



Preliminary Ignition Investigation Report

Ignition Database Index:	20240953
Electric Incident Investigation (EII) Number:	N/A
Incident Name:	Ridge – 15 Jul 2024
PG&E Facility Ignition?	Yes
CPUC Reportable Ignition?	Yes
Date & Time of Incident:	July 15, 2024@ 1020 hours
Street Address:	11482 Dyerville Loop Road
City:	Myers Flat
County:	Humboldt
Latitude/Longitude:	40.28777, -123.80394
State Responsibility Area (SRA) / Local Responsibility Area (LRA) / Federal Responsibility Area (FRA)	State Responsibility Area (SRA)
PG&E Division:	Humboldt
High Fire Threat District (HFTD):	Tier 2
High Fire Risk Area (HFRA):	Yes
EPSS Buffer:	No
Fire Index Area (FIA):	105
Fire Potential Index (FPI) Rating: FIA	R2
Fire Potential Index (FPI) Rating: Circuit	R2
Was there a PSPS event at the time of ignition?	No
Suspected Initiating Event:	PG&E Equipment
Failure Driver:	All types of equipment/facility failure
Failure Sub-driver:	Insulator failure
Circuit:	Fruitland 1142 (192311142)
Circuit Protection Zone:	Fruitland 1142-LR 615540
Nominal Voltage:	12kV
Pole SAP Equipment ID:	100989592
Subject to PRC 4292 Veg Pole Clearance:	No
PG&E Equipment associated with ignition:	LAPP post-type Insulator
EPSS enabled at time of ignition?	Yes
Fault Type:	Line-to-Ground
Wire Down (Primary)?	Yes
Lead Agency/Agency Having Jurisdiction:	CAL FIRE
Fire Size:	0.26 – 9.99 Acres
FAS Field Remarks:	“broken insulator slight angle no cause found”
HAWC Summary:	“Resources responded to a vegetation fire at 11482 Dyerville Loop Road in Meyers Flat. In a Tier 2 area.

	<p>The fire was contained at 1.78 acres. There was an outage in the immediate area. The outage was on the GARBERVILLE 1102 circuit impacting approximately 808 customers on OIS # 2517272. This was an EPSS enabled circuit. SIPT responded to this incident. Activities performed the following activities: assessment and protection of assets. There was not damage to assets reported at this time. An Everbridge message was sent.</p> <p>Notifications: HAWC Ops, PSS, DCC <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>, GCC <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>, GAS <input type="checkbox"/>, ENOC <input type="checkbox"/>, HYDRO <input type="checkbox"/>, REMOTE GRID <input type="checkbox"/> An Incident Report was not sent. A Preliminary Fire Report was not sent. All functional areas have been notified. Closing barring any significant change in the situation."</p>
Injuries / Fatalities / Property Damage / Media Attention:	None
Weather Conditions:	<p>It was a fair and dry day near the incident location. Conditions at the time of the incident: Temperature 72°F, relative humidity 57%, 2.5 mph sustained winds with up to 5.5 mph gusts out of the southwest.</p>
Red Flag Warning (RFW) / High Wind Warning (HWW):	No/No
911 Standby Relief Time:	36 minutes
OIS #:	2517272
ILIS #:	24-0087931
FAS #:	T006449628
Assigned Attorney:	N/A
Ignition Investigator & Phone:	<div> <div></div> <div></div> </div> <div> <div></div> <div></div> </div>

Executive Summary

On July 15, 2024, at 1020 hours, Circuit Breaker (CB) 1110/2 on the EPSS-enabled, three-phase Garberville 1102 12kV Overhead Distribution Circuit opened when a line-to-ground fault occurred, deenergizing approximately 2,605 customers. At 1025 hours, PG&E dispatched two troubleshooters (Troubleshooter #1, Troubleshooter #2) to investigate the outage. At 1032 hours, the Fortuna Emergency Command Center Fire Department ("FECC") notified PG&E of a vegetation fire and wire down at 11482 Dyerville Loop Road Myers Flat, California ("Incident Location") along the three-phase Fruitland 1142 12kV Distribution Circuit (see Figure 1 and Figure 2).¹ At 1035 hours, PG&E redirected Troubleshooter #1 to the Incident Location. At 1039 hours, CAL FIRE arrived at the Incident Location to begin firefighting efforts.² The Incident Location is located within a Tier 2 HFTD.

At 1118 hours, Troubleshooter #1 opened the jumpers on Fuse 6865 to deenergize the line to make the area safe. At 1123 hours, Troubleshooter #1 arrived at the Incident Location and observed CAL FIRE clearing a vegetation fire, a failed ceramic post-type LAPP insulator, and one phase of 4-ACSR primary overhead conductor on the ground at wood pole SAP ID # 100989592 ("Incident Pole") located on the Fruitland 1142 distribution circuit (see Figure 3 and Figure 4). The failed insulator caused one phase of 4-ACSR primary overhead conductor to come down between the Incident Pole and the two adjacent poles, Pole #2, SAP ID # 100989591 ("Incident Span #1", source side) and Pole #3, SAP ID # 100989594 ("Incident Span #2", load side) (see Figure 2). The conductor was not broken. The failed insulator was retained for further evaluation. At 1322 hours, Troubleshooter #1 created EC Notification #129223091 to replace the damaged Incident Pole (including crossarm and insulators).

By 1432 hours, the troubleshooters had patrolled the line from Garberville Substation to the open jumpers on Fuse 6865 and the Distribution Control Center ("DCC") had subsequently closed CB 1110/2, returning service to 2,603 customers.³ By 1605 hours, a PG&E repair crew completed replacing the Incident Pole and closed the jumpers on Fuse 6865 returning service to the remaining two customers.

The broken insulator retained from the Incident Location was provided to Applied Technology Services (ATS) for visual examination. ATS determined moisture ingress and cement expansion were possible contributing factors to the mechanical failure (fracture into two pieces) of the post-type ceramic insulator manufactured by LAPP in 1971. ATS visual examination of the insulator revealed the fracture surface was clean, indicative of a "fast fracture." However radial cracks on the ceramic skirt contained algae indicating they had been present for an extended duration of time (on the order of years). The ceramic skirt cracks likely reduced the insulator's load-bearing capacity, resulting in subsequent fracture. The cement around the base of the insulator was cracked which could allow moisture ingress and cement expansion, resulting in radial cracks and possibly contributing to the mechanical failure. Figure 5 provides photographs of the failed insulator condition when received by ATS.

¹ Due to a clearance at the time of the incident, Line Recloser (LR) 185476 was closed which resulted in the Incident location, and a major portion of Fruitland 1142, being sourced by Garberville Substation. This configuration resulted in the outage being fed back to Garberville 1102, however, the Incident Location was on Fruitland 1142. Per discussion with System Protection engineers on August 27, 2024, LR 185476 was closed on July 11, 2024, four days prior to the incident, and was not a causative factor to the ignition.

² CAL FIRE Incident Report # 24CAHUU0006615.

³ According to call logs, at 1154 hours, Troubleshooter #3 reported a second hazard location associated with this outage; a tree branch was laying on a secondary service line at [REDACTED]. No ignition was reported at this location, and the branch was removed. This trouble was unrelated to the failed insulator and did not contribute to the outage. Details regarding dispatch of Troubleshooter #3 to investigate this outage are unknown.

Asset Failure Analysis (AFA) performed an Extent of Condition (XoC) investigation for this ignition. AFA hypothesized that the insulator and crossarm replacement performed on Pole #2 in March 2020 may have also contributed to the mechanical failure of the insulators on the Incident Pole.⁴ AFA is evaluating whether pole work performed on adjacent structures may damage triangular construction porcelain insulators installations.

AFA also initiated a Safety Condition Assessment Review (SCAR)⁵ to inspect the condition of insulators on eight poles proximate to the Incident Location (Figure 7). SCAR aerial photographs of downstream Pole #3, taken on August 28, 2024,⁶ show that two post-type LAPP insulators exhibit cracks; the cracks appear to be both of newer and older vintage. AFA hypothesized that the newer vintage cracks may be related to repair work performed on the Incident Pole. On September 10, 2024, a PG&E repair crew replaced the insulators and crossarm on Pole #3 as part of EC 129509389.^{7, 8, 9}

The 2019 Wildfire Safety Inspection Program (WSIP) inspection report and the 2019 GO 165 Detailed Overhead Inspection for the Incident Pole erroneously indicated LAPP insulators were not present; photographs taken as part of these inspections clearly indicate they were installed as of May 9, 2019, and May 22, 2019, respectively. At this time (2019), it was PG&E's policy, as reflected in the Distribution Inspection checklist, to identify LAPP insulators installed between 1968 to 1976 during the performance of the Detailed Overhead Inspection and create a notification for replacement.^{10,11} Had either the WSIP and GO 165 Detailed OH inspections correctly identified the presence of post-type LAPP insulators, an EC notification should have been created for replacement and the ignition would likely not have occurred. Detailed analysis performed by AFA in 2023, determined that LAPP post insulators (1972 and earlier) were not a major ignition driver and did not justify a proactive replacement strategy. Consequently, PG&E's current strategy is to replace and/or dispose of these obsolete LAPP insulators when they are encountered during work performed on facilities.¹²

⁴ EC # 118640462, Priority A, completed March 5, 2020. AFA determined EC # 118640462 erroneously called out the wrong SAP ID (#100989588) and that the corrective work on this notification is associated with Pole 2. Review of 2019 WSIP inspection and 2022 GO165 OH Enhanced Detailed Inspection photographs show the insulators on Pole 2 were changed out during this period (Figure 6).

⁵ As of the date of this report, the SCAR was complete and necessary actions taken.

⁶ iHAWC team performed the aerial inspection.

⁷ EC Notification 129509389, Priority A issued on September 10, 2024.

⁸ CIRT originally issued E-Tag # 129489964 to replace Pole #3 due to the pole top decaying, the insulator cracking, and loose chicken wing hardware present. AFA Corrective Action CA-01 entailed submitting a summary of the XoC evaluation to CIRT to re-evaluate and replace the two cracked insulators. CIRT issued EC Notification # 129489964, priority A tag on September 10, 2024 to replace the damaged insulators and crossarm.

⁹ The XoC investigation identified two additional corrective actions: 1) CA-02: Updating the 2025 OH Inspection Job Aid to incorporate images of abnormal conditions with triangular construction insulators (post-type insulator installation) and guidance on how to prioritize identified abnormal conditions, and 2) CA-03: Address an existing gap in the iHAWC team app which does not allow inspectors to create an X-tag; specific actions to be determined.

¹⁰ AFA report "Lapp Insulator Ignitions and Failures Evaluation and Extent of Condition (Index 20210293)", dated 2/28/2023, Slide 26

¹¹ In 2020, the direction changed, and the Distribution Inspection checklist included treating LAPP insulators the same as any other insulator, creating an EC Notification if there is a compelling abnormal condition to be corrected. See AFA report dated 2/28/2023, Slide 26

¹² Currently, the use of LAPP post insulators manufactured 1972 and earlier are obsolete per Document 022088 which requires replacing and/or disposing of LAPP post insulators (1972 and earlier) when they are encountered during work performed on facilities.

A weather station located 0.5 miles north of the Incident Location recorded a temperature of 72°F and a relative humidity of 57% with sustained winds of 2.5 mile per hour (mph) and wind gusts up to 5.5 mph out of the southwest at the time of the incident. Meteorology indicated the actual Fire Potential Index (FPI) rating was R2.

This information is preliminary, and all times, customer numbers and measurements mentioned in this report are approximate.

System Protection Analysis

Due to clearances on the line at the time of the incident, the Incident Location was being sourced by Garberville 1102 distribution circuit. Garberville 1102 was equipped with multiple EPSS enabled protective devices at the time of the incident (see section titled Single Line Diagram). Protective devices upstream of the Incident Location equipped with Sensitive Ground Fault (SGF) and Downed Conductor Detection (DCD) capabilities, listed in the order of closest proximity, include LR 615540, LR 6054, and LR 2006 (all Brand Viper, Type M-7679-Rev 7.3) and CB 1102/2¹³ (Brand: Oil, Type M-7679-Rev 1.5). Due to back feeding conditions associated with the circuit configuration, LR 615540 and LR 2006 were placed in Mode 2 on July 11, 2024, and not EPSS enabled at the time of the incident. The only EPSS enabled devices with SGF and DCD capabilities at the time of the incident were LR 6054 and LR 1102/2.

The insulator failing causing one phase of primary conductor to fall to the ground triggered a line-to-ground high impedance fault. The faults caused CB 1102/2 to operate on DCD target and respond to the fault in 996 milliseconds. The first DCD capable upstream device, LR 6054, did not detect fault conditions prior to LR 1102/2 operating. Distribution Protection Engineering (“DPE”) determined this was likely due to a combination of fault characteristics and inherent properties of the two DCD enabled LR’s (type and DCD algorithms). DPE’s assessment is that the EPSS protective devices operated as expected given the system configuration at the time of the incident.

Ignition Impact

The insulator failure caused one phase of 4-ACSR wire to fall to the ground for two spans, igniting an approximate 1.8-acre vegetation fire that spread outward from the Incident Pole and was extinguished by CAL FIRE. The ignition caused fire damage to the Incident Pole. There was no other damage to surrounding property, no individuals were injured, and there was no reported media exposure. The outage associated with this event affected 1,418 customers for approximately three hours, 1,185 customers for approximately four hours and two customers for approximately eight hours.

Sequence of Events

July 15, 2024

- 1020 hours, CB 1102/2 opens on a line-to-ground fault; PG&E records first no light (FNL)
- 1025 hours, PG&E dispatches two troubleshooters to investigate the outage
- 1032 hours, FECC notifies PG&E of a vegetation fire and wire down at Incident Location
- 1039 hours, CAL FIRE arrives at the Incident Location
- 1100 hours, Troubleshooter #1 arrives to the Incident Location
- 1118 hours, Troubleshooter #1 opens Fuse 6865 jumpers

¹³ CB 1102/2 is controlled by LR 1102/2 (acting as a relay)

- 1123 hours, Troubleshooter #1 reports wire down two spans west of Fuse 6865, fire department clearing the fire, and patrol from Fuse 6865 to Incident Location complete with no trouble identified
- 1154 hours, Troubleshooter #3¹⁴ reports a tree branch laying on top of secondary service line at 909 Redway Drive; crew is removing the branch from the line; helicopter being requested to patrol beyond LR 2010
- 1237 hours, Troubleshooter #2 initiates ground patrol
- 1302 hours, Troubleshooter #2 reports patrol completed from CB 1102/2 to LR 2010 to source side of LR 1510; no additional trouble identified
- 1311 hours, DCC opens LR 1510
- 1319 hours, DCC closed CB 1102/2 returning service to 961 customers; CAL FIRE reports fire contained and controlled at 1.8 acres
- 1322 hours, Troubleshooter #1 creates EC Notification # 129223091 to replaced damaged pole
- 1327 hours, DCC opens LR 56048
- 1334 hours, DCC closed LR 1510 returning service to 457 customers
- 1407 hours, DCC closed LR 56048 returning service to 379 customers
- 1426 hours, Troubleshooter #1 leaves Incident Location
- 1428 hours, Troubleshooter #3 reports 100% main line patrol completed from Incident Location to LR 2010. No further trouble found, ok to energize, all personnel in the clear
- 1432 hours, DCC closed LR 2010 returning service to 806 customers
- 1437 hours, Repair crew given approval to open Fuse 6865 jumpers to de-energize line for repairs
- 1459 hours, PG&E dispatched repair crew to Incident Location
- 1503 hours, Troubleshooter #2 leaves incident
- 1510 hours, Repair crew on site
- 1605 hours, Repair crew reports all repairs complete and ready to close Fuse 6895 open jumpers
- 1613 hours, Repair crew closes jumpers on Fuse 6865 closed returning service to two customers
- 1745 hours, Repair crew leaves site

Corrective Notification Associated with Ignition

Corrective Notification EC 129223091 was created to replace the damaged pole (including crossarms and insulators). Replacement of the pole was completed on July 15, 2024.

Pending Work

Type	Number	Description	Priority	Date Identified	Due Date
EC Notification	N/A				
COE Notification	N/A				
LC Notification	N/A				
Veg Work Order	N/A				

Please note this may not include pending major program or project work at the incident location.

¹⁴ Details regarding dispatch of Troubleshooter #3 to Incident Location #2 and when he left incident location are unknown.

Asset Info & Most Recent Inspections and Tests

Incident Pole		
Info / Inspection	Most Recent Dates	Findings
Install Date:	1971	Wood Pole, 40-feet high
Inspections:	June 6, 2022	GO165 Detailed Enhanced Inspection: No abnormal or compelling conditions identified. LAPP post-type insulators shown in photographs.
	May 22, 2019	GO165 Detailed Enhanced Inspection; No compelling, abnormal conditions for the pole, equipment, and its associated spans identified. Photographs show post-type ceramic LAPP insulators present; inspection states insulators are not LAPP manufactured.
Patrol:	May 20, 2024	Helicopter patrol found no abnormal conditions.
Corrective History:	November 25, 2014	EC # 109686754, Priority F. Missing high voltage and guy marker signs. Work completed March 18, 2019.
Infrared Inspection	N/A	
VM Inspection:	N/A	
EVM Inspection:	N/A	
Equipment Test:	N/A	
Pole Intrusive Test:	November 26, 2013	Distribution Pole Test and Treat – Intrusive Inspection Status: Pass.
WSIP Inspection:	May 9, 2019	No compelling, abnormal conditions for the pole, equipment, and its associated spans identified. Insulators are in good condition. Photographs show post-type ceramic LAPP insulators present; inspection states insulators are not LAPP manufactured.

*Incident Location: Pole SAP ID: 100989592 (July 15, 2024 replacement pole SAP ID # 104219296)

Pole 2 (Source side)		
Info / Inspection	Most Recent Dates	Findings
Install Date:	1974	Wood Pole, 45-feet high
Inspections:	June 5, 2022	GO165 Detailed Enhanced Inspection: No abnormal or compelling conditions identified. LAPP insulators are not present in inspection photographs (Figure 6).
	May 22, 2019	GO 165 Detailed Enhanced Inspection: No compelling, abnormal conditions for the pole, equipment, and its associated spans identified. Photographs show post-type ceramic LAPP insulators present; inspection states insulators are not LAPP manufactured.
Patrol:	May 20, 2024	Helicopter patrol found no abnormal conditions.

Corrective History:	March 5, 2020	EC # 118640462, ¹⁵ Priority A: Broken Insulator, replace crossarm; no pole replacement.
Infrared Inspection	N/A	
VM Inspection:	N/A	
EVM Inspection:	N/A	
Equipment Test:	N/A	
Pole Intrusive Test:	Nov 26, 2013	Distribution Pole Test and Treat – Intrusive Inspection Status: Pass.
WSIP Inspection:	May 8, 2019	No compelling, abnormal conditions for the pole, equipment, and its associated spans identified. Insulators are in good condition. Photographs show post-type ceramic LAPP insulators present; inspection states insulators are not LAPP manufactured.

*Incident Location: Pole SAP ID: 100989591

Pole 3 (Load side)		
Info / Inspection	Most Recent Dates	Findings
Install Date:		Wood Pole, 45-feet high
Inspections:	June 6, 2022	GO165 Detailed Enhanced Inspection: High Sign missing. No other abnormal or compelling conditions identified. LAPP insulators shown in photographs.
	May 22, 2019	GO165 Detailed Enhanced Inspection: No compelling, abnormal conditions for the pole, equipment, and its associated spans identified. Photographs show post-type ceramic LAPP insulators present; inspection states insulators are not LAPP manufactured.
Patrol:	May 20, 2024	Helicopter patrol found no abnormal conditions.
Corrective History:	June 6, 2022	EC #123773225. High sign missing, install. Tag updated on June 22, 2022 to replace decayed and leaning pole. Required end date June 6, 2023. Work pending at time of incident.
Infrared Inspection	N/A	
VM Inspection:	N/A	
EVM Inspection:	N/A	
Equipment Test:	N/A	
Pole Intrusive Test:	November 26, 2013	Distribution Pole Test and Treat – Intrusive Inspection Status: Pass.
WSIP Inspection:	May 9, 2019	No compelling, abnormal conditions for the pole, equipment, and its associated spans identified. Insulators are in good condition. Photographs show post-type ceramic LAPP insulators present; inspection states insulators are not LAPP manufactured.

*Incident Location: Pole SAP ID: 100989594

¹⁵ AFA determined EC # 118640462 called out the wrong SAP ID (#100989588) and this notification is associated with Pole 2.

Hazard Barrier Analysis


Hazard	Equipment Failure	Sub-Hazard	Insulator Failure
	Insulator failure leading to a downed conductor and 1.8 Acre ignition.		
Barrier	Expected vs. Observed Performance	Why did the barrier not prevent the ignition event? (See ICF Codes)	Comments
Barriers that Positively Affected Ignition			
Enhanced Powerline Safety Settings - Downed Conductor Detection Document: TD-2700P-26	Expected Performance: Automatically turn off power when a high impedance fault/downed conductor is detected to reduce the risk of ignition in HFRA Observed Performance: Barrier performed as expected	A1B2C2D3 – Device tripping time is limited	CB 1102/2 operated on DCD target recognizing the fault in 996 ms and clearing the fault within 4.063 seconds thus limiting ignition impact.
Barriers that Negatively Affected Ignition			
Distribution Detailed Inspection TD-2301S, Rev. 1 TD-8124S, Rev. 0 TD-2305M TD-2305M-JA02, Rev 13	Expected Performance: Identify obsolete and/or damaged insulators on pole Observed Performance: Barrier did not perform as expected	A3B1C1D1 –Required work not identified	The 2019 WSIP and GO 165 OH inspections erroneously indicated LAPP insulators were not present; photographs taken as part of these inspections show post-type LAPP insulators present. Had either the WSIP or the GP 165 OH inspections correctly identified the presence of post-type LAPP insulators in 2019, an EC notification should have been created for replacement and the ignition likely would not have occurred.
Barriers that were Assessed as Opportunities			

Hazard	Equipment Failure	Sub-Hazard	Insulator Failure
	Insulator failure leading to a downed conductor and 1.8 Acre ignition.		
Barrier	Expected vs. Observed Performance	Why did the barrier not prevent the ignition event? (See ICF Codes)	Comments
Aerial Inspections Program 2023-2024 WMP, TD-2305M-JA02 Rev. 11	Expected Performance: Identify damaged insulators on a pole Observed Performance: Barrier did not exist	N/A	No records of aerial inspections were identified. An aerial inspection may have identified the damaged insulator.
Covered Conductor on Primary Conductors Document 015195 Rev. 5, TD-9001B-009 Rev. 2	Expected Performance: Covered conductor may lower ignition potential in the event of line-to-ground contact. Observed Performance: Barrier did not exist	N/A	Covered conductor may have reduced risk when wire contacted the ground. Note: The Incident Conductor did not break as a result of the insulator failure.
Pole Clearing Program Documents: TD-7112P-01, CCR Title 14-1254, 2023-2025 Wildfire Mitigation PRC 4292	Expected Performance: Limit fire spread for ignitions initiating within 10-feet of pole in SRA Observed Performance: Barrier did not exist	N/A	Ignition initiated at/near pole due to insulator failure causing wire down. Pole clearing may have reduced ignition potential and impact.

Potential Next Steps / Associated CAP Items:

- Evaluate whether pole work may damage adjacent triangular construction porcelain insulators installations and, if appropriate, develop strategies to mitigate risk. (AFA)

Single Line Diagram –



Photos and Diagrams of Events




Figure 1 Aerial view showing the Incident Location (indicated with red "X") and closest upstream protective devices (marked with yellow pins). See Footnote 3 for brief discussion regarding Incident Location 2. Source: Google Earth, image undated.




Figure 2: Aerial view of circuit layout in vicinity of Incident Pole. Source: Google Earth



Figure 3 Photographs of damaged Incident Pole (top left), extent of vegetation fire looking towards source side Pole # 2 from the Incident Pole (top, right) and the failed insulator (bottom). Arrows in top right photograph indicate downed wire. Source: Google Maps, image undated.

Wind Direction

Advancing indicator

Lateral indicator

Backing indicator

Specific Origin Area
N 40 17.310
W 123 48.217

Fire Perimeter

Power Pole

Power Line

Fire Size: 1.78 Acres

Dyerville Loop Rd

This report is preliminary and based on available information as of August 28, 2024; event data is subject to change based upon subsequently discovered information. Doc. R18 – Mar 2024



Index 953 FRUITLAND 1142 Insulator




Figure 5 View of failed insulator as received by ATS (top left) and views of the fracture surface and radial cracks. Source: ATS report # 0006.6-24.51.



*Figure 6 Views of Pole #2 (source side of incident pole) showing crossarm and insulators change between 2019 (left) and 2022 (right).
Source: 2019 image: WSIP inspection report # 181-7155634; 2022 image: 2022 GO165 Overhead Inspection report.*




Figure 7 Insulators inspected on the eight identified poles proximate to the Incident Location. Source: SCAR EDGIS Map of Inspection Poles.

Attachments

Attachments and references can be located in the ESA folder, located below:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

-----END of REPORT-----