

PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

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June 10, 2013

**Advice Letter 4007-E**

Brian K. Cherry  
Vice President, Regulation and Rates  
Pacific Gas and Electric Company  
77 Beale Street, Mail Code B10C  
P.O. Box 770000  
San Francisco, CA 94177

**SUBJECT: Amendment to an Existing Power Purchase Agreement for  
Procurement of Eligible Renewable Energy Resources Between  
Sierra Power Corp. and PG&E**

Dear Mr. Cherry:

Advice Letter 4007-E is effective, per Resolution E-4575, on April 18, 2013.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Edward F. Randolph".

Edward F. Randolph, Director  
Energy Division

March 1, 2012

**Advice 4007-E**

(Pacific Gas and Electric Company ID U39 E)

Public Utilities Commission of the State of California

**Subject: Amendment to an Existing Power Purchase Agreement for  
Procurement of Eligible Renewable Energy Resources Between Sierra  
Power Corporation and Pacific Gas and Electric Company**

**I. INTRODUCTION****A. Purpose of the Advice Letter**

Pacific Gas and Electric Company (“PG&E”) seeks California Public Utilities Commission (“Commission” or “CPUC”) approval of an amendment (“Amendment”) to an existing Power Purchase Agreement (“PPA”) that PG&E executed with Sierra Power Corporation (“Sierra Power”). Commission approval of this Amendment will enable Sierra Power to continue to generate and sell to PG&E Renewables Portfolio Standard (“RPS”)-eligible power from its existing 7.5<sup>1</sup> megawatt (“MW”) biomass facility (“Facility”) located in Terra Bella, California.

The Amendment provides the Facility with a higher price for delivered energy in exchange for other beneficial terms and conditions. If approved, the Amendment will enable Sierra Power to continue to operate its in-state Facility at historic levels and provide RPS-eligible generation through the remainder of the PPA term. The Amendment will become effective upon CPUC Approval and will remain in effect through the remainder of the PPA term (until July 8, 2014). Once the Amendment is approved, a true-up payment will be made under the terms of the Amendment. PG&E submits the Amendment for Commission approval to establish the reasonableness of its terms and for authorization to recover its payments and any other costs incurred under the Amendment through its Energy Resource Recovery Account (“ERRA”). PG&E requests that the Commission issue a resolution no later than September 13, 2012 approving the Amendment and containing the findings set forth in Section VI. below.

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<sup>1</sup> While the nameplate capacity is 7.5 MW, the current negotiated contract capacity is 6 MW.

## **B. Subject of the Advice Letter**

The PPA resulted from an Interim Renewable Energy Solicitation in 2003 that PG&E conducted in accordance with Decision (“D.”) 03-06-071 and the Assigned Commissioner Ruling of August 13, 2003 that provided guidance and outlined the parameters of utility procurement of renewable resources prior to full RPS implementation.

The original PPA was filed for Commission approval in Advice Letter 2423-E on September 18, 2003 and approved in Resolution E-3853 on October 16, 2003. PG&E has exercised (with Commission approval) two options to extend the term of the PPA,<sup>2</sup> resulting in a PPA expiration date in July 2014. The PPA was also amended in 2006 to increase the energy price. The 2006 price amendment was filed for Commission approval in Advice Letter 2911-E on October 6, 2006 and approved in Resolution E-4058 on January 11, 2007.

In 2011, PG&E and Sierra Power began discussions regarding an amendment to the PPA that would support the Facility’s continued operation in light of increasing fuel costs and the anticipated expiration of a California Energy Commission (“CEC”) subsidy. As a result, PG&E and Sierra Power negotiated and executed the Amendment, which is attached as Confidential Appendix F.

The Amendment provides the Facility with a higher price for delivered energy in exchange for other beneficial terms and conditions. PG&E anticipates that with the approval of the Amendment, which would provide sustainable revenues, Sierra Power will continue to provide approximately 45 gigawatt-hours (“GWh”) per year of bundled, in-state, RPS-eligible energy to PG&E for the remainder of the PPA.

In addition, the Facility has many positive characteristics that meet PG&E’s portfolio needs. The Facility is located in-state, and is interconnected directly with the California Independent System Operator (“CAISO”) grid. It is a baseload Facility with existing interconnections that does not require additional CAISO network upgrades, does not require PG&E or the CAISO to procure additional ancillary services normally associated with intermittent resources.

The Facility also provides other benefits. It provides additional air quality benefits, such as NO<sub>x</sub> and particulate reduction, resulting from the diversion of agricultural waste from open field burning to controlled combustion. The Facility is integral to the US Forest

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<sup>2</sup> The Commission approved PG&E’s exercise of these options in Resolution E-3877 on July 8, 2004 and in Resolution E-4223 on February 20, 2009.

Service fire-prevention activity as an off-taker of logs and debris thinned from nearby national forests.

Although the Amendment price is above the 2011 Market Price Referent (“MPR”) for a five year contract starting in 2012, the price is competitive with shortlisted projects in PG&E’s 2011 RPS Solicitation and with other recently executed contracts, as discussed in Section II.A. below and in Confidential Appendices A and D. PG&E also analyzed Sierra Power’s financial condition and concluded that the PPA price adjustment is justified. Sierra Power has provided an attestation to demonstrate the need for the Amendment, which is attached as Confidential Appendix H.

The Amendment will become effective upon CPUC Approval, and will remain in effect through the remainder of the PPA term (until July 8, 2014). Once approved, a true-up payment will be made under the terms of the Amendment. The true-up mechanism is explained in Confidential Appendix D.

PG&E respectfully requests that the Commission approve the Amendment. The scope of and drivers for the Amendment are further described in Confidential Appendices A and D.

### C. General Project(s) Description

<b>Project Name:</b>	Sierra Power Corporation
<b>Technology</b>	Biomass
<b>Contract Capacity (MW):</b>	6 MW <sup>3</sup>
<b>Capacity Factor</b>	Approximately 86%
<b>Expected Generation (GWh/Year)</b>	Approximately 45 GWh/year
<b>Guaranteed Commercial Operational Date</b>	Online
<b>Date Contract Delivery Term Begins</b>	Amendment effective date is the date of CPUC Approval


<sup>3</sup> The current negotiated contract capacity is 6 MW. The nameplate capacity is 7.5 MW. The Facility has the option to increase or decrease its contract capacity once per year. In 2007, Sierra Power changed its contract capacity to 6 MW and has not changed it since.

<b>Delivery Term (Years)</b>	Amendment is applicable to remainder of PPA delivery term, until July 8, 2014. If a resolution approving the Amendment is issued on September 13, 2012 and final and non-appealable CPUC Approval is received on October 13, 2012, then the Amendment term would be approximately one year, nine months. The Amendment does not increase the PPA delivery term.
<b>Vintage (New/Existing/Repower)</b>	Existing
<b>Location (City and State)</b>	Terra Bella, CA
<b>Control Area (e.g., CAISO, BPA)</b>	CAISO
<b>Nearest Competitive Renewable Energy Zone (CREZ) as Identified by the Renewable Energy Transmission Initiative (RETI)<sup>4</sup></b>	N/A: The Facility is an existing facility
<b>Type of Cooling, If Applicable</b>	N/A
<b>Price Relative to MPR (i.e. above/below)</b>	The Amendment term is less than five years. Because there is no MPR for contracts of less than five years, PG&E compared the Amendment price to the 2011 MPR for a five year contract starting in 2012. The Amendment price is above this MPR.  (Cost information is discussed in further detail in Confidential Appendices A and D.)

<sup>4</sup> Information about RETI is available at: <http://www.energy.ca.gov/reti/>.

## D. General Deal Structure

Figure 1: Delivery Structure of PPA



## E. RPS Statutory Goals

Senate Bill (“SB”) 1078 established the California RPS Program, requiring an electrical corporation to increase its use of eligible renewable energy resources to 20 percent of total retail sales no later than December 31, 2017. The legislature subsequently accelerated the RPS goal to reach 20 percent by the end of 2010. In April 2011, Governor Brown signed into law SB 2 1X. As implemented by D.11-12-020, SB 2 1X requires retail sellers of electricity to procure the following quantities of RPS-eligible resources between 2011 and 2020:

- An average of twenty percent of the combined bundled retail sales during the first compliance period (2011-2013).
- Sufficient procurement during the second compliance period (2014-2016) that is consistent with the following formula:  $(.217 * 2014 \text{ retail sales}) + (.233 * 2015 \text{ retail sales}) + (.25 * 2016 \text{ retail sales})$ .
- Sufficient procurement during the third compliance period (2017-2020) that is consistent with the following formula:  $(.27 * 2017 \text{ retail sales}) + (.29 * 2018 \text{ retail sales}) + (.31 * 2019 \text{ retail sales}) + (.33 * 2020 \text{ retail sales})$ .

The Facility is currently operational and with the Amendment, is expected to produce approximately 45 GWh per year through mid-2014. The Amendment will therefore

contribute toward PG&E's RPS procurement requirements primarily in the first compliance period.

#### **F. Confidentiality**

In support of this Advice Letter, PG&E has provided the confidential information listed below. This information includes the Amendment and other information that more specifically describes the rights and obligations of the parties. This information is being submitted in the manner directed by D.08-04-023 and the August 22, 2006, Administrative Law Judge's Ruling Clarifying Interim Procedures for Complying with D.06-06-066 to demonstrate the confidentiality of the material and to invoke the protection of confidential utility information provided under either the terms of the IOU Matrix, Appendix 1 of D.06-06-066 and Appendix C of D.08-04-023, or General Order 66-C. A separate Declaration Seeking Confidential Treatment is being filed concurrently with this Advice Letter.

#### **Confidential Attachments:**

**Appendix A – Consistency with Commission Decisions and Rules and Project Development Status**

**Appendix B – 2011 Solicitation Overview**

**Appendix C – Independent Evaluator Report (Confidential)**

**Appendix D – Contract Amendment Summary**

**Appendix E – Non-Modifiable Terms in Amendment to Power Purchase Agreement**

**Appendix F – Amendment to Sierra Power Power Purchase Agreement**

**Appendix G – Project's Contribution Toward RPS Goals**

**Appendix H – Attestation of Kent Duysen, President of Sierra Power Corporation**

#### **Public Attachments:**

**Appendix I – Independent Evaluator Report (Public)**

## II. CONSISTENCY WITH COMMISSION DECISIONS

### A. Compliance with Resolution E-4199

In Resolution E-4199, the Commission set forth its standards for reviewing an amendment to a PPA that had previously been approved by the Commission. PG&E prepared this advice letter following the guidelines set forth in Resolution E-4199. Specifically, the Resolution E-4199 requirements are addressed to the extent possible in the public portion of this Advice Letter, and are further addressed in the Confidential Appendices as detailed in the table below:

<b>Requirement</b>	<b>Refer To</b>
<i>The IOU should:</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Compare the Amended contract against the most recently approved set of MPRs and the time of delivery (“TOD”) factors associated with that solicitation year</li> </ul>	Appendix B Appendix D
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Re-evaluate the competitiveness of the Amended PPA as compared to the PPAs that the IOU is currently negotiating and to the IOU’s most recent shortlist, and provide a sufficient showing in the advice letter that the Amended PPA is competitive based on current market data</li> </ul>	Appendix A Appendix B Appendix D
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Explain why the contract change is needed</li> <li>Provide all relevant data to justify the change</li> </ul>	Appendix A Appendix D
<i>The Counterparty must:</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provide the Commission and the Independent Evaluator (“IE”) with the original cash flow model, reflecting the price in the original contracts</li> <li>Provide the Commission and the IE with the latest cash flow model, reflecting the price in the amended contracts</li> </ul>	Appendix C Appendix D
<i>The confidential IE report must, at a minimum, include its:</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evaluation of the new prices based on the PPA’s market valuation as compared to the bids in the IOU’s most recent solicitation</li> <li>Review of the cash flow model</li> <li>Evaluation of the change in model inputs</li> </ul>	Appendix C

## **1. The Adjustment in the Contract Price is Justified**

PG&E performed due diligence regarding the requested Amendment price adjustment when PG&E and Sierra Power negotiated the Amendment. PG&E used the guidance provided in Resolution E-4199 and obtained cost information and the Facility's cash flow models. PG&E evaluated the cost information and performed a market value assessment to determine whether the contract price adjustment was justified. Confidential Appendix A contains a thorough description of PG&E's analysis and evaluation.

Based on the review of the cash flow models and supporting information provided by Sierra Power, cost assumptions, and evaluation of the market value, PG&E concluded that the PPA price adjustment is justified. Confidential Appendix D contains a detailed explanation of the price adjustment and how it affects payments under the Amendment.

The IE, Arroyo Seco Consulting, reviewed the Amendment and financial pro forma provided by Sierra Power. The IE considered how Resolution E-4199 should be applied to an existing project and whether Sierra Power's cash flow models justified the contract price adjustment. The IE's assessment is that the price adjustment is justified from a cost perspective. In addition, the IE found that the Amendment ranked favorably relative to other procurement options based on price.<sup>5</sup> Confidential Appendix C and Public Appendix I contain the IE's assessment and conclusions.

## **2. The Amended PPA Is Competitive as Compared to Current Market Data**

This Amendment is competitive relative to other recently executed transactions, as well as other RPS procurement options available to PG&E. Further information on the comparison of the Amendment against current market data is provided in Confidential Appendices A and D to this Advice Letter.

### **B. Consistency With PG&E's Adopted RPS Procurement Plan**

PG&E's 2011 renewable procurement plan ("2011 RPS Plan") was conditionally approved in D.11-04-030 on April 14, 2011. PG&E submitted a final version of the 2011 RPS Plan on May 4, 2011. The goal of PG&E's 2011 RPS Plan is to procure approximately one to two percent of PG&E's annual retail sales, or 800 to 1,600 GWh per year. The Amendment does not add incremental capacity to PG&E's current

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<sup>5</sup> See Public Appendix I at p. 50 ("Arroyo opines that the market valuation of the amended SPC contract ranks as moderate to high compared to relevant peer groups of competing proposals, and the contract price ranks low to moderate.")

portfolio of renewable resources because the Project is currently providing energy to PG&E. If approved, the Project will continue to deliver approximate 45 GWh per year for the remaining contract term that is already accounted for in PG&E's portfolio.

The Amendment is consistent with PG&E's 2011 RPS Plan because it was evaluated consistent with the review protocol in the 2011 RPS Solicitation, including portfolio fit, viability and market valuation.

### **C. Consistency With Commission Guidelines for Bilateral Contracting**

The Amendment resulted from bilateral negotiations between PG&E and Sierra Power. To address the issue of bilateral contracting, the Commission developed guidelines pursuant to which utilities may enter into bilateral RPS contracts. In D.03-06-071, the Commission authorized entry into bilateral RPS contracts, provided that such contracts did not require Public Goods Charge funds and were "prudent."<sup>6</sup> Later, in D.06-10-019, the Commission again held that bilateral contracts were permissible provided that they were at least one month in duration, and also found that such contracts must be reasonable and submitted for Commission approval by advice letter.<sup>7</sup> Also in that decision, the Commission stated that bilateral contracts were not eligible for supplemental energy payments.<sup>8</sup>

Based on D.03-06-071 and D.06-10-019, the Commission set forth the following four requirements for approval of bilateral contracts in a Resolution approving a bilateral RPS contract executed by PG&E: (1) the contract is submitted for approval by advice letter; (2) the contract is longer than one month in duration; (3) the contract does not receive above-market funds ("AMF"); and (4) the contract is deemed reasonable by the Commission.<sup>9</sup> The Commission noted that it would be developing evaluation criteria for bilateral contracts, but that the above four requirements would apply in the interim.<sup>10</sup>

On June 19, 2009, the Commission issued D.09-06-050 establishing price benchmarks and contract review processes for short-term and bilateral RPS contracts. D.09-06-050 provides that bilateral contracts should be reviewed using the same standards as contracts resulting from RPS solicitations.

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<sup>6</sup> D.03-06-071 at 57-58.

<sup>7</sup> D.06-10-019 at 29.

<sup>8</sup> *Id.* at 31.

<sup>9</sup> Resolution E-4216 at 5.

<sup>10</sup> *Id.*

The Amendment satisfies the four requirements listed above and the requirements of D.09-06-050. The Amendment is not eligible for AMF because it resulted from bilateral negotiations. The Amendment's term is longer than one month in duration. Finally, the Amendment is reasonable when considered against standards used for evaluating contracts resulting from PG&E's 2011 RPS Solicitation, including price, as PG&E explains in this Advice Letter and in the attached Confidential Appendices.

#### **D. Consistency of Bid Evaluation Process With Least-Cost Best-Fit Decision**

The RPS statute requires PG&E to procure the "least-cost best-fit" ("LCBF") eligible renewable resources.<sup>11</sup> The LCBF decision directs the utilities to use certain criteria in their bid ranking<sup>12</sup> and offers guidance regarding the process by which the utility ranks bids in order to select or "shortlist" the bids with which it will commence negotiations. PG&E's approved process for identifying the LCBF renewable resources focuses on four primary areas:

- 1) Determination of market value of bid;
- 2) Calculation of transmission adders and integration costs;
- 3) Evaluation of portfolio fit; and
- 4) Consideration of non-price factors.

PG&E examined the reasonableness of the Amendment using the same comparison tools used with other RPS transactions received in the 2011 RPS Solicitation. The general finding is that the price adjustment is reasonable and the cost is market competitive. A more detailed discussion of PG&E's evaluation of the Amendment is provided in Confidential Appendices A and D.

#### **1. Market Valuation**

In a "mark-to-market analysis," the present value of the bidder's payment stream is compared with the present value of the product's market value to determine the benefit (positive or negative) from the procurement of the resource, irrespective of PG&E's portfolio. This analysis is based on an evaluation of the contract price in the Amendment. PG&E's analysis of the market value is confidential and addressed in Confidential Appendix A.

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<sup>11</sup> Pub. Util. Code § 399.14(a)(2)(B).

<sup>12</sup> D.04-07-029.

## **2. Portfolio Fit**

Portfolio fit considers how well an offer's features match PG&E's portfolio needs. As part of the portfolio fit assessment, PG&E differentiates offers by the firmness of their energy delivery and by their energy delivery patterns. A higher portfolio fit measure is assigned to the energy that PG&E is sure to receive and fits the needs of the existing portfolio. The existing Facility is currently delivering and these deliveries will continue until July 2014, which will contribute toward PG&E's near-term RPS goals.

## **3. Consistency With the Transmission Ranking Cost Decision**

The Amendment does not introduce any additional transmission costs. The Facility is interconnected and is currently delivering power to PG&E.

## **4. Consistent Application of TODs**

There are no TOD factors in the original PPA or in the Amendment.

## **5. Qualitative Factors**

PG&E considered several qualitative factors in the evaluation of the Amendment:

1. Forest fire prevention: The Facility and the adjacent sawmill are highly integrated. The Facility receives 20% of its wood chip fuel from the sawmill and the sawmill relies on the Facility for 100% of its energy needs. The sawmill is an off-taker of logs thinned from nearby forests as part of the US Forest Service's forest fire prevention measures.
2. Project viability: The Facility is operational and PG&E has high confidence that the Facility will continue to operate under the Amendment.
3. In-state resource: The Facility is within California and maintaining the Facility will directly preserve local in-state jobs.
4. First compliance period deliveries: The short-term nature of the Amendment (expiry date is July 8, 2014) will contribute to PG&E's efforts to comply with the RPS mandates, particularly in the first compliance period (2011 – 2013).

### **E. Compliance With Standard Terms and Conditions**

The Commission set forth standard terms and conditions to be incorporated into contracts for the purchase of electricity from eligible renewable energy resources in D.04-06-014 and D.07-02-011, as modified by D.07-05-057 and D.07-11-025. These terms and conditions were compiled and published in D.08-04-009. Additionally, the non-modifiable term related to Green Attributes was finalized in D.08-08-028 and the non-modifiable terms related to Tradable Renewable Energy Credits (“TREC’s”) were finalized in D.10-03-021, as modified by D.11-01-025.

In addition to the changes described in Section I above and in Confidential Appendix D, the Amendment updates the PPA to include the most current RPS non-modifiable standard terms and conditions. Highlighting of the non-modifiable terms in the Amendment is provided in Confidential Appendix E.

The following table sets forth the specific page and section number where the Commission’s non-modifiable terms are located in the Amendment. These terms are highlighted in blue in the Amendment attached as Confidential Appendix E.

<b>Amendment to Power Purchase Agreement Between Sierra Power and PG&amp;E</b>		
<b>Non-Modifiable Term</b>	<b>Amendment Section No.</b>	<b>Amendment Page No.</b>
STC 1: CPUC Approval	Amendment Section 2	1
STC 2: REC’s and Green Attributes		
• Definition of Green Attributes	Amendment Section 9.1	2
• Conveyance of Green Attributes	Amendment Section 9.2	2
STC 6: Eligibility	Amendment Section 9.3	2 - 3
STC 17: Applicable Law	Amendment Section 9.5	3
STC REC-1 Transfer of Renewable Energy Credits	Amendment Section 9.3	3
STC REC-2 Tracking of REC’s in WREGIS	Amendment Section 9.4	3

#### **F. Consistency With Unbundled Renewable Energy Credit Transactions**

The Amendment is for the purchase of bundled RPS-eligible energy and therefore does not include the purchase of unbundled renewable energy credits.

#### **G. Consistency With Minimum Quantity Decision**

In D.07-05-028, the Commission determined that in order to count energy deliveries from short-term contracts with an existing facility toward RPS goals, RPS-obligated load-serving entities must contract for deliveries equal to at least 0.25 percent of their prior year's retail sales through long-term contracts or through short-term contracts with new facilities.

PG&E was in compliance with the minimum quantity set forth in D.07-05-028 for 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 and expects to be in compliance for 2012 as well.

#### **H. Tier 2 Short-Term Contract "Fast Track" Process**

PG&E is not submitting this contract under the "Fast Track" Process.

#### **I. Market-Price Referent**

The actual price under the Amendment is confidential, market-sensitive information. As the Amendment provides for a price adjustment, it is appropriate to compare the amended price with the most recently approved MPR and the TOD factors associated with that solicitation year,<sup>13</sup> which would be the 2011 MPR established in Resolution E-4442 on December 1, 2011. Because there is no MPR for contracts of less than five years, PG&E compared the Amendment to the 2011 MPR for a five year contract starting in 2012. The price under the Amendment is above this MPR. Total cost information is discussed in Confidential Appendices A and D.

#### **J. Above-Market Funds**

The Amendment is not eligible for AMF because it resulted from bilateral negotiations.

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<sup>13</sup> See Resolution E-4199 at 36 ("Contracts re-filed for approval of a price amendment should be compared against the most recently approved set of MPRs and the TODs associated with that solicitation year.")

Notwithstanding the fact that the Amendment is not AMF-eligible, an AMF analysis of the Amendment is included in Confidential Appendix D, in accordance with CPUC requirements.

### **K. Compliance With Interim Emissions Performance Standard**

In D.07-01-039, the Commission adopted an Emissions Performance Standard (“EPS”) that applies to new and renewed contracts for a term of five or more years for baseload generation with an annualized plant capacity factor of at least 60 percent. The Amendment is not a form of covered procurement subject to the EPS, because the Amendment is not a new or renewed contract for a term of five or more years. Notification of compliance with D.07-01-039 is provided through this Advice Letter, which has been served on the service list in the RPS rulemaking, R.11-05-005.

### **L. Procurement Review Group Participation**

The Procurement Review Group (“PRG”) for PG&E includes the Commission’s Energy Division and Division of Ratepayer Advocates, Department of Water Resources, Union of Concerned Scientists, The Utility Reform Network, the California Utility Employees, and Jan Reid, as a PG&E ratepayer. The Amendment was discussed at a meeting on December 13, 2011. Additional information is provided in Confidential Appendix A.

### **M. Independent Evaluator**

The IE, Arroyo Seco Consulting, evaluated the Amendment. The findings of the IE regarding the Amendment are contained in Confidential Appendix C and Public Appendix I. The IE supports CPUC approval of the Amendment.<sup>14</sup>

### **N. Consistency With Decision Implementing Portfolio Content Categories**

SB 2 1X set out three portfolio content categories that apply to RPS-eligible generation associated with RPS procurement contracts signed after June 1, 2010. The Commission recently described these three categories in detail in D.11-12-052. In that decision, the Commission also required the investor-owned utilities to include in their advice letters

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<sup>14</sup> See Public Appendix I at p. 51 (“Arroyo concurs with PG&E management that the SPC contract amendment merits CPUC approval;” “In Arroyo’s opinion the contract amendment offers moderate to high net value, low to moderate price, and high project viability.”)

an upfront showing related to the categorization of their RPS procurement transactions signed after June 1, 2010.<sup>15</sup>

The PPA was originally signed prior to June 1, 2010, and thus is exempt from the D.11-12-052 categorization requirements for new RPS procurement.<sup>16</sup> The procurement associated with the Amendment counts in full toward procurement requirements in effect prior to SB 2 1X as long as it satisfies the following three statutory requirements:<sup>17</sup>

- (1) The renewable energy resource was eligible under the rules in place as of the date when the contract was executed.
- (2) For an electrical corporation, the contract has been approved by the commission, even if that approval occurs after June 1, 2010.
- (3) Any contract amendments or modifications occurring after June 1, 2010, do not increase the nameplate capacity or expected quantities of annual generation, or substitute a different renewable energy resource. The duration of the contract may be extended if the original contract specified a procurement commitment of 15 or more years.

The generation associated with the existing PPA qualified as RPS-eligible renewable energy under the rules in place when it was executed and, as mentioned above, the existing PPA was approved by Commission Resolution E-3835 on October 16, 2003. The Amendment does not increase the nameplate capacity for the Project or the expected quantities of annual generation and the duration remains unchanged under the Amendment.

### **III. Project Development Status**

#### **A. Company/Development Team**

Sierra Power developed the project in the 1980s. The Facility's engineering, procurement, and construction was managed by Wellons, Inc. Wellons is an experienced engineering and construction manager of biomass-fueled generators.

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<sup>15</sup> D.11-12-052 at p. 10.

<sup>16</sup> *Id.* at pp. 62-63.

<sup>17</sup> Pub. Util. Code Section 399.16(d).

## **B. Technology**

Sierra Power is an existing biomass Facility with a contract capacity of 6 MW and a gross nameplate capacity of 7.5 MW. It has been delivering energy to PG&E since December 2003 under the existing PPA. The Amendment does not involve any changes to the generating technology.

### **1. Technology Type and Level of Technology Maturity**

The Facility's generating technology was already mature when the project was constructed in the 1980s. It uses a Wellons four-cell cyclo-blast furnace, a Nebraska A-Style boiler and a Westinghouse turbine.

### **2. Quality of Renewable Resource**

The Facility is based on well established and proven biomass technology, and there is sufficient available fuel to serve the PPA. Sierra Power consumes approximately 75,000 Bone Dry Tons of biomass chips each year. The adjacent sawmill, Sierra Forest Products, supplies approximately 20% of the Facility's fuel.

The Facility is located in Terra Bella, CA, approximately 35 miles from a large agricultural area, where there are thousands of acres of citrus, almonds, pistachios, stone fruit and grape vineyards. Whole orchard tree removal supplies about 50% of the Facility's fuel.

Urban/construction waste constitutes the remaining 30% of Sierra's annual fuel needs. Tree trimmings, pallets, construction wood trim ends and other woody waste from the Los Angeles area are the main contributors to the urban waste fuel type. Sierra has had a relationship with its main urban waste supplier for many years.

### **3. Other Resources Required**

No other resources are required.

## **C. Development Milestones**

The Facility is operational and the Amendment does not introduce any new development milestones.

**1. Site Control**

The Facility is an existing power plant with full site control.

**2. Equipment Procurement**

The capital equipment necessary for operations is already in place.

**3. Permitting/Certification Status**

As an existing operational facility, Sierra Power has all necessary permits for the continuation of delivery of energy.

**4. Production Tax Credit/Investment Tax Credit**

The Facility does not receive any Production Tax Credits or Investment Tax Credits.

**5. Transmission**

The existing Facility does not require any transmission-related upgrades.

**D. Financing Plan**

Not applicable. The Facility is operational and Sierra Power has no plans to finance any Facility upgrades or maintenance.

**IV. CONTINGENCIES AND/OR PROJECT MILESTONES**

This section is not applicable as the Facility is operational and the Amendment does not introduce any new development milestones.

**V. REGULATORY PROCESS****A. Requested Effective Date**

PG&E requests that the Commission issue a resolution approving this advice filing by September 13, 2012. PG&E requests a September 13, 2012 resolution date so that Sierra Power can receive additional revenues to support continued operation of the Facility as soon as is reasonably possible.

**B. Earmarking**

PG&E reserves the right to earmark deliveries from the PPA.

**VI. REQUEST FOR COMMISSION APPROVAL**

PG&E requests that the Commission issue a resolution no later than September 13, 2012, that:

1. Approves the Amendment in its entirety, including payments and the true-up to be made by PG&E pursuant to the Amendment, subject to the Commission's review of PG&E's administration of the Amendment.
2. Finds that any procurement pursuant to the Amendment is procurement from eligible renewable energy resources for purposes of determining PG&E's compliance with any obligation that it may have to procure eligible renewable energy resources pursuant to the California RPS (Public Utilities Code Section 399.11 et seq.), D.03-06-071 and D.06-10-050, or other applicable law.
3. Finds that all procurement and administrative costs, as provided by Public Utilities Code section 399.13(g), associated with the PPA as amended by the Amendment shall be recovered in rates.
4. Adopts the following finding of fact and conclusion of law in support of CPUC Approval:
  - a. The PPA, as amended by the Amendment, is consistent with PG&E's 2011 RPS procurement plan.
  - b. The terms of the PPA, as amended by the Amendment, including the price of delivered energy, are reasonable.
5. Adopts the following finding of fact and conclusion of law in support of cost recovery for the PPA as amended by the Amendment:
  - a. The utility's costs under the PPA as amended by the Amendment shall be recovered through PG&E's Energy Resource Recovery Account.
  - b. Any stranded costs that may arise from the PPA as amended by the Amendment are subject to the provisions of D.04-12-048 that authorize recovery of stranded renewables procurement costs over the life of the

contract. The implementation of the D.04-12-048 stranded cost recovery mechanism is addressed in D.08-09-012.

6. Adopts the following findings with respect to resource compliance with the EPS adopted in R.06-04-009:
  - a. The Amendment is not a form of covered procurement subject to the EPS, because the Amendment is not a new or renewed contract for a term of five or more years.
7. Adopts a finding of fact and conclusion of law that deliveries from the Amendment shall count in full toward PG&E's RPS requirements and shall be exempt from the RPS portfolio content category requirements because the original PPA and the Amendment meet the criteria set forth in Section 399.16(d) of the Public Utilities Code.

### **Protests:**

Anyone wishing to protest this filing may do so by sending a letter by **March 21, 2012**, which is **20** days from the date of this filing. The protest must state the grounds upon which it is based, including such items as financial and service impact, and should be submitted expeditiously. Protests should be mailed to:

CPUC Energy Division  
Attention: Tariff Unit, 4<sup>th</sup> Floor  
505 Van Ness Avenue  
San Francisco, California 94102

Facsimile: (415) 703-2200  
E-mail: [mas@cpuc.ca.gov](mailto:mas@cpuc.ca.gov) and [jjn@cpuc.ca.gov](mailto:jjn@cpuc.ca.gov)

Copies should also be mailed to the attention of the Director, Energy Division, Room 4004, and Honesto Gatchalian, Energy Division, at the address shown above.

The protest also should be sent via U.S. mail (and by facsimile and electronically, if possible) to PG&E at the address shown below on the same date it is mailed or delivered to the Commission:

Pacific Gas and Electric Company  
Attention: Brian K. Cherry  
Vice President, Regulation and Rates  
77 Beale Street, Mail Code B10C  
P.O. Box 770000  
San Francisco, California 94177  
Facsimile: (415) 973-6520  
E-Mail: PGETariffs@pge.com

**Effective Date:**

PG&E requests that the Commission issue a resolution approving this advice filing on September 13, 2012.

**Notice:**

In accordance with General Order 96-B, Section IV, a copy of this Advice Letter excluding the confidential appendices is being sent electronically and via U.S. mail to parties shown on the attached list and the service lists for R.11-05-005, and R.10-05-006. Non-market participants who are members of PG&E's Procurement Review Group and have signed appropriate Non-Disclosure Certificates will also receive the Advice Letter and accompanying confidential attachments by overnight mail. Address changes to the General Order 96-B service list should be directed to PGETariffs@pge.com. For changes to any other service list, please contact the Commission's Process Office at (415) 703-2021 or at Process\_Office@cpuc.ca.gov. Advice letter filings can also be accessed electronically at <http://www.pge.com/tariffs>.



Vice President – Regulation and Rates

cc: Service List for R.11-05-005  
Service List for R.10-05-006  
Paul Douglas – Energy Division  
Jason Simon – Energy Division  
Adam Schultz – Energy Division  
Joseph Abhulimen – DRA  
Cynthia Walker – DRA

Attachments

**Limited Access to Confidential Material:**

The portions of this Advice Letter marked Confidential Protected Material are submitted under the confidentiality protection of Section 583 and 454.5(g) of the Public Utilities Code and General Order 66-C. This material is protected from public disclosure because it consists of, among other items, the Amendment itself, price information, and analysis of the proposed RPS Amendment, which are protected pursuant to D.06-06-066 and D.08-04-023. A separate Declaration Seeking Confidential Treatment regarding the confidential information is filed concurrently herewith.

**Confidential Attachments:**

**Appendix A – Consistency with Commission Decisions and Rules and Project Development Status**

**Appendix B –2011 Solicitation Overview**

**Appendix C – Independent Evaluator Report (Confidential)**

**Appendix D – Contract Amendment Summary**

**Appendix E – Non-Modifiable Terms in Amendment to Power Purchase Agreement**

**Appendix F – Amendment to Sierra Power Power Purchase Agreement**

**Appendix G – Project’s Contribution Toward RPS Goals**

**Appendix H – Attestation of Kent Duysen, President of Sierra Power Corporation**

**Public Attachments:**

**Appendix I – Independent Evaluator Report (Public)**

# CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

## ADVICE LETTER FILING SUMMARY ENERGY UTILITY

MUST BE COMPLETED BY UTILITY (Attach additional pages as needed)

Company name/CPUC Utility No. **Pacific Gas and Electric Company (ID U39 E)**

Utility type:

ELC       GAS  
 PLC       HEAT       WATER

Contact Person: Meredith Allen and Kimberly Chang

Phone #: (415) 973-2368 and (415) 972-5472

E-mail: meae@pge.com and kwcc@pge.com

EXPLANATION OF UTILITY TYPE

ELC = Electric      GAS = Gas  
PLC = Pipeline      HEAT = Heat      WATER = Water

(Date Filed/ Received Stamp by CPUC)

Advice Letter (AL) #: **4007-E**

Tier: **3**

Subject of AL: **Amendment to an Existing Power Purchase Agreement for Procurement of Eligible Renewable Energy Resources Between Sierra Power Corporation and Pacific Gas and Electric Company**

Keywords (choose from CPUC listing): Contracts, Portfolio

AL filing type:  Monthly  Quarterly  Annual  One-Time  Other \_\_\_\_\_

If AL filed in compliance with a Commission order, indicate relevant Decision/Resolution #:

Does AL replace a withdrawn or rejected AL? If so, identify the prior AL: No

Summarize differences between the AL and the prior withdrawn or rejected AL: \_\_\_\_\_

Is AL requesting confidential treatment? If so, what information is the utility seeking confidential treatment for: Yes. See the attached matrix that identifies all of the confidential information.

Confidential information will be made available to those who have executed a nondisclosure agreement:  Yes  No All members of PG&E's Procurement Review Group who have signed nondisclosure agreements will receive the confidential information.

Name(s) and contact information of the person(s) who will provide the nondisclosure agreement and access to the confidential information: Gillian Clegg (415) 973-1332

Resolution Required?  Yes  No

Requested effective date: **September 13, 2012**

No. of tariff sheets: N/A

Estimated system annual revenue effect (%): N/A

Estimated system average rate effect (%): N/A

When rates are affected by AL, include attachment in AL showing average rate effects on customer classes (residential, small commercial, large C/I, agricultural, lighting).

Tariff schedules affected: N/A

Service affected and changes proposed<sup>1</sup>: N/A

Pending advice letters that revise the same tariff sheets: N/A

Protests, dispositions, and all other correspondence regarding this AL are due no later than 20 days after the date of this filing, unless otherwise authorized by the Commission, and shall be sent to:

**CPUC, Energy Division**

**Tariff Files, Room 4005**

**DMS Branch**

**505 Van Ness Ave.,**

**San Francisco, CA 94102**

**jnj@cpuc.ca.gov and mas@cpuc.ca.gov**

**Pacific Gas and Electric Company**

**Attn: Brian Cherry**

**Vice President, Regulation and Rates**

**77 Beale Street, Mail Code B10C**

**P.O. Box 770000**

**San Francisco, CA 94177**

**E-mail: PGETariffs@pge.com**

**DECLARATION OF GILLIAN CLEGG  
SEEKING CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT  
FOR CERTAIN DATA AND INFORMATION CONTAINED IN  
ADVICE LETTER 4007-E  
(PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY - U 39 E)**

I, Gillian Clegg, declare:

1. I am presently employed by Pacific Gas and Electric Company ("PG&E"), and have been an employee at PG&E since 2007. My current title is Principal within PG&E's Energy Procurement organization. In this position, my responsibilities include negotiating PG&E's Renewables Portfolio Standard Program ("RPS") Power Purchase Agreements. In carrying out these responsibilities, I have acquired knowledge of PG&E's contracts with numerous counterparties and have also gained knowledge of the operations of electricity sellers in general. Through this experience, I have become familiar with the type of information that would affect the negotiating positions of electricity sellers with respect to price and other terms, as well as with the type of information that such sellers consider confidential and proprietary.

2. Based on my knowledge and experience, and in accordance with Decision ("D") 08-04-023 and the August 22, 2006 "Administrative Law Judge's Ruling Clarifying Interim Procedures for Complying with Decision 06-06-066," I make this declaration seeking confidential treatment of Appendices A - H to PG&E's Advice Letter 4007-E, submitted on March 1, 2012.

3. Attached to this declaration is a matrix identifying the data and information for which PG&E is seeking confidential treatment. The matrix specifies that the material PG&E is seeking to protect constitutes the particular type of data and information listed in Appendix 1 of D.06-06-066 and Appendix C of D.08-04-023 (the "IOU Matrix"), or constitutes information that should be protected under General Order 66-C. The matrix also specifies the category or

categories in the IOU Matrix to which the data and information corresponds, if applicable, and why confidential protection is justified. Finally, the matrix specifies that: (1) PG&E is complying with the limitations specified in the IOU Matrix for that type of data or information, if applicable; (2) the information is not already public; and (3) the data cannot be aggregated, redacted, summarized or otherwise protected in a way that allows partial disclosure. By this reference, I am incorporating into this declaration all of the explanatory text in the attached matrix.

I declare under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the State of California, that to the best of my knowledge, the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on March 1, 2012, at San Francisco, California.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
GILLIAN CLEGG

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY'S (U 39 E)**  
**Advice Letter 4007-E**  
**March 1, 2012**

**IDENTIFICATION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION**

Redaction Reference	1) The material submitted constitutes a particular type of data listed in the Matrix, as appended to D.06-06-066 (Y/N)	2) Which category or categories in the Matrix the data correspond to:	3) That it is complying with the limitations on confidentiality specified in the Matrix for that type of data (Y/N)	4) That the information is not already public (Y/N)	5) The data cannot be aggregated, redacted, summarized, masked or otherwise protected in a way that allows partial disclosure (Y/N)	PG&E's Justification for Confidential Treatment	Length of Time
<p><b>Document: Advice Letter 4007-E</b></p> <p>Appendix A</p>	<p>Y</p>	<p>Item VI B) Utility Bundled Net Open Position for Energy (MWh).</p> <p>Item VII G) Renewable Resource Contracts under RPS program - Contracts without SEPs.</p> <p>Item VII (un-numbered category following VII G) Score sheets, analyses, evaluations of proposed RPS projects.</p> <p>Item VIII A) Bid information and B) Specific quantitative analysis involved in scoring and evaluation of participating bids.</p> <p>General Order 66-C.</p>	<p>Y</p>	<p>Y</p>	<p>Y</p>	<p>This Appendix contains bid information and evaluations from the 2011 Solicitation; discusses, analyzes and evaluates the Project and the terms of the Amendment; analyzes the Amendment's contribution toward PG&amp;E's compliance with California's Renewables Portfolio Standard ("RPS") program; contains information concerning and analyses and evaluations of project viability; and contains confidential information of the counterparty. Disclosure of this information would provide valuable market sensitive information to competitors. Release of this information would be damaging to negotiations. Disclosure could also reveal PG&amp;E's remaining RPS net open energy position. In addition, if information about and evaluations of project viability is made public, it could harm the counterparties and adversely affect project viability. Finally, certain information has been obtained in confidence from the counterparty under an expectation of confidentiality. It is in the public interest to treat such information as confidential because if such information were made public, it would put the counterparty at a business disadvantage, could create a disincentive to do business with PG&amp;E and other regulated utilities, and could have a damaging effect on current and future negotiations with other counterparties.</p>	<p>For information covered under Item VII G) remain confidential for three years after the commercial operation date, or one year after expiration (whichever is sooner).</p> <p>For information covered under Item VI B) and Item VII (un-numbered category following VII G), remain confidential for three years.</p> <p>For information covered under Item VIII A), remain confidential until after final contracts submitted to CPUC for approval.</p> <p>For information covered under Item VIII B), remain confidential for three years after winning bidders selected.</p> <p>For information covered under General Order 66-C, remain confidential.</p>

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY'S (U 39 E)**  
**Advice Letter 4007-E**  
**March 1, 2012**

**IDENTIFICATION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION**

Redaction Reference	1) The material submitted constitutes a particular type of data listed in the Matrix, appended as Appendix 1 to D.06-06-066 (Y/N)	2) Which category or categories in the Matrix the data correspond to:	3) That it is complying with the limitations on confidentiality specified in the Matrix for that type of data (Y/N)	4) That the information is not already public (Y/N)	5) The data cannot be aggregated, redacted, summarized, masked or otherwise protected in a way that allows partial disclosure (Y/N)	PG&E's Justification for Confidential Treatment	Length of Time
Appendix B	Y	Item VIII A) Bid information and B) Specific quantitative analysis involved in scoring and evaluation of participating bids.	Y	Y	Y	This Appendix contains bid information and bid evaluations from the 2011 Solicitation. This information would provide market sensitive information to competitors and is therefore considered confidential. Furthermore, offers received outside of the solicitations are still under negotiation, further substantiating why releasing this information would be damaging to the negotiation process.	For information covered under Item VIII A), remain confidential until after final contracts submitted to CPUC for approval  For information covered under Item VIII B), remain confidential for three years after winning bidders selected.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY'S (U 39 E)**  
**Advice Letter 4007-E**  
**March 1, 2012**

**IDENTIFICATION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION**

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Appendix C	Y	<p>Item VII G) Renewable Resource Contracts under RPS program - Contracts without SEPs.</p> <p>Item VII (un-numbered category following VII G) Score sheets, analyses, evaluations of proposed RPS projects.</p> <p>Item VIII A) Bid information and B) Specific quantitative analysis involved in scoring and evaluation of participating bids.</p> <p>General Order 66-C.</p>	Y	Y	Y	<p>This Appendix contains bid information and evaluations from the 2011 Solicitation; discusses, analyzes and evaluates the Project and the terms of the Amendment; contains information, analyses, and evaluations of project viability; and it contains confidential information of the counterparty. Disclosure of this information would provide valuable market sensitive information to competitors. Release of this information would be damaging to negotiations with other counterparties and should remain confidential. In addition, if information about and evaluations of project viability is made public, it could harm the counterparty and adversely affect project viability.</p> <p>Finally, certain information has been obtained in confidence from the counterparty under an expectation of confidentiality. It is in the public interest to treat such information as confidential because if such information were made public, it would put the counterparty at a business disadvantage, could create a disincentive to do business with PG&amp;E and other regulated utilities, and could have a damaging effect on current and future negotiations with other counterparty.</p>	<p>For information covered under Item VII G) remain confidential for three years after the commercial operation date, or one year after expiration (whichever is sooner).</p> <p>For information covered under Item VII (un-numbered category following VII G), remain confidential for three years.</p> <p>For information covered under Item VIII A), remain confidential until after final contracts submitted to CPUC for approval.</p> <p>For information covered under Item VIII B), remain confidential for three years after winning bidders selected.</p> <p>For information covered under General Order 66-C, remain confidential.</p>

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY'S (U 39 E)**

Advice Letter 4007-E

March 1, 2012

**IDENTIFICATION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION**

Redaction Reference	1) The material submitted constitutes a particular type of data listed in the Matrix, appended as Appendix 1 to D.06-06-066 (Y/N)	2) Which category or categories in the Matrix the data correspond to:	3) That it is complying with the limitations on confidentiality specified in the Matrix for that type of data (Y/N)	4) That the information is not already public (Y/N)	5) The data cannot be aggregated, redacted, summarized, masked or otherwise protected in a way that allows partial disclosure (Y/N)	PG&E's Justification for Confidential Treatment	Length of Time
Appendix D	Y	Item VII (G) Renewable Resource Contracts under RPS program - Contracts without SEPs.  Item VII (un-numbered category following VII G) Score sheets, analyses, evaluations of proposed RPS projects.  Item VIII A) Bid information and B) Specific quantitative analysis involved in scoring and evaluation of participating bids.  General Order 66-C.	Y	Y	Y	This Appendix contains bid information and evaluations from the 2011 Solicitation; discusses, analyzes and evaluates the Project and the terms of the Amendment; and contains confidential information of the counterparty. Disclosure of this information would provide valuable market sensitive information to competitors. Release of this information would be damaging to negotiations with other counterparties and should remain confidential. Furthermore, the counterparty to the Amendment has an expectation that the terms of the Amendment will remain confidential.  It is in the public interest to treat such information as confidential because if such information were made public, it would put the counterparty at a business disadvantage, could create a disincentive to do business with PG&E and other regulated utilities, and could have a damaging effect on current and future negotiations with other counterparty.	For information covered under Item VII (G) remain confidential for three years after the commercial operation date, or one year after expiration (whichever is sooner).  For information covered under Item VII (un-numbered category following VII G), remain confidential for three years.  For information covered under Item VIII A), remain confidential until after final contracts submitted to CPUC for approval.  For information covered under Item VIII B), remain confidential for three years after winning bidders selected.  For information covered under General Order 66-C, remain confidential.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY'S (U 39 E)**

Advice Letter 4007-E

March 1, 2012

**IDENTIFICATION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION**

Redaction Reference	1) The material submitted constitutes a particular type of data listed in the Matrix, appended as Appendix 1 to D.06-06-066 (Y/N)	2) Which category or categories in the Matrix the data correspond to:	3) That it is complying with the limitations on confidentiality specified in the Matrix for that type of data (Y/N)	4) That the information is not already public (Y/N)	5) The data cannot be aggregated, redacted, summarized, masked or otherwise protected in a way that allows partial disclosure (Y/N)	PG&E's Justification for Confidential Treatment	Length of Time
Appendix E	Y	Item VII G) Renewable Resource Contracts under RPS program - Contracts without SEPs.	Y	Y	Y	This Appendix contains the Amendment for which PG&E seeks approval in the Advice Letter filing. Disclosure of certain terms of the Amendment would provide valuable market sensitive information to competitors. Release of this information would be damaging to negotiations with other counterparties and should remain confidential. Furthermore, the counterparty to the Amendment has an expectation that the terms of the Amendment will remain confidential.	For information covered under Item VII G), remain confidential for three years after the commercial operation date, or one year after expiration (whichever is sooner).
Appendix F	Y	Item VII G) Renewable Resource Contracts under RPS program - Contracts without SEPs.	Y	Y	Y	This Appendix contains the Amendment for which PG&E seeks approval in the Advice Letter filing. Disclosure of certain terms of the Amendment would provide valuable market sensitive information to competitors. Release of this information would be damaging to negotiations with other counterparties and should remain confidential. Furthermore, the counterparty to the Amendment has an expectation that the terms of the Amendment will remain confidential.	For information covered under Item VII G), remain confidential for three years after the commercial operation date, or one year after expiration (whichever is sooner).
Appendix G	Y	Item VII (un-numbered category following VII G) Score sheets, analyses, evaluations of proposed RPS projects. Item VI B) Utility Bundled Net Open Position for Energy (MWh).	Y	Y	Y	This Appendix contains information that, if disclosed, would provide valuable market sensitive information to competitors and allow them to see PG&E's remaining RPS net open energy position. Since negotiations are still in progress with other counterparties, this information should remain confidential for three years.	Remain confidential for three years.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY'S (U 39 E)**  
**Advice Letter 4007-E**  
**March 1, 2012**

**IDENTIFICATION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION**

Redaction Reference	1) The material submitted constitutes a particular type of data listed in the Matrix, appended as Appendix 1 to D.06-06-066 (Y/N)	2) Which category or categories in the Matrix the data correspond to:	3) That it is complying with the limitations on confidentiality specified in the Matrix for that type of data (Y/N)	4) That the information is not already public (Y/N)	5) The data cannot be aggregated, redacted, summarized, masked or otherwise protected in a way that allows partial disclosure (Y/N)	PG&E's Justification for Confidential Treatment	Length of Time
Appendix H	Y	General Order 66-C.	Y	Y	Y	This Appendix contains an Attestation from Sierra Power Corporation, which describes the need for the Amendment and includes information regarding Sierra Power's financial condition, facility operations, and fuel mix. Information about the counterparty's financial conditions and business plan is protected by General Order 66-C, paragraph 2.8	For information covered by General Order 66-C, remain confidential indefinitely.

**Public Appendix I**  
**Independent Evaluator Report**

ARROYO SECO CONSULTING

PACIFIC GAS AND  
ELECTRIC COMPANY  
BILATERAL CONTRACT  
AMENDMENT  
EVALUATION

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REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT  
EVALUATOR ON AN AMENDMENT TO THE  
CONTRACT WITH SIERRA POWER  
CORPORATION

FEBRUARY 14, 2012

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	3
1. ROLE OF THE INDEPENDENT EVALUATOR .....	4
2. ADEQUACY OF OUTREACH TO PARTICIPANTS AND ROBUSTNESS OF SOLICITATION.....	8
3. FAIRNESS OF OFFER EVALUATION AND SELECTION METHODOLOGY.....	15
4. FAIRNESS OF HOW PG&E ADMINISTERED THE OFFER EVALUATION AND SELECTION PROCESS.....	36
5. FAIRNESS OF PROJECT-SPECIFIC NEGOTIATIONS .....	49
6. MERIT FOR CPUC APPROVAL.....	50

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report provides an independent evaluation of the process by which the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (“PG&E”) negotiated and executed an amendment to an existing Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) with Sierra Power Corporation (“SPC”) for the output of its 7.5-MW (nameplate capacity) biomass-fueled cogeneration plant in the unincorporated community of Terra Bella, in southern Tulare County.

This contract amendment originated in an approach by SPC’s management to PG&E in early 2011, as it sought to renegotiate the terms of the existing PPA. An independent evaluator (IE), Arroyo Seco Consulting (Arroyo), conducted activities to review and assess PG&E’s processes as the parties negotiated a contract amendment.

The structure of this report follows the 2011 Independent Evaluator Report Template provided by the Energy Division of the CPUC. Topics covered include:

- The role of the IE;
- Adequacy of outreach for and robustness of the prior competitive solicitation;
- The fairness of the design of PG&E’s least-cost, best-fit (LCBF) methodology;
- The fairness of PG&E’s administration of its LCBF methodology;
- Fairness of project-specific negotiations; and
- Merit of the PPA for CPUC approval.

Arroyo’s opinion is that the negotiations between PG&E and SPC were conducted fairly. Arroyo agrees with PG&E that the contract amendment merits CPUC approval, based on an independently developed opinion that the contract will provide moderate to high net valuation, a low to moderate contract price, moderate portfolio fit with PG&E’s supply needs, and high project viability. Also, to the extent that the contract amendment makes it likelier that SPC will continue to operate and provide RPS-eligible to PG&E and jobs to its local community, the amendment supports specific legislative goals of the RPS program.

# 1. ROLE OF THE INDEPENDENT EVALUATOR

Pacific Gas and Electric Company issued a Request for Offers (RFO) on May 11, 2011, a competitive solicitation for power generation that qualifies as eligible renewable energy resources (ERRs) under the California Renewables Portfolio Standard Program.<sup>1</sup> The RPS Program was established by state law to ensure that retail sellers of electricity meet targets for procurement from ERRs as a percentage of annual retail sales.

The CPUC had conditionally approved PG&E's 2011 RPS procurement plan in its Decision 11-04-030 issued on April 14, 2011. This chapter elaborates on the prior CPUC decisions that form the basis for an Independent Evaluator's participation in the 2011 RPS RFO and in bilaterally negotiated contracts for RPS-eligible energy, describes key roles of the IE, details activities undertaken by the IE in this solicitation to fulfill those roles, and identifies the treatment of confidential information.

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## A. CPUC DECISIONS REQUIRING INDEPENDENT EVALUATOR PARTICIPATION

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The CPUC first mandated a requirement for an independent, third-party evaluator to participate in competitive solicitations for utility power procurement in Decision 04-12-048 on December 16, 2004 (Findings of Fact 94-95, Ordering Paragraph 28). The CPUC required use of an IE when Participants in a competitive procurement solicitation include affiliates of investor-owned utilities (IOUs), IOU-built projects, or IOU-turnkey projects. The Decision envisaged that establishing an IE role would serve as a safeguard against anti-competitive conduct in the process of evaluating IOU-built or IOU-affiliated projects competing against Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) with independent power developers.

In approving the IOUs' 2006 RPS procurement plans, the CPUC issued Decision 06-05-039 on May 25, 2006. This Decision expanded the CPUC's requirements, ordering that each IOU use an IE to evaluate and report on the entire solicitation, evaluation, and selection process, for the 2006 RPS RFO and future competitive solicitations. This requirement now applies whether or not IOU-owned or IOU-affiliate generation participates in the solicitation (Finding of Fact 20, Conclusion of Law 3, and Ordering Paragraph 8). This was intended by the CPUC to increase the fairness and transparency of the Offer selection process.

Decision 06-05-039 required the IE to report separately from the utility on the bid solicitation, evaluation, and selection process. Based on that Decision, the IE should provide a preliminary report along with the IOU submitting its short list.

Subsequently, as part of Rulemaking 08-08-009 to continue implementation of the RPS program, the CPUC issued Decision 09-06-050 on June 19, 2009. In that decision, the

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<sup>1</sup> The solicitation protocol was amended slightly on June 7, 2011 to alter the schedule for the RFO.

Commission concluded that short-term bilaterally negotiated contracts (e.g. those with term of less than ten years) should be governed by the same contract review processes and standards as contracts that arise through competitive solicitations, including review by an Independent Evaluator. This requirement applies to the amendment to the contract with Sierra Power Corporation.

In Resolution E-4199 issued on March 12, 2009, the CPUC ordered that in situations in which an existing RPS contract price is amended, and the amended contract has a price above the Market Price Referent (MPR), the seller will provide the Energy Division and the IE with cash flow models for the contract's original price and proposed new price. Resolution E-4199 orders the IE to submit a confidential report with the utility's advice letter filing that includes the IE's review of the models and evaluation of the change in model inputs.

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## B. KEY INDEPENDENT EVALUATOR ROLES

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To comply with the requirements ordered by the CPUC, PG&E retained Arroyo Seco Consulting to serve as IE for the 2011 competitive solicitation for renewable resources, providing an independent evaluation of the utility's Offer evaluation and selection process.

The CPUC stated its intent for participation of an IE in competitive procurement solicitations to "separately evaluate and report on the IOU's entire solicitation, evaluation and selection process", in order to "serve as an independent check on the process and final selections."<sup>2</sup> More specifically, the Energy Division of the CPUC has provided a template to guide how IEs should report on the 2011 RPS competitive procurement process, outlining four specific issues that should be addressed:

- Describe the IE's role;
- Did the IOU do adequate outreach to potential bidders, and was the solicitation robust?
- Was the IOU's LCBF methodology designed such that bids were fairly evaluated?
- Was the LCBF bid evaluation process fairly administered?

The structure of this report, setting out detailed findings for each of these issues, is organized around the template provided by the ED.

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## C. IE ACTIVITIES

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To fulfill the role of evaluating PG&E's 2011 solicitation, several tasks were undertaken, both prior to Offer Opening and subsequently; these activities had direct application to the evaluation of the Sierra Power Corporation contract amendment. Prior to Offer Opening

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<sup>2</sup> CPUC Decision 06-05-039, May 25, 2006, "Opinion Conditionally Approving Procurement Plans for 2006 RPS Solicitations, Addressing TOD Benchmarking Methodology", page 46.

on June 22, 2011, Arroyo performed several tasks to assess PG&E's methodology for evaluating Offers:

- Reviewed the solicitation and its attachments including PG&E's 2011 Form Agreements and description of the LCBF methodology and criteria.
- Examined the utility's nonpublic protocols detailing how PG&E would evaluate Offers against various criteria.
- Attended PG&E's Bidders' Conference on May 19, 2011 to evaluate the information provided to potential Participants, and how that information was distributed.
- Reviewed the list of registered attendees of the Bidders' Conference against PG&E's master list of RFO contacts (used for outreach to potential Participants).
- Reviewed the posting of questions and answers from the Bidders' Conference on PG&E's public website to check whether information that was made available in-person to conference attendees was also provided to other potential Participants.
- Examined PG&E's 2011 RFO master contact list; performed an analysis of contacts with respect to industry and technology representation.
- Interviewed members of PG&E's evaluation committee regarding details of the 2011 version of the utility's LCBF methodology and its inputs.

During the period between Offer Opening and PG&E's development of a final short list for submittal to the CPUC, Arroyo's activities included:

- Participating in opening Offers. Arroyo observed the opening of each Offer and observed the PG&E team logging in each Offer. The IE took an electronic copy of each Offer package, and independently built a database for tracking Offers.
- Reading portions of each Offer. Arroyo particularly scrutinized Offers for utility purchase. For PPA Offers, Arroyo focused on pricing, collateral, interconnection, permitting, technology, resource assessment, site control, and development and ownership experience descriptions in detail.
- Building an independent valuation model and using it to value Offers. This served as a cross-check against PG&E's LCBF model. The IE model used independent inputs and a different methodology than PG&E's. It was much simpler and lacked detail and granularity used in the PG&E model. However, the independent valuation was useful for testing the PG&E team's ranking of Offers using alternate assumptions.
- Attending PG&E's evaluation team discussions of Offers, criteria, issues, etc.
- Scoring Offers independently for viability, using the ED's 2011 version of the Project Viability Calculator. The independently developed Offer valuations and

viability scores provided part of the basis for developing an independent view of the relative merit of Offers that the PG&E team selected or rejected.

- Reviewing PG&E’s scoring of Offers for the criteria other than market valuation and project viability, testing for consistency and fairness in the treatment of projects.
- Attending meetings of PG&E’s steering committee, as it made decisions about the logic for selecting a short list and approved proposed selections for the short list.
- Attending meetings of PG&E’s Procurement Review Group (PRG), including answering questions about the solicitation and the Offers, and presenting an independent commentary and observations about the RFO.
- Offering PG&E’s evaluation team and steering committee commentary based on independent opinion. In a few cases Arroyo provided specific suggestions on particular topics such as the feasibility of specific out-of-state transmission proposals.

Additionally, in order to prepare this report on the amendment to the contract with Sierra Power Corporation, Arroyo pursued project-specific activities:

- Observed (telephonically) several negotiation sessions between utility staff and SPC’s management;
- Reviewed draft term sheets, draft contract amendments, and other documents passed between the parties;
- Performed an independent valuation of the amended SPC contract;
- Analyzed the input assumptions to SPC’s cash flow models and the models’ projections;
- Compared the net value and pricing of the amended SPC contract to peer groups consistent of alternative proposals available to PG&E.

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#### **D. TREATMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION**

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The CPUC’s Decision 06-06-066 detailed guidelines for treating confidential information in IOU power procurement and related activities, including competitive solicitations. The Decision provides for confidential treatment of “Score sheets, analyses, evaluations of proposed RPS projects”, vs. public treatment (after submittal of final contracts) of the total number of projects and megawatts bid by resource type. Where the IE’s reporting on the fairness of PG&E’s selection of Offers requires explicit discussion of such analyses, scores, and evaluations, these are handled in greater detail in this report’s confidential appendix.

## 2. ADEQUACY OF OUTREACH TO PARTICIPANTS AND ROBUSTNESS OF THE SOLICITATION

In its 2011 RPS solicitation, PG&E sought to meet a goal of procuring 1 to 2% of retail load by selecting Offers that will lead to negotiated contracts and commercially operating generating facilities. This section assesses the degree to which PG&E adequately conducted outreach activities to drum up sufficient participation in the RFO process, and the degree to which the resulting solicitation may be judged robust enough to be competitive.

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### A. CLARITY AND CONCISION OF SOLICITATION MATERIALS

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While not really concise (it totals 53 pages excluding attachments, vs. Edison's 46 pages and SDG&E's 24 pages), Arroyo believes that the contents of PG&E's 2011 RPS RFO solicitation protocol generally provided clear and comprehensible direction to Participants on how to prepare and submit complete Offer packages that could be accepted and evaluated. Arroyo has a few observations about the clarity of the guidance provided in the protocol and issues created when Participants failed to understand or follow that guidance:

- Most Offers were submitted as complete and conforming packages. Common deficiencies in other Offers included:
  1. Failure to submit the offer form (Attachment D) for all Offer variants or phases;
  2. Errors in filling in the offer form, such as missing data, incomplete project description, or incomplete self-scored Project Viability Calculator;
  3. Use of a earlier draft version of Attachment D from the original posting of the RFO documents, rather than the one finalized on June 2, 2011 and posted on PG&E's public web site then;
  4. Failure to provide the text and data of the Offer in the requested Microsoft Word 2003 and Excel 2003 formats (as opposed to later versions or to Acrobat .pdf files);
  5. Corrupted data files;
  6. Failure to submit the hardcopies of the Offer as clearly requested in the protocol;
  7. Failure to submit a copy of a completed CAISO or PTO interconnection study in cases where the project had progressed to the point where such a study had been obtained. This requirement was explicitly stated in the solicitation protocol but widely ignored by Participants; and

8. In the case of projects outside California and not directly interconnecting to the CAISO, failure to specify how power would be delivered to a CAISO intertie point with a firm schedule, or what arrangements would be made to deliver to the CAISO.

Since requirements for the offer form were addressed in the solicitation protocol, in the instruction sheet for the offer form, and in the bidders' workshop presentation, Arroyo can only surmise that many Participants neglected to pay attention to these small but important details. Sending deficiency letters to Participants who failed to provide required information and obtaining corrections was time-consuming for all involved, but in most cases corrected documents were provided by the Participants and were accepted by PG&E. Arroyo cannot identify any specific improvements to the clarity of the RFO materials that might have reduced the incidence of such Participant errors, other than editing the instructions for attachment D (e.g. restating in the offer form instructions the need to Enable Macros in MS Excel) or walking through the form step by step in a section of the bidders' conference.

- The 2011 solicitation protocol stated at least four preferences of the utility that are not specifically among the evaluation criteria, including preferences for:
  1. Projects considered bundled, in-state resources, over projects whose output will be considered renewable energy credits (RECs) for RPS compliance purposes;
  2. Projects that deliver to CAISO nodes within the PG&E service territory, as opposed to the territories of other utilities (CAISO or otherwise) or to an interface point at the boundary of the CAISO;
  3. Projects that contribute to PG&E's Resource Adequacy (RA) requirements, such as CAISO-interconnected projects with full deliverability, as opposed to energy-only projects in the CAISO or projects in other balancing area authorities for which deliverability or import capability of RA capacity throughout the contract term to PG&E has not yet been established.
  4. Projects that offer flexibility in on-line date, given regulatory uncertainty affecting PG&E's need for RPS-eligible energy in 2014 and 2015.<sup>3</sup>

Based on comments provided in feedback sessions after the RFO, it appeared that several Participants were not aware of these stated preferences, perhaps because the description of the preference fell outside the chapter of the solicitation protocol that describes how Offers were to be evaluated. Arroyo recommends that in the future PG&E should edit the protocol to clarify that these specific preferences can play an important role in selection, even though they are not among the evaluation criteria. This would improve the transparency of the selection process to Participants.

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<sup>3</sup> In PG&E's presentation at the bidders' conference, PG&E also expressed a preference that was not included in the solicitation protocol: "PG&E expects to focus on the latter part of the second (2014-2016) compliance period." It would have been helpful to state this preference clearly within the text of the protocol.

- The discussions that took place while debriefing non-shortlisted Participants after the RFO suggest that several developers did not understand the role of the Project Viability Calculator as a tool for assessing the likelihood that a proposed project could attain commercial operation and for screening proposals. Also, it is clear from how some Participants self-scored their projects that the Calculator’s scoring guidelines provided by the ED are broadly misunderstood or misinterpreted.

Several Participants did not or chose not to understand that the Calculator was designed such that the highest score for “project development experience” or “ownership/O&M experience” is assigned only if the development team has previously brought into operation at least two projects of the same technology and similar or larger MW capacity than that proposed. Some Participants could have improved their scores if they had read the guidelines more carefully and chosen to propose projects that could score higher based on those details. However, guidelines were provided in plain sight in the offer form. It is unclear how PG&E could have provided better guidance on how it uses the Calculator, beyond spending more time in the bidders’ workshop walking through each criterion in the Calculator in detail.

Given the bulk of material that PG&E needs to provide in its protocol, it is not surprising that it exceeds fifty pages. Arroyo cannot identify any straightforward way to make the protocol more concise; the material provided is generally needed to provide Participants with a full and transparent view of how the solicitation will function and with full disclosure about obligations and constraints that govern Participants if they choose to proceed. One possibility would be to reduce the information required in Offers to focus more narrowly on data needed to establish eligibility and to perform the evaluation.

When the utility solicited feedback from non-shortlisted Participants after closing the solicitation, the sense of the feedback provided by developers was that PG&E’s “solicitation was well organized” and “the most user-friendly of the three IOUs”, that “the instructions were pretty clear”, that in particular “the bidders’ conference was very informative” and that the utility team’s handling of questions and answers was responsive and helpful. Criticisms of the solicitation tended to focus on technical problems and burdensome nature of filling out the offer form, the priorities embedded in the Project Viability Calculator, the lack of transparency on what sort of projects were short-listed at what prices, the large volume and possible redundancy of information requested in the Offers, and that hardcopies of the Offer packages should not be required as opposed to electronic copies.

Overall, Arroyo believes that PG&E’s solicitation materials were clear, if not particularly concise, and that improvement opportunities to help ensure that more complete Offer packages are submitted in the future are minor. Improvements could be helpful in streamlining the process and increasing Participants’ satisfaction. Arroyo has some specific critiques regarding the solicitation protocol’s lack of transparency about Offers for sites for development, described in the next chapter.

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## B. ADEQUACY OF OUTREACH

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Here are some considerations used to evaluate whether PG&E performed successfully in reaching out to the community of renewable power developers:

- How many individuals were contacted? To what extent were these contacts in companies that develop renewable power?
- Was a diverse set of renewable technologies covered in the contacts, or was the outreach excessively focused on one or two technologies?
- How widely was information about the solicitation disseminated? Was information about the solicitation readily available to the public?
- To what extent did Participants appear well-informed about the details of the solicitation?


By May 2011, PG&E had compiled a general contact list for use in publicizing its RFOs, totaling more than 1,600 individuals; this is a significant increase from the version of the list used in the 2009 RPS solicitation, with closer to 1,100 contacts. PG&E appears to have been actively compiling contacts for outreach, including a contact list for the biogas industry.

When analyzed to attempt to assess which industries the contacts represented, the largest segment was made up of individuals active in the solar power sector, followed by wind power and biomass-based generation. Figure 1 displays the estimated shares by industry sector of these contacts. Note that this contact list is employed not just for renewable solicitations but for all-source RFOs as well.

Inspection of the contact list reveals that many of the major developers of renewable energy in North America are included, particularly among solar, wind, and geothermal developers. About 60% of the individual contracts represented organizations that could develop renewable generation or sell from existing facilities. Other contacts were with entities that provide services to renewable energy developers, such as attorneys, financing providers, consultants, equipment vendors, and wholesale marketers; it is unclear whether these providers sought to be on PG&E's RFO contact list in order to keep abreast of the solicitation or to develop business with renewable energy developers.

PG&E did not issue a press release to announce the issuance of the 2011 RPS RFO. However, news of the solicitation was picked up and reported in the electric power trade press, including publications such as [Global Power Report](#), [Megawatt Daily](#), [Power, Finance, and Risk](#), and [ReCharge](#). In addition, the detailed solicitation protocol and its attachments, the schedule, and other informational items were posted on PG&E's public website.

Figure 1. Breakdown of contact list by sector




Arroyo notes that news of PG&E’s RPS RFO was publicized not only in the trade press but also on the public websites of several law firms whose practices include a focus on renewable energy contract law, such as Allen Matkins, Davis Wright Tremaine, Stoel Rives, and Wilson Sonsini. The news of the RFO was also disseminated by the Geothermal Resources Council and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory.

Another indicator of the adequacy of outreach for the RFO was the response of attendees for the bidders’ conference. Figure 2 counts individuals, by sector, who registered for the conference (there is no means to check who actually attended). A turnout of more than 400 individuals represents a very strong response and expression of industry interest, and is an increase of about 70% over the registration for the 2009 RPS RFO bidders’ conference. The largest share of attendees represented the solar and wind sectors.

Arroyo estimates that out of the attendees at the 2011 bidders’ conference, about 55% were with firms that submitted Offers. This was a higher portion than in the 2009 bidders’ conference. This is an indication of successful outreach, in that the audience that registered for the conference was made up mostly of the staffs of developers, owners, or traders that were positioned to submit Offers, as opposed to vendors, attorneys, or consultants to developers, or to small entities that were not really prepared to propose projects.

Arroyo’s conclusion is that PG&E conducted substantial outreach to renewable power developers in North America. The number of individuals contacted, the distribution of the news of the solicitation in the electric power trade press, and the strikingly large attendance at the bidders’ conference and the decent yield of Offers submitted by conference attendees all suggest that PG&E’s overall outreach effort was strong and effective.

Figure 2. Breakdown of registration for bidders' conference




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### C. ROBUSTNESS OF THE SOLICITATION

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Here are some considerations used to evaluate whether PG&E performed successfully in conducting a robust solicitation:

- Was the response to the solicitation large enough for PG&E to expect to achieve its goal of procuring 1 – 2% of retail load, given the likely attrition of Offers between short list and commercial operation, without having to accept a majority of Offers?
- Was the response to the solicitation diverse with respect to technologies?
- Was the distribution of responses broadly represented by projects that were assessed as moderately or highly viable, or was there an excess of less viable Offers?

The Offers PG&E received totaled an immense volume of projected generation. If all the Offers were contracted they would total more than PG&E's entire retail load. Such a massive response to the RFO should provide plenty of opportunity for PG&E to negotiate, contract for, and procure the stated objective for the RFO of 1 to 2% of retail load. Total GWh/year volume elicited in Offers exceeded the 2009 RFO's response by more than 80%. This ratio of offered volume to targeted procurement volume reflects a remarkably healthy and robust response. More than 300 in-state projects were proposed for contracts, often with several variants (e.g. varying on-line dates, pricing packages, delivery terms, etc.).

The Offers submitted to the 2011 RPS RFO provided more technology diversity than those submitted to the 2009 RFO. There was a greater volume of 2011 proposals for

projects using technologies or resources that were weakly represented in the last solicitation. While it is difficult to attribute this to specific outreach activities by the utility, Arroyo is aware that PG&E staff had actively reached out in order to make potential Participants using these weakly represented technologies aware of the availability of the RPS RFO as a means to obtain long-term PPAs. Given the large number of Offers submitted in 2011 using the well-represented technologies such as solar and wind, Arroyo does not believe that the outreach activities of the utility were in any way unfair to those developer communities.

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#### D. ADEQUACY OF FEEDBACK FROM PARTICIPANTS

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After receiving notification that their Offers had been rejected, several of the non-shortlisted Participants expressed an interest in follow-up discussions to be debriefed on reasons for the decision. Arroyo participated in many of these sessions. Based on the number of debriefing sessions that took place (about fifty) and the extent to which the utility team obtained actionable commentary about the RFO from Participants, Arroyo believes that PG&E sought adequate feedback about the bidding and evaluation process.

In general these feedback sessions were welcomed by Participants. They created an opportunity for Participants to obtain a somewhat clearer view of how PG&E's evaluation criteria and preferences applied to their specific Offers, and of what factors played a role in the failure to select the Offers. Many Participants, when prompted to offer feedback on PG&E's solicitation materials and process, had generally positive commentary, including positive ratings for the format of the Offer (such as for the verification checks built into the spreadsheet), for the process and its fairness, for the helpfulness of the bidders' conference, and for the opportunity to debrief on the outcome of PG&E's selection. A variety of specific criticisms were offered, including some constructive suggestions that are summarized later in this report. Some major themes of the criticisms included:

- Data requirements for the written Offers were onerous;
- More transparency in characterizing the price of short-listed Offers would be preferred (often by Participants whose Offers were not short-listed and who aspire to submit their projects to future solicitations with improved pricing);
- The requirement for hardcopies of the Offers should be dropped in favor of electronic-only submittals; and
- More clarity on how the Project Viability Calculator guidelines are applied would be helpful; many Participants disagreed with the Calculator's design because they felt their Offers were unfairly disadvantaged by how scoring criteria are specified.

Arroyo's opinion is that PG&E's efforts to give and receive feedback after the close of the solicitation were adequate and quite helpful both to the utility and to those Participants who were willing to take part in a debriefing session.

### 3. FAIRNESS OF OFFER EVALUATION AND SELECTION METHODOLOGY

The key finding of this chapter is that PG&E's evaluation and selection methodology for identifying a short list for the 2011 RPS RFO was designed fairly, overall. Arroyo has some disagreements with the utility's approach.

The following discussion identifies principles for evaluating the methodology, describes it, evaluates its strengths and weaknesses, and identifies some specific issues with the methodology and its inputs that Arroyo recommends be addressed in future solicitations.

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#### A. PRINCIPLES FOR EVALUATING THE METHODOLOGY

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The Energy Division of the CPUC has usefully suggested a set of principles for evaluating the process used by IOUs for selecting Offers in competitive renewable solicitations, within the template intended for use by IEs in reporting. These include:

- The IOU bid evaluation should be based only on information submitted in bid proposal documents.
- There should be no consideration of any information that might indicate whether the bidder is an affiliate.
- Procurement targets and objectives were clearly defined in the IOU's solicitation materials.
- The IOU's methodology should identify quantitative and qualitative criteria and describe how they will be used to rank bids. These criteria should be applied consistently to all bids.
- The LCBF methodology should evaluate bids in a technology-neutral manner.
- The LCBF methodology should allow for consistent evaluation and comparison of bids of different sizes, in-service dates, and contract length.

Some additional considerations appear relevant to PG&E's specific situation. Unlike some utilities, PG&E does not rely on weighted-average calculations of scores for evaluation criteria to arrive at a total aggregate score. Instead, the team ranks Offers by net market value, after which, "[u]sing the information and scores in each of the other evaluation criteria, PG&E will decide which Offers to include and which ones not to include on the Shortlist."<sup>4</sup> The application of judgment in bringing the non-valuation criteria to bear on

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<sup>4</sup>Pacific Gas and Electric Company, "Renewables Portfolio Standard, 2011 Solicitation Protocol, May 11, 2011 (Updated June 7, 2011)", page 40.

decision-making, rather than a mechanical, quantitative means of doing so, implies an opportunity to test the fairness and consistency of the method using additional principles:

- The methodology should identify how non-valuation measures will be considered; non-valuation criteria used in selecting Offers should be transparent to Participants.
- The logic of how non-valuation criteria or preferences are used to reject higher-value Offers and select lower-value Offers should be applied consistently and without bias.
- The valuation methodology should be reasonably consistent with industry practices.

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#### **B. PG&E'S LEAST-COST BEST-FIT METHODOLOGY**

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The California legislation that mandated the RPS program required that the procurement process use criteria for selection of least-cost and best-fit renewable resources; in Decisions D.03-06-071 and D.04-07-029 the CPUC issued detailed guidelines for the IOUs to select LCBF renewable resources. PG&E adopted Offer selection and evaluation processes and criteria for its 2011 RPS RFO. These are summarized in Section XI of PG&E's 2011 Solicitation Protocol for its renewable solicitation, and detailed in its Attachment K.

Additionally, PG&E developed non-public documents for internal use that detail the protocols for each individual criterion used in the evaluation process. These include:

- Market valuation
- Portfolio fit
- Project viability
- RPS goals
- Adjustment for transmission cost adders
- Ownership eligibility
- Sites for development

The first five of these are listed as evaluation criteria in the 2011 RPS RFO solicitation protocol (in contrast to prior years, PG&E did not score Offers on Credit). Additionally, the protocol states two other criteria: the materiality and cost impact of Participants' proposed modifications to the RFO's requirements and to the PPA, and the total volume of offers submitted by a single counterparty (considering the volume of energy already under contract as well). In other words, PG&E stated that it will take into account the degree to which Participants have proposed changes to its 2011 RPS Form Agreement for contracting, and the degree of supplier concentration in contracts with individual counterparties.

This section summarizes PG&E's methodology briefly and at a high level; readers are referred to PG&E's 2011 RPS Solicitation Protocol and its Attachment K for a fuller treatment of the detailed methodology.

## MARKET VALUATION

PG&E measures market value as benefits minus costs. Benefits include energy value and capacity value (Resource Adequacy); ancillary services value is assumed zero. Costs are PG&E's payments to the Participant, adjusted by Time-of-Delivery (TOD) factors as specified in the solicitation protocol. TOD factors serve as multipliers to the contract price per megawatt-hours (MWh) based on the time of day and season of the delivery, and are intended to reflect the relative value of the energy and capacity delivered in those time periods. Also, costs are adjusted to reflect transmission adders. The costs of integrating an intermittent resource into the electric system, such as load-following, providing imbalance services, operational reserves, and regulation, are assumed zero. Both benefits and costs are discounted from the entire contract period to 2011 dollars per MWh in the methodology.

PG&E measures energy value by projecting a forward energy curve (in hourly granularity) out to the time horizon of the contract period, and multiplying projected hourly energy price by the projected hourly generation specified by the Offer's generation profile. For dispatchable Offers, the protocol uses a real-option pricing model to measure energy benefit.

PG&E develops an outlook for the value of Resource Adequacy capacity as a time series of nominal dollar per kilowatt-year estimates. The CPUC established specific guidelines for estimating RA capacity.<sup>5</sup> Also, the CPUC decided to base Net Qualifying Capacity on a 70% exceedance level for solar and wind resources whose output is stochastic in nature, in a calculation that takes into account diversity benefits of multiple individual generators with different profiles. In 2011, the PG&E team has adapted its methodology for estimating the RA capacity of as-yet-unbuilt projects to match the CPUC guidance more closely. Capacity benefit is calculated as the product of capacity value and quantity, and discounted to 2011 nominal dollars.

## PORTFOLIO FIT

For the 2011 renewable solicitation, PG&E employed a quantitative scoring system to assess the portfolio fit of an Offer into its overall set of energy resources and obligations. The team calculated one score for the firmness of delivery of the offered resource and another score for the time of delivery of the resource (relative to PG&E's portfolio needs). The overall score for portfolio fit is the numerical average of the two.

## PROJECT VIABILITY

PG&E employed the Energy Division's final 2011 version of the Project Viability Calculator to assess the likelihood that a proposed generation facility will be completed and enter full commercial operation by the proposed on-line date. The CPUC suggested that the Calculator is intended for use as a screening tool rather than a dispositive means of making

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<sup>5</sup> California Public Utilities Commission, Decision 09-06-028, "Decision Adopting Local Procurement Obligations for 2010 and Further Refining the Resource Adequacy Program", June 18, 2009.

selection decisions.<sup>6</sup> PG&E was also willing to use its business judgment in assessing the relative viability of projects rather than relying solely on Calculator scores to make selections.

The viability score is developed through an assessment of several attributes of the project provided in the detailed Offer, including

- Project development experience,
- Ownership and operating and maintenance experience,
- Technical feasibility,
- Resource quality,
- Manufacturing supply chain (e.g. constraints upon availability of key components),
- Site control,
- Permitting status,
- Project financing status,
- Interconnection progress,
- Transmission requirements, and
- Reasonableness of Commercial Operation Date (COD).

The Energy Division provided a set of scoring guidelines for each of these criteria, in a helpful effort to standardize how a project would be assigned a score between zero and ten for each. The guidelines support the pursuit of consistency and fairness in rating the viability of proposed projects room for judgment; the combination of the Calculator and its guidelines should serve as a guide to developers on how projects will be assessed by IOUs.

More discussion about the utility of the Calculator as a standardized tool as it was applied in PG&E's 2011 RPS RFO is provided below in the section about the administration of the methodology and in the confidential appendix.

### RPS GOALS

PG&E assesses the degree to which the Offer is consistent with and will contribute to the state of California's goals for the RPS Program, and the degree to which the Offer will

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<sup>6</sup> California Public Utilities Commission, Decision 09-06-018, "Decision Conditionally Accepting 2009 Renewables Portfolio Standard Procurement Plans and Integrated Resource Plan Supplements", June 8, 2009, page 20. Arroyo agrees that it is imprudent to rely excessively on the numerical score to make a judgment about the likelihood a project will come on-line on schedule.

contribute to PG&E's goals for supplier diversity. The CPUC has articulated specific attributes of renewable generation projects which can be considered in utility procurement evaluations, such as benefits to low-income or minority communities, environmental stewardship, and resource diversity, that do not clearly fall within the other evaluation criteria. Similarly, the CPUC has issued a Water Action Plan, and to the extent a renewable energy project makes use of water on site, its proposed use of water is evaluated for consistency or inconsistency with the CPUC's recommended water conservation practices.

Additionally, the state Legislature articulated benefits anticipated for the RPS program in the Legislative Findings and Declarations associated with the laws passed to create the program, and PG&E assesses the degree to which Offers would promote these benefits.

The Governor of California issued Executive Order S-06-06 that, among other things, established a goal that the state will meet 20% of its renewable energy needs with electricity generated from biomass. PG&E assesses the extent to which an Offer supports that goal.

PG&E has well-defined corporate objectives for supplier diversity, and evaluates whether the Participant is, or will make a good faith effort to subcontract with, Women-, Minority-, and Disabled Veteran-owned Business Enterprises (WMDVBEs). In the 2011 RPS RFO PG&E asked Participants to submit a completed Supplier Diversity Questionnaire with information on the Participant's WMDVBE status, its intent to subcontract with diverse entities, and its own supplier diversity program. The PG&E team scored these questionnaires as part of evaluating Offers against the overall RPS Goals criterion. A change in the 2011 RFO is that PG&E stated that it will include in resulting PPAs a contractual requirement to make good-faith efforts towards a contracted supplier diversity target, and to report annual payments to diverse subcontractors. In Attachment L it requested Participants to specify the percentage of subcontracting spending would be to WMDVBEs.

#### TRANSMISSION COST ADDERS

The cost of transmission to move power from a project offered in the solicitation to PG&E retail customers is considered in valuation. The methodology takes into account the need to upgrade the transmission network in order to accommodate the increment of new renewable generation in locations (clusters) that may require significant capital outlay, either by PG&E or by other IOUs. Each California IOU publishes a Transmission Ranking Cost Report (TRCR) which identifies clusters that require network upgrades to accommodate new generation, and estimates a proxy for the cost of upgrades and the amount of new generation that would trigger the need for upgrades. If a CAISO interconnection study has been completed, the team generally uses the more project-specific estimate of transmission network upgrade costs identified in the study rather than the TRCR-based proxy (assuming that the Participant has included the study as part of its Offer package, as was required).

PG&E takes into account both the cost of upgrades required to achieve a reliable interconnection as well as the cost required to achieve a fully deliverable interconnection, for Offers that propose to obtain a full capacity interconnection. While PG&E did not require Participants to achieve full capacity interconnections in the RFO, Offers that proposed energy-only interconnections were not credited with any Resource Adequacy value.

The Solicitation Protocol and its Attachment K lay out the analysis required to allocate network upgrade costs to individual Offers. This includes the use of a model to calculate the present value of the impact of the network upgrade capital cost on revenue requirement, estimating in 2011 dollars per MWh the impact on customers of the upgrade.

This year, PG&E required Offers to specify a CAISO delivery point and a price at that point, rather than allowing them to propose delivery outside the CAISO. Alternatively, these Participants could propose to use a pseudo-tie arrangement or dynamic scheduling arrangement for the CAISO to manage delivery, despite a project's interconnection in a non-CAISO balancing authority area.

#### UTILITY OWNERSHIP ALTERNATIVES AND SITES FOR DEVELOPMENT

PG&E developed protocols for evaluating Offers proposing to sell the utility a site for development of renewable generation or to build a facility and transfer it to PG&E ownership. The evaluation of turnkey Offers includes an analysis of the project's value under PG&E ownership and a consideration of the extent to which ownership of such a project is compatible with the utility's core competencies.

There is little specific guidance about how PG&E evaluates the tradeoff between a PPA Offer variant and a Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) Offer variant (e.g. build and transfer to utility ownership) for the same project. Nor is there much guidance regarding how the utility evaluates compatibility of owning a project with PG&E's core competencies.

Similarly, both the public solicitation protocol and the non-public protocol give very little specific guidance about how PG&E evaluates Offers for sites for development, and Attachment K is silent on the subject. The protocol does not reveal what technologies PG&E would consider for such an Offer, what term is required, whether site sale or site lease is preferred, or any other requirements or preferences the utility applies when it evaluates proposed sites for development. In the actual event these Offers were evaluated based on criteria that were absent from both the public and non-public protocols, which Arroyo regards as less than fair to Participants. This lack of transparency detracts from the clarity of the RFO materials and contributed to wasted effort on the part of Participants.

#### COUNTERPARTY CONCENTRATION

In the 2011 RPS solicitation protocol, PG&E stated explicitly that it will consider its total exposure to volume of contracted deliveries from any individual counterparty and the volume already contracted with that party in making selection decisions. Arroyo regards supplier concentration as a legitimate business concern for the utility and its customers, both for credit risk for the utility's supply portfolio as well as risk of development failure.

This year, PG&E made an effort to avoid the prior practices of one or two individual developers that submitted excessively large numbers of Offers, by limiting the total number of Offers per Participant to five, with an exception for small Offers (up to ten Offers per Participant if the total capacity of Offers does not exceed 200 MW). Some developers still submitted more than five large Offers, and others circumvented the restriction by bringing in different part-owners for different groups of projects. Other developers submitted multiple Offers for projects owned by different subsidiaries or initially owned by other

developers while retaining an option to purchase the project if successful. Overall, these tactics used to avoid PG&E's stated limitation do not appear to have benefited those developers at all, but it created excess effort for the utility team; PG&E chose to evaluate all Offers (absent a screening evaluation it would be impossible to know which projects to reject).<sup>7</sup>

### PG&E'S PREFERENCES REGARDING OFFERS

In addition to the various evaluation criteria, PG&E's solicitation protocol states two preferences regarding selection of Offers. In section III regarding Solicitation Goals, the section on contract term refers to regulatory uncertainty regarding implementation rules on annual compliance goals and states that "PG&E will encourage bids that recognize that uncertainty and offer flexibility toward meeting a range of possible targets (e.g., varied online dates)". Arroyo views this as a reasonable preference to take into account when making a short list given the status of PG&E's RPS compliance position for the next several years.

PG&E also states in its solicitation protocol a preference for projects that deliver power to "a nodal delivery point...within PG&E's service territory" over projects that deliver to CAISO interface points (e.g. the California-Oregon Border, Mead, Palo Verde, or Four Corners substations) or to "California locations outside of the CAISO's control area" (e.g. points within the grids of the Western Area Power Administration, or WAPA, Imperial Irrigation District, or IID, non-CAISO municipal utilities such as the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, or LADWP, or non-CAISO rural electric cooperatives such as the Plumas-Sierra Rural Electric Cooperative), or to out-of-state locations.

Arroyo regards this as a reasonable preference, and appropriate to state in the protocol. Most of the operators of control areas external to the CAISO have in the past chosen not to provide imbalance service or operating reserves that would be required to enable an intermittent generator in their territory to schedule firm deliveries to a CAISO intertie. Also, contracting with projects that interconnect into PG&E's grid can have other benefits to the utility and its ratepayers, such as enhancing local voltage support. In situations where PG&E is cut off from other service territories (as for example the catastrophic collapse of SDG&E's and IID's systems in September 2011) the robustness of PG&E's system is enhanced by having renewable generation on line in its own territory rather than in other utilities' grids. Consequently Arroyo views PG&E's lower preference for out-of-state power or power delivered into non-CAISO control areas as based on legitimate business concerns.

A third area where PG&E's solicitation protocol does not quite express a preference or an evaluation criterion is in contract language modifications. The protocol states that the utility will assess the materiality and cost impact of the Participant's proposed modifications to PG&E's Form Agreement or standard term sheet. The inference is that the utility will generally prefer Offers where the Participant submits revisions and comments to the Form Agreement with modest or nil proposed changes to PG&E's standard terms and conditions

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<sup>7</sup> Some developers believed that the five-Offer limitation was too constraining in the situation where the company has a large "pipeline" of potential projects of multiple technologies. Other developers praised the five-Offer limitation, observing that "it was very intelligent to limit the size to five projects" because it avoided an even larger proposal response without affecting the short list, under the belief that the limit focuses developers' attention on their lowest-priced and most viable projects.

over Offers whose mark-ups demand unfair concessions, such as projects that propose to post Delivery Term Security that is far less than PG&E's standard requirement.

While Arroyo views these preferences as legitimate business concerns and as factors that are reasonable for PG&E to consider in deciding which Offers to select or reject for its short list, Arroyo is concerned that the transparency of how such preferences affect Offer selection could be improved. In the debriefing sessions for non-shortlisted Participants it seemed that some were unaware of the expressed preference for projects interconnecting within PG&E's grid, or for projects interconnecting within the CAISO, vs. projects delivering at a CAISO intertie point. Arroyo recommends that in future solicitations PG&E edit the solicitation protocol to help clarify that preference.

Also, it would have improved the clarity of the solicitation protocol if it had explicitly stated that PG&E's preference would "focus on the latter part of the 2014-2016 compliance period" as stated in the bidders' conference presentation. It appears, based on debriefings after the RFO's close, that several Participants missed that point and assumed that Offers with earlier on-line dates were preferred, as had previously been the case in PG&E's 2009 RPS RFO. Arroyo speculates that some Participants could have improved the attractiveness of their Offers had they been aware of this subtly stated preference and acted upon it.

#### SELECTION OF A SHORT LIST

Having ranked Offers by market valuation, including the impact of transmission adders, and having scored the Offers against the non-valuation criteria, the PG&E team decides which Offers to include on the short list. As stated in the solicitation protocol, the team ranks all conforming offers based on net value, then uses scores and information from the non-valuation criteria to decide which Offers to include on the list, and which to exclude.

In conditionally accepting the 3 California IOUs' procurement plans for 2011 RPS solicitations, the CPUC noted that "each utility may apply its own reasonable business judgment in running its solicitation, within the parameters" and guidance provided by the CPUC. This affords PG&E a certain degree of latitude in making decisions about how to use information about criteria such as Project Viability and RPS Goals and preferences such as service territory and on-line date in selecting Offers. Unlike other utilities that employ a weighted average of scores for all criteria as a determinative measure to make selection and rejection decisions, PG&E can, up to a point, use its judgment to select lower-valued Offers or less-viable Offers that have special attributes in meeting RPS Goals, for example.

A detailed discussion of specific choices the utility made in applying evaluation criteria and preference to selecting a short list is provided in the confidential appendix.

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#### **C. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF PG&E'S METHODOLOGY**

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PG&E's evaluation methodology for renewable energy solicitations has been revised over the course of several years, and its evolution has benefitted from input from IEs, the utility's PRG, and internal review. It has thus achieved a certain degree of refinement that has strengthened the process from the perspective of fairness and reasonableness.

## 1. MARKET VALUATION

General strengths and weaknesses. PG&E's valuation methodology has several advantages over methods used by other utilities:

- It is rooted in a comparison to market price forwards rather than to model outputs for hypothetical future market price based on inputs such as forecast demand, modeled supply increases, and fuel price scenarios.
- It is relatively rapid to turn around several valuations at once, in contrast to the burdensome nature of running multiple cases of traditional utility production cost models with dozens of cases for each generating unit assumed built vs. assumed not built to calculate system cost differences between scenarios with each unit in vs. out.
- It uses a valuation concept that is generally accepted in the electric power industry.
- It provides an intuitive valuation based on the degree to which a generating unit is "in the money" with respect to market price

There are some drawbacks with this approach, some of which are common to any valuation methodology for long-term PPAs:

- Because western power forward markets are not liquid and transparent beyond a limited time horizon, PPAs that last for up to 25 years must rely on extrapolation of market forward curves for valuation rather than on direct observation of traded prices for power two decades hence.
- A certain degree of interpolation or projection is required to achieve hourly granularity in price assumptions.
- In the absence of functioning, liquid, transparent markets in California for Resource Adequacy, the valuation must rely on fundamental forecasts for the value of capacity rather than on traded forward curves.
- There are challenges in estimating what Net Qualifying Capacity will be assigned by the CAISO to a project that does not yet exist. To a large extent PG&E must rely on the generation profiles provided by Participants, some of which appear to be of dubious quality.
- The methodology, given its inputs from forward curves, RA value assumptions, and discount rate, sometimes gives results that might appear counterintuitive, such as preferring higher-priced but longer-term contracts to lower-priced but shorter-term contracts, or preferring PPAs with later on-line dates to earlier on-line dates, all else being equal. Such outcomes can be explained by inspection of the data and input parameters and are consistent with the methodology. If the results run counter to the utility's or ratepayer's preferences, issues can be addressed through PG&E's flexibility to apply business judgment to its decisions.

- In the 2011 RPS solicitation, PG&E has used historical information about locational marginal price (LMP) to adjust the valuation of Offers based on the historical record. Attachment K to the solicitation protocol displayed the aggregation multipliers used to adjust for LMPs in various zones within the CAISO. Unfortunately, analogous multipliers had not been prepared for delivery points at intertie points of the CAISO; Arroyo recommends that prior to the next RFO the PG&E team investigate how best to make LMP adjustments for Offers that propose to deliver at such points.

Price vs. Value. PG&E’s LCBF methodology takes into account both proposed price and estimated net value of each Offer, in the sense that price is a key input to the utility’s valuation model. However, PG&E ranks Offers and Offer variants by calculated net value to make a primary screening for selection purposes, and does not construct or review a separate ranking by contract price. The valuation ranking takes into account the total cost to ratepayers of a PPA by including the contract payments (or purchase price) for a project and the transmission rate impact of required network upgrades and the effect of differing market prices across zones on the attractiveness of a project’s output. When reviewing Offers to make a short list, PG&E does include information on LCBF-based net value and pricing, but the focus is on net value including transmission cost impacts rather than on contract price.

Financial Benefits and Costs. Overall, PG&E’s LCBF methodology adequately takes into account nearly all financial benefits and costs of proposed Offers (see below for one exception). There are some areas that would be challenging for the evaluation team to quantify in financial terms. For example:

- Environmental externalities relating to the impact of new projects on wildlife or scarce water supplies are difficult to quantify as financial costs. A sub-team of PG&E’s evaluation team reviews such aspects of proposed projects as their potential impact on threatened and endangered species. While these concerns are not translated into estimates of financial costs, PG&E’s selection of a short list is informed by these data.
- Some local areas of PG&E’s grid could suffer from deficiencies in local capacity resources compared to requirements identified to maintain local reliability. For example, the CAISO has identified a deficiency of 36 MW of resources in the Sierra local area within PG&E’s territory.<sup>8</sup> It is difficult to quantify as financial benefits the extra benefit to grid reliability that would be provided by contracting with new resources in local areas with deficiencies.
- The California IOUs assume that the cost of integrating new resources into the electric system is zero, consistent with current CPUC policy. Utilities in other jurisdictions apply estimated costs of integration for intermittent resources when ranking the value of potential new projects, based on estimates of such components as obtaining sufficient load-following resources and voltage/frequency regulation. One might anticipate that at some point as load

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<sup>8</sup> California Independent System Operator, “2012 Local Capacity Technical Analysis: Final Report and Study Results”, April 29, 2011, page 2.

grows and as intermittent resources make up a greater proportion of the resource mix within the CAISO the price of increasingly scarce but required load-following and regulation may increase. This potential effect is not included in PG&E's valuation; there is no CEC-approved methodology for such an estimate.

Arroyo acknowledges the challenges of quantifying benefits and costs such as these in monetary terms, and opines that the PG&E LCBF methodology incorporates most financial benefits and costs that reasonably can be estimated at this point in time, with the following two exceptions.

Transmission upgrade costs. As described above, PG&E's LCBF methodology includes the costs of transmission upgrades in its value calculations of all Offers involving projects that propose to interconnect directly to the CAISO, using proxy costs from TRCRs or estimates of network upgrade costs from interconnection studies or executed interconnection agreements. However, the methodology does not take into account these costs in situations where the project proposes to interconnect outside the CAISO balancing authority area and the network costs are ultimately borne by transmission customers of that other balancing authority area. Arroyo believes that valuing projects in these areas without applying transmission adders while valuing projects within the CAISO with adders is less than fully fair to developers of projects within the territories of the three IOUs.

Arroyo recommends that PG&E incorporate estimates of transmission upgrade costs for Offers where projects propose to interconnect within California to non-CAISO balancing authority areas that are entirely or partially located within California. While Arroyo acknowledges that PG&E's ratepayers will not directly bear the costs of network upgrades in these other BAAs, the California ratepayers served directly by these balancing authorities will. Additionally, to the extent that PG&E procures energy from projects within such BAAs, taking delivery at a CAISO intertie point, PG&E's customers will pay a contract price for that power which recovers the cost of transmitting the project's output to the intertie, and those transmission tariffs will eventually reflect the cost of required network upgrades. However, in the 2011 RFO, Arroyo can identify at most one proposal whose selection or rejection might have differed if non-CAISO network upgrade costs had been counted.

Congestion charges. As described previously, the current implementation of the LCBF methodology does not count the congestion charges between certain distant CAISO delivery points and the EZ hubs internal to CAISO service territories. Arroyo recommends that the PG&E team develop estimates of LMP multipliers appropriate for these delivery points as it has done for zones within the main body of the CAISO grid.

## 2. EVALUATION OF PORTFOLIO FIT

The approach PG&E employed in the 2011 RPS RFO to score Offers on portfolio fit differed from that used in prior years. The current approach has specific advantages:

- The numerical score is based on quantitative calculations or on technology-specific attributes, and is objective in its development with little discretion or judgment involved in applying scoring guidelines.

- The scoring for time of delivery is closely related to how PG&E currently perceives its greatest needs for new RPS procurement, an important consideration for compliance strategy.

There are a few drawbacks to this approach:

- The current scoring approach is somewhat black and white; it tends to provide either a high score or a low score with few steps in between.
- In the greater scheme of things, the portfolio fit criterion does not appear to have as much impact as others such as market valuation, project viability, and RPS goals. To Arroyo's awareness there has not yet been a situation where a renewable Offer's superior portfolio fit score has enabled it to be shortlisted by PG&E despite inferior value or viability; nor has there been a situation where an inferior portfolio fit score has led an Offer to be rejected from a short list.

PG&E's revised portfolio fit criterion for the 2011 RPS solicitation is consistent with the utility's current understanding of its generation need for each compliance period under SBX 2. Arroyo has almost no visibility into how PG&E calculates its net short position of RPS-eligible energy procurement vs. RPS goals in the three compliance periods and can therefore have no opinion about whether that calculation was reasonable. To the extent information was made available to the utility's Procurement Review Group, it appears that the portfolio fit methodology aligns well with times when PG&E expects more procurement is needed.

The utility's estimates have considerable potential for error, both because of uncertainty about how the CPUC's implementation rules will set targets for intermediate years like 2014 and 2015, and because of uncertainty about the likelihood that contracted projects will come on-line and the extent to which projects whose PPAs are expiring will be recontracted.

### 3. EVALUATION OF BIDS WITH VARYING SIZES, IN-SERVICE DATES, AND CONTRACT LENGTH

Offer Size. PG&E's LCBF valuation methodology is essentially neutral to project size; it does not consider extrinsic variables such as MW capacity or GWh volume as positive or negative factors but rather reduces the value of the Offer to a normalized \$/MWh metric. To the extent project size has an impact on valuation, it reveals itself in the proposed contract price if the technology is one that provides economies of scale and enables developers to propose lower prices for larger projects.

The viability scoring system, however, is not neutral to project size. The larger the proposed project, the less likely it is that the developer has succeeded in the past in developing similar or larger sized projects, owned and operated similar or larger sized projects, or financed similar or larger sized projects. So the Offer is likelier to score lower on Project Development Experience, Ownership/O&M Experience, and Project Financing Status if the project is larger.

From the debriefings after the conclusion of the RFO, it became evident that many developers failed to appreciate that proposing new projects much larger than any they had

previously brought into operation will lower their viability score using the Energy Division's Project Viability Calculator. Other developers with deep experience in developing large projects in conventional technologies were unaware that the design of the Calculator did not fully take that experience into account in scoring when they proposed to construct large projects using a renewable technology with which they had no prior experience.

This left some non-selected Participants with a sense that the design of the Project Viability Calculator was unfair to them, arguing that it has a "rich get richer" aspect in which only those developers who have previously brought into operation large renewable energy projects can achieve the highest scores for developer and ownership experience for proposed new large renewable energy projects.

The fact that PG&E's objective for the 2011 solicitation is to procure 1 to 2% of retail load, combined with the RFO Goals non-quantitative factor of resource diversity, makes it difficult for the utility to select the very largest-volume proposals offered. An extreme hypothetical scenario in which the utility selects one Offer only of several TWh/year would be the opposite of pursuing resource diversity. The RFO Goals criterion gives PG&E the basis for preferring to select multiple smaller Offers rather than a very few large projects, in pursuit of greater resource diversity. This tradeoff between the criteria of highest valuation vs. resource diversity requires the utility to exercise business judgment about its priorities.

On-Line Date. PG&E's LCBF valuation methodology, using current inputs, exhibits a propensity to favor projects that start later rather than earlier, all else being equal (this is related to inputs about forward prices, capacity value, and discount rate). It is a modest effect, and is roughly consistent with the stated preference of the utility to focus on the latter part of the 2014-2016 compliance period rather than on the first compliance period.

Because of the focus of PG&E's methodology on selecting projects ranked high for net value and project viability, the process is not designed to provide a short list that fits best with PG&E's net short position for RPS compliance. That would require the most valued and most viable proposals to have offered in-service dates that closely match the compliance periods when the utility has the largest net short position, which would be coincidental if it occurred. Instead, because there are more than three evaluation criteria to pursue, the methodology is designed to construct a short list composed primarily of high-valued and highly viable proposals of which some have on-line dates that fall close to compliance periods with short positions, but of which others have substantially earlier or far later in-service dates and don't necessarily fit well with compliance periods of the greatest need.

Similarly, PG&E's methodology is not designed to construct a short list with the highest value to ratepayers while meeting the utility's RPS compliance needs. Such an alternative approach would necessarily disregard the project viability criterion by selecting the highest valued Offers with in-service dates matching RPS compliance periods of greatest need, regardless of whether those low-priced and well-timed projects have progressed at all in permitting, interconnection, and site control processes, and whether or not their technology is well-commercialized or never before demonstrated at utility scale. The IOUs have had bitter experience with low-priced projects that proposed attractive on-line dates but failed to achieve timely commercial operation because of viability issues. PG&E's methodology is designed to screen out high-valued projects that fit well with compliance period needs if they

rank low on project viability. If the PG&E had an alternative approach that disregards viability in pursuit of highest value and fit with compliance needs, then one would expect a short list with a significantly higher likelihood of contract failure than the current approach.

Contract Duration. The valuation methodology similarly tends to favor contracts with longer duration to those with shorter terms, all else being equal. Since few Participants ever seem to propose both a longer and shorter duration contract at the same contract price, this is a very minor effect, typically swamped by price differences between Offer variants.

#### 4. EVALUATION OF BIDS' TRANSMISSION COSTS

The valuation methodology assigns estimated transmission costs to the contract price of generation in order to compare Offers fairly, taking into account the full cost of generating power including upgrades required to achieve reliable deliverability for new generation. Many features of the transmission cost methodology are specified by regulatory decisions.

The methodology has a few strengths:

- It provides a means to level the playing field between Offers that deliver directly into PG&E's service territory at uncongested locations and those whose proposed facilities will require expensive new transmission upgrades and new substation facilities to maintain grid reliability.
- It provides a view of full costs of the project rather than only the energy procurement cost.

The transmission cost methodology also has some drawbacks:

- The process of estimating transmission adders is analytically burdensome. It requires checking of Participant's information by transmission experts and consumes a considerable portion of the total time for valuation analysis.
- TRCR adders are a generalized, regional proxy for the actual cost of a particular-sized project at a particular interconnection point. There can be rather large deviations between the final cost of network upgrades written into an interconnection agreement and an early TRCR estimate.
- In those cases where the TRCR adder turns out to be an underestimate of actual network upgrade cost, PG&E's prior practice of only performing the full LCBF valuation including transmission adders during solicitations impedes the transparency of decision-making.
- TRCR adders are available only for California IOUs, and only for specific transmission clusters that the IOUs have analyzed. They are not available for other balancing authorities in California or outside the state. It would be challenging for the PG&E team to estimate a proxy for network upgrade cost for projects interconnecting, for example, in the Sacramento Municipal Utility District's or IID's grid unless the project had obtained a system impact study or facilities study or

interconnection agreement from that balancing area authority. Given the focus on new renewables in Imperial Valley, this shortage of information is inconvenient.

- CAISO Phase I studies have been known to provide gross early overestimates of the actual network upgrade costs. In some transmission clusters, excessive numbers of new projects have applied for interconnections; their aggregate new capacity is so large that Phase I estimates of work required to accommodate such a large new build are massive. When posed with the obligation to finance hundreds of millions of dollars of network upgrades for their projects, many developers choose to drop out of the CAISO queue, leaving sufficiently fewer new projects moving through the Phase II study to result in much smaller estimates of network upgrade costs. In these situations, the methodology disadvantages projects that have received a Phase I study but not yet a Phase II study, even though the analysis in hand is the best currently available estimate of project-specific upgrade requirements. This seems less than fully fair to some projects caught in that early stage of analysis.

Whether the transmission adder methodology relies more on TRCR proxy adders or on interconnection studies or interconnection agreement data depends entirely on what projects Participants submit. In the case of PG&E's 2011 RPS solicitation, roughly half the Offers had not applied for an interconnection or had not yet completed a Phase I study or system impact study. This illustrates how reliant the methodology is on the accuracy of the IOUs' Transmission Ranking Cost Reports.

Most Phase I and Phase II interconnection studies provide estimates of both reliability network upgrades and deliverability network upgrades. In situations in which the project has not yet been studied as a full capacity resource, the studies lack an analysis of required deliverability upgrades. In many cases projects apply for an energy-only resource and later request a deliverability assessment (such as for projects that initiated their application under the Small Generator Interconnection Process). PG&E's methodology is designed to be internally consistent; either it treats a project as energy-only and takes into account the estimated reliability network upgrades only and doesn't attribute Resource Adequacy value to the facility, or it treats it as full-capacity, takes into account costs of both reliability and deliverability network upgrades, and attributes RA value. In some cases projects were analyzed both ways and the approach that provided the higher valuation was selected, giving the project the benefit of the doubt that of the two the higher-valued approach would be chosen. This would be consistent with the logic of PG&E choosing to contract with a new project as an energy-only resource if the deliverability network upgrade costs would exceed the value of Resource Adequacy the project can provide.

Conformance checks of transmission study results were performed. Arroyo notes that some Offers misstated the estimated network upgrade costs provided by CAISO or PTO studies. Arroyo believes that PG&E did a thorough job of checking the original source materials when conducting its analysis of transmission adders. Part of the challenge was that many Participants omitted the requested copy of the latest interconnection study, requiring the utility team to seek this information for deficient Offer packages.

## 5. EVALUATION OF BIDS' PROJECT VIABILITY

The implementation of the Project Viability Calculator as a screening tool for use in the evaluation of Offers has brought several advantages:

- The Calculator is a step in the direction of more standardized evaluation of viability across all three IOUs.
- The Calculator provides a broader set of criteria by which projects are assessed than was the case with PG&E's prior approach to scoring viability.
- The range of scores from zero to 100 gives more visibility to differences between projects than methods that use single-digit scores.
- The methodology allows PG&E to use both the more standardized tool as well as business judgment in taking project characteristics into account when making short list decisions.

There are still opportunities to improve the use of the Calculator.

- Some of the scoring guidelines for the Calculator are sufficiently ambiguous that reasonable individuals scoring the same project can arrive at different results. When the scores rated by Arroyo and the PG&E team were compared, the variance between scores had a standard deviation of 12 points. Even among individual members of the PG&E team there was a need to review and standardize scoring to reduce discrepancies between individuals' practices. This suggests that the Calculator is still a crude screening tool with a lot of noise in the scoring process, and that differences of only two or three points between projects should not be regarded as determinative in selecting one and rejecting the other, because the difference falls within the error of the analysis.
- As evidenced by feedback from Participants, developers in general have a poor understanding of how the utility interprets the scoring guidelines. Many developers, for example, claimed not understand that their project cannot obtain a score of 10 out of 10 for project development experience if their team has never brought at least two projects of equal or larger size with similar technology into operation...even though that is explicitly what the scoring guidelines in the Calculator state.
- Some scoring criteria would be difficult for a layperson to interpret, such as the Transmission System Upgrade Requirements criterion that requires some basic knowledge of what components of an upgrade require or don't require a CPUC Permit to Construct or Notice of Construction. Many or most developers lack on-staff experts in the regulatory landscape for new transmission build in California.
- Some of the Offers were scored low simply because the Participants omitted basic information about their projects, even though upon debriefing it became clear that full disclosure would have resulted in a higher viability score. It is unclear to Arroyo how this could be improved in the future, since the solicitation materials clearly stated what information was required.

In Arroyo's opinion, PG&E reasonably measured the viability of every project that submitted a conforming proposal for bundled energy, out-of-state power attached to renewable energy credits, or biogas. The evaluation team did not use the Calculator to evaluate Offers for RECs only or sites for development; some Participants for the former did not submit data needed to evaluate their viability, and proposals of land sales or leases are not amenable for scoring as power projects with the information requested or supplied.

The Participants' self-scoring was uneven in quality. While the PG&E team agreed with the self-scored Calculator scores for about a quarter of Offers, on average PG&E gave the Participant-estimated scores a "haircut" of eleven points. This is somewhat distorted by a few developers who scored their own projects by more than 40 points higher than the PG&E team; Arroyo agreed with PG&E that these projects had been assigned grossly inflated scores by any objective standard.

PG&E conducted conformance checks of viability assessments for Offers, in part to ensure quality control and consistency in how multiple scorers applied the scoring guidelines. Particular attention was paid to Offers that were considered for short listing in early drafts, in order to confirm the quality and consistency of the assessments.

In some cases factors not assessed by the Calculator were taken into consideration when the PG&E team made selections; this is consistent with the direction provided by the CPUC about the use of the Calculator as a screening tool.

## 6. OTHER STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

Evaluation of different technologies. PG&E's protocol tends to avert selecting Offers for utility ownership for which the utility lacks particular core competencies, so there is a bias against purchasing projects that the company is less well-suited to own and operate. This seems reasonable and appropriate, since it is not in ratepayers' interest for the utility to own generating facilities that require specific skills PG&E lacks.

The Project Viability Calculator was designed to be technology-neutral as well. However, the Calculator will return a lower score for a project that relies on a technology that is not well-commercialized, or that the developer lacks prior experience developing, owning, operating, or financing, all else being equal. The methodology will tend to discount projects based on emerging technologies or on those that have not been implemented broadly at utility scale, and will tend to promote projects that rely on technologies with widespread market acceptance and many examples of operating 100+ MW installations. It became evident from debriefing Participants that some developers were unaware that the Calculator's design tends to disfavor emerging technologies, and that other competitive venues than the IOUs' RPS RFOs that do not require the use of the Calculator might be more appropriate for projects that employ poorly-commercialized technologies.

PG&E's protocol for RFO Goals includes a provision allowing the utility to consider the non-quantitative factor of resource diversity benefits in the selection process; this is stated in Attachment K and supported by regulatory decisions. This feature allows the utility to consider such things as its resource need for baseload vs. peaking or intermittent generation in selecting Offers. To the extent some technologies are operated as baseload in the

California market and there is a resource need for baseload resources this may tilt Offer selection towards those projects over technologies that provide intermittent or peaking generation. Similarly, the RFO Goals criterion accommodates the non-quantitative factor of continuing to meet the goal stated by Executive Order S-06-06 for biomass-fueled renewable energy, which could tilt Offer selection towards biomass or biogas-fueled generation.

Out-of-state projects. One issue regarding both value and viability concerns Offers for out-of-state projects that propose not to actually deliver power to the CAISO but instead intend to be managed through a pseudo-tie or dynamic scheduling. There are only a very few projects to date where these have been implemented by the CAISO. Because such approaches require the assent of both the CAISO and the foreign balancing area authority to which the project will interconnect (and PTOs in between), it is difficult for PG&E to judge the likelihood of whether such arrangements will actually be achieved. It was evident from reviewing out-of-state Offers that several Participants do not comprehend how their projects will be treated by the CPUC for RPS compliance purposes, with several assuming that their PPAs will be treated as bundled in-state delivery of power, despite failing to specify how they will obtain dynamic scheduling by the CAISO. One hopes that more experience with dynamic scheduling will make it clearer what can and cannot be achieved with these arrangements and that future solicitation protocols can clarify how PG&E will assess them.

Similarly, Arroyo considers it risky for the utility to value out-of-state projects that assume that the import of their power at a CAISO intertie will provide full Resource Adequacy value to PG&E ratepayers. The process for allocation of RA import capability at intertie points does not currently accommodate long-term dedication of that capability to IOUs, putting at risk the delivery of RA value. Simply assuming that full RA benefits of the capacity of these out-of-state projects will be realized for the entire delivery term of a PPA may overstate the value of these projects. However, in the actual selection of projects Arroyo can identify at most one Offer whose selection or rejection might have differed if PG&E had taken a different approach in evaluating pseudo-ties or RA import capability.

Participants' viewpoints on strengths and weaknesses. Feedback from Participants provided some insight into other strengths of PG&E's approach compared to other utilities'.

- The bidders' conference was cited as being "very helpful" by several Participants, in clarifying objectives, evaluation process, and requirements. The ability to ask questions and to obtain answers quickly and spontaneously was cited as useful.
- The solicitation materials were regarded as clear, straightforward, and "user-friendly", with the exception of the Attachment D offer form, with which some Participants had technical difficulties. (Others found the verification process built into this year's Attachment D to be quite helpful and fully functional.) Participants who submitted less commonly pursued approaches (e.g. projects outside the CAISO or sites for development) tended to be more frustrated with their perception that the solicitation materials lacked clarity about their Offers would be evaluated.
- While some Participants clearly did not understand how the scoring guidelines in the Project Viability Calculator were intended to be used and were frustrated that their

early-stage projects were disfavored by the design of the Calculator, others expressed opinions that the Calculator was “fair and relevant” and straightforward.

- While frustrated by PG&E’s policy of not disclosing detailed information about the nature of the short list, and the utility’s unwillingness to provide second chances to improve rejected Offers, Participants appreciated the opportunity to be debriefed about the reasons why their Offers were rejected because they could gather useful information on how to make their projects more competitive in future solicitations. Some Participants particularly appreciated that PG&E provided timely responses about whether their Offers were selected or rejected, in contrast to another IOU.
- Some Participants felt disadvantaged compared to rivals who, they feared, could propose unreasonably low pricing, obtain a PPA, then sell the project. They suggested that PG&E erect higher barriers to participation by “non-serious” parties, such as higher offer deposits (as required in other jurisdictions). Arroyo views this theme as a form of confirmation that PG&E’s approach to outreach was successful in obtaining broad and robust competition from the developer community.

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#### D. FUTURE LCBF METHODOLOGY IMPROVEMENTS

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The methodology employed by PG&E has undergone repeated refinement, motivated both by internal choices within the utility and external impetus by the regulator. This process has provided incremental improvements to the methodology over time. Arroyo can at this point only suggest a few modest changes that may further improve the means by which PG&E evaluates Offers or the transparency with which Participants can view the evaluation process, some of which were suggested in feedback sessions by Participants.

##### ENHANCING TRANSPARENCY

One set of suggestions would seek to address the sense that comprehension of how PG&E evaluates and selects Offers among the developer community could be improved. This could help reduce wasted effort on the part of developers in promoting projects that are unlikely to be selected, and reduce the amount of wasted effort within the utility as it attempts to analyze Offers with poor viability and low value. Some ideas could include:

- Reviewing the scoring guidelines for the Project Viability Calculator in the bidders’ conference, to explain what is required to obtain top scores in each criterion;
- Including scoring guidelines for all 11 criteria used in the Calculator in Attachment K, with commentary on what it takes to obtain top scores in each category;
- Editing the solicitation materials to further emphasize the need for out-of-state projects to provide a full price at a CAISO delivery point that the developer would be willing to write into a PPA, rather than a busbar price outside the CAISO;

- Modifying solicitation materials to clarify that the developer must provide a copy of the most recent interconnection study or executed interconnection agreement that will serve as the basis for estimating a transmission adder for network upgrades;
- Revising the solicitation materials to clarify that, in addition to the various evaluation criteria, PG&E will use its preferences regarding delivery point and commercial operation date to make selection decisions. In particular, it would be key to make as clear as possible within the solicitation protocol itself what PG&E's preferences for on-line date are, seeing that many Participants completely failed to notice this;
- Editing the both the public and non-public solicitation protocols to provide a fuller description of how Offers for sites for development will be evaluated, what the basic requirements for eligibility are, what specific evaluation criteria will be used, and what characteristics of offered sites would render them attractive or unattractive to the utility as candidates for ownership. The ownership team should provide clearer internal documentation of how it made its selection and rejection decisions.

### STREAMLINING THE PROCESS

At least one other IOU has chosen to drop the requirement for hardcopies of the Offer package; to Arroyo this now seems an appropriate step for PG&E to take, going forward. Arroyo has some lingering concern about the Participants who fail to put all the information present in their hardcopy Offers into readable electronic form using the required format, but this may be dispelled if Offers are submitted entirely in electronic form. Arroyo agrees that it is still best to submit electronic Offer packages by flash drive rather than by e-mail.

Some Participants have objected to the volume of information that PG&E requires for a complete Offer. Arroyo agrees that there are some opportunities to delete some required information that has little or no impact on a short-listing decision (such as project block diagrams and resumes of managers) in favor of seeking such information after short-listing.

### IMPROVING VALUATION INPUTS

Arroyo has suggestions for improving the methodology for assessing the value of Offers:

- Use a discount rate based on an estimate of the cost of capital for power developers, rather than PG&E's authorized cost of capital. Arroyo believes that given the risks that face renewable project development (permitting, site control, interconnection, equipment procurement, financing, etc.) it is more appropriate to discount future benefits and costs of the projects using a higher discount rate representative of the riskier independent power industry, rather than that of a regulated monopoly.
- Restudy the inputs to the model that set the basis for Resource Adequacy valuation. For example, it appears that PG&E's current assumption for new entrant capital costs is materially higher than that embedded in the currently applicable Market Price Referent. Arroyo believes that current assumptions (including the use of a regulated utility's cost of capital as discount rate) cause the PG&E team to overstate the value

of RA capacity, and that this tends to create distortions and biases in project valuation rankings.

- Clarify that the most recent CAISO or PTO interconnection study (or interconnection agreement if available) is required in the Offer package. Without this non-public information it is difficult to assess an appropriate transmission adder other than using TRCR information, and data from either a Phase I or Phase II study report is more specific to a given resource than TRCR proxy estimates.
- Develop LMP multipliers for CAISO interconnection points at the periphery of the balancing authority area, such as Four Corners, Moenkopi, Mead, and the Hassayampa-North Gila line, so that energy from projects that propose such nodes as delivery points can be valued taking congestion into account. These are CAISO delivery points that are external to the body of the IOUs' service territories and tend to record higher congestion differentials than points within the territories.
- Discuss with the CAISO its plans and policies for establishing pseudo-ties or dynamic scheduling arrangements for new projects outside the balancing authority area, in order to establish a view about which projects realistically can expect to obtain such treatment and which not. For example, Arroyo perceives it as unlikely that the CAISO could or would set up dynamic scheduling arrangements with projects that interconnect in WECC balancing authority areas that would require wheeling through three service territories to get to a CAISO intertie.
- Offers claiming that a project will be managed as a pseudo-tie should be required to state the specific CAISO intertie with which it will be permanently associated as required by CAISO rules; this would clarify how best to value the proposal.
- Include in the LCBF valuation the costs of network upgrades for projects that interconnect within California but outside the CAISO grid. The practice of evaluating full costs for some projects but PPA costs only (omitting the impact on transmission rates) for other California projects seems inconsistent and less than fully fair to developers who choose to build their generation within the CAISO grid. It also seems less than fully fair to California customers in non-CAISO balancing authority areas who will bear the primary burden for those upgrades.

## 4. FAIRNESS OF HOW PG&E ADMINISTERED THE OFFER EVALUATION AND SELECTION PROCESS

This section describes the extent to which PG&E's administration of its protocols for Offer evaluation and selection in the 2011 RPS solicitation was conducted fairly. Arroyo's overall conclusion is that the process was conducted in a fair and generally consistent manner. Arroyo disagreed with PG&E about the length of its short list. This chapter discusses how PG&E developed a final short list to submit to the CPUC.

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### A. PRINCIPLES USED TO DETERMINE FAIRNESS OF PROCESS

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The Energy Division has suggested a set of principles proposed to guide IEs in determining if an IOU's administration of its evaluation and selection process was fair:

- Were all bids treated the same regardless of the identity of the bidder?
- Were bidder questions answered fairly and consistently and the answers made available to all bidders?
- Did the utility ask for "clarifications" that provided one bidder an advantage over others?
- Was the economic evaluation of the bids fair and consistent?
- Was there a reasonable justification for any fixed parameters that were a part of the IOU's LCBF methodology (e.g., RMR values; debt equivalence parameters)?
- What qualitative and quantitative factors were used to evaluate bids?

Some other considerations appear relevant to reviewing PG&E's administration of its methodology. The use of business judgment in bringing multiple non-valuation criteria to bear on decision-making, rather than a mathematical, objective means of doing so, implies an opportunity to test the fairness of administration using additional principles:

- Were the decisions to reject higher-valued Offers from the short list because of low scores in criteria other than valuation or PG&E's preferences applied consistently across all Offers?
- If PG&E did not select the projects for the short list that provide the best overall value while meeting the needs of PG&E's three compliance periods, what factors prevented those projects from being selected? Was their rejection based on factors that were communicated transparently to Participants in the solicitation protocol?

- Does the resulting short list conform to the needs of PG&E's portfolio?
- Were the judgments used to create the short list based on evaluation criteria and preferences that were publicly made available in the solicitation protocol to Participants prior to Offer submittal?

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## **B. REVIEWING PG&E'S ADMINISTRATION OF ITS EVALUATION AND SELECTION PROCESS**

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PG&E provided Arroyo Seco Consulting with many detailed inputs to its valuation model and with results of market valuation at several steps during the evaluation process, including detailed information about transmission adders applied to Offers. Arroyo also had copies of all Offers and of correspondence between PG&E and Participants during this period, and was able to make independent opinions about the strengths and weakness of individual Offers against the evaluation criteria laid out in PG&E's protocols.

Arroyo was present at evaluation team and steering committee meetings in which draft proposals for the short list of Offers were developed, reviewed, questioned, modified, argued, and finalized. The logic and priorities underlying why specific Offers were rejected and accepted to the short list were made evident in these sessions. Arroyo had access to members of the evaluation team responsible for scoring the Offers against each of the evaluation criteria. Arroyo was able to question decisions that appeared unfair or inconsistent from an independent perspective.

Additional elements of Arroyo's approach for evaluating the fairness of the evaluation and selection process include:

- Building an independent valuation model that directly used detailed Offer information, to construct an independent ranking of Offers by net market value;
- Independently scoring Offers using the 2011 Project Viability Calculator;
- Developing a separate and independent point of view about which Offers most merited selection for a short list;
- Comparing PG&E's valuation ranking to the IE model's ranking, identifying outliers (e.g. where the utility ranked an Offer much higher than the IE or vice versa), identifying the root cause for variances, and determining whether variances were justified by different inputs and methodology or stemmed from errors by either PG&E or Arroyo;
- Auditing communications between PG&E and Participants to check whether any individual Participant was advantaged by requests posed or information provided;
- Reviewing in detail and discussing PG&E's decisions to reject Offers for nonconformance with the requirements of the solicitation protocol;

- Reviewing PG&E’s decisions to reject Offers for low scores in non-valuation criteria, or based on the utility’s stated preferences, and independently reviewing whether those rejections were fair and reasonable;
- Testing these rejection and acceptance decisions for consistency; reviewing whether the logic for rejection and acceptance was consistently applied to all Offers.

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**C. FAIRNESS OF REJECTION OF OFFERS FOR NONCONFORMANCE TO REQUIREMENTS OF THE SOLICITATION**

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After Offers were received, PG&E performed a detailed review of the packages in order to identify deficiencies that needed to be addressed by requesting additional information from Participants and to assess which Offers deviated from the requirements of the solicitation protocol. Most Participants whose Offers were identified as deficient were able and willing to address the missing information. A few did not.

Fifteen Offers were rejected by PG&E for nonconformance with the requirements of the Solicitation Protocol. Also, a few variants of Offers were rejected though other variants of the same Offer were accepted as conforming. PG&E rejected some Offers and variants because they violated the requirement stated in the solicitation protocol that projects for a Purchase and Sale Agreement (e.g. for transfer to utility ownership) must be sited within the state of California. PG&E is not at this point in time considering the purchase of out-of-state power plants through RPS solicitations.

Other offers for PPAs were rejected as nonconforming because they specified a price for delivery at a project busbar in a balancing authority area outside California rather than to a CAISO delivery point. Or they proposed an out-of-state project as a PPA for bundled product delivery, rather than a REC sale or a CAISO-approved pseudo-tie or dynamic scheduling arrangement. Some out-of-state Offers failed to provide a detailed or credible plan about how to deliver power to the CAISO, particularly for intermittent resources, or failed to name a specific point of interconnection to the CAISO where the power will be delivered. The solicitation protocol had cited CPUC Decision 11-01-025 regarding bundled transactions requiring interconnections inside California or using dynamic scheduling. It appeared that some Participants do not understand current requirements for a project to be considered an in-state bundled resource for purposes of RPS compliance.

Similarly, some variants were rejected because they failed to conform to another requirement stated in the protocol for PSAs: “The Project and transmission interconnection must be designed and constructed in conformance with California Independent System Operator’s (CAISO) various reliability agreements, procedures, protocols, tariffs, and standards.”<sup>9</sup> While this eligibility requirement does not say so in so many words, Arroyo interprets it to disqualify PSAs for in-state generation whose interconnection is outside the CAISO’s balancing authority area. Such projects would not operate under the CAISO tariff. PG&E is not considering purchasing generation outside the CAISO through RFOs.

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<sup>9</sup> Pacific Gas and Electric Company, “Renewables Portfolio Standard: 2011 Solicitation Protocol, May 11, 2011 (Updated June 7, 2011)”, page 9.

One Offer submitted for a PSA was rejected for non-compliance with the requirement stated in the solicitation protocol that the “Project should utilize a commercially proven, non-solar technology.” PG&E is not currently considering solar generation proposals from the RPS RFO for transfer to utility ownership (as opposed to other competitive solicitations focused on pursuing turnkey approaches to utility-owned solar generation).

PG&E rejected another set of Offers that failed to provide basic information required by the solicitation protocol, such as project location, and which explicitly were offered as indicative, non-binding proposals as opposed to the binding and exclusive requirement for participation in the RFO as stated in the protocol. Other Offers were deemed nonconforming to the requirements of the protocol because they proposed new transmission or new shaping-and-firming service arrangements rather than new PPAs, PSAs, unbundled RECs, or biogas sales as requested in the protocol.

In the days immediately following Offer Opening, some Participants sent PG&E corrections and changes to their previously submitted Offers. Arroyo notes that some of these were prompted by deficiency notices e-mailed to the Participants by PG&E, while others were unprompted voluntary efforts of the Participants to address errors they recognized only after shipping the original Offers. Arroyo does not consider the changes, even improvements, in these Offers to have been prompted by “signaling” by PG&E or by an unfair request for “clarifications” by the utility.

Overall, Arroyo’s opinion is that PG&E’s decisions about which Offers or Offer variants to classify as nonconforming were fair to Participants. There were Offers that were very clearly nonconforming based on explicit deficiencies from the requirements clearly stated in the solicitation protocol; most Offers were clearly conforming. There was also a gray area in between, in which reasonable people could disagree about whether an Offer should be rejected for nonconformance or not; in general the PG&E team gave Participants whose Offers fell into this gray zone the benefit of the doubt and evaluated the proposals. In many of these cases Arroyo would have rejected the proposals. However, none of these accepted Offers from the gray area were selected given their rankings for value and viability.

Another gray area that troubles Arroyo is the failure of several Participants to submit the required Attachment L, PG&E’s supplier diversity questionnaire. As described below, it appears that some Participants did not take the supplier diversity evaluation criterion of the RFO and the requirements of the protocol relating to diversity seriously. In future Arroyo would suggest that Offers lacking a completed Attachment L be rejected as non-conforming if PG&E contacts the Participant to correct the deficiency but the Participant fails to do so.

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#### **D. REASONABLENESS AND FAIRNESS OF PARAMETERS AND INPUTS**

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The vast majority of the many parameters and inputs that PG&E used in its evaluation of the 2011 RPS RFO Offers were reasonably and fairly chosen, in Arroyo’s opinion. Arroyo identified only one issue regarding the choices PG&E made about parameters and inputs that merits discussion.

PG&E used a discount rate of 7.6% to bring future Offer costs and benefits to a 2011 present value. This value is based on PG&E's approved cost of capital. It represents the approved weighted average cost of capital (WACC) for PG&E, on an after-tax basis.

Arroyo doubts it is appropriate to use a regulated utility's authorized cost of capital as the discount rate for net revenues from PPAs with renewable generation developers. These developers are generally not regulated utilities but are rather private or public companies in the independent power producer (IPP) sector. The cost of equity and cost of debt for the riskier IPP sector are both higher than for regulated utilities. For example, the cost of debt assumed into the Energy Division's 2009 analysis of the Market Price Referent (MPR), an analysis that represents the risks of an IPP developer building a proxy plant under a long-term PPA, was 7.67% compared to PG&E's authorized 6.05%, and the assumed cost of equity underlying the proxy developer was 11.96% vs. PG&E's authorized 11.35%.

Arroyo asserts that the flow of net benefits of power deliveries from independent power companies contracting in long-term PPAs has more risk associated with it than PG&E's risk (e.g. higher credit risk, bankruptcy risk, liquidity risk, development risk) that merits discounting the net benefits at the higher WACC associated with the IPP industry. That suggests that the appropriate WACC to be used when evaluating Offers in this solicitation should be closer to the 8.25% after-tax WACC for the proxy plant used in the 2009 MPR model than to the regulated utility's 7.6%. PG&E disagrees, and believes that cash flows in a PPA secured by a regulated utility's credit should be discounted at a regulated WACC.

Arroyo's opinion is that use of a low discount rate results in valuations that overstate the importance of the most distant years of contract term, when the methodology depends on extrapolated market forward prices. Arroyo views this as a distortion that skews PG&E's value rankings towards preferring long-dated PPAs, and projects with later on-line dates. In particular, the lower discount rate tends to overemphasize the value of Resource Adequacy.

PG&E has a variety of internal controls in place to ensure that selection of inputs is reasonable and fair. The Energy Supply organization relies on a separate and independent risk management function for oversight on power market assumptions used in valuation, and on a financial function for oversight on financial assumptions. The choice of parameters is described in internal protocols. Also, the IE has the opportunity to review the inputs to the valuation model in detail and to raise questions with the team as appropriate.

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#### **E. THIRD-PARTY ANALYSIS**

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In its 2011 solicitation, PG&E outsourced a portion of the analysis of transmission adders to an external consultant. An internal PG&E transmission expert oversaw the work and performed quality control on the product; also, Arroyo had an opportunity to review the third-party work product and compare it to the IE's independent analysis as a check.

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#### **F. TRANSMISSION COST ADDERS AND INTEGRATION COSTS**

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PG&E generally followed its transmission analysis protocols in administering its procedures for market valuation. The team used TRCR proxy costs from the three

California IOUs or data from Phase I or Phase II interconnection studies or interconnection agreements to estimate the cost of network upgrades for new projects interconnecting in congested locations. This is a great deal of transmission information to process in a short period of time and the team should be commended for its success in having developed, acquired, and applied a full set of this data within the deadline for creating a short list.

The team followed the public and non-public protocols for analysis of transmission adders. As stated in the discussion of PG&E's LCBF methodology, there are two areas in which Arroyo disagrees with how this was performed. Both fall within lacunae in the protocols, so PG&E's practice was entirely consistent with its protocols.

- Arroyo believes that transmission cost adders should be estimated for projects that interconnect within California but outside the CAISO's balancing authority area, using the estimates of network upgrade costs provided in those other PTO's interconnection studies. Arroyo considers the valuations of these PPAs to understate the full cost of power from the projects, and the analytic approach to be less than fully fair to projects that interconnect to the CAISO grid.
- In Arroyo's opinion, the lack of estimated LMP multipliers for CAISO intertie points that fall outside the main body of the BAA presents a gap in data inputs. Projects that propose to interconnect to these points are unfairly advantaged vs. projects assigned to recognized LMP zones. Arroyo's opinion is that projects interconnecting to far-flung outposts of the CAISO grid in other states should be evaluated with a recognition that nodal prices there are on average materially lower than those within the core of CAISO service territories due to congestion.

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#### **G. AFFILIATE PROPOSALS AND TURNKEY OFFERS**

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PG&E has more stringent eligibility requirements for renewable energy projects intended for utility ownership through turnkey development and transfer (the utility does not have unregulated affiliates that participated in the RPS RFO). For example, PG&E does not accept proposals for utility-owned generation that is sited outside California or outside the CAISO balancing authority area. In the RPS solicitation PG&E did not accept PSA proposals for solar generation; it separately conducts a competitive solicitation seeking solar photovoltaic generation for utility ownership.

Analytically, PG&E has an extra step in applying the same LCBF methodology to projects proposed for PSAs; it estimates a stream of revenue requirements for the project and the estimated operating and maintenance costs to replace PPA payments as the cost of the PSA. Otherwise the evaluation of turnkey proposals is quite similar to that of PPAs.

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#### **H. PG&E'S USE OF ADDITIONAL CRITERIA AND ANALYSIS IN CREATING A SHORT LIST**

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PG&E's overall approach to creating a short list was to rank PPA Offers for bundled delivery to a CAISO node by net value and to screen out (as a first cut) all Offers that scored below a chosen threshold for project viability. Then the PG&E team went down the list

ranked by value, selecting Offers primarily based on highest valuation and higher than threshold viability. These selections were modified by criteria and preferences other than value and viability, described in this section.

PG&E stopped adding highly valued projects to its short list when the total volume of the selections totaled several times the RFO's target of 1% to 2% of PG&E's retail load. The team made a business judgment of how much more than the target would be needed to achieve the goals for the RFO, given a likelihood that Participants would choose exclusive negotiations with other utilities or that Offers would drop out of negotiations at some point.

The team applied different value cutoffs to different classes of projects based on the utility's stated preferences; for example, the valuation cutoff was lower for projects sited within PG&E's service territory than for those interconnecting to other utility's grids. Similarly, the valuation cutoff for Offers of unbundled RECs or RECs plus firm energy was set higher than the cutoff for Offers proposing bundled delivery of energy to a CAISO point. Other situations where the cutoff varied are described below.

## 1. SERIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS

Appendix K to PG&E's 2011 solicitation protocol states specific subcomponents of the RPS Goals evaluation criterion. Among these is "environmental stewardship", which is identified in the CPUC's Decision 04-07-029 as one of a few designated "qualitative attributes" that the Decision allowed the IOUs to use as the basis for including Offers on a short list, subject to (1) the Offer being within reasonable price proximity to others selected and (2) support from the utility's PRG prior to elevation.

In the 2011 RFO, PG&E's evaluation team screened Offers to identify higher-valued projects with potentially serious environmental impacts; this is the contrapositive of the logic stated in Decision 04-09-027, in that PG&E is using a qualitative attribute to reject Offers from its short list. The team identified only a few Offers as posing sufficiently egregious threats to consider rejection on the basis of the most serious environmental concerns. These typically related to concerns regarding impact to endangered or threatened species from construction of a generating facility in close proximity to critical habitat.

In administrating its methodology, PG&E only rejected one 2011 Offer based solely on serious environmental concerns; it was adjacent to known occurrences of both endangered and fully protected species. Other projects that were identified as posing such concerns were rejected anyway based on inadequate value or viability scores.

## 2. RESOURCE DIVERSITY

Another component of the RFO Goals evaluation criterion is resource diversity. Attachment K of PG&E's 2011 solicitation protocol cited "Resource Diversity benefits" as a non-quantitative factor identified in CPUC Decision 04-07-029 that could be considered in Offer selection.

PG&E made an effort to increase the resource diversity of its energy mix by altering the value cutoff point below which it rejected Offers. For example, the PG&E team chose to accept baseload generation Offers that were valued below proposals for intermittent generation that were rejected. In a sense, the team chose to create a short list that is quite diverse in resource type (rather than, say, one technology) by applying the valuation criterion differently for different resources, rather than selecting only the highest-valued proposals that had acceptable viability. This will likely result in PG&E contracting with a diverse mix of baseload and peaking, and firm and intermittent resources, at a higher cost to ratepayers than only contracting disproportionately with one type of resource at lower cost.

### 3. SUPPLIER CONCENTRATION

In this year's solicitation, PG&E stated in its protocol that averting excess supplier concentration would be an evaluation criterion. During the selection process this criterion played a role: the PG&E team limited the volume of selected Offers from any individual counterparty. In some cases where a Participant had its most attractive Offers selected, the PG&E team chose to reject remaining Offers from that Participant even though they were higher valued than Offers from other Participants that were also selected. PG&E also chose to reject some rather large proposals from a developer with whom the utility has already contracted large-volume projects that have not yet achieved commercial operation.

One way that PG&E avoided excess supplier concentration was to reject some rather high-volume Offers with high valuations in favor of smaller Offers with lower valuations from the same developer. This enabled the short list to include a larger number of Participants whose smaller Offers were selected, instead of fewer Participants with only large Offers. The result is a more robust solicitation in the sense that more companies are likely to complete contracts and that PG&E's counterparty credit risk will be diversified. It also means that total ratepayer cost will be higher than an alternative scenario in which only the very highest-valued, viable Offers were selected regardless of volume.

In future years the transparency of solicitations would be improved if this aspect or consequence of the supplier concentration criterion were communicated more clearly in the bidders' conference and in the protocol. Arroyo believes that it is unlikely that most Participants were aware that submitting large projects could disadvantage those proposals.

### 4. DELIVERY POINT

PG&E stated in its 2011 solicitation protocol a preference for projects that deliver at nodal points within PG&E's service territory, over projects that deliver to other nodal points within the CAISO, to interface points of the CAISO, and to points outside the CAISO.

In the 2011 RPS solicitation, PG&E translated this stated preference into a higher valuation cutoff for in-state projects outside its service territory and a lower valuation cutoff for projects inside. In other words, some projects interconnecting in the SP-15 zone were rejected, whereas if the project with the same resource type, valuation, and viability had proposed to interconnect in NP-15 or ZP-26 it would likely have been selected.

## 5. COMMERCIAL OPERATION DATE

The solicitation protocol clearly stated PG&E's preference to select Offers that demonstrated flexibility in on-line date. PG&E's bidders' conference presentation stated that the utility would focus on the latter part of the 2014-2016 compliance period. This preference aligns with the utility's current view of its RPS portfolio needs.

It is difficult to separate the application of this preference in Offer selection from an independent effect: that the LCBF valuation methodology assigns a higher value, all else being equal, to projects with later on-line dates than to projects with earlier on-line dates. Arroyo is not aware of any individual Offer that selected solely because of the timing of its COD, as opposed to a better valuation for later on-line date. Nor is Arroyo aware of any Offer that was rejected solely because its proposed on-line date was far from the latter part of the 2014-2016 compliance period. It was clear that fit of projects' timing with the utility's compliance needs was on the mind of the PG&E team as it constructed the short list.

In future RPS solicitations, PG&E should improve the transparency of its selection process by stating its timing preference directly in the protocol. It was evident from debriefings that many Participants were operating under the mistaken belief that PG&E preferred projects with the earliest on-line dates, as was the case in its 2009 RPS RFO.

## 7. SUPPLIER DIVERSITY

One of the components of the RPS Goals evaluation criterion is whether an Offer will contribute towards PG&E's supplier diversity goals. The solicitation protocol states that

“It is the policy of PG&E that Women-, Minority-, and Disabled Veteran-owned Business Enterprises (WMDVBE) shall have the maximum practicable opportunity to participate in the performance of Agreements resulting from this Solicitation. PG&E encourages Participants to carry out PG&E's policy and contribute to PG&E's goal by reaching greater than 30% of all procurement with WMDVBEs...The Supplier Diversity evaluation will take into account the Participant's status as a WMDVBE, intent to subcontract with WMDVBEs, and the Participant's own Supplier Diversity Program.”

PG&E's evaluation committee scored Offers based on the submittal of Attachment L, a Supplier Diversity Questionnaire.

Historically, only a tiny proportion of IOUs' short-listed Offers or executed PPAs have been executed with WMDVBEs, and PG&E's policy of scoring Offers against this subcriterion is no doubt intended to help address the shortfall between actual procurement of renewable power from WMDVBE's (or from prime contractors that use diverse suppliers as subcontractors) and PG&E's overall supplier diversity goal.

Among developers submitting to the 2011 RPS RFO, only three Participants were WMDVBEs that have been certified by the CPUC Clearinghouse. None of the Offers submitted by certified WMDVBEs scored above the valuation cutoff. Other Participants claimed to be WMDVBEs that had not yet obtained CPUC certification, but review of their ownership suggested that this claim was inaccurate for at least one entity.

Not only were few Participants actual WMDVBEs, but only a subset of Participants agreed to pursue PG&E's stated WMDVBE subcontracting goal (30% of spend). Some Participants whose Offer was shortlisted stated an intent to meet this goal in their proposals but others did not. Arroyo views the overall response from the renewable energy developer community towards PG&E's diversity goals as rather weak. It appears that many Participants failed to take the supplier diversity criterion seriously. In future solicitations there may be opportunities to explain or communicate the diversity goal more clearly, and to more explicitly link Offer selection to a Participant's willingness to commit to some subcontracting goal.

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## I. ANALYSIS OF PG&E'S SHORT LIST RESULTS

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This section provides a review of instances in which Arroyo Seco Consulting disagreed with PG&E's decisions in the administration of its evaluation and selection methodology, and a discussion of the fairness of the decisions.

### 1. SOURCES OF DISAGREEMENT

Arroyo disagreed with some minor aspects of the PG&E analysis and selection, but these pertained to micro-level issues that did not affect overall selection of a short list. For example, Arroyo and the PG&E team scored Offers using the same Project Viability Calculator; in nearly all cases the scores differed, but relative rankings of Offers were similar overall. Other examples of minor disagreement with no impact on selection include:

- Arroyo disagreed with the estimates of LMP multipliers applied to CAISO delivery points outside California which had not been assigned to an LMP zone;
- Arroyo would have rejected as non-compliant more out-of-state Offers with weak cases for achieving regulatory treatment as bundled in-state resources;
- Arroyo would not have assigned full Resource Adequacy value to some of the out-of-state Offers that proposed to deliver power at CAISO intertie points where PG&E's ability to secure RA import capability is limited.

Arroyo's primary critique of PG&E's short list is that it is too large. Total volume is a multiple of the target for procurement of contracts from the 2011 RFO. By choosing to accommodate a large short list, PG&E has selected some Offers that Arroyo considers marginally attractive, rather than focusing on the highest valued, most viable proposals:

- Because PG&E chose a different cutoff for valuation for different types or locations of resources, it selected several Offers that Arroyo ranked as mediocre in net value. Arroyo would have shortened the short list by rejecting these lower-valued proposals.
- PG&E used a cutoff for viability score to screen out many Offers. However, the team selected a very few Offers that it had scored below this threshold, because of other attributes that PG&E considered sufficiently attractive to outweigh the

projects' weaker viability assessments. Arroyo would have rejected those proposals based on the projects' mediocre viability.

- Arroyo's input assumptions to the independent valuation place a lower value on Resource Adequacy capacity than PG&E's do. As a result, Arroyo would have ranked some solar projects lower than PG&E did, and some wind generation projects higher; Arroyo would have considered selecting more wind generation.

Although Arroyo disagreed with the resulting short list that PG&E selected, the basis for these disagreements largely centers on differences in business judgments about relative priorities and choices of numerical inputs. Arroyo believes that the choices the PG&E team made were reasonable and justifiable. For example, PG&E's choice to lower the valuation cutoff for certain resource types and locations was fully consistent with placing a relatively high priority on the non-quantitative sub-criterion of resource diversity and on the stated preference for projects within PG&E's service territory. While Arroyo's relative preferences differ, Arroyo believes that PG&E's relative priorities, based on its business judgment, are reasonable.

Similarly, Arroyo disagrees with PG&E's selection of inputs for its valuation of capacity, but acknowledges that the underlying sources of the inputs which generate the RA value estimates come directly from the CPUC and the California Energy Commission. It seems reasonable for a regulated utility to select parameters in a way that they are consistent with guidance from regulators, though Arroyo believes that better choices are available for inputs.

Separately, Arroyo can offer only a qualified opinion about whether the selection of Offers for sites for development was made fairly. The group within PG&E that analyzes these Offers provided incomplete documentation of the basis for selection decisions. Arroyo disagrees with the shortlisting decisions about these Offers. The CPUC will have a better opportunity to review these if PG&E executes contracts for these in the future.

## 2. INDEPENDENT OFFER ANALYSES

Arroyo conducted its own rather simplified valuation analysis. PG&E's and Arroyo's valuations generally correlated well for many Offers, but with a fair amount of noise in the comparison, as shown in Figure 3 that compares the two sets of valuations. Some of the differences between valuations include:


- Less value assigned to Resource Adequacy in the independent assessment, which tends to lower the value ranking of projects with the most estimated Net Qualifying Capacity such as solar generation;
- Less value assigned to projects interconnecting in non-CAISO balancing authority areas;
- Less of a premium assigned to projects with later CODs or longer delivery terms.

This comparison was useful in quality control to identify errors in PG&E's or the IE's input parameters. Also, the comparison helped identify what factors caused specific Offers

to be ranked high or low in PG&E’s short-listing process, such as the impact of the discount rate assumption, the on-line date, and the size of transmission adder.

Arroyo also scored each Offer for viability independently of PG&E’s analysis. This was useful to get an estimate of what the standard error of the Calculator is, and a sense of whether differences in score reflect significant differences in viability or are within the noise of the method. Arroyo emerged from the comparison (shown in Figure 4) with a view that differences of a dozen or fewer points in viability score may not reflect significant differences in the likelihood that project will succeed in attaining commercial operation on schedule, given the modest precision of the tool and the subjectivity of its use.

Figure 3



Some of the differences between viability scores include:


- Lower IE scores for projects proposing very large solar photovoltaic facilities;
- Lower IE scores for projects from developers with experience only in distributed generation (e.g. beyond the meter) projects rather than wholesale generation;
- Lower IE scores for projects for which specific network upgrades are as yet poorly characterized.

### 3. RECTIFYING DEFICIENCIES OF REJECTED OFFERS

PG&E communicated early to several Participants about basic deficiencies in their Offer packages and provided them with an opportunity to correct these deficiencies by completing

or correcting their original submissions. None of these original deficiencies caused rejection from the short list, as far as Arroyo can discern. Many of the issues related to failure to complete an Attachment D offer form fully, using the final version of that form, or omission of the most recent CAISO or PTO interconnection study.

Figure 4



Given the robustness of the solicitation and the large number of Offer variants, PG&E did not collect every piece of information required by the protocol from every Participant. Some Participants had obtained interconnection studies for their project but did not submit copies with their proposals. Arroyo observes that in these cases the missing information would not have made a difference to the selection decision. PG&E made a concerted effort to obtain copies of these studies for most of these projects. By this point it was evident which Offers had proposed uncompetitive, high prices and were unlikely to be short-listed.

#### 4. OVERALL FAIRNESS OF ADMINISTRATION

Despite a variety of minor disagreements, Arroyo Seco Consulting’s overall judgment is that PG&E’s administration of its protocols to arrive at a short list for the 2011 RPS RFO was fair, unbiased, consistent, and reasonable.

Most disagreements between Arroyo and the PG&E team fall into the category of choices that Arroyo would have not made if it were administering the solicitation, but that Arroyo agrees are choices a reasonable person could make if that person had different priorities or emphases regarding the weights assigned to evaluation criteria. Arroyo believes that PG&E’s preferences and its choices are within the realm of “reasonable business judgment” that the CPUC allows IOUs to exercise in energy procurement.

## 5. FAIRNESS OF PROJECT-SPECIFIC NEGOTIATIONS

This chapter gives an independent review of the extent to which PG&E's negotiations with Sierra Power Corporation to amend the existing contract for renewable energy were conducted fairly. A more detailed narrative of discussion points of the negotiation and its fairness to ratepayers and to other counterparties is provided in the confidential appendix to this report.

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### A. INDEPENDENT EVALUATOR'S OBSERVATIONS OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN SPC AND PG&E

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Arroyo observed several negotiation sessions between PG&E's and SPC's staffs. Arroyo was also able to review draft versions of term sheets or contracts in order to identify specific proposals and counterproposals the parties made regarding contract terms in the course of discussion over several months.

Based on this review, Arroyo did not identify any situations in which PG&E provided SPC with concessions in contract terms that the IE considered to be materially unfair to ratepayers or to other counterparties. Nor did PG&E provide SPC with information that might have unfairly advantaged the seller compared to its competitors.

The changes to the existing PPA were relatively few. PG&E requested, and SPC agreed to, several contract terms that enhance ratepayer protections compared to the existing agreement.

Arroyo concludes that the negotiations between PG&E and SPC were conducted fairly. More details on specific negotiating points and the resulting changes to the PPA are discussed in the confidential appendix to this report.

## 6. MERIT FOR CPUC APPROVAL

This chapter provides an independent review of the merits of the amendment to the contract between PG&E and Sierra Power Corporation against criteria identified in the Energy Division's 2011 RPS IE template.

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### A. CONTRACT SUMMARY

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On December 22, 2011, PG&E and SPC executed a contract amendment to their existing RPS agreement that governs delivery of renewable energy from a woody waste biomass-fueled generator. The existing, operating facility is located within the unincorporated community of Terra Bella in Tulare County, and has produced renewable energy for PG&E customers since 2003. The term of the amendment runs through the termination date of the existing contract in July 2014.

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### B. NARRATIVE OF EVALUATION CRITERIA AND RANKING

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The 2011 template for IEs provided by the Energy Division calls for a narrative of the merits of the proposed project on the criteria of contract price, portfolio fit, and project viability. More specific details are provided in the confidential appendix to this report.

#### CONTRACT PRICE AND MARKET VALUATION

Arroyo has compared the net value of the SPC amendment to relevant peer groups of previously and currently offered competing sources of RPS-eligible energy, using both PG&E's LCBF methodology and the simpler but independent IE model. Based on those comparisons, Arroyo opines that the market valuation of the amended SPC contract ranks as moderate to high compared to relevant peer groups of competing proposals, and the contract price ranks as low to moderate. The confidential appendix to this report provides a more detailed discussion of the pricing of the contract amendment and the basis for Arroyo's opinion that the net valuation of the amendment ranks as moderate to high among competing alternatives.

#### OPEN-BOOK REVIEW

Both Arroyo and PG&E conducted an open-book review of a cash flow model provided by SPC that projects the generator's financial performance over the term of the amendment. Arroyo's opinion based on this model is that some degree of price relief from the existing contract would be justified by the cash flow model inputs, and that the price increase in the contract amendment likely provides sufficient price relief to render the plant economic to continue operation. Arroyo takes issue with a few of the model inputs that SPC selected, but the IE's conclusions about the need for price relief are unchanged even if these inputs are adjusted to reflect more realistic assumptions. Arroyo notes that there is considerable

potential for forecast error in the model inputs and that the majority of SPC's assumptions appear reasonable and well-founded.

### PORTFOLIO FIT

Arroyo ranks the amended SPC contract's fit with PG&E's supply portfolio needs as moderate. PG&E may not have an immediate need for incremental RPS-eligible energy, but SPC's production is already in the utility's baseline assumption for the purpose of forecasting RPS needs. If SPC should curtail or cease production in the absence of temporary price relief, this might create or accelerate a future need for PG&E to procure more RPS-eligible power.

The existing facility generally operates as a baseload generator. While PG&E does not have an immediate need for more baseload generation, removing the project's production from the portfolio might create or accelerate such a need at some point in time.

### PROJECT VIABILITY

In Arroyo's opinion, the physical project viability of the SPC facility is high. The project has operated for decades. An existing, currently operating project is more viable, in a physical rather than economic sense, than any proposed as-yet-unbuilt generator.

### RPS GOALS

The SPC contract amendment would advance PG&E and the state towards the goal stated in Executive Order S-06-06 of providing at least 20% of the state's renewable power needs from biomass-based generation. Arroyo believes that PG&E currently exceeds that target, but over time there is some risk that biomass as a portion of PG&E's supply portfolio will drop below 20% because of rapid growth in other sources of renewable generation. Arroyo believes that approval of the contract amendment will increase the likelihood that SPC will continue to provide PG&E customers with generation over the term of the contract, as opposed to ceasing its production under the pricing of the existing contract.

Additionally, the legislative findings stated in Senate Bill 1078 that established the RPS program included a view that increasing the use of renewable energy sources may create employment opportunities. The CPUC's Decision 04-07-029 included benefits to low-income and minority communities as a qualitative attribute that could be taken into consideration by utilities in evaluating competitive offers for new renewable generation. In the absence of a contract amendment there is greater risk of the power plant's shutdown, which would affect SPC's employment base and that of its fuel suppliers. The project is sited in a community with a high proportion of individuals living in poverty and with a plurality of minority residents.

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## **C. DISCUSSION OF MERIT FOR APPROVAL**

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Arroyo concurs with PG&E management that the SPC contract amendment merits CPUC approval. In Arroyo's opinion the contract amendment offers moderate to high net value, low to moderate contract price, and high project viability. It would contribute to

PG&E's efforts to meet its RPS Goals. In particular, the contract amendment would support continued compliance with Executive Order S-06-06 regarding the goal for biomass-fueled generation in the state. It would protect against employment losses in a locality with a high poverty rate.

In Arroyo's opinion, some degree of price relief would be justified by the assumed inputs to SPC's cash flow model. The price relief granted by the contract amendment appears likely to be sufficient to motivate SPC's continued operation at production levels near historical output, based on the assumptions provided in the cash flow model. (This would also be the case if alternative input assumptions that Arroyo believes are more reasonable were used in the cash flow model.)

**PG&E Gas and Electric  
Advice Filing List  
General Order 96-B, Section IV**

AT&T	Department of Water Resources	North America Power Partners
Alcantar & Kahl LLP	Dept of General Services	North Coast SolarResources
Ameresco	Douglass & Liddell	Northern California Power Association
Anderson & Poole	Downey & Brand	Occidental Energy Marketing, Inc.
BART	Duke Energy	OnGrid Solar
Barkovich & Yap, Inc.	Economic Sciences Corporation	Praxair
Bartle Wells Associates	Ellison Schneider & Harris LLP	R. W. Beck & Associates
Bloomberg	Foster Farms	RCS, Inc.
Bloomberg New Energy Finance	G. A. Krause & Assoc.	Recurrent Energy
Boston Properties	GLJ Publications	SCD Energy Solutions
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Brookfield Renewable Power	Goodin, MacBride, Squeri, Schlotz & Ritchie	SMUD
CA Bldg Industry Association	Green Power Institute	SPURR
CLECA Law Office	Hanna & Morton	San Francisco Public Utilities Commission
CSC Energy Services	Hitachi	Seattle City Light
California Cotton Ginners & Growers Assn	In House Energy	Sempra Utilities
California Energy Commission	International Power Technology	Sierra Pacific Power Company
California League of Food Processors	Intestate Gas Services, Inc.	Silicon Valley Power
California Public Utilities Commission	Lawrence Berkeley National Lab	Silo Energy LLC
Calpine	Los Angeles Dept of Water & Power	Southern California Edison Company
Cardinal Cogen	Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps LLP	Spark Energy, L.P.
Casner, Steve	MAC Lighting Consulting	Sun Light & Power
Center for Biological Diversity	MBMC, Inc.	Sunshine Design
Chris, King	MRW & Associates	Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan
City of Palo Alto	Manatt Phelps Phillips	Tabors Caramanis & Associates
City of Palo Alto Utilities	McKenzie & Associates	Tecogen, Inc.
City of San Jose	Merced Irrigation District	Tiger Natural Gas, Inc.
City of Santa Rosa	Modesto Irrigation District	TransCanada
Clean Energy Fuels	Morgan Stanley	Turlock Irrigation District
Coast Economic Consulting	Morrison & Foerster	United Cogen
Commercial Energy	Morrison & Foerster LLP	Utility Cost Management
Consumer Federation of California	NLine Energy, Inc.	Utility Specialists
Crossborder Energy	NRG West	Verizon
Davis Wright Tremaine LLP	NaturEner	Wellhead Electric Company
Day Carter Murphy	Navigant Consulting	Western Manufactured Housing Communities Association (WMA)
Defense Energy Support Center	Norris & Wong Associates	eMeter Corporation