is subject to the EPS.

A greenhouse gas Emissions Performance Standard ("EPS") was established by SB 1368, which requires that the Commission consider emissions costs associated with new long-term (five years or greater) power contracts procured on behalf of California ratepayers.

To implement SB 1368, in D.07-01-039, the Commission adopted an EPS that applies to contracts for a term of five or more years for baseload generation with an annualized plant capacity factor of at least 60 percent. The PPA is not a covered procurement subject to the EPS because the generating facility has a forecast annualized capacity

factor of less than sixty percent and therefore is not baseload generation under paragraphs 1(a)(ii) and 3(2)(a) of the Adopted Interim EPS Rules.

Notification of compliance with D.07-01-039 is provided through this Advice Letter, which has been served on the service list in the RPS rulemaking, R.11-05-005

2. If the contract is subject to the EPS, discuss how the contract is in compliance with D.07-01-039.

See Section II.H.1 above.

3. If the contract is not subject to EPS, but delivery will be firmed/shaped with specified baseload generation for a term of five or more years, explain how the energy used to firm/shape meets EPS requirements.

Not applicable.

4. If the contract term is five or more years and will be firmed/shaped with unspecified power, provide a showing that the utility will ensure that the amount of substitute energy purchases from unspecified resources is limited such that total purchases under the contract (renewable and non-renewable) will not exceed the total expected output from the renewable energy source over the term of the contract.

Not applicable.

- 5. If substitute system energy from unspecified sources will be used, provide a showing that:
 - a. the unspecified energy is only to be used on a short-term basis; and
 - b. the unspecified energy is only used for operational or efficiency reasons; and
 - c. the unspecified energy is only used when the renewable energy source is unavailable due to a forced outage, scheduled maintenance, or other temporary unavailability for operational or efficiency reasons; or
 - d. the unspecified energy is only used to meet operating conditions required under the contract, such as provisions for number of start-ups, ramp rates, minimum number of operating hours.

Not applicable.

- I. Procurement Review Group (PRG) Participation
 - 1. List PRG participants (by organization/company).

The Procurement Review Group ("PRG") for PG&E includes the Commission's Energy Division and Office of Ratepayer Advocates, Department of Water Resources, Union of

Concerned Scientists, The Utility Reform Network, the California Utility Employees, and Jan Reid, as a PG&E ratepayer.

2. Describe the utility's consultation with the PRG, including when information about the contract was provided to the PRG, whether the information was provided in meetings or other correspondence, and the steps of the procurement process where the PRG was consulted.

The PPA was presented to the PRG as part of PG&E's proposed shortlist on March 27, 2013. The transaction was subsequently presented to the PRG as a potential contract for execution on November 12, 2013. Additional information is provided in Confidential Appendix A.

3. For short-term contracts, if the PRG was not able to be informed prior to filing, explain why the PRG could not be informed.

Not applicable

J. Independent Evaluator (IE)

The use of an IE is required by D.04-12-048, D.06-05-039, 07-12-052, and D.09-06-050.

1. Provide name of IE.

The Independent Evaluator ("IE") is Lewis Hashimoto from Arroyo Seco Consulting.

2. Describe the oversight provided by the IE.

The IE reviewed and assessed PG&E's RPS evaluation and selection process, and observed the negotiations of the PPA to ensure that they were conducted fairly.

3. List when the IE made any findings to the Procurement Review Group regarding the applicable solicitation, the project/bid, and/or contract negotiations.

The IE provided insights and findings to the PRG during the PRG meetings noted in Section II.I.2 above.

4. Insert the public version of the project-specific IE Report.

The public version of the IE report is attached to this Advice Letter as Appendix C2.

III.Project Development Status

- A. Company / Development Team
 - 1. Describe the Project development team and/or company principals and describe how many years of experience they have had on the development side of the electric industry.

8minutenergy's and Gestamp's combined leadership teams have strong solar and energy project experience. 8minutenergy is the largest solar developer in the Imperial Valley and states that it has a pipeline of over 900 MW of solar projects. Gestamp Solar is an established developer of large-scale solar power plants with experience that spans

development, Engineering Procurement and Construction ("EPC"), and operations and maintenance. Gestamp has financed and constructed more than 500 MW of operating solar PV projects worldwide.

2. List any successful projects (renewable and conventional) the Project development team and/or company principals have owned, constructed, and/or operated.

Sampling of 10+ MW Projects Developed by 8ME/Gestamp

	Devel	oped and In O	peration	i de la companya de	
Project Name	Location	Country	MW	Technology	
Osa de la Vega	Toledo	Spain	30	Solar PV-Fixed Structure	
Fuente Alamo	Murcia	Spain	34	Solar PV-Fixed Structure	
Calaparra	Murcia	Spain	20	Solar PV-Fixed Structure	
Carpio del Tajo	Toledo	Spain	15	Solar PV-Fixed Structure	
La Robla	Leon	Spain	10	Solar PV-Two-Axis-Tracker	
Zarapicos	Salamanca	Spain	11.5	Solar PV-Fixed Structure	
El Coronil	Sevilla	Spain	11.5	Solar PV-Two-Axis-Tracker	
Benahadux	Almeria	Spain	10.6	Solar PV-Fixed Structure	
Puglia	Puglia	Italy	10	Solar PV-Fixed Structure	
Tacna	Tacana	Peru	40	Solar PV-One-Axis Structure	
Panamericana	Panamaricana	Peru	40	Solar PV-One-Axis Structure	
Mulilo de AAR	Northern Cape	South Africa	10	Solar PV-Fixed Structure	
Mulilo Prieska	Northern Cape	South Africa	20	Solar PV-Fixed Structure	

	Pro	jects Under Cor	struction	
Project Name	Location	Technology	Generating Capacity	COD
Mount Signal	Imperial	PV	200 MW-ac by Q2'14	2013/2014
Solar Farm I	County,		Currently: 150MW	
	CA			

B. Technology

- 1. Technology Type and Level of Technology Maturity
 - a. Discuss the type and stage of the Project's proposed technology (e.g. concept state, testing stage, commercially operating, utility-scale operation, ample history of operation).

The Project will use either crystalline silicon or thin-film PV panels, mounted on single-axis trackers. Crystalline silicon and thin-film PV are mature, proven, widely installed

and regularly financed solar generation technology solutions. The Project will use modules, inverters, and trackers that are all field-proven and deemed bankable by third-party financiers. Several utility scale projects using similar technology are in operation worldwide.

b. If the technology has not been commercially demonstrated, identify whether the developer has or plans to have a demonstration project. Describe the project (MW, hours run), its results (e.g., temperature, GWh, or other appropriate metric) and its ability to perform on a commercial scale.

The technology has been commercially demonstrated therefore this section is not applicable.

c. If hybrid technology will be deployed, describe the configuration and potential issues and/or benefits created by the hybrid technology.

The technology proposed is not a hybrid technology therefore this section is not applicable.

- 2. Quality of Renewable Resource
 - a. Explain the quality of the renewable resource that the Project will rely upon. Provide supporting documentation, such as project-specific resource studies, reports from RETI or the National Renewable Energy Lab (NREL) that supports resource quality claims and ability for the facility to provide expected generation.

The solar resource in the area of the Project is generally considered good for solar energy generation. According to 8ME/Gestamp, energy production for the proposed project was determined with state of the art simulation software. Production simulation is based on NREL, NASA and / or Meteonorm TMY solar insolation data. These data provide temperature and irradiation values on an hourly basis for a typical meteorological year (averaged over periods of up to thirty years).

- b. For biomass projects, please provide a fuel resource analysis and the developer's fuel supply plan. Identify:
 - i. From whom/where the fuel is being secured;
 - ii. Where the fuel is being stored

Not applicable.

c. Explain whether the IOU believes that the Project will be able meet the terms of the contract given its independent understanding of the quality of the renewable resource. If necessary, reference successful nearby projects, completed studies, and/or other information.

PG&E has no reason to doubt that the Project will be able to meet the terms of the contract based on 8ME and Gestamp's combined experience and characterization of the solar data and modeling used to calculate expected generation.

3. Other Resources Required

a. Identify any other fuel supply (other than the renewable fuel supply discussed above) necessary to the Project and the anticipated source of that supply;

There is no other fuel supply necessary.

b. Explain whether the developer has secured the necessary rights for water, fuel(s), and any other required inputs to run the Project.

The Project has onsite water availability via existing IID canals that service the site. Solar PV technology does not require water for the electricity generation process or for cooling. Rather, water is used only for panel washings. No other significant operational inputs are required.

c. Provide the estimated annual water consumption of the facility (gallons of water/year).

Water demand for panel washing is expected to use less than five acre-feet total per year, which is less than one percent of water used for farming operations.

d. Explain whether the IOU believes that the Project will be able meet the terms of the contract given its independent understanding of the adequacy of the additional fuel or any other necessary resource supply. If necessary, reference successful nearby projects, completed studies, and/or other information.

PG&E expects the Project to meet the terms of the PPA given the adequacy of the solar resource.

C. Development Milestones

1. Site Control

Explain the status of Project site control, including:

- a. Site control type (e.g. ownership, lease, BLM Right-of-Way grant, etc.)
 - i. If lease, describe duration of site control and any exercisable extension options
 - ii. Level or percent of site control attained if less than 100%, discuss seller's plan for obtaining full site control

The Project has 100 percent site control for the generation facility and the gen-tie. See Confidential Appendix A for additional information.

2. Equipment Procurement

Explain the status of equipment procurement for the Project, including:

a. The status of the procurement of major equipment (e.g. equipment in-hand, contracts executed and equipment in delivery, negotiating contracts with supplier(s), etc.). For equipment not yet procured, explain any contingencies and overall timing.

See Confidential Appendix A.

b. The developer's history of ability to procure equipment.

8ME/Gestamp's history of being able to procure equipment either directly or through EPC contractors is demonstrated by the projects they have online or in construction as shown in the table in Section III.A.2.

c. Any identified equipment procurement issues, such as lead time, and their effect on the Project's date of operability.

At this time, 8ME/Gestamp do not anticipate any equipment procurement issues that would negatively affect the anticipated commercial operation date of the Project.

3. Permitting / Certifications Status

a. Describe the status of the Project's RPS-eligibility certification from the CEC. Explain if there is any uncertainty regarding the Project's eligibility.

The Project has been Pre-Certified by the CEC and assigned certification number 61295C.

b. Use the following table to describe the status of all major permits or authorizations necessary for development and operation of the Project, including, without limitation, CEC authorizations, air permits, certificates of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) or permits to construct (PTC) for transmission, distribution, or substation construction/ expansion, land use permits, building permits, water use or discharge authorizations, Federal Aviation Administration authorizations, military authorizations, and Federal Communication Commission authorizations. If necessary, table may be split between public and confidential sections – permits requests with public agencies should be included in the public portion.

8ME/Gestamp state that all required permits and discretionary approvals have been received for both the Project and all interconnection related upgrades. The Project was unanimously approved by the Imperial County Board of Supervisors and received its

Conditional Use Permit on August 21, 2012. The project's Environmental Impact Report was certified on the same day.

Name of Permit or Lease required	Grantor	Description of Permit or Lease	Current Status (to be filed, pending approval, approved)	Projected timeframe for approval
Conditional Use Permit	Imperial County	Land use permit allowing construction and operation of solar PV facility	Approved August 21, 2012	N/A

- 4. Production Tax Credit (PTC) / Investment Tax Credit (ITC) / Other government funding—if applicable
 - a. Explain the Project's potential eligibility for tax credits or other government funding based on the technology of the Project and contract operation date.

The Project is eligible for the ITC. Under current U.S. tax law, the Project is required to reach commercial operation before the end of 2016 in order to avail the ITC.

b. If the developer is pursuing PTCs/ITCs/Other, explain the criteria that must be met and the developer's plans for obtaining the PTCs/ITCs/Other.

The main criterion to avail the ITC under current U.S. tax law is for the Project to reach commercial operation prior to December 31, 2016. Once the Project is in service, it will submit a tax return to the Internal Revenue Service, which will include a description of the Project costs eligible for the ITC. The ITC is thirty percent of the eligible Project costs.

c. Explain whether the utility or the seller bears the risk if the anticipated tax credits/funding are not obtained.

The Seller bears the risk if the ITC is not obtained.

5. Transmission

a. Discuss the status of the Project's interconnection application, whether the Project is in the CAISO or any other interconnection queue, and which transmission studies are complete and/or in progress.

Details are described in Confidential Appendices A and D.

b. Discuss the status of the Interconnection Agreement with the interconnecting utility (e.g., draft issued, executed and at FERC, fully approved).

Details are described in Confidential Appendix A.

c. Describe the required network and gen-tie upgrades and the capacity to be available to the Project upon completion, including any proposed curtailment schemes.

Details are described in Confidential Appendix A.

d. Describe any required substation upgrades or construction.

Details are described in Confidential Appendix A.

e. Discuss the timing and process for all transmissionrelated upgrades. Identify critical path items and potential contingencies in the event of delays.

Details are described in Confidential Appendix A.

f. Explain any issues relating to other generating facility projects in the transmission queue as they may affect the Project.

Details are described in Confidential Appendix A.

g. If the Project is dependent on transmission that is likely to be congested at times, leading to a product that is less than 100% deliverable for at least several years, explain how the utility factored the congestion into the LCBF bid analysis.

Expectations regarding congestion are factored into the quantitative analysis through the use of Locational Marginal Price ("LMP") multipliers.

h. Describe any alternative transmission arrangements available and/or considered to facilitate delivery of the Project's output.

Not Applicable.

D. Financing Plan

1. Explain developer's manner of financing (e.g. project financing, balance sheet financing, utility tax equity investment, etc.).

Details are described in Confidential Appendix A.

2. Describe the developer's general project financing status.

Details are described in Confidential Appendix A.

3. To what extent (%) has the developer received firm commitments from financers (both debt and equity), and how much financing is expected to be needed to bring the Project online?

Details are described in Confidential Appendix A.

4. List any government funding or awards received by the Project.

The Project has not received any government funding or awards. The Project expects to qualify for the federal energy ITC program by coming online prior to December 31, 2016.

5. Explain the creditworthiness of all relevant financiers.

Gestamp works with global project finance institutions in non-recourse project finance lending. These institutions are active in the market and have investment grade credit ratings.

6. Describe developer's history of ability to procure financing.

The following table details selected project financings that demonstrate Gestamp's history in procuring financing. Additional details can be found in Confidential Appendix A.

Date	Project	Size
2011	Renault PV Carport	55MW
2013	Tacna & Panamericana, Peru	40MW
2010-2012	Various US PV Projects	11MW
2012	Prieska and DE AAR	30MW
2008-2010	Calasparra, Spain	22MW
2008-2009	Fuente Alamo, Spain	36M
2008-2009	Benahadux, Spain	12M

7. Describe any plans for obtaining subsidies, grants, or any other third party monetary awards (other than Production Tax

Credits and Investment Tax Credits) and discuss how the lack of any of this funding will affect the Project.

The Project does not contemplate the use of any subsidies, grants or other third party monetary awards other than the ITC.

IV. Contingencies and/or Milestones

Describe major performance criteria and guaranteed milestones, including those outside the control of the parties, including transmission upgrades, financing, and permitting issues.

The PPA includes certain performance criteria and milestones that PG&E includes in its form RPS PPA contracts. These and other contingencies and milestones are addressed in Confidential Appendices A and D. The terms of the PPA are conditioned on the occurrence of CPUC Approval, as it is defined in the PPA.

V. Safety Considerations

1. What terms in the PPA address the safe operation, construction and maintenance of the Project? Are there any other conditions, including but not limited to conditions of any permits or potential permits, that the IOU is aware of that ensure such safe operation, construction and decommissioning?

Local, state and federal agencies that have review and approval authority over the Project are charged with enforcing safety, environmental and other regulations for the Project, including decommissioning. Section 3.9(a) of the PPA requires Seller to "acquire all permits and other approvals necessary for the construction, operation and maintenance of the Project." Moreover, PG&E requires that the Project abide by contractual obligations in the PPA that require certain Standards of Care (Section 3.5) and Covenants (Section 10.3) to not violate applicable laws, rules and regulations. These provisions serve to: (1) clarify that the burden of safe operations resides with the seller, the entity with control over on-site decisions, and (2) protect PG&E customers against bearing the cost of imprudent or unsafe operations. They do not provide PG&E with rights to enforce or dictate safe operations of the Project as those rights reside with the governmental authorities with safety and permitting oversight over the Project.

2. What has the IOU done to ensure that the PPA and the Project's operation are: consistent with Public Utilities Code Section 451; do not interfere with the IOU's safe operation of its utility operations and facilities; and will not adversely affect the public health and safety?

The Project is owned, constructed and operated by a third party. As explained in Section V.1, the Seller is obligated to own and operate the Project in accordance with the laws, rules, and regulations and apply to it, a number of which are referenced in the PPA to clarify that the burden of safe operations, including operations that impact public safety, lies with the Seller. PG&E's safe operation of its utility operations and facilities is addressed in the interconnection process. While interconnection safety is not specified in the PPA, under the terms of the PPA, PG&E will declare that the Projects have

commenced deliveries under the PPA only after IID, as the transmission operator, has concluded its testing and given the Project permission to commence commercial operations.

3. If PPA or amendment is with an existing facility, please provide a matrix that identifies all safety violations found by any entity, whether government, industry-based or internal with an indication of the issue and if the resolution of that alleged violation is pending or resolved and what the progress or resolution was/is.

Not applicable. The PPA is for a new facility.

4. If PPA or amendment is with an existing facility, will the PPA or amendment lead to any changes in the structure or operations of the facility? Any change in the safety practices at the facility? If so, with what federal, state and local agencies did the developer confer or seek permits or permit amendments for these changes?

Not applicable. The PPA is for a new facility.

VI. REQUEST FOR COMMISSION APPROVAL

PG&E requests that the Commission issue a resolution no later than September 11, 2014, that:

- 1. Approves the PPA in its entirety, including payments to be made by PG&E pursuant to the PPA, subject to the Commission's review of PG&E's administration of the PPA.
- 2. Finds that any procurement pursuant to the PPA is procurement from eligible renewable energy resources for purposes of determining PG&E's compliance with any obligation that it may have to procure eligible renewable energy resources pursuant to the California RPS (Public Utilities Code Section 399.11 et seq.), D.03-06-071, D.06-10-050, D.11-12-020, D.11-12-052 or other applicable law.
- 3. Finds that all procurement and administrative costs, as provided by Public Utilities Code Section 399.13(g), associated with the PPA shall be recovered in rates.
- 4. Adopts the following finding of fact and conclusion of law in support of CPUC Approval:
 - a. The PPA is consistent with PG&E's 2012 RPS procurement plan.
 - b. The terms of the PPA, including the price of delivered energy, are reasonable.
- 5. Adopts the following finding of fact and conclusion of law in support of cost recovery for the PPA:
 - a. The utility's costs under the PPA shall be recovered through PG&E's Energy Resource Recovery Account.

b. Any stranded cost that may arise from the PPA is subject to the provisions of D.04-12-048 that authorize recovery of stranded renewables procurement costs over the life of the contract. The implementation of the D.04-12-048 stranded cost recovery mechanism is addressed in D.08-09-012.

- 6. Adopts the following findings with respect to resource compliance with the EPS adopted in R.06-04-009:
 - a. The PPA is not a form of covered procurement subject to the EPS, because the generating facility has an expected capacity factor of less than 60 percent and, therefore, is not baseload generation under Paragraphs 1(a)(ii) and 3(2)(a) of the adopted Interim EPS Rules.
- 7. Adopts a finding of fact and conclusion of law that deliveries from the PPA shall be categorized as procurement under the portfolio content category specified in Section 399.16(b)(1)(A), subject to the Commission's after-the-fact verification that all applicable criteria have been met.

Protests:

Anyone wishing to protest this filing may do so by letter sent via U.S. mail, facsimile or E-mail, no later than March 11, 2014, which is 20 days after the date of this filing. Protests must be submitted to:

CPUC Energy Division ED Tariff Unit 505 Van Ness Avenue, 4th Floor San Francisco, California 94102

Facsimile: (415) 703-2200

E-mail: EDTariffUnit@cpuc.ca.gov

Copies of protests also should be mailed to the attention of the Director, Energy Division, Room 4004, at the address shown above.

The protest shall also be sent to PG&E either via E-mail or U.S. mail (and by facsimile, if possible) at the address shown below on the same date it is mailed or delivered to the Commission:

Brian K. Cherry Vice President, Regulatory Relations Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street, Mail Code B10C P.O. Box 770000 San Francisco, California 94177

Facsimile: (415) 973-7226 E-mail: PGETariffs@pge.com Any person (including individuals, groups, or organizations) may protest or respond to an advice letter (General Order 96-B, Rule 7.4). The protest shall contain the following information: specification of the advice letter protested; grounds for the protest; supporting factual information or legal argument; name, telephone number, postal address, and (where appropriate) e-mail address of the protestant; and statement that the protest was sent to the utility no later than the day on which the protest was submitted to the reviewing Industry Division (General Order 96-B, Rule 3.11).

Effective Date:

PG&E requests that the Commission issue a resolution approving this Tier 3 advice filing by **September 11, 2014**.

Notice:

In accordance with General Order 96-B, Section IV, a copy of this Advice Letter excluding the confidential appendices is being sent electronically and via U.S. mail to parties shown on the attached list and the service lists for R.11-05-005, and R.12-03-014. Non-market participants who are members of PG&E's Procurement Review Group and have signed appropriate Non-Disclosure Certificates will also receive the Advice Letter and accompanying confidential attachments by overnight mail. Address changes to the General Order 96-B service list should be directed to PGETariffs@pge.com. For changes to any other service list, please contact the Commission's Process Office at (415) 703-2021 or at Process_Office@cpuc.ca.gov. Advice letter filings can also be accessed electronically at http://www.pge.com/tariffs.

Vice President – Regulatory Relations

Brian Cherry KHC

cc: Service List for R.11-05-005

Service List for R.12-03-014

Paul Douglas – Energy Division Jason Simon – Energy Division

Shannon O'Rourke – Energy Division

Joseph Abhulimen – ORA

Karin Hieta – ORA

Cynthia Walker - ORA

Limited Access to Confidential Material:

The portions of this Advice Letter marked Confidential Protected Material are submitted under the confidentiality protection of Sections 583 and 454.5(g) of the Public Utilities Code and General Order 66-C. This material is protected from public disclosure because

it consists of, among other items, the PPA itself, price information, and analysis of the proposed PPA, which are protected pursuant to D.06-06-066 and D.08-04-023. A separate Declaration Seeking Confidential Treatment regarding the confidential information is filed concurrently herewith.

CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

ADVICE LETTER FILING SUMMARY ENERGY UTILITY

MUST BE COMPLETED BY UTILITY (Attach additional pages as needed)							
Company name/CPUC Utility No. Pacific (Gas and Electric Comp	any (ID U39 E)					
Utility type:	Contact Person: Kings	ley Cheng					
☑ ELC □ GAS	Phone #: (415) 973-5265						
□ PLC □ HEAT □ WATER							
EXPLANATION OF UTILITY T	/PE	(Date Filed/ Received Stamp by CPUC)					
ELC = Electric GAS = Gas							
	WATER = Water						
Advice Letter (AL) #: 4363-E Subject of AL: Power Purchase Agreement for Procurement of an Eligible Renewable Energy Resource between 83WI 8ME, LLC and Pacific Gas and Electric Company							
Keywords (choose from CPUC listing): Agr	reements, Portfolio						
AL filing type: \square Monthly \square Quarterly \square Ann	nual 🗹 One-Time 🗆 Oth	er					
If AL filed in compliance with a Commission or	der, indicate relevant Dec	ision/Resolution #: <u>N/A</u>					
Does AL replace a withdrawn or rejected AL?	If so, identify the prior AL	: <u>No</u>					
Summarize differences between the AL and the prior withdrawn or rejected AL:							
matrix that identifies all of the confidential Confidential information will be made available	information. to those who have execut	ed a nondisclosure agreement: Yes No All members sure agreements will receive the confidential information.					
Name(s) and contact information of the person(s information: <u>Uday Mathur, (415) 973-2784</u>	s) who will provide the no	ndisclosure agreement and access to the confidential					
Resolution Required?							
Requested effective date: $\underline{\textbf{September 11, 2014}}$		No. of tariff sheets: $\underline{N/A}$					
Estimated system annual revenue effect (%): $\underline{N/}$	<u>A</u>						
Estimated system average rate effect (%): $\underline{N/A}$							
When rates are affected by AL, include attachm commercial, large C/I, agricultural, lighting).	ent in AL showing average	e rate effects on customer classes (residential, small					
Tariff schedules affected: N/A							
Service affected and changes proposed: N/A							
Pending advice letters that revise the same tariff sheets: $\underline{N/A}$							
Protests, dispositions, and all other corresponde otherwise authorized by the Commission, and sl		due no later than 20 days after the date of this filing, unless					
California Public Utilities Commission		c Gas and Electric Company					
Energy Division		Attn: Brian K. Cherry Vice President, Regulatory Relations					
EDTariffUnit 505 Van Ness Ave., 4 th Flr.		77 Beale Street, Mail Code B10C					
San Francisco, CA 94102		P.O. Box 770000					
E-mail: EDTariffUnit@cpuc.ca.gov		rancisco, CA 94177 il: PGETariffs@pge.com					

DECLARATION OF UDAY MATHUR SEEKING CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT FOR CERTAIN DATA AND INFORMATION CONTAINED IN ADVICE LETTER 4363-E (PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY - U 39 E)

I, Uday Mathur, declare:

- 1. I am presently employed by Pacific Gas and Electric Company ("PG&E"), and have been an employee at PG&E since 2007. I am a Principal within the Renewable Transactions Group of the Energy Procurement organization at PG&E. My responsibilities include negotiating PG&E's Renewables Portfolio Standard Program ("RPS") power purchase agreements with counterparties in the business of generating and selling electric energy. In carrying out these responsibilities, I have acquired knowledge of such sellers in general and, based on my experience in dealing with facility owners and operators, I am familiar with the types of data and information about their operations that such owners and operators consider confidential and proprietary. I am also familiar with the information that would affect the negotiating positions of these electricity sellers with respect to price and other terms.
- 2. Based on my knowledge and experience, and in accordance with Decision ("D") 08-04-023 and the August 22, 2006 "Administrative Law Judge's Ruling Clarifying Interim Procedures for Complying with Decision 06-06-066," I make this declaration seeking confidential treatment of Appendices A, B, C1, D, E, F, and G to PG&E's Advice Letter 4363-E, submitted on February 19, 2014.
- 3. Attached to this declaration is a matrix identifying the data and information for which PG&E is seeking confidential treatment. The matrix specifies that the material PG&E is seeking to protect constitutes the particular type of data and information listed in Appendix 1 of D.06-06-066 and Appendix C of D.08-04-023 (the "IOU Matrix"), or constitutes information

that should be protected under General Order 66-C. The matrix also specifies the category or categories in the IOU Matrix to which the data and information corresponds, if applicable, and why confidential protection is justified. Finally, the matrix specifies that: (1) PG&E is complying with the limitations specified in the IOU Matrix for that type of data or information, if applicable; (2) the information is not already public; and (3) the data cannot be aggregated, redacted, summarized or otherwise protected in a way that allows partial disclosure. By this reference, I am incorporating into this declaration all of the explanatory text in the attached matrix.

I declare under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the State of California, that to the best of my knowledge, the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on February 19, 2014, at San Francisco, California.

UDAY MATHUF

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY'S (U 39 E) Advice Letter 4363-E Rebruary 19, 2014

IDENTIFICATION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

Length of Time		For information covered under tem V C) and VI B) the front three years of the forecast remain confidential for three years.	For information covered under Item VII G) remain confidential for three vears after the commercial operation	date, or one year after expiration (whichever is sooner).	For information covered under Item VII (un-numbered category	rollowing vil C), remain confidential for three years.	For information covered under Item VIII A), remain confidential until after final contracts submitted to	CPUC for approval.	For information covered under Item VIII B), remain confidential for three	years area withing produces second. For information covered under General Order 66-C, remain confidential.
PG&E's Justification for Confidential Treatment		This Appendix contains information on PG&E's sales forecast and PG&E's renewable not open position. This information would provide market sensitive information to competitors and is therefore considered confidential.	This Appendix contains bid information and evaluations from the 2012 Solicitation, discuss, analyze and evaluate the Darios and the forms of the Darios of the Arms of the Darios of Arms of the Darios of the Control of the Darios of the Dari	("PPA"); contain information, analyses and evaluations of project viability; and contain confidential information of the	counterparty (including financial information). Disclosure of this information would provide valuable market sensitive information to competitors. Release of this information	would be damaging to PG&E's contract negotiations.	In addition, it information about and evaluations of the project's viability is made public, it could harm the counterparties and adversely affect project viability. Finally, cortain information has been obtained in confidence from	the counterparty under an expectation of confidentiality. It is in the public interest to treat such information as	confidential because if such information were made public, it would put the counterparty at a business disadvantage,	could create a disincentive to do business with FUACE and other regulated utilities, and could have a damaging effect on current and future negotiations with other counterparties.
5) The data cannot be aggregated, redacted, summarized, masked or otherwise protected in a way that allows partial disclosure (Y/N)		Ā								
4) That the information is not already public (Y/N)	!	Y								
3) That it is complying with the limitations on confidentiali ty specified in the Matrix for that type of data (Y/N)		Į.								
2) Which category or categories in the Matrix the data correspond to:	53-E	Item V C) LSE Total Bnergy Forecast – Bundled Customer (MWh)	Item VI B) Utility Bundled Net Open (Long or Short) Position for Energy (MWh)	Item VII G) Renewable Recourse Contracts under RPS	program – Contracts without SEPs.	Item VII (un-numbered category following VII G))	Score sheets, analyses, evaluations of proposed RPS projects.	Item VIII A) Bid information	and by opening quantitative analysis involved in scoring and evaluation of participating	bids. General Order 66-C.
1) The material submitted constitutes a particular type of data listed in the Matrix, appended as Appendix 1 to D.06-06-066 (Y/N)	vice Letter 43(¥								
Redaction	Document: Advice Letter 4363-E	Appendix A								

Length of Time	For information covered under Item VIII A), remain confidential until after final contracts submitted to CPUC for approval For information covered under Item VIII B), remain confidential for three years after winning bidders selected.
PG&E's Justification for Confidential Treatment	This Appendix contains bid information and bid cvaluations from the 2012 Solicitation. This information would provide market sensitive information to competitors and is therefore considered confidential. Furthermore, offers received outside of the solicitations are still under negotiation, further substantiating why releasing this information would be damaging to the negotiation process.
5) The data cannot be aggregated, redacted, summarized, masked or otherwise protected in a way that allows partial disclosure (YM)	X
4) That the information is not already public (Y/N)	>-
3) That it is complying with the limitations on confidentiali ty specified in the Matrix for that type of data (Y/N)	>
2) Which category or categories in the Matrix the data correspond to:	Item VIII A) Bid information and B) Specific quantitative analysis involved in scoring and evaluation of participating bids.
1) The material submitted constitutes a particular type of data listed in the Matrix, appended as Appendix 1 to D.06-06-066 (Y/N)	>
Redaction Reference	Appendix B

Length of Time	For information covered under Item VII G) remain confidential for three years after the commercial operation date, or one year after expiration (whichever is sooner). For information covered under Item VII (un-numbered category following VII G), remain confidential for three years. For information covered under Item VIII A), remain confidential until after final contracts submitted to CPUC for approval. For information covered under Item VIII B), remain confidential for three years after winning bidders selected. For information covered under General Order 66-C, remain confidential.
PG&E's Justification for Confidential Treatment	This Appendix contains bid information and evaluations from the 2012 Solicitation; discusses, analyzes and evaluates the Project and the terms of the PPA; contains information, analyses, and evaluations of project viability; and it contains confidential information of the counterparty. Disclosure of this information would provide valuable market sensitive information to competitors. Release of this information would be damaging to negotiations with other counterparties and should remain confidential. In addition, if information about and evaluations of project viability is made public, it could harm the counterparty and adversely affect project viability. Finally, certain information has been obtained in confidence from the counterparty under an expectation of confidentiality. It is in the public interest to treat such information as confidential because if such information were made public, it would put the counterparty at a business disadvantage, could create a disincentive to do business with PG&E and other regulated utilities, and could have a damaging effect on current and future negotiations with other counterparty.
5) The data cannot be aggregated, redacted, summarized, masked or otherwise protected in a way that allows partial disclosure (Y/N)	>-
4) That the informa tion is not already public (Y/N)	≻
3) That it is complying with the limitations on confidentiall ty specified in the Matrix for that type of data (Y/N)	≯
2) Which category or categories in the Matrix the data correspond to:	Item VII G) Renewable Resource Contracts under RPS program - Contracts without SEPs. Item VII (un-numbered category following VII G) Score sheets, analyses, evaluations of proposed RPS projects. Item VIII A) Bid information and B) Specific quantitative analysis involved in scoring and evaluation of participating bids. General Order 66-C.
1) The material submitted constitutes a particular type of data listed in the Matrix, appended as Appendix 1 to D.06-06-066 (V/N)	>
Redaction Reference	Appendix C1

Length of Time	For information covered under Item VII G) remain confidential for three years after the commercial operation date, or one year after expiration (whichever is sooner). For information covered under Item VII (un-numbered category following VII G), remain confidential for three years. For information covered under General Order 66-C, remain confidential.	For information covered under Item VII G), remain confidential for three years after the commercial operation date, or one year after expiration (whichever is sooner)
PG&E's Justification for Confidential Treatment	This Appendix contains bid information and discusses the terms of the PPA. Disclosure of this information would provide valuable market sensitive information to competitors. Release of this information would be damaging to negotiations with other counterparties and should remain confidential. Furthermore, the counterparty to the PPA has an expectation that the terms of the PPA will remain confidential. It is in the public interest to treat such information as confidential because if such information were made public, it would put the counterparty at a business disadvantage, could create a disincentive to dobusiness with PG&E and other regulated utilities, and could have a damaging effect on current and future negotiations with other counterparty.	This Appendix contains the PPA for which PG&E seeks approval in the Advice Letter filing. Disclosure of certain terms of the PPA would provide valuable market sensitive information to competitors. Release of this information would be damaging to negotiations with other counterparties and should remain confidential. Furthermore, the counterparty to the PPA has an expectation that the terms of the PPA will remain confidential.
5) The data cannot be aggregated, redacted, summarized, masked or otherwise protected in a way that allows partial disclosure (Y/N)	>	>-
4) That the informa tion is not already public (Y/N)	> -	>-
3) That it is complying with the limitations on confidentiali ty specified in the Matrix for that type of data (Y/N)	>-	> -
2) Which category or categories in the Matrix the data correspond to:	frem VII G) Renewable Resource Contracts under RPS program - Contracts without SEPs. Item VII (un-numbered category following VII G) Score sheets, analyses, evaluations of proposed RPS projects. General Order 66-C.	Item VII G) Renewable Resource Contracts under RPS program - Contracts without SEPs.
1) The material submitted constitutes a particular type of data listed in the Matrix, appended as Appendix 1 to D.06-06-066 (Y/N)	>	<i></i> ⊁
Redaction Reference	Appendix D	Appendix E

Length of Time	For information covered under Item VII G), remain confidential for three years after the commercial operation date, or one year after expiration (whichever is sooner).	Remain confidential for three years.
	This Appendix contains the PPA for which PG&E seeks approval in the Advice Letter filing. Disclosure of certain terms of the PPA would provide valuable market sensitive information to competitors. Release of this information would be damaging to negotiations with other counterparties and should remain confidential. Furthermore, the counterparty to the PPA has an expectation that the terms of the PPA will remain confidential.	This Appendix contains information that, if disclosed, would provide valuable market sensitive information to competitors and allow them to see PG&E's remaining RPS net open energy position. This information should remain confidential for three years.
5) The data cannot be aggregated, redacted, summarized, masked or otherwise protected in a way that allows partial disclosure (Y/N)	À	X
4) That the informa tion is not already public (Y/N)	>	>-
3) That it is complying with the limitations on confidentiality specified in the Matrix for that type of data (Y/N)	>	>
2) Which category or categories in the Matrix the data correspond to:	Item VII G) Renewable Resource Contracts under RPS program - Contracts without SEPs.	Item VII (un-numbered category following VII G) Score sheets, analyses, evaluations of proposed RPS projects. Item VI B) Utility Bundled Net Open Position for Energy (MWh).
1) The material submitted constitutes a particular type of data listed in the Matrix, appended as Appendix 1 to D.06-06-066 (Y/N)	>	¥
Redaction Reference	Appendix F	Appendix G

Public Appendix C2 Independent Evaluator Report

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY 2012 RENEWABLE POWER SOLICITATION

REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT EVALUATOR ON A CONTRACT WITH 83WI 8ME, LLC

FEBRUARY 19, 2014

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2. FAIRNESS OF PROJECT-SPECIFIC NEGOTIATIONS	
3. MERIT FOR CPUC APPROVAL	

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report provides an independent evaluation of the process by which the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) undertook a competitive solicitation in 2013¹ to procure energy eligible to meet Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS) goals. An independent evaluator (IE), Arroyo Seco Consulting (Arroyo), conducted a range of activities to review, test, and check PG&E's processes as the utility conducted outreach to renewable power developers and operators, solicited Offers, evaluated Offers, and selected a short list of Offers with which to pursue negotiations.

Subsequent to the selection of a short list, PG&E negotiated with the selected Participants to seek agreement on the terms of contracts for renewable power. On December 19, 2013, PG&E executed a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) for renewable energy with 83WI 8ME, LLC. This project company is owned by two parent companies: 8minutenergy SPV4 LLC (itself a wholly-owned subsidiary of 8minutenergy Renewables LLC, a solar energy development company headquartered in Folsom) and GASNA 15, LLC, an indirect subsidiary of Gestamp Asetym Solar, S.L., a Madrid-based solar developer and subsidiary of Corporación Gestamp, S.L., an industrial holding company. The contract will deliver power from Midway Solar Farm I² ("Midway I") a new 50-MW solar photovoltaic generation project to be constructed in the Imperial Valley about five miles northwest of Calipatria and three miles east of the Salton Sea.

The purpose of this report is to provide an independent review of the extent to which the project-specific negotiations with 83WI 8ME were fair, and an opinion about whether this contract merits approval by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC).

The structure of this report follows the 2012 RPS Shortlist Report Template provided by the Energy Division of the CPUC. Topics covered include:

- The role of the IE;
- Adequacy of outreach for and robustness of the 2012 competitive solicitation;
- The fairness of the design of PG&E's least-cost, best-fit (LCBF) methodology;

² The project will

at the existing Midway substation

about six miles to the east.

¹ While the Offers were due on February 6, 2013 and were evaluated in 2013, the solicitation was issued on December 10, 2012 and is considered to be a 2012 Request for Offers.

- The fairness of PG&E's administration of its LCBF methodology;³
- Fairness of project-specific negotiations; and
- Merit of the contract for CPUC approval.

Arroyo's opinion is that the negotiations between PG&E and 83WI 8ME were conducted fairly with respect to ratepayers and competitors.

Arroyo ranks the 83WI 8ME contract as moderate to high in valuation and low in contract price. Arroyo's assessment is that the contract's portfolio fit with PG&E's compliance needs ranks as moderate to high. The project viability of the contract ranks as moderate based on Arroyo's scoring with the Energy Division's Project Viability Calculator.

Arroyo's opinion is that the 83WI 8ME agreement merits CPUC approval based on its low price and moderate to high value; the contract's fit with PG&E's supply portfolio and the proposed project's expected viability seem entirely acceptable.

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³ The first chapter is a summary of the IE report prepared in June 2013 that accompanied PG&E's short list for its 2012 RPS solicitation.

1. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE SHORT LIST REPORT

Pacific Gas and Electric Company issued a Request for Offers (RFO) on December 10, 2012, a competitive solicitation for power generation qualifying as eligible renewable energy resources (ERRs). In its solicitation protocol for the 2012 RPS RFO, PG&E announced its intent to procure about 1.25% of its retail sales volume, or about 1,000 GWh annually. This chapter summarizes the contents of the previously submitted Independent Evaluator report that described PG&E's selection of a short list for the 2012 RPS solicitation.

A. ROLE OF THE INDEPENDENT EVALUATOR

The CPUC required an independent evaluator to participate in competitive solicitations for utility power procurement in Decision 04-12-048. It required an IE when Participants in a competitive procurement solicitation include affiliates of investor-owned utilities (IOUs), IOU-built projects, or IOU-turnkey projects. Decision 06-05-039 expanded requirements, ordering use of and IE to evaluate and report on the entire solicitation, evaluation, and selection process for the 2006 RPS RFO and future competitive solicitations. This was intended to increase the fairness and transparency of the Offer selection process.

To comply with the requirements ordered by the CPUC, PG&E retained Arroyo Seco Consulting to serve as IE for the 2012 RPS solicitation. Arroyo undertook several tasks both prior to Offer Opening and subsequently. These included reviewing PG&E's solicitation protocols and discussing the methodology with the evaluation team, observing and analyzing PG&E's outreach efforts, participating in Offer opening, reading the Offers, performing independent evaluations of Offer value and project viability, monitoring PG&E's evaluation of Offers against its evaluation criteria, and discussing the shortlisting process and decisions with PG&E's team, management, and its Procurement Review Group.

The CPUC's Decision 06-06-066 detailed guidelines for treating confidential information in IOU power procurement including competitive solicitations. It provides for confidential treatment of "Score sheets, analyses, evaluations of proposed RPS projects", vs. public treatment of the total number of projects and MW bid by resource type. Where Arroyo's reporting on the fairness of PG&E's selection of Offers requires explicit discussion of such analyses, scores, and evaluations, these are redacted in the public version of this document.

B. ADEQUACY OF OUTREACH TO PARTICIPANTS AND ROBUSTNESS OF THE SOLICITATION


Concision and clarity of solicitation materials. PG&E's 2012 RPS solicitation protocol was modestly sized for a document of its type and is more concise than protocols PG&E used in prior years. Some of the bulky text specifying detailed requirements for Offers was shifted into Attachment J from the protocol's main body. Arroyo regards this as an improvement. Arroyo believes that the contents of PG&E's 2012 RPS RFO solicitation

protocol generally provided clear and comprehensible direction to Participants on how to prepare and submit complete Offer packages that could be accepted and evaluated.

By December 2012, PG&E had compiled a general contact list for use in publicizing its RFOs, totaling more than 1,900 individuals, an increase from the version of the list used in the 2011 RPS solicitation. About 60% of contacts represented entities that could develop renewable generation, sell from existing facilities, or sell RECs.

PG&E did not issue a press release to announce the issuance of the 2012 RPS RFO. News of the solicitation was picked up and reported in the electric power trade press, including Megawatt Daily. A turnout of 170 individual registrants and 167 actual attendees represented a strong response and expression of industry interest. Out of the firms represented at the 2012 bidders' conference, about three-quarters were companies directly involved with developing or owning and operating renewable energy generation.

Arroyo's conclusion is that PG&E conducted substantial outreach to renewable power developers active in North America. The number of individuals contacted, the distribution of the news of the solicitation in the electric power trade press, and the attendance at the bidders' conference all suggest that PG&E's overall outreach effort was strong and effective.



Arroyo speculates that the lower volume of Offers this year vs. last year stems partly from the requirement for new projects to have an active interconnection application that has obtained a Phase I interconnection study. In the 2011 RPS RFO, half of all Offers were for the output of proposed projects that had not yet applied for an interconnection or obtained a completed Phase I study. Such projects would have been ineligible to participate if the 2012 requirement had been in place. Also, some developers might have chosen not to offer projects that they would rather bring on line before PG&E's preferred 2019 and 2020 dates.

Imperial Valley Offers. The CPUC has stated a public interest in obtaining a robust response to the IOUs' RPS solicitations from developers in the Imperial Valley. In the 2009 RPS solicitations it required IOUs to hold special Imperial Valley bidders' conferences.

PG&E received Offers for output of Imperial Valley facilities, of all proposals for bundled energy delivery.

	In the 2012 solicitation the total capacity of Offers for Imperial
Valley projects,	, totaled about of all capacity offered. The total annual
volume of Imper	rial Valley projects,
. This rep	resentation of Imperial Valley projects seems to be quite robust

Adequacy of feedback from Participants. PG&E offered an opportunity for Participants whose Offers were rejected to discuss the outcome. Arroyo observed of these sessions

Arroyo' opinion is that PG&E sought adequate feedback from Participants about the bidding and evaluation process.

C. FAIRNESS OF OFFER EVALUATION AND SELECTION METHODOLOGY

Arroyo's opinion is that PG&E's evaluation and selection methodology for identifying a short list for the 2012 RPS RFO was designed fairly, overall. Arroyo has some specific but narrow disagreements with the utility's approach.

Consistency with RPS Procurement Plan. PG&E's methodology was, overall, consistent with the approved 2012 RPS procurement plan. This includes numerous elements including the procurement goal, a focus on contracts that will contribute to RPS needs after 2019, equivalent treatment of existing and new projects' Offers, a preference for Offers contributing to Resource Adequacy needs, a discount to valuation for intermittent generation vs. firm energy, and use of a zero integration cost adder.

The plan also stated that PG&E would procure long-term volumes with initial delivery dates "no later than the latter part of the third compliance period." However, there was no specific element of PG&E's methodology that deterred selection of or discounted the value of Offers whose delivery starts after the end of the third compliance period. In the actual event,

and PG&E chose not to shortlist such Offers.

Market Valuation. PG&E's valuation methodology has several advantages over methods used by other utilities. It is rooted in a comparison to market forward prices rather than to model outputs for hypothetical future market price based on inputs such as forecast demand, modeled supply increases, and fuel price scenarios. It is relatively rapid to turn around several valuations, in contrast to the burdensome nature of running multiple cases of traditional utility production cost models. Net Market Value is a valuation concept that is generally accepted in the electric power industry. It provides an intuitive valuation based on the degree to which generating units are "in the money" with respect to market price.

There are some drawbacks with this approach, some of which are common to any valuation methodology for long-term PPAs. The methodology must rely on extrapolation of market forward curves rather than on direct observation of traded prices for power two decades hence. Such extrapolated prices are unlikely to be accurate forecasts. A certain degree of interpolation or projection is required to achieve hourly granularity in price assumptions. The diurnal shape of California power market pricing is changing in response to the addition of new renewable resources, and it is difficult to forecast with accuracy how hourly price profiles might evolve over three decades.

In the absence of functioning, liquid, transparent markets in California for Resource Adequacy, the valuation relied on fundamental forecasts for the value of capacity rather than on traded forward curves. These forecasts peg the value of RA at rather high and monotonically increasing levels in future years, whereas the record so far in deregulated wholesale power markets is one of boom and bust cycles.

There are challenges in estimating what Net Qualifying Capacity the CAISO will assign to a project that does not yet exist, when changes to the currently approved methodology are anticipated but not fully confirmed. PG&E's approach to estimating NQC in the 2012 RPS RFO relied on its own assumptions about what the CAISO and CPUC will adopt.

PG&E's LCBF methodology took into account both proposed price and estimated net value of each Offer, in the narrow sense that price is a key input to the utility's valuation model. However, PG&E ranked Offers by Portfolio-Adjusted Value to make a primary screening for selection purposes, and does not construct or review a separate ranking by contract price. As a result, the methodology did not systematically select the lowest-priced Offers, particularly when those projects would incur large upgrade costs.

PG&E's LCBF methodology included the costs of transmission upgrades in its value calculations of all Offers involving projects that propose to interconnect directly to the CAISO. PG&E proposed used estimates of network upgrade costs from interconnection studies including CAISO Cluster 4 Phase II studies and Cluster 5 Phase I studies.

Arroyo believes that the LCBF methodology for the 2012 RPS RFO did not appropriately count congestion charges between peripheral CAISO delivery points, such as the Palo Verde hub, and hubs internal to CAISO service territories. Arroyo recommends that PG&E develop estimates of LMP multipliers appropriate for these delivery points as it has done for zones within the main body of the CAISO grid. Arroyo's concern is that the methodology overvalues Offers for delivery at Palo Verde because it does not take into consideration the difference between the value of power delivered at the periphery of the CAISO and the value of power delivered in the core of Edison's territory;

<u>Transmission costs.</u> The valuation methodology assigned estimated transmission costs to the contract price of generation in order to compare Offers fairly, taking into account the full cost of generating power including both the price paid for the PPA and the cost of

upgrades required to achieve reliable deliverability for new generation. This approach provided a view of full costs of a project rather than only the energy procurement cost. This is a truer representation of the full cost to society of a new project.

The transmission cost methodology also had some drawbacks. The process of estimating transmission adders can be analytically burdensome. CAISO Phase I studies have been known to provide gross early overestimates of the actual network upgrade costs. In such a case, the methodology may disadvantage projects that have received a Phase I study but not yet a Phase II study, even though the analysis in hand is the best currently available estimate of project-specific upgrade requirements. This seems less than fully fair to some projects caught in that early stage of analysis, but is likely to be unavoidable when relying on project-specific information.

Arroyo expressed a concern in its IE report on PG&E's 2011 RPS RFO that PG&E applied transmission adders to projects that interconnect to the CAISO but did not include any estimate of network upgrade costs for projects that interconnect to the Imperial Irrigation District's grid. Arroyo believes that excluding network upgrade costs when valuing Offers located in California within IID's territory could unfairly bias selection towards IID-interconnecting projects. In those cases California ratepayers would end up bearing the upgrade costs in their rate base, but they happen to be businesses and households whose transmission rate base is outside the CAISO grid, so these costs were not taken into account when PG&E estimated the value of the contract offer.⁴

In its Decision approving PG&E's 2012 RPS procurement plan, the CPUC stated that "the Commission agrees with PG&E that no preferences should be given to CAISO-interconnected projects or to projects otherwise interconnected." By loading the valuation of CAISO-interconnected projects with network upgrade costs but not considering them when valuing IID-interconnected projects, the methodology created a potentially systematic preference for the latter. In Arroyo's opinion, PG&E's calculation of net value is not a neutral metric for comparing CAISO- and non-CAISO-interconnected projects. This resulted in a selection bias which is the opposite of the concern previously expressed by stakeholders including IID, fearing discrimination against IID-interconnected projects.

Not only did PG&E's method for calculating transmission adders omit network upgrades on the IID grid that are caused by new projects, it also omitted the cost of network upgrades that could or would be required in the CAISO grid for new generation built in IID's territory. Specifically, SDG&E estimated the impact of new "external" generation built to interconnect onto IID's grid upon SDG&E's network reliability. At some level of new build within IID's territory, SDG&E would have to construct new 69-kV transmission

⁴ Developers have objected that they paid, up front, the full cost of the required network upgrades.

Arroyo's opinion is that IID ratepayers end up bearing some or all of the cost of network upgrades, and that these grid costs should be counted in evaluating whether a project should be built or not.

However, IID's practice is to provide the project with transmission service credits equivalent to that payment; the credits can be used to reduce the operating cost of transmitting the project's output to an IID-CAISO intertie point (though the project earns no interest for upfront financing the upgrades). To the extent that these credits reduce the project's expenses and reduce IID's transmission revenues, IID's customers make up the loss of revenues through rates. On that basis

lines in its territory in order to accommodate flows from those projects into its Imperial Valley substation and westward into its territory without overloads. Because projects that interconnect to IID's grid did not obtain an analysis of such reliability network upgrades to SDG&E's grid in their interconnection studies, PG&E was unable to obtain project-specific information about how to estimate CAISO upgrade costs driven by such effects.

<u>Project viability.</u> The implementation of the Project Viability Calculator as a screening tool in the evaluation of Offers brought several advantages. The Calculator is a step in the direction of more standardized evaluation of viability across all three IOUs. It provides a broader set of criteria by which projects are assessed than was the case with PG&E's prior approach to scoring viability. The range of scores from zero to 100 gives more visibility to differences between projects than prior methods that use single-digit scores.

There are still opportunities to improve the use of the Calculator. It is a somewhat crude screening tool with noise in the scoring process; differences of only two or three points between projects should not be regarded as determinative in selecting one and rejecting the other, because the difference falls within the error of the analysis. Some Participants chose to self-score their proposals in grossly inflated ways that overstate the Offer's viability beyond any reasonable measure. Arroyo believes this renders the self-scored Calculators submitted with offer packages too unreliable to use without review and correction.

PG&E's protocol stated that the utility "will evaluate the project viability of each offer" using the Project Viability Calculator, and that "PG&E will review all submissions and adjust self-scores as appropriate." Similarly, PG&E's presentation in its Participants' Webinar indicated that "All offers will be scored" using the Calculator.

D. FAIRNESS OF HOW PG&E ADMINISTERED THE OFFER EVALUATION AND SELECTION PROCESS

Arroyo's opinion is that PG&E's process for evaluating and selecting Offers for its 2012 RPS RFO short list was, overall, conducted in a fair and generally consistent manner. Arroyo disagreed with some of PG&E's choices.


FARINESS OF REJECTION OF OFFERS FOR NON-CONFORMANCE

After Offers were received, PG&E performed a detailed review of the packages in order to identify deficiencies that needed to be addressed and to assess which Offers deviated from the requirements of the solicitation protocol.

Some Participants submitted Offers for full-capacity PPAs, but the interconnection applications and studies showed that their projects had applied for energy-only interconnections. PG&E communicated the need for correct classification of interconnections and gave Participants an opportunity to reprice their Offers.

were rejected by PG&E for nonconformance with the RFO's requirements; this is a relatively small number compared to rejections in PG&E's prior RPS solicitations. Most did not meet the requirement that new projects must have at least a CAISO Phase I interconnection study or its equivalent.

non-CAISO balancing authority areas outside California did not have means of delivering their energy to a CAISO intertie point as Category 2 resources nor a proposal to arrange to be managed using a pseudo-tie or dynamic transfer agreement. In each case Arroyo agreed with PG&E's judgment that these proposals did not meet the RFO's requirements.



Overall, Arroyo's opinion is that PG&E's decisions to reject Offers for failure to meet the stated requirements of the solicitation protocol were fair both to Participants submitting non-conforming proposals and those submitting conforming Offers.

REASONABLENESS OF PARAMETERS AND INPUTS

Nearly all parameters and inputs that PG&E used in its evaluation of the 2012 RPS RFO Offers were reasonably and fairly chosen, in Arroyo's opinion. Arroyo identified only one issue regarding the choices PG&E made about parameters and inputs that merits discussion.

PG&E chose inputs to its valuation of the buyer curtailment option using its business judgment about the size of the CAISO imbalance charges, ancillary services costs, and similar costs that would be avoided by exercising the option. The inputs are based on assumptions requiring subjective judgment. PG&E later assumed that the curtailment option would be more valuable for projects in NP-15 than elsewhere, which would imply that the adjustment to NMV for these benefits should be higher for NP-15 projects.

TRANSMISSION COST ADDERS AND INTEGRATION COSTS

PG&E closely followed its public and nonpublic protocols in administering its procedures for transmission adders. The team relied on data from interconnection studies or interconnection agreements to estimate the cost of network upgrades for new projects.

As stated in the discussion of PG&E's LCBF methodology, there is a narrow subset of cases in which Arroyo disagrees with how PG&E applies transmission cost adders. In Arroyo's opinion, transmission cost adders should be calculated and applied when valuing projects that interconnect within California outside the CAISO's balancing authority area, using the estimates of network upgrade costs provided in those other Transmission Owners' interconnection studies. PG&E ignored network upgrade costs that are borne by ratepayers of other balancing authority areas and that do not affect rates of PG&E customers.

PG&E's protocols did not specifically address how to calculate transmission adders for new projects with non-CAISO delivery points, and did not explicitly call for excluding these transmission costs. However, the non-public protocol for market valuation specified that transmission network upgrade costs would be subtracted in calculating Net Market Value. In future RFOs it would be better for the procurement plan and solicitation protocol to state explicitly that transmission adders will be set to zero for non-CAISO-interconnecting projects so that this element of the methodology is transparent to regulators and developers.

Arroyo would have applied transmission adders to projects that will interconnect to IID's grid, using IID facility studies as the basis for network upgrade cost adders.

With the exception of projects outside the CAISO, Arroyo's opinion is that PG&E properly assessed and applied transmission adders to Offers. PG&E applied no integration cost adder, consistent with the Decision approving the 2012 RPS procurement plans.

USE OF ADDITIONAL CRITERIA IN CREATING A SHORT LIST

PG&E's overall approach to creating a short list was to rank PPA Offers for delivery of bundled energy by Portfolio-Adjusted Value and to select highest-valued Offers. Short list selection was also strongly influenced by PG&E applying its seller concentration criterion, and placing an extra emphasis on the buyer curtailment option value component of PAV.

Seller concentration. In an initial pass, the highest-ranked Offers were selected for the short list (regardless of technology)

The seller concentration criterion was applied to screen out Offers that would lead to shortlisting a total


from any individual developer or development consortium.

The implementation of the seller concentration criterion had some uneven effects.



Resource diversity and buyer curtailment option as other criteria. After the initial selection of the highest-PAV Offers (as constrained by avoiding excess seller concentration), PG&E selected lower-valued Offers outside of strict economic ranking, in two categories.







<u>Supplier diversity.</u> An element of the RPS Goals evaluation criterion is whether an Offer will contribute towards PG&E's supplier diversity goals. Among developers submitting to the 2012 RPS RFO, none were CPUC-certified WMDVBEs. This compares unfavorably to prior years in which PG&E received Offers from diverse business enterprises.

ANALYSIS OF PG&E'S SHORT LIST SELECTION

Arroyo disagreed with one aspect of how PG&E applied its methodology and with a few of the choices made in the selection process.





• <u>Maximum Buyer Curtailment.</u> PG&E chose to select in NP-15 that offered the maximum hours of buyer curtailment. Arroyo is uncertain whether PG&E's belief that NP-15 project curtailments offer the most benefit to its ratepayers is accurate, or whether ZP-26 projects might provide comparable benefits.

Although Arroyo disagreed with these particular choices that PG&E made, the basis for most of these disagreements centers on differences in business judgments about relative priorities, not on choices made contrary to the solicitation protocol. Arroyo believes that PG&E's selections, based on its subjective business judgment, are reasonable.

Overall fairness of administration. Despite a handful of disagreements, Arroyo Seco Consulting's overall judgment is that PG&E's decisions to select or reject Offers to arrive at a short list for the 2012 RPS RFO were reasonable and justifiable, overall. Most disagreements between Arroyo and PG&E were about choices Arroyo would have not made if it were administering the RFO, but that Arroyo agrees are choices a reasonable person could make if she had different priorities or emphases regarding weights assigned to evaluation criteria. Arroyo believes that PG&E's choices are within the realm of "reasonable business judgment" that the CPUC allows IOUs to exercise in energy procurement.

While Arroyo believes that PG&E may be justified in omitting transmission adders for IID-interconnecting projects because those costs do not directly affect PG&E ratepayers, in Arroyo's opinion the practice is not particularly fair. Nothing in the solicitation protocols suggests that upgrade cost will <u>not</u> be applied for such projects; this choice lacks transparency. Arroyo's opinion is that PG&E's administration of its methodology was overall reasonable but that treatment of IID-interconnecting projects was less than fully fair.

Imperial Valley. PG&E received for projects operating in or proposed to be sited in the Imperial Valley, 14% of the total number of conforming Category 1 Offers. Projects sited in the Imperial Valley comprise

Overall, developers' response to propose Imperial Valley projects was robust and PG&E's selection of Imperial Valley Offers was representative of that strong response.

2. FAIRNESS OF PROJECT-SPECIFIC NEGOTIATIONS

This chapter provides an independent review of the extent to which PG&E's negotiations with 8minute Renewables and Gestamp Asetym Solar North America ("GASNA", the parent company of GASNA 15, LLC that holds a partial ownership share in the project company) for a power purchase agreement for 83WI 8ME, LLC were conducted fairly with respect to competitors and to ratepayers.

PG&E notified the project owners that their Offer for the output of the Midway Solar Farm I project had been shortlisted in mid-April 2013. The parties began negotiations in early June 2013. Arroyo telephonically observed more than two dozen negotiation sessions between PG&E and the team of 8minutenergy Renewables and GASNA (many of the discussions took place through e-mail exchanges; the large number of sessions bespeaks the challenges of the negotiation). Arroyo was also able to review multiple draft versions of the contract in order to identify specific proposals and counterproposals the parties made in the course of discussions. The original starting point for the negotiations was PG&E's 2012 RPS Form Agreement published with the 2012 RPS solicitation protocol in December 2012. PG&E later revised and updated some subsections of its Form Agreement (changes that applied to draft PPAs with all shortlisted parties) during the course of negotiations.⁷

Arroyo's opinion is that PG&E's negotiations with the 8minutenergy Renewables and GASNA commercial team for the 83WI 8ME contract were conducted in a manner that was fair to ratepayers and competitors.


A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

8minutenergy Renewables Energy is a California-based developer of solar photovoltaic generation projects.

PG&E previously executed a contract in

October 2013 with 87RL 8ME, LLC, an indirect subsidiary of 8minutenergy Renewables and Saferay GmbH, for the output of the proposed 15-MW Woodmere Solar Farm in Kern County. That contract arose from PG&Es fourth Renewable Auction Mechanism solicitation.

⁷ For example, the revised Form Agreement prevents PG&E from paying sellers for "surplus delivered energy", deliveries that exceed contract capacity in any settlement interval. It requires the seller to install equipment needed to implement buyer curtailments. The annual threshold for "excess energy", beyond which payments to the seller is reduced, was tightened to a trigger level at 115% of contract quantity from the previous trigger level of 120%. These changes and others had the general effect of enhancing ratepayer protections in the contracts resulting from the 2012 RPS RFO. Most of the changes were included in PG&E's Form Agreement for its 2013 RPS solicitation.



GASNA already has contracts with PG&E at the project company level for its proposed 14-MW Peabody RBJ solar project in Solano County (from the 2nd RAM RFO), 15-MW Twisselman Solar Project in Kern County (from the 3rd RAM RFO), 1.5-MW San Joaquin 1B project in Fresno County, and 1.5-MW La Joya del Sol project near Fresno (both on PG&E's feed-in tariff). Of these only La Joya del Sol has achieved commercial operation so far.

The Midway Solar Farm I project will be a 50-MW solar photovoltaic facility to be constructed in the Imperial Valley on currently cultivated agricultural land.

The negotiations with 8minutenergy Renewables and GASNA for the 83WI 8ME contract continued from June through December 2013 and resulted in an agreement that was executed on December 19, 2013.

B. PRINCIPLES FOR EVALUATING THE FAIRNESS OF NEGOTIATIONS

Arroyo took into account several principles to evaluate the degree of fairness with which PG&E handled negotiations with 8minutenergy Renewables and GASNA.


- Were sellers treated fairly and consistently by PG&E during negotiations? Were all sellers given equitable opportunities to advance their Offers towards final PPAs? Were individual sellers given unique opportunities to move their proposals forward or concessions to improve their contracts' commercial value, opportunities not provided to others?
- Was the distribution of risk between seller and buyer in the PPAs distributed equitably across PPAs? Did PG&E's ratepayers take on a materially disproportionate share of risks in some contracts and not others? Were

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
- individual sellers given opportunities to shift their commercial risks towards ratepayers, opportunities that were not provided to others?
- Was non-public information provided by PG&E shared fairly with all sellers? Were individual sellers uniquely given information that advantaged them in securing contracts or realizing commercial value from those contracts?
- If any individual seller was given preferential treatment by PG&E in the course of negotiations, is there evidence that other sellers were disadvantaged by that treatment? Were other proposals of comparable value to ratepayers assigned materially worse outcomes?

C. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PG&E AND 83WI 8ME'S DEVELOPERS

Some of the issues addressed in the negotiation included:









D. DEGREE OF FAIRNESS OF PROJECT-SPECIFIC NEGOTIATIONS

The developers of the Midway I project requested numerous changes from the revised version of PG&E's 2012 RPS Form Agreement provided to the seller in May 2013. The siting of the project deep within the IID grid rather than interconnected to the CAISO grid required variances from PG&E's Form Agreement in several provisions, and posed incremental risks to the buyer, making this a complex and lengthy negotiation. Of the requested changes, PG&E granted few concessions.

Arroyo regards the changes from the Form Agreement to the 83WI 8ME contract to have minimal adverse impact on ratepayers. Most of these seem modest changes that are, in Arroyo's opinion, reasonable accommodations to the commercial situation, such as the provision governing the Arroyo believes that PG&E's refusal to grant a large number of requested concessions succeeded in maintaining fairness to direct competitors of 8minutenergy Renewables and GASNA, by avoiding disparate treatment of Midway I compared to other projects.



Arroyo did not observe PG&E providing the developers of the Midway I project with non-public information that advantaged it against competing sellers. PG&E's treatment of 83WI 8ME during negotiations was, overall, comparable with the treatment of its competitors in the 2012 RPS RFO. Much of the challenge in the negotiation was to arrive at terms that treat this IID-interconnected project roughly similarly to those granted to CAISO-interconnected projects while protecting ratepayers from risks that come with purchasing power from a project in a foreign balancing area. Arroyo believes that the parties largely succeeded in avoiding disparate treatment, neither advantaging nor disadvantaging the seller excessively compared to its competitors, and keeping ratepayers whole when buying renewable energy from a seller whose long-term ability to deliver Resource Adequacy attributes to PG&E's customers is at greater risk than a CAISO-interconnected project.

Arroyo's opinion is that PG&E's negotiations with 83WI 8ME were conducted fairly with respect to ratepayers and competitors.

3. MERIT FOR CPUC APPROVAL

This chapter provides an independent review of the merits of the contract between PG&E and 83WI 8ME, LLC against criteria identified in the Energy Division's 2012 RPS IE template.

A. CONTRACT SUMMARY

On December 19, 2013, PG&E and 83WI 8ME, LLC executed a power purchase agreement for delivery of RPS-eligible energy from a proposed new solar photovoltaic facility, Midway Solar Farm I.

Contract capacity for this PPA is 50 MW. The contract quantity for the PPA declines over time on a fixed schedule based on expected degradation of the solar panels, averaging 119 GWh/year over the delivery term. The contract's guaranteed commercial operation date is June 1, 2020,

. The project will be located in the Imperial Valley on currently cultivated agricultural land about five miles northwest of Calipatria.

B. NARRATIVE OF EVALUATION CRITERIA AND RANKING

The 2012 RPS template for IEs provided by the Energy Division calls for a narrative of the merits of the proposed project on the criteria of contract price, portfolio fit, and project viability.

CONTRACT PRICE AND MARKET VALUATION

Arroyo has compared the net value of the 83WI 8ME contract to relevant peer groups of previously and currently offered competing sources of RPS-eligible energy, using the results of both PG&E's analysis and a simpler but independent model. Based on those comparisons, Arroyo opines that the valuation of the contract ranks as moderate to high compared to relevant peer groups of competing proposals, and the contract price ranks low.

Contract Price. Deliveries from the Midway I project to PG&E would be priced

The contract with 83WI 8ME fell into the lowest-priced decile of all Category 1 Offer variants received in PG&E's 2012 RPS RFO when ranked on levelized post-TOD price (it is inappropriate to compare pre-TOD prices because of the substantially different TOD factors that are applied to full-capacity vs. energy-only contracts; unfortunately the post-TOD price comparison relies heavily on the seller's estimate of generation profile). This is

an apples-to-oranges comparison because the vast majority of Offers were for full-capacity delivery that provide a project's capacity attributes to PG&E's customers, not energy-only deliveries as 83WI 8ME's is. Among energy-only Offers in the 2012 RPS RFO, the 83WI 8ME contract ranks in the lowest-priced quartile for post-TOD price. Among remaining shortlisted Offers shown to PG&E Procurement Review Group in November 2013, the contract's post-TOD price ranked in the lowest-priced quartile. On that basis, Arroyo's opinion is that the 83WI 8ME contract's pricing ranks as low.

Market Valuation. In presenting the 83WI 8ME PPA to its Procurement Review Group in November 2013, the utility estimated the "portfolio-adjusted value" (PAV) of the contract This analysis ranked the 83WI 8ME contract as the proposals from the 2012 RPS RFO.¹³

When PG&E selected a short list in March 2013, it estimated PAV for all Offer variants. At that time the full-capacity 83WI 8ME Offer for a 50-MW project with a 20-year term ranked in the among conforming Category 1 Offer variants submitted the 2012 RPS RFO. The parties subsequently altered the contract price during negotiations and switched to an energy-only contract as described in the previous chapter;

Arroyo performed a valuation of all Offers to the 2012 RPS solicitation using a much simpler but independent methodology with independently determined input parameters. Using that approach to estimating net market value, Arroyo ranks the executed version of the 83WI 8ME contract in the highest-valued quartile among Offers received. However, this analysis is premised on 8minutenergy Renewables' and GASNA's assertions that the project pays for network upgrades and that IID ratepayers do not bear the capital costs of improvements to IID's grid required to take the output of the facility.

12 PG&E altered the input parameters to its PAV methodology when ranking proposed contracts for selection for execution in November 2013.

, compared to the overall set of input parameters it previously used to select a short list in March 2013. While PG&E routinely updates input parameters such as market forward curve data when analyzing PAV,

At the margin

Arroyo believes that the alteration changed which PPAs were selected for execution. However, despite this additional burden applied to Midway I's economics in the adjusted valuation, the Offer was selected for execution.

13 Of the Offers shortlisted in March 2013, by November two had been withdrawn and one was withdrawn by

PG&E had ceased further negotiations with

One could argue that IID ratepayers do in fact eventually bear the cost of network upgrades required by the Midway I project. IID's LGIAs provide for each new project to fund the capital cost of required network upgrades up front. However, the LGIA also requires IID to provide transmission credits back to the project over time. These credits benefit the project by reducing its payments for transmission service charges to move project output across the IID system, for example to a CAISO intertie point. The credits are provided on a one-to-one basis for the upfront payments for network upgrades (without interest) and have the effect of offsetting an operating expense the project must pay if contracted with an IOU. This is a form of reimbursement of the upfront payments.

If viewed as reimbursement to the project for its upfront funding of network upgrade expenditures, then IID's issuance of transmission credits implies that ultimately IID ratepayers fund the network upgrade costs, analogous to how CAISO ratepayers ultimately fund network upgrades in PG&E's territory that are required to interconnect new generators there, even though the generators provide up-front funding for upgrades. By analogy, transmission adders should be applied when valuing IID-interconnected projects in order to take into account the burden on ratepayers of both generation procurements costs and grid costs. On that basis, an alternative valuation of the 83WI 8ME contract would take into account the costs for improvements to IID's grid that are eventually recovered by 83WI 8ME through transmission credits and therefore borne by ratepayers.


If network upgrade costs are counted as part of the burden on society for building and interconnecting the Midway I project, the 83WI 8ME contract's ranking falls to the cusp between top-quartile and second-quartile valuation using Arroyo's methodology. Arroyo acknowledges that PG&E's customers will not bear the cost of the network upgrades except to the extent that 83WI 8ME is recovering a portion of their cost in the PPA price in order to finance network upgrade construction up front (the mechanism of transmission credits to refund 83WI 8ME does not pay the project interest on the funds it advances to IID). This is the basis for PG&E's choice not to apply transmission adders when valuing projects that do not interconnect to the CAISO. However, a case could be made that evaluation of socioeconomic investments should take account of capital expenditures borne by society whether the California ratepayers that bear the burden reside in the CAISO's territory or not.


Based on these comparisons, Arroyo's opinion is that the 83WI 8ME contract ranks moderate to high in valuation.

PORTFOLIO FIT

Deliveries from the Midway I facility are expected to begin in June 2020. The utility's 2012 RPS procurement plan expressed an expectation that it would have procured sufficient RPS-eligible energy to meet its RPS compliance needs through the third compliance period, and a strong preference for Offers with deliveries beginning in 2019 or later. ¹⁴

¹⁴ In its 2013 draft RPS procurement plan PG&E expressed a forecasted need for incremental RPS-eligible deliveries beginning in 2020, presumably taking into account procurement from the 2012 RFO.





In contrast, the average RPS Portfolio Need adjustment for Offers received in the 2012 RPS RFO was ______. The RPS Portfolio Need adjustment for the 83WI 8ME contract ranks moderate to high in comparison to competing Offers.

PROJECT VIABILITY

Arroyo has scored the Midway I project using the Energy Division's Project Viability Calculator, which lists several attributes of projects on which viability may be measured.

Project development experience. While 8minutenergy Renewables has jointly developed solar photovoltaic projects to the point of obtaining PPAs with utilities, it has not yet brought any into commercial operation; nor have members of its development team. 8minutenergy Renewables and Silver Ridge Power, LLC (formerly AES Solar) jointly developed the 150 – 200 MW Mount Signal I solar project in the Imperial Valley to the point of obtaining an executed contract with San Diego Gas & Electric Company and beginning construction. However, 8minutenergy Renewables reports that it transferred its ownership of the project company to Silver Ridge Power in November 2012, the month that construction began. Press reports indicate that Silver Ridge Power assembled the \$636 million project financing for the Mount Signal I project, not 8minutenergy Renewables.

8minutenergy Renewables and GASNA succeeded in executing a PPA for their jointly developed Calipatria Solar Farm project (aka 70SM1 8ME, LLC, the project company) with SDG&E; this 20-MW project has an expected on-line date of May 31, 2015. In addition to the 15-MW Woodmere Solar Farm jointly developed with Saferay GmbH, that executed a RAM PPA with PG&E, 8minutenergy Renewables and Saferay obtained a PPA with Edison for their 20-MW Redcrest Solar project in Kern County through Edison's third RAM solicitation. Redcrest Solar also has an expected on-line date in May 2015.

Of the four projects that GASNA has contracted with PG&E that are described in Chapter 4, only the 1.5-MW La Joya del Sol project has begun commercial operation. However, Gestamp Asetym Solar S.L. has an extensive record of developing, financing,

building, and bringing into operation solar photovoltaic projects in Europe, primarily as a turnkey contractor. The largest of these appears to have been the 34-MW Fuente Alamo project in Murcia, Spain, which was constructed in four separate phases and subsequently sold.

Thus, neither 8minutenergy Renewables nor GASNA (nor its affiliates) yet have experience developing, constructing, and bringing into operation a single photovoltaic facility as large as 50 MW of capacity.

Ownership/O&M experience. Based on its short history to date, 8minutenergy Renewables' business model appears to involve developing solar photovoltaic projects in joint development arrangements with a partner, then transferring ownership of the project company to the partner prior to start of construction. Arroyo speculates that 8minutenergy Renewables could similarly sell its interest in 83WI 8ME to GASNA or another party. 8minutenergy Renewables has never owned or operated a utility-scale commercial solar generator, nor have members of its development team.

GASNA owns and operates the 1.5-MW La Joya del Sol project near Fresno. Gestamp Asetym Solar has built and brought into operation several European projects, but its stated "policy is to sell them on as investments". It appears that in several cases Gestamp Asetym Solar continues to operate and maintain solar facilities after it has sold them to financial entities. It remains unclear who the ultimate owner of Midway I will be, and what company will operate and maintain the project over the delivery term.

These technologies are well-commercialized and
deployed in numerous projects around the world.
deployed in numerous projects around the world.
Description and item
Resource quality.
Arroyo would expect average levels of solar irradiance at the project site near Calipatria to be
superior to insolation in nearly all parts of PG&E's service territory.
superior to hisolation in hearty all parts of PG&E's service termory.
Arroyo believes that the solar resource in
the Imperial Valley appears sufficient to support the project's production profile.
are imperiar valley appears sufficient to support the project's production profile.

Technical feasibility.

¹⁵ Interview with Alfredo Gonzalez, Operations Manager, Gestamp Asetym Solar, quoted by ABB on its website, http://www.abb.us/cawp/seitp202/7688b760ec88ba9ec12577f9004acd5a.aspx

Manufacturing supply chain.

vendor that 8minutenergy Renewables and GASNA named in their offer package for 83WI 8ME appears not to have any supply chain constraints that would prevent them from meeting the needs for a 50-MW project that might come on-line mid-decade.

Site control. 8minutenergy Renewables and GASNA have secure full site control for the Midway I project

<u>Permitting.</u> Imperial County granted a conditional use permit to the Midway I project in August 2012.

Project financing status.

Gestamp Asetym Solar and its subsidiaries have a successful track record of financing the construction of solar photovoltaic projects smaller than 50 MW in capacity using bank debt. Examples include two South African projects totaling 30 MW in capacity that were financed in 2012 with about €80 million in debt from South African banks, and two Spanish projects totaling about 18 MW financed in 2008 with about €120 million loan from a consortium of four Spanish banks. In other cases Gestamp Asetym Solar obtained construction financing then sold the project upon commercial operation; for example, phases II and III of the Fuente Alamo project were sold to Fotowatio in 2008. Arroyo is unaware of any GASNA affiliate obtaining project financing for a solar photovoltaic project as large as the 50-MW Midway I facility.

While 8minutenergy Renewables was successful in partnership in developing and contracting the Mount Signal Solar project, it was its partner, Silver Ridge Power, LLC (formerly AES Solar), that sought and obtained project financing for that large facility under construction in Imperial County.

Interconnection progress.

Transmission requirements.

Reasonableness of COD.

The project already has its conditional use permit from Imperial County, and has achieved full site control; the technology is commercialized and there should not likely be manufacturing constraints on the construction of the project. Given these considerations, in Arroyo's opinion it is reasonable to expect the Midway I project to come on-line at the guaranteed commercial operation date of June 2020.

Arroyo has scored the Midway I project and the other submittals to PG&E's 2012 RPS RFO using the Energy Division's Project Viability Calculator. The independently estimated score is ; on that basis Arroyo ranks the project in the third-highest quartile among Offers to the solicitation. On that basis, Arroyo views Midway I as moderate in project viability.

RPS GOALS

In PG&E's 2012 RPS RFO, the utility applied an evaluation criterion for consistency with and contribution to California's goals for the RPS program. Offers were evaluated on three dimensions:

- California-based projects providing benefits to communities afflicted with poverty, high unemployment, or high emission levels;
- Impact of the project on California's water quality and use;
- Contribution to the biomass goal of Executive Order S-06-06.

The Midway I project will be located near the city of Calipatria. Based on the U.S. Census Bureau's 2008-2012 American Community Survey, Calipatria has median household income well below that of the state of California as a whole (\$38 vs. \$70 thousand per year), and its percentage of individuals living in poverty is considerably above that of the state (21.1% vs. 15.3%). Calipatria has an unemployment rate that is somewhat above that of the state as a whole (12.4% vs. 11.0%). Imperial County is a non-attainment area for the PM-2.5 particulate standard and 2008 ozone standard. As a solar photovoltaic facility, Midway I will likely have minimal impact on water quality and use. It does not contribute to the state's biomass goal. On that basis Arroyo would expect that the project would score as high on the RPS Goals criterion as defined by PG&E for its 2012 solicitation.

C. DISCUSSION OF MERIT FOR APPROVAL

In Arroyo's opinion, the 83WI 8ME contract merits CPUC approval:

- The contract price (after adjustment for time-of-delivery factors) ranks low when compared to all Offers received in PG&E's 2012 RPS solicitation, and ranked low among the shortlisted proposals that PG&E considered for execution.
- PG&E's estimate of Portfolio-Adjusted Value ranks the contract as high compared to all 2012 Offers; it ranks moderate in PAV within the short list that PG&E considered for contract execution. Arroyo's independent analysis ranks the contract as high in net value when compared to all 2012 Offers.

- In Arroyo's opinion, the proposed Midway Solar Farm I facility ranks as moderate in project viability. Its developers do not yet have experience developing, constructing, or owning, operating, and maintaining a single solar photovoltaic facility as large as 50 MW. However, European affiliates of GASNA have considerable experience bringing smaller solar PV projects into operation, the facility has obtained its interconnection agreement from IID and its conditional use permit from Imperial County, and does not face serious impediments to obtaining required network upgrades. Arroyo believes that Midway I should reasonably be able to meet its guaranteed commercial operation date.
- The PPA ranks moderate to high in portfolio fit when compared to all 2012 Offers when using PG&E's metric for adjusting PAV for timing of contribution to RPS compliance needs.
- The project will be sited near a community afflicted with high unemployment, high poverty rates, and high emission levels.

Overall, Arroyo's opinion is that the 83WI 8ME contract merits CPUC approval based on superior pricing, moderate to high value, and moderate project viability.

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