



Preliminary Ignition Investigation Report

Ignition Database Index:	20241351
Electric Incident Investigation (EII) Number:	N/A
Incident Name:	N/A
PG&E Facility Ignition?	Yes
CPUC Reportable Ignition?	Yes
Date & Time of Incident:	September 16, 2024, at 1629 hours
Street Address:	[REDACTED]
City:	Novato
County:	Marin
Latitude/Longitude:	[REDACTED]
State Responsibility Area (SRA) / Local Responsibility Area (LRA) / Federal Responsibility Area (FRA)	LRA
PG&E Division:	North Bay
High Fire Threat District (HFTD):	Tier 3
High Fire Risk Area (HFRA):	Yes
EPSS Buffer:	No
Fire Index Area (FIA):	190
Fire Potential Index (FPI) Rating: FIA	R2
Fire Potential Index (FPI) Rating: Circuit	R1
Was there a PSPS event at the time of ignition?	No
Suspected Initiating Event:	Equipment – PG&E
Failure Driver:	All types of equipment/ facility failure
Failure Sub-driver:	Splice/Clamp/Connector
Circuit:	Ignacio 1101
Circuit Protection Zone:	Ignacio 1101LR1300
Nominal Voltage:	12kV
Pole SAP Equipment ID:	102235782
Subject to PRC 4292 Veg Pole Clearance:	No
PG&E Equipment associated with ignition:	Parallel groove (PG) bolted connector
EPSS enabled at time of ignition?	No
Fault Type:	Series
Wire Down (Primary)?	No
Lead Agency/Agency Having Jurisdiction:	CAL FIRE
Fire Size:	1 meter - <3 meters
FAS Field Remarks:	customer stated earlier in day his contractor witnessed sparks from top of pole, started small grass fire which they extinguished and called the

	FD. inspected pole, found 1 bolt connectors from riser pin terminals to rack secondary NG, arcing occurred when touched. replaced all 1 bolts with press connections. customer stated his electrician noticed high voltage (255) at meter. tag created to install RVM next day. voltage at time is 252
HAWC Summary:	N/A
Injuries / Fatalities / Property Damage / Media Attention:	0/0/0
Weather Conditions:	On September 16, 2024, at 0910 hours near the Incident Location: Temperature: 57.9°F Relative Humidity: 77% Wind Speed: 1.8 MPH Wind Gust: 3.2 MPH from the east-northeast
Red Flag Warning (RFW) / High Wind Warning (HWW):	No RFW/No HWW
911 Standby Relief Time:	N/A
OIS #:	2569944
ILIS #:	N/A
FAS #:	T006502243
TOTL #:	N/A
Assigned Attorney:	N/A
Ignition Investigator & Phone:	

Executive Summary

On September 16, at 1629 hours a PG&E troubleshooter was dispatched to the Ignacio 1101 Distribution Circuit on Burning Tree Drive in the City of Novato in response to a customer reporting sparks from the top of the pole and a small grass fire earlier in the day. The ensuing fire was three feet by 5.5 feet wide in size.

The Incident Location was [REDACTED], a Tier 3 High Fire Threat District (HFTD) with clear weather conditions. The Ignacio 1101 is a 12kV two phase overhead primary distribution circuit and PG&E's Enhanced Powerline Safety Settings (EPSS) were not enabled at the time of the incident.

On the morning of September 16, 2024, a resident at the Incident Location observed sparking from the top of the pole with SAP ID 102235782 that ignited a small grass fire. The resident suppressed the fire but contacted the Novato Fire Protection District (NFPD) at 0906 hours as a safety precaution after the fire was extinguished. NFPD was dispatched at 0907 hours and arrived at the Incident Location at 0915 hours and confirmed the fire was extinguished. NFPD cleared the scene at 0920 hours.

On September 16, 2024, at 1629 hours, a PG&E troubleshooter was dispatched to the Incident Location after the resident contacted PG&E. The troubleshooter arrived at the Incident Location at 1732 hours where resident explained that earlier in the day, they had witnessed sparks from the top of the pole that ignited a small grass fire. The troubleshooter inspected the incident pole and observed a no-good bolted connector from the riser pin terminals to the rack secondary that was arcing when touched. The troubleshooter replaced all three bolted connectors with press connectors as part of Field Order T006502234.

It was a seasonably cool and dry day on September 16, 2024, near the Incident Location as a low-pressure system moved through the territory. The high temperature for the day was 70.4°F at 1810 hours and the low temperature was 55.7°F at 2350 hours. The relative humidity was as high as 82% at 0700 hours and as low as 49% at 1600 hours. The strongest wind speed was 16.8 miles per hour (mph) out of the west at 0220 hours.

The no-good bolt connector was collected for analysis by PG&E's Applied Technology Services (ATS) team. The ATS team conducted a visual examination to document the failed bolted connector. The ATS team observed internal arc damage, external arc marking due to contact with secondary conductor, and tool marks and gouging on the bolt. It was also observed that the bolt had sheared into two pieces and showed signs of over-tightening. The PG&E troubleshooter who replaced the bolted connectors explained that the bolt sheared as he was making the repairs.

PG&E's Asset Failure Analysis (AFA) team performed an Extent of Condition (XOC) on the failed connector. The XOC identified the failed connector as a parallel groove (PG) bolted connector. PG bolted connectors are known "bad actors" and [Document 028852](#), Connectors for Aluminum Conductors on Distribution Linesⁱ, calls for the replacement of PG bolt connectors in the field when performing work on a structure with these connectors present. The AFA also points out that a prior inspection did not identify the PG connector in HFTD. As required in document 028852, the responding troubleshooter did replace all present PG bolted connectors on the structure.

This information is preliminary and subject to change based on new data.

System Protection Analysis

There is no system protection analysis as this incident occurred on secondary conductor.

Ignition Impact

The ignition resulted in a small grass fire spreading to a size of approximately three feet by 5.5 feet. There were no sustained outages associated with the ignition. No injuries, property damage or significant media coverage was identified with this incident.

Sequence of Events

September 16, 2024

- 0906 hours: Customer contacts first responders/ (NFPD) as a safety precaution after extinguishing a small grass fire.
- 0907 hours: NFPD is dispatched to Incident Location.
- 0909 hours: NFPD is enroute to Incident Location.
- 0915 hours: NFPD arrived at Incident Location where small grass fire had been extinguished.
- 0920 hours: NFPD cleared the scene.
- 1629 hours: PG&E troubleshooter is dispatched to the Incident Location.
- 1732 hours: PG&E troubleshooter is enroute to the Incident Location
- 1845 hours: PG&E troubleshooter arrived at the Incident Location.
- 2007 hours: PG&E troubleshooter completed repairs by replacing three bolt connectors with three press connectors.

Corrective Notification Associated with Ignition

On September 16, 2024, Field Order T006502234 was created and a PG&E troubleshooter replaced three bolt connectors with three press connectors.

Pending Work

Type	Number	Description	Priority	Date Identified	Due Date
EC Notification	117083615	Pole replacement	E	4/23/2019	10/20/2019
COE Notification	N/A				
LC Notification	N/A				
Veg Work Order	N/A				

Please note this may not include pending major program or project work at the incident location.

Asset Info & Most Recent Inspections and Tests

Source Side Structure		
Info / Inspection	Most Recent Date	Findings
Install Date:	1968	
Inspection:	April 30, 2022	No abnormal conditions identified
Patrol:	August 21, 2019	Pending receipt
Corrective History:	April 23, 2019	EC Notification 117083615 identified pole with SAP ID 102235782 as needing replaced due to rotten pole top.


		Notes in long text challenge the condition of the pole and a 2022 GO165 inspection did not note any compelling damage to the pole. The EC Notification is currently open.
EVM Inspection:		(Note: document if “not previously in EVM Scope”)
Pole Intrusive Test:	December 7, 2021	No abnormalities identified

*Incident Location: SAP ID: 102235782

Hazard Barrier Analysis:

Hazard	Equipment Failure	Sub-Hazard	Connector Failure (secondary distribution)
Target	Connector failure in Tier 3 HFTD leading to 1-3 meter fire.		
Barrier	Expected vs. Observed Performance	Why did the barrier not prevent the ignition event? (See ICF Codes)	Notes/Opportunities
Barriers that Negatively Affected Ignition			
Patrol & Inspection Minimum Work Completion for inspections	Expected Performance: Ensure that crew assesses all maintenance conditions and safety items on the tag or report/address any additionally identified items. Includes creation of tags for damage identified during patrol, inspection, or other work Observed Performance: Barrier did not perform as expected	A3B1C1D2 –Damage identified; no EC tag created	The inspection did not identify or flag the PG bolt connector in an HFTD
Barriers that were Assessed as Opportunities			
Distribution System Hardening Program	Expected Performance: Targets conductor replacement in high wildfire risk areas and areas most impacted by PSPS; Observed Performance: Barrier did not exist	[A1B1C2D3 - Limitation : Visibility Limitation; Equipment Condition Visibility; Fatigue damage not visually apparent]	System hardening could be considered as this incident occurred in an HFTD

Single Line Diagram




Photos and Diagrams of Events

This report is preliminary and based on available information as of **January 30, 2025**; event data is subject to change based upon subsequently discovered information.

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
EDGIS map of incident location

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Google Earth image showing aerial view of Incident Location.



Photo showing Incident Location and incident pole. Photo is from an inspection prior to the incident.



Photo of the top of the Incident Pole. Photo taken by responding troubleshooter



Photo of NFPD on site. Fire was initially suppressed by resident who contacted NFPD as a safety precaution.



Photo showing measurement of fire footprint. Photo taken by responding troubleshooter.



Photo of failed bolt connector at the Incident Location. Photo provided by responding troubleshooter.

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Attachments

Attachments and references can be located in the ESA folder, located below:



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