

October 15, 2024

VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL


Leslie Palmer
Director, Safety and Enforcement Division
California Public Utilities Commission
505 Van Ness Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94102

Dear Mr. Palmer:

As required by Resolution ESRB-8 and in accordance with Ordering Paragraph 1 of California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Decision (D.) 19-05-042, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) respectfully submits this report for the September 30 – October 1, 2024, PSPS. This report has been verified by a PG&E officer in accordance with Rule 1.11 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,



Susan C. Martinez
Director of Liaison, Regulatory Operations and Engagement

Enclosures

cc: Anthony Noll, SED
ESRB_ComplianceFilings@cpuc.ca.gov
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Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) Report to the CPUC
September 30 – October 1, 2024 De-energization

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PG&E Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) Report to the CPUC September 30 – October 1, 2024 De-energization

Section 1 – Summary and Overview

Section 1.1 - Brief description of the PSPS event starting from the time when the utility's Emergency Operation Center is activated until service to all customers have been restored.
(D.21-06-014, page 286, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

High winds can cause tree branches and debris to contact energized electric lines, and potentially damage our equipment causing a wildfire. As a result, we may need to turn off power during severe weather to help prevent wildfires. This is called a Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS). PG&E will not take any chances with customer safety. For the safety of our customers and communities, PSPS continues to be a necessary tool as a last resort. We know that turning off the power disrupts lives, and do not take this decision lightly.

On September 27, 2024, PG&E's Meteorology Team identified a potential fire weather event in forecast models and notified the acting Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Commander. On September 28, 2024, we activated our EOC for a PSPS and began notifying Public Safety Partners. On the evening of September 28, 2024, we further refined the PSPS scope based on updated meteorological forecasts, notified Public Safety Partners and customers in the areas anticipated to be impacted, readied the grid, and prepared Community Resource Centers (CRCs) and other customer support.

We closely monitored weather conditions across 17 Time Places (TPs),¹ as shown in Figure 1, and ultimately PG&E decided to move forward with de-energizing customers, due to unfavorable weather conditions.

On September 30, 2024, at approximately 04:38 PDT, PG&E began de-energizing its assets and customers to mitigate catastrophic wildfire risk across the Sacramento Valley Foothills. Wind gusts near 46 mph were recorded during the period of concern.

On September 30, 2024, at 12:13 PDT, the first Weather "All-Clear" was issued for a portion of All-Clear zones with the remaining All-Clears being declared on September 30, 2024, at 13:30 PDT once winds subsided. A potential second wave of de-energization in TP 17 was monitored for the early morning of October 1. However, weather conditions improved and did not meet PSPS thresholds, therefore, TP 17 was not re-de-energized. During this PSPS, we ultimately de-energized 9,176 customers² in five TP's across five counties.

A damaged asset caused by weather was identified during patrol and inspections. Figure 2 shows the fire spread simulation of what a wildfire might have looked like, and the potential damage or impact caused, if a PSPS had not been initiated. See Section 4 for more information.

¹ A Time-Place (TP) is a portion of the PG&E grid that is electrically and geographically coherent and is forecast to experience consistent timing for severe fire weather. TP's are identified for each PSPS and receive consistent treatment for notifications and de-energization. Once actual weather conditions occur, Weather "All-Clear" and service restoration times may vary due to actual weather conditions within a TP.

² Customers refers to active service points (meters).

During this PSPS, PG&E mitigated and avoided the de-energization of approximately 10,458 customers in the final scope through the use of sectionalization, temporary substation generation, and backup power support. PG&E notified those customers who required de-energization and contacted more than 222 community representatives to ensure that communities could prepare before the PSPS.

PG&E opened 11 CRCs that were operated within the impacted counties, which hosted approximately 460 visitors from September 30, 2024, through October 1, 2024. Additionally, we partnered with local organizations to provide ten hotel stays and food to over 487 customers in need.

Customers were re-energized safely and as quickly as possible. Within 24 hours of the Weather “All-Clear,” 100% of customers’ power had been restored. The average restoration time for this PSPS was 4.5 hours.

Figure 1: PSPS Timeline





Figure 2: Fire Spread Simulation
Fire Spread Simulation Damage to Equipment (Shasta County)



Impact Analysis

Size (ac)	951.01
Initial Attack Assessment	3 - High
No. of Buildings	11
Total Population	1
No. of Places	2

Section 1.2 - A table including the maximum numbers of customers notified and actually de-energized; number of counties de-energized; number of Tribes de-energized; number of Medical Baseline customers de-energized; number of transmission and distribution circuits de-energized; damage/hazard count; number of critical facilities and infrastructure de-energized. Hazards are conditions discovered during restoration patrolling or operations that might have caused damages or posed an electrical arcing or ignition risk had PSPS not been executed (D.21-06-034, Appendix A, page A15, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

Table 1 identifies the maximum number of customers notified and de-energized; number of Tribes de-energized; number of counties de-energized; number of Medical Baseline (MBL) Program customers de-energized; number of transmission and distribution circuits de-energized; damage/hazard count; and number of Critical Facilities and Infrastructure (CFI) de-energized.

Table 1: Customers Notified and De-energized³

Total Customers			MBL Customers	Counties	Tribes	Circuits			Damage Count	CFI De-energized
Notified	De-energized	Canceled	De-energized	De-energized	De-energized	Transmission De-energized	Unique Distribution Circuits in Any Version of Scope	Distribution Circuits De-energized		
14,098 ⁴	9,176 ⁵	4,779	853	5	2	5	43	20	1	176

³ The information, times, and figures referenced in this report are based on the best available information available at the time of the report's submission. The information, times, and figures herein are subject to revision based on further analysis and validation.

⁴ Of the 14,098 customers notified of planned PSPS impact, 169 customers received a notice that they may be de-energized but did not receive a cancellation and are not counted as a de-energized customer. See Section 5.5 and 5.7 for more information.


⁵ Of the 9,176 customers de-energized, 34 customers did not receive any notifications before de-energization. 33 of these customers were among the 52 reported in Section 5.5 that had no valid contact information. See Section 5.5 for more information.

Section 1.3 - A PDF map depicting the de-energized area(s) (*SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

During the September 30 – October 1, 2024, PSPS PG&E de-energized 9,176 customers in five TPs. The final de-energization footprint is shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: De-energization Footprint Map



Section 2 – Decision Making Process

Section 2.1 - A table showing all factors considered in the decision to shut off power for each circuit de-energized, including sustained and gust wind speeds, temperature, humidity, and moisture in the vicinity of the de-energized circuits (*Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

See Appendix A for a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope for the September 30 – October 1, 2024, PSPS.

Section 2.2 - Decision criteria and detailed thresholds leading to de-energization including the latest forecasted weather parameters versus actual weather. Also include a PSPS decision-making diagram(s)/flowchart(s) or equivalent along with narrative description (*D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A22, D.21-06-014, page 284, SED Additional Information.*)


Response:

This section provides an overview of the criteria and threshold evaluation process that were used in the decision to de-energize customers during the September 30 – October 1, 2024, PSPS.

PSPS Preparation and Scoping Process

At a high level, Figure 4 shows the process used to prepare for a PSPS. PG&E utilized and referenced the following protocols and tools during the September 30 – October 1, 2024, PSPS to determine the latest forecasted weather parameters versus actual weather. Appendix A includes anticipated parameters based on the latest forecast used to develop the planned de-energization scope versus actual weather parameters for each circuit.

Figure 4: PG&E's High-level PSPS Process Steps



PG&E considers executing a PSPS when strong gusty winds, critically low humidity levels, and low fuel moisture levels pose an unacceptable risk of causing fast-spreading, catastrophic wildfires. Assessments begin several days before the weather event is forecasted to take place.

We identify weather conditions that could create high fire potential by using a combination of high outage and ignition potential, high-resolution internal and external weather forecasting models and data from federal agencies that include the following:

- Ignition Probability Weather (IPW): Determines the potential of an outage due to weather conditions, and then for that outage to lead to an ignition.
- Fire Potential Index (FPI): Assists with fire model development and calibration.
- Technosylva: Provides fire spread modeling via data inputs.

Through partnerships with external experts, we developed our machine learning models using historic datasets and advanced forecast models that provide a better understanding of historical weather events and improve our weather forecasting. These models use the following:

- Precise location data points across our service territory to conduct hourly weather analyses using high-resolution, historical data.
- Over 100 trillion data points of historical weather and fuel moisture.
- Hourly weather data such as temperature, relative humidity, wind speed, precipitation, pressure, and dead and live fuel moisture.
- Data storage and processing via the PG&E-Amazon Web Services Cloud.

Our thresholds and guidance for identifying critical fire risk and outage/ignition potential are determined by analyzing and rigorously testing our current PSPS protocols and criteria through decades of historical weather data in and around California.

External forecast information from the National Weather Service (NWS) (e.g., Red Flag Warnings) and other forecast agencies are examined carefully. Furthermore, we coordinate with these agencies during high-risk periods via daily conference calls to ultimately decide whether to de-energize portions of the grid for public safety.

Tools and Technology


PG&E partners with Technosylva, an external expert in the wildfire modeling field to test and deploy cloud-based wildfire spread model capabilities. This helps us better understand where we might need to turn off power.

Each day, PG&E delivers wildfire conditions datasets to Technosylva, who then perform over 100 million fire spread simulations to provide fire spread scenarios that help to identify circuits that may be at risk during dry, windy weather. These are done every three hours, for the five days ahead.

Decision Criteria and Thresholds for Distribution PSPS Protocols

When determining whether to turn off power for safety, we start with the distribution system. These powerlines are closer to communities and are generally more susceptible to dry, windy weather threats. The PSPS guidance values presented in Figure 5 were developed using 10 years of PG&E's high-resolution climate data to help understand wildfire risk and the potential customer impacts of PSPS. We evaluate within a small geographic area (700 square meter areas) and if any of the measures are forecasted to be met, we scope the circuit segments within that region for de-energization. There is no single criterion or threshold that will require turning off power to a distribution circuit. For event-specific thresholds, see Appendix A. Our process is outlined in Figure 5 below.

Figure 5: PSPS Protocols for Distribution



Step 1: Minimum Fire Potential Conditions

The first step to determine the scope of a PSPS is evaluating the Minimum Fire Potential Conditions (mFPC). This ensures that PSPS is only executed during wind events when atmospheric conditions and fuels are dry. A PSPS is evaluated if the mFPC noted in step 1 of Figure 5 above are met.

These values were established from an examination of historical fire occurrence in the PG&E service area, PSPS sensitivity studies using historical data viewed through the lens of both customer impacts and wildfire risk mitigated, as well as information published by federal agencies regarding fire behavior and criteria used to issue warnings to the public.

Step 2: In-Depth Review of Fire Risk


If all minimum fire conditions are met, we conduct an in-depth review of fire risk using three separate measures. If the criteria for any of these measures are met, we may need to turn off power for safety. We evaluate all of the factors below together, rather than isolating any specific factor to assess fire risk against the potential harms of de-energization. For event-specific factors, see Appendix A.

- **Catastrophic Fire Probability:** This model combines the probability of fire ignitions due to weather impacting the electric system with the probability that a fire will be catastrophic if it starts. It is the combination of the Fire Potential Index Model (FPI) and the Ignition Probability Weather Model (IPW). The CFP_D model accounts for changes over time based on actual performance data. Thus, the model will address positive and negative trends in grid performance and reliability year-over-year, incorporating grid improvements such as system hardening, and enhanced vegetation management based on their performance at mitigating outages over time.
 - **IPW Model:** A system comprised of two machine learning models. These models are used to evaluate the probability of outages across several outage classes (Outage Probability Weather (OPW) model) and the probability of that outage becoming an ignition (Ignition Given Outage Probability Weather Model (IOPW)). These models are combined for

each location at each hour to ascertain the ignition Probability (IPW). These machine learning models use 10 years of weather data to correlate approximately 500,000 outages occurring on PG&E's distribution grid. The model analyzes the potential for several types of power outages in each weather event, as well as the potential for that outage to be the source of an ignition. IPW learns from and accounts for changes on the grid from year-to-year.

- **FPI Model:** This model outputs the probability that a fire will become large or catastrophic and is used as a daily and hourly tool to drive operational decisions to reduce the risk of utility caused fires. It was enhanced in 2024 with additional data and improved analytic capabilities.
- **Tree Considerations:** Our PSPS protocols utilize a machine learning model to integrate the potential for trees to strike the lines into our OPW Model and IPW Model. This helps our Meteorology Team more accurately analyze risk posed by trees and how that translates to increased ignition probability. See Figure 6 below explaining OPW modeling. Scenarios with a high risk of an IPW and a high FPI value will always warrant a PSPS. However, power may be turned off in other scenarios to avoid catastrophic wildfires.

Figure 6: Incorporating Tree Strike Potential into PSPS Modeling



- **Catastrophic Fire Behavior (CFB):** We also evaluate areas that are meeting mFPC (windy and dry conditions) but are not meeting our Catastrophic Fire Probability (CFP) guidance values by utilizing dynamic wildfire spread simulations from Technosylva. This allows us to consider potential ignition events that are rarer and more difficult to forecast such as animal and third-party contacts, or external debris impacting electrical lines. These locations are only considered once the mFPC are met, ensuring that conditions are sufficiently windy and dry.
 - **Fireline Intensity:** The U.S. Forest Service Rocky Mountain Research Station did a study of fire line intensity which is determined by the size

and components of flames. It is measured as the rate of heat energy released (Btu) per unit length of the fire line (ft) per unit (s). It is also calculated by estimating the flame length, the distance measured from the average flame tip to the middle of the fire's base. Internal studies that evaluated historical fire simulation outputs to actual fire events, damages, and fatalities showed that outputs of flame length and rate of spread were best correlated to historical fire outcomes. Studies, as mentioned above, have shown that more intense fires with higher flame lengths and higher rates of spread are more difficult to control. Thus, we evaluate fire simulation data that indicates where fast-spreading and intense fires could manifest and incorporate that into our PSPS decision making process.

- Vegetation and Electric Asset Criteria Considerations: We review locations from recent inspections where high-priority trees or electric compliance issues may increase the risk of ignition. If an area is forecast to experience minimum fire conditions and there are known issues with equipment or vegetation that have not yet been addressed, we may need to turn off power.

PSPS Protocols for Transmission

In addition to analyzing distribution circuits that may need to be de-energized for safety, we also review the transmission lines and structures in areas experiencing dry, windy weather conditions. Transmission lines are like the freeways of the electric system, carrying high voltage energy across long distances. Similar to our distribution protocols, there is no single factor or threshold that will require turning off power to a transmission line.

Step 1: Minimum Fire Potential Conditions

When determining whether to turn off power for safety on transmission lines, we review the same minimum fire potential conditions as with distribution circuits. If these conditions are met, we will then look at the criteria below to determine whether a transmission line must be turned off.

Step 2: In-Depth Review of Fire Risk


Once PG&E identifies the initial scope, we work with the California Independent Service Operator (CAISO) to ensure the initial scope is appropriate. This includes analyzing whether it will compromise the power supply to other jurisdictions, utilities or facilities connected to our system. This important step can last several hours, which is why the potential scope of a PSPS may change as we get closer to the forecasted weather event.

- Catastrophic Fire Probability – Asset (CFP_T – Asset): We use machine learning to assess the likelihood of equipment failure during a given weather event, and the subsequent risk of catastrophic wildfires if a failure occurs. This model uses a combination of the Operability Assessment (OA) and FPI Models, both in time and space, at every transmission structure to form the Transmission Catastrophic Fire Probability model for asset failures. The OA Model combines historical wind speeds for each structure, historical outage activity, Bayesian updating, and the condition of assets based on inspection programs to help understand the wind-related failure probability of each structure. The OA Model can be driven with forecast wind speeds to output the probability of failure at the structure level.
- Catastrophic Fire Probability – Vegetation (CFP_T – Veg): The transmission-specific vegetation risk model is a calibrated probability of vegetation risk built internally

using data collected and managed by PG&E vegetation management and external contractors such as NV5 and Formation Environmental. This model leverages aerial LiDAR data to map the location and attributes of trees near transmission lines. The transmission vegetation risk model is based on several factors such as overstrike, the amount of unobstructed fall paths to a wire, the slope between tree and conductor, and tree exposure. The transmission vegetation risk model is combined with the FPI Model in space and time to form CFP_T – Veg.

- CFB: We may de-energize customers where the consequence of a potential wildfire ignition would be extreme, even if the probability of a power line or equipment failure is low.
- Vegetation and Electric Asset Criteria Considerations: We review locations from recent inspections where high-priority trees or electric compliance issues are present that may increase the risk of ignition. Figure 7 provides a quantitative summary of our PSPS Protocols for Transmission.

Figure 7: PSPS – Protocols for Transmission



Step 3: Determining the Outage Area

Transmission lines meeting the criteria above then pass to the next stage of review. We conduct a Power Flow Analysis on the in-scope transmission lines (if applicable) to analyze any potential downstream impacts of load shedding.

Reviewing Impact and Forecasted Weather

After determining the outage area both for Distribution and Transmission, PG&E reviews the forecasted customer impacts of each circuit against the forecasted wildfire risk of each circuit. If there's reasonable risk for ignition on the distribution circuits or transmission lines during the forecasted weather event, it is included in the PSPS scope. We then share this analysis internally during key decision-making points to inform PSPS decision making and further risk modeling.

Starting 12 hours before the forecasted PSPS de-energization time, we transition from evaluating forecast data to observing the weather in real-time. Based on real-time observations and analysis, we continually evaluate all the outage areas identified in the previous steps and use external tools and analysis to determine whether to initiate PSPS de-energization.

Decision-Making and Analysis to Validate if PSPS is Necessary

During high-risk periods, PG&E Meteorologists participate in daily interagency conference calls that commonly include multiple NWS local offices, the NWS western region headquarters, and representatives from the Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC), also known as Predictive Services. This call is hosted by the Northern California and/or Southern California GACC offices.

During these calls, the external agencies present their expert assessment on the upcoming periods and locations of risk, wind speeds and fuel moisture levels, and any other relevant factors to consider.

During a PSPS, PG&E's Lead Meteorologist for the event, called the Meteorologist-in-Charge (MIC), summarizes these forecasts and discussions for the PG&E Officer-in-Charge (OIC), who ultimately makes the decision to execute a PSPS.

The following sources and tools are considered before initiating a PSPS by the MIC:

- Fire Weather Watches and Red Flag Warning (NWS - Federal)
- Significant fire potential for wind (GACC - Federal)
- Storm Prediction Center (part of NOAA - Federal)
- Daily interagency conference call with agencies during high-risk periods
- Field observer information
- Live weather data from weather stations
- Location of existing fires
- External weather model data

Based on the above analyses, we can determine how many customers may be subject to de-energization, and further investigate mitigation options, such as advanced switching solutions, sectionalization, the use of islanding, alternative grid solutions, and temporary generation, to support customers who could lose upstream power sources but are in areas that may be safe to keep energized.

We monitor and forecast weather over a multi-day horizon, so we can anticipate when a PSPS may be needed and activate our EOC as far in advance as possible. Our internal weather model and external modeling are updated multiple times per day. PG&E's Meteorology Team constantly evaluates both internal and external weather models for changes in weather timing, strength, and potential locations impacted. We then incorporate these changes into a new weather scope generally once per day.

Weather shifts may force changes to PSPS scope and impacts at any point in time during PSPS planning and execution; this may allow us to avoid de-energization in some areas if fire-critical conditions lessen but can also cause some areas and customers to move into de-energization scope late in the process if forecasted fire-critical weather footprints change or increase. Possible

changes in PSPS scope and impact are driven by the inherent uncertainty in weather forecast models.

Section 2.3 - A thorough and detailed description of the quantitative and qualitative factors it considered in calling, sustaining, or curtailing each de-energization event including any fire risk or PSPS risk modeling results and information regarding why the de-energization event was a last resort, and a specification of the factors that led to the conclusion of the de-energization event. (D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 9, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

The quantitative factors that were used in the decision to de-energize customers for safety are provided in Appendix A. Below, we outline a detailed description of the qualitative factors that were provided by our Meteorology Team when determining to de-energize customers.

PG&E Meteorology Team Review

On the morning of Friday, September 27, 2024, weather models indicated a shift in the forecast trend, indicating significantly stronger offshore winds than expected in previous forecasts, with breezy to locally gusty north to northeast winds expected across the northern half of the territory. Around midday, PG&E's Meteorology Team, Emergency Planning and Response Team, and EOC Commander met to discuss the potential PSPS.

Based on the emerging risk of a PSPS, we entered EOC readiness posture at 17:30 PDT on September 27 and activated the EOC at 02:00 PDT on September 28.

The first PSPS scope was developed on Friday evening, September 27, reflecting the risk of dry winds mostly along the elevated terrain surrounding the Sacramento Valley, as well as small portions of the Sierra foothills and North Bay terrain, and very isolated peaks in the Central Coast.

The weather forecast and PSPS models were closely monitored to adjust the scope leading up to the PSPS and was adjusted on Saturday, September 28.

During the morning hours of September 27, federal forecast agencies began to highlight the upcoming weather conditions. Several California National Weather Service offices began mentioning elevated fire conditions during the period of concern in their area forecast discussions, however, decided not to issue Fire Weather Watches or Red Flag Warnings. The Northern Geographic Area Coordination Center of Predictive Services did issue a high risk forecast for the Sacramento Valley with a high wind trigger for Monday, September 30. All federal agencies kept this posture throughout the period of concern.

High Resolution PSPS Models Guidance

The tools and models outlined in Section 2.2 are part of the decision criteria that PG&E's Meteorologists consider when determining the PSPS scope. Longer range weather forecast model data are used to determine the location and timing of a PSPS. Typically, these weather forecasts are less certain the farther the observed date. This is akin to the well-known hurricane "cone of uncertainty" in which the potential track of a hurricane is represented by an area that expands farther out in time, which resembles an expanding cone. Thus, there is an inherent tradeoff between longer-range forecasts for a PSPS, the uncertainty in the PSPS scope, and

waiting until forecasts become more certain. Forecast uncertainty leads to changes in PSPS scope as weather forecast models are updated, and the scope is refined closer to the period of concern.

As the PSPS unfolds in real-time, PG&E’s Meteorologists transition to real-time observations of weather stations, satellite data, pressure gradients, and live feeds from Alert Wildfire Camera. These observations help to evaluate if the weather is behaving as expected. In many instances, models trend stronger or weaker with each model iteration leading up to a PSPS.

External PSPS Decision Inputs


Meteorological analyses establish that high winds in California create significant fire threat and exacerbate fire spread. The NWS issues a Red Flag Warning to indicate critical fire weather conditions under which any fire that develops will likely spread rapidly; CAL FIRE states, “the types of weather patterns that cause a watch or warning include low relative humidity, strong winds, dry fuels, the possibility of dry lightning strikes, or any combination of the above.” As noted previously, PG&E’s PSPS outages consistently occur during periods and in areas where federal, state, and local authorities have identified as having extreme fire risk including the presence of strong winds.

We compare our fire risk forecasts against those of external agencies, for validation that there is shared recognition of high fire risk across the California meteorology community. Between September 29, 2024, and October 1, 2024, our analysis of fire risk justifying a PSPS was validated by numerous sources and warnings:

- North Ops Predictive Services issued their 7-day Significant Fire Potential Outlook showing High Risk for one Predictive Service Area, which covered the Sacramento Valley and adjacent terrain.
- Elevated fire weather concerns were discussed by multiple National Weather Service offices in their Area Forecast Discussion, including the Sacramento and Bay Area offices; these offices ultimately decided not to issue fire weather watches or red flag warnings.

Figure 8: North Ops Predictive Services Forecast

California North Ops							
Published: Sep 29, 2024 7:14:55 AM							
Predictive Service Area (PSA)	Sun 29 Sep	Mon 30 Sep	Tue 1 Oct	Wed 2 Oct	Thu 3 Oct	Fri 4 Oct	Sat 5 Oct
NC01 - North Coast							
NC02 - Mid Coast To Mendocino							
NC03A - Bay Marine							
NC03B - Diablo-Santa Cruz Mtns							
NC04 - Northwestern Mtn							
NC05 - Sac Valley/Foothills		W					
NC06 - NE California							
NC07 - Northern Sierras							
NC08 - Far Eastside							



We also review forecasted wind speeds in the potential PSPS-impacted counties to evaluate the need for a PSPS. Figure 9 also shows the Utility Fire Potential Index (FPI) Ratings for Fire Index Areas (FIAs) in PG&E's service area for September 30 – October 1, 2024. We determine the scope for PSPS outages within those FIAs with fire risk rating R5-Plus from PG&E's FPI model. In Figure 10, the PSPS scope can be compared with other agencies to vet the fire weather risk.

Figure 9: PG&E Utility Fire Potential Index Ratings for September 30 – October 1, 2024





Figure 10: Comparison of GACC High Risk Wind Warning Footprints to Final PSPS Scope



Section 2.4 - An explanation of how the utility determined that the benefit of de-energization outweighed potential public safety risks, and analysis of the risks of de-energization against not de-energizing. The utility must identify and quantify customer, resident, and the general public risks and harms from de-energization and clearly explain risk models, risk assessment processes, and provide further documentation on how the power disruptions to customers, residents, and the general public is weighed against the benefits of a proactive de-energization. (D.19-05- 042, Appendix A, page A24, D.21-06-014, page 284, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

For the September 30 – October 1, 2024, PSPS PG&E used the PSPS Risk Model using the latest scope prior to the first potential de-energization. As discussed in detail below, based on the scoping of this PSPS, our Risk Model supported initiating a PSPS based on the forecasted impact information that indicated that each of the 37 distribution circuits and five transmission lines in the latest scope surpassed the analysis threshold of one to support de-energization. Note the PSPS Risk Model calculations are based on forecasted conditions.

PG&E’s PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool, which is further detailed below, addresses the CPUC’s requirements presented in the 2019 PSPS OIL.⁶ This decision requires California investor-owned utilities (IOUs) to quantify the risk/benefits associated with initiating or not initiating a PSPS for our customers.

PG&E incorporated the aforementioned risk-benefit analysis into our PSPS execution process to help inform our PSPS decision-making process. Our risk-benefit tool aligns with California

⁶ D. 21-06-014

IOUs Multi-Attribute Value Function (MAVF) framework, as defined through the Safety Modeling Assessment Proceeding (SMAP), which specifies how various consequences are factored into a risk calculation. Utilizing this framework, we incorporate PSPS forecast information into our PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool, which is further described under the “Risk Assessment” section below.

The output of the tool is a ratio that compares the calculated PSPS potential benefit from initiating de-energization (i.e., mitigation of catastrophic wildfire consequence) to the risks associated with PSPS (i.e., impact to customers resulting from a PSPS outage). Key inputs in the risk-benefit analysis include results from Technosylva wildfire simulations specific to the distribution circuit and transmission lines in scope for a potential de-energization, the number of customers forecasted to be de-energized, and the forecasted number of customer minutes across each identified circuit in scope for potential de-energization.

After the potential de-energization scope is determined, including the identification of potentially impacted circuits for the potential PSPS in question, this scope and the Technosylva wildfire simulation outputs are used as inputs into the Risk-Benefit tool, which quantifies the potential public safety risk and wildfire risk resulting from the forecasted impacts of the pending PSPS. Note, that the Wildfire Risk Score is based on an 8-hour simulation from Technosylva and while useful, in some cases this can significantly understate the risk. Thus, the MIC may still recommend de-energizing circuits where the Risk-Benefit tool shows higher PSPS risk than Wildfire risk.

Risk Assessment

As referenced above, PG&E’s PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool utilizes the California IOU agreed approach utilizing the MAVF framework that captures the safety, reliability and financial impact of identified potential risk events, as outlined in our Enterprise Risk Register.⁷ The tool’s calculations use a non-linear scaling of consequences reflecting our focus on low-frequency/high-consequence risk events without neglecting high-probability/low-consequence risk events. Developed by the PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool, MAVF scores are used to compare the potential de-energization risk from a forecasted PSPS to the potential risk of catastrophic wildfires from keeping the circuits energized, specific to the potentially impacted circuits being considered for PSPS de-energization.

The following inputs are used in calculations to build MAVF risk scores for PSPS outages and wildfires, which are ultimately weighed against one another:

- Technosylva Wildfire Simulation Data: Fire simulation forecasts on the consequence of a potential wildfire’s impact on customers, wildlife and infrastructures on each circuit for every three hours. These values are based on Technosylva’s proprietary and sophisticated wildfire modeling, using real-time weather models, state-of-the-art fuel, and 8-hour fire spread modeling.
- Forecasted Circuits: The final list of the distribution circuits and transmission lines identified to be in-scope for a potential PSPS.
- Customer Minutes: Forecasted outage duration the customers will face by the potential PSPS.

⁷ Full details of the MAVF methodology are provided through the Risk Assessment and Modeling Phase (RAMP) Report RAMP Report, pp. 3-3 to 3-15 and General Rate Case (GRC) workpapers in response to Energy Division GRC-2023-Phil_DR_ED_001_Q01Supp01.

- Customers Impacted: Forecasted number of customers anticipated to be impacted by the potential PSPS.
- Customer Category and Critical Customer Adjustment Factor: The type of customer (ex. MBL Program, etc.) is incorporated into the analysis through the use of a “critical customer adjustment factor,” which is applied to the customer outage duration to reflect a higher risk score for customers who are at a greater adverse risk of a potential de-energization event.

Once the above data are made available and incorporated into the tool, the modeling considerations described below are used to estimate the consequence of the: 1) potential wildfire risk and 2) PSPS risk at the per-circuit level. Throughout the tool, a variety of modeling considerations are made to facilitate calculations which are included in Table 2 and summarized in Figure 11.

Table 2: 2024 PSPS Risk-Benefit Consequence Modelling Considerations

Consequence Type	Wildfire Consequence Considerations	PSPS Consequence Considerations
Safety	Calculated based on maximum population impacts derived from Technosylva wildfire simulation models and a fatality ratio based on National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) data.	Calculated from an estimate of Equivalent Fatalities (EF) per Million Customer Minutes Interrupted (MMCI). The EF/MMCI ratio is estimated from previous PG&E PSPS outages and other large external outage events. ⁸
Reliability	N/A	Calculated directly from the potential number of customers impacted and outage duration based on customer minutes interrupted.
Financial	Calculated based on maximum building impacts derived from Technosylva wildfire simulation models and a cost per structure burned previously evaluated in 2020 RAMP Report. ⁹	Calculated based on two financial estimates, 1) distribution of a lump sum cost of execution across all relevant circuits and 2) an estimated proxy cost per customer in scope per PSPS. ¹⁰

Potential Wildfire Risk

Wildfire consequence impacts are calculated based on the outputs of the Technosylva simulations. Variables include 1) population impacted by wildfire and 2) structure impacted by wildfire used to calculate natural unit values for two consequence components:

⁸ Previous PG&E PSPS include 2019-2021 events, and other large external outage events include the 2003 Northeast Blackout in New York City, 2011 Southwest Blackout in San Diego, 2012 Derecho Windstorms, 2012 Superstorm Sandy, 2017 Hurricane Irma, 2021 Blackout event.

⁹ See A.20-06-012.

¹⁰ The assumptions used in these calculations, including the proxy cost per customer per PSPS, are subject to be updated and are not intended to prejudice or create precedent with regard to the development of more precise values of resiliency or cost of PSPS metrics being considered in other ongoing proceedings at the California Public Utilities Commission, such as the Risk-Based Decision-Making Rulemaking [R.20.07.013] and the Microgrid and Resiliency Strategies.

- Wildfire Safety Consequence: Equivalent Fatalities (EF)
- Wildfire Financial Consequence: Financial Cost of Wildfire (in dollars)

Potential PSPS Risk

PSPS consequence impacts are based on the following values: duration of de-energization by circuit, and number of customers impacted by de-energization on each circuit. These input values are used to calculate natural unit values for three consequence components:

- PSPS Safety Consequence: Equivalent Fatalities (EF) as an output of Customer Minutes interrupted
- PSPS Electric Reliability Consequence: Customer Minutes Interrupted \times Critical Customer Adjustment Factor
- PSPS Financial Consequence: Financial Cost of PSPS (in dollars) \times Critical Customer Adjustment Factor

Once the consequence values (safety, reliability, financial) are estimated, they are converted into MAVF risk scores. Once the Risk-Benefit tool calculates the impacts between the PSPS and a wildfire, it is summarized in Figure 12 by indicating if the adverse impact from a PSPS outweighs the risk of a wildfire.

Figure 11: Visual Representation of PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool





Figure 12: PSPS Potential Benefit Versus PSPS Potential Risk Consequence



Section 2.5 - Explanation of alternatives considered and evaluation of each alternative. (D.19-05-042 Appendix A, page A22.)

Response:

After reviewing the meteorological information that indicated potential for catastrophic wildfire and the impacts on customers through de-energization, we considered whether alternatives to de-energizing, such as additional vegetation management and disabling automatic reclosers, could adequately reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire thus lowering the need for de-energization. We determined these measures alone did not reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire in areas within the PSPS scope sufficiently to protect public safety.

Leading up to the September 30 – October 1, 2024, PSPS PG&E readied de-energization mitigations, reviewed alternatives to de-energization, and took the following steps:

- Our Operations team reviewed asset and vegetation tags that included incremental customers into PSPS scope and worked to correct these tags.
- Conducted hazard tree mitigation efforts on circuits, potentially in PSPS scope in the days leading up to the PSPS. Tree-trimming near a utility line can keep limbs and trunks from nearby trees from falling into a line, but it does not mitigate against broken limbs from distant trees outside the vegetation management perimeter that could blow into a line or break utility equipment.
- Pre-patrols of potentially impacted transmission facilities were also ongoing in the days leading up to the time of anticipated de-energization. While pre-patrols can help identify and correct asset tags on impacted transmission lines, even transmission lines in fully healthy condition may still pose a wildfire risk. Thus, pre-patrol of potentially impacted transmission facilities was not considered a sufficient alternative to PSPS.
- Enabled Enhanced Powerline Safety Setting (EPSS) and disabled automatic reclosing in Tier 2/Tier 3 High Fire Threat District (HFTD) areas. This reduces the ignition risk from attempts to re-energize circuits via automatic reclosing.

- Prepared to reduce the public safety impacts of de-energization by employing granular scoping processes to significantly reduce the public safety impacts of de-energization by de-energizing smaller segments of the grid within the close confines of the fire-critical weather footprint, rather than de-energizing larger amounts of customers in more populated areas.
- Reviewed opportunities for islanding, sectionalization, temporary generation, backup-generation, and alternate grid solutions to reduce and mitigate the number of customers de-energized.
- Prepared to reduce the public safety impacts of de-energization by providing local CRCs closest in proximity to support customers in those impacted communities.
- Supported vulnerable customers through California Foundation for Independent Living Centers (CFILC) and Community Based Organizations (CBO) resource partners that offered various services to customers impacted by this event. Further information is detailed in Section 6.5.
- Notified impacted customers via extensive use of Advanced Notifications and outreach tools of the expected de-energization.
- Increased our restoration efforts including helicopters and fixed wing aircraft to conduct line safety patrols after the Weather “All-Clear,” readied and prepared equipment for patrols and repairs to restore service to lines that were deemed operationally safe to power.

Section 3 – De-energized Time, Place, Duration and Customers

Section 3.1 - The summary of time, place and duration of the event, broken down by phase if applicable (*Resolution ESRB-8 page 3, SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

The PSPS occurred over the timeframe of September 30 – October 1, 2024, in five TPs located in five counties.

Section 3.2 - A zipped geodatabase file that includes PSPS event polygons of de-energized areas. The file should include items that are required in Section 3.3. (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

A zipped geodatabase file that includes PSPS polygons of final de-energized areas combined with the PSPS data can be found in the attachment, “*PGE_PSPS_EVENT_09302024.gdb.zip*.”

Section 3.3 - A list of circuits de-energized, with the following information for each circuit. This information should be provided in both a PDF and excel spreadsheet (*Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.*)

- **County**
- **De-energization date/time**
- **Restoration date/time**
- **“All Clear” declaration date/time**
- **General Order (GO) 95, Rule 21.2-D Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 classification or non- High Fire Threat District**
- **Total customers de-energized**
- **Residential customers de-energized**
- **Commercial/Industrial Customers de-energized**
- **Medical Baseline (MBL) customers de-energized**
- **AFN other than MBL customers de-energized**
- **Other Customers**
- **Distribution or transmission classification**

Response:

A total of 9,176 customers were de-energized during this PSPS. Of the customers de-energized, there were 8,452¹¹ residential, 625 commercial/industrial, 853 MBL Program customers, 2,499 Access and Functional Need Customers (AFN) other than MBL, and 98 customers in the “Other”¹² category. Additionally, one PG&E defined transmission-level¹³ customer was de-energized. Appendix B lists de-energized circuits and the relevant information relating to each circuit. Delayed restoration time due to reclassification and/or damages are further noted for each circuit.

¹¹ MBL Program and AFN customers are included within the count of residential customers affected.

¹² ‘Other’ includes customers that do not fall under the residential or commercial/industrial categories such as governmental agencies, traffic lights, agricultural facilities, and prisons.

¹³ PG&E defines transmission level customers as customers being served by 60 kV assets or higher. The customer impacted in this PSPS was not under CAISO Control, thus would not meet the definition of a transmission customer per D. 21.06.034.

Section 4 – Damages and Hazards to Overhead Facilities

Section 4.1 – Description of all found wind-related damages or hazards to the utility’s overhead facilities in the areas where power is shut off. (*Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

On September 30, 2024, weather stations near the PSPS areas recorded wind gusts as high as 46 miles per hour. These are shown in Table 22 and Figure 22 in Section 12.

During patrols of the de-energized circuits prior to restoring power, PG&E found one incident of wind-related damage. Damages are conditions that occurred during the PSPS, likely wind-related, necessitating repair or replacement of PG&E’s asset, such as a wire down or a fallen pole, while hazards are conditions that might have caused damage or posed an electrical arcing or ignition risk had PSPS not been executed, such as a tree limb found suspended in electrical wires. The damage location is illustrated in Figure 13 and mapped in Figure 14.

Figure 13: Vegetation-Damage in Shasta County – Broken Tie Wire



Section 4.2 - A table showing circuit name and structure identifier (if applicable) for each damage or hazard, County that each damage or hazard is located in, whether the damage or hazard is in a High Fire-Threat District (HFTD) or non-HFTD, Type of damage/hazard of damage. (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

A table of damages and hazards within the de-energized areas can be found in Appendix C.

Section 4.3 - A zipped geodatabase file that includes the PSPS event damage and hazard points. The file should include items that are required in Section 4.2. (SED Additional Information.)

Response:


A zipped geodatabase file that includes the PSPS damage and hazard points can be found in attachment, “PGE_PSPS_EVENT DAMAGES_HAZARDS_09302024.gdb.zip.”

Section 4.4 - A PDF map identifying the location of each damage or hazard. (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

See Figure 14 below for a map identifying the location of the damage.

Figure 14: Map of Damage Incident During September 30 – October 1, 2024 PSPS



Section 5 – Notifications

Section 5.1 - A description of the notice to public safety partners, local/tribal governments, paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a community resource center, multi-family building account holders/building managers in the AFN community, and all customers, including the means by which utilities provide notice to customers of the locations/hours/services available for CRCs, and where to access electricity during the hours the CRC is closed. (Resolution ESRB-8, page 3. D21-06-034, Appendix A, page A2, A9-A10, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

Throughout the PSPS, PG&E made significant efforts to notify Tribal/Local Governments, Public Safety Partners, CBOs (including paratransit agencies), and impacted customers in accordance with the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines.¹⁴

PG&E followed the Notification Plan included in our [PG&E's 2024 Pre-Season Report, Appendix C: Notification Plan](#), pp. 70-79. In addition, PG&E completed the following:

- PG&E worked closely with telecommunications service providers throughout the PSPS to effectively coordinate, share information, and manage the weather event. PG&E also provided telecommunications service providers with a dedicated PG&E contact in the EOC known as the Critical Infrastructure Lead (CIL), who shared up-to-date PSPS information and answered specific, individual questions. These partners were able to reach the CIL 24/7 during the PSPS by e-mail or phone. In addition, PG&E proactively reached out to eight telecommunications service providers¹⁵ via email or phone as weather changes or new information regarding the PSPS became available.
- In accordance with the Phase 3 PSPS Guidelines,¹⁶ PG&E provided proactive notifications and impacted zip code information to paratransit agencies that served known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons. All notifications to paratransit agencies included a link to the PSPS emergency website page, pge.com/pspsupdates and a section called “Additional Resources” with a link to a map showing areas potentially affected by the shutoff. This site also directs users to other webpages, such as the CRC page, which includes information such as CRC locations, hours, and services available (see Section 9). The PSPS emergency website updates page also includes two prominent buttons at the top of the page, allowing customers to look up an address to determine impact, and a map showing areas potentially affected by the shutoff.
- Every PSPS notification directs recipients to pge.com/pspsupdates, which includes a link to CRC information. This website prominently highlights the dedicated CRC page, which includes CRC locations, hours of operation, services available at each site, information regarding how to find local CRCs and via the PSPS outage map and where to access electricity during the hours CRCs are closed.

¹⁴ D.19-05-042.

¹⁵ American Tower Corporation, AT&T Corporation, Charter Communications, Ducor Telephone Co., Frontier Communications Corp, TDS Telecom, T-Mobile-Sprint, and Verizon Wireless.

¹⁶ D.21-06-034.

- PG&E considers multi-family building account holders/building managers in the Access and Functional Needs (AFN) community as part of our All Customers (including MBL Program customers and Self-Identified Vulnerable (SIV)¹⁷ Program customers) group. For information on PG&E’s outreach and community engagement with master-metered owners, property managers, and building account holders, refer to [PG&E’s AFN Quarterly Progress Report](#) of activities between April 1, 2024, and June 30, 2024.

Table 3 provides a description of the notifications PG&E sent to Tribal/Local Governments Public Safety Partners, and all customers in accordance with the minimum timelines set forth by the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines.¹⁸

Table 3: Notification Descriptions

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
PRIORITY NOTIFICATION: 48-72 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization	Public Safety Partners and CBOs, ¹⁹ transmission level customers, and municipal utilities	<p>On September 27, 2024, PG&E’s Meteorology Team noted a potential PSPS and updated the weather forecast on pge.com/weather to “elevated” in certain parts of the service area. At this time, local PG&E representatives called each County Office of Emergency Services (OES) in PG&E’s electrical service area and select Tribes and cities to inform them that PG&E is monitoring an increased potential of PSPS outages.</p> <p>Following PG&E’s activation of its EOC, the following was completed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> PG&E submitted a PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E’s EOC has been activated and that PG&E is monitoring for potential PSPS. PG&E sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners²⁰ via call, text, and e-mail; these notifications included the following information: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Estimated window of the de-energization time. When weather is anticipated to pass. Estimated Time of Restoration (ETOR).

¹⁷ Self-Identified Vulnerable (SIV) Program is inclusive of customers who have indicated they are “dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology” as well as customers that are not enrolled or qualify for the MBL Program and “certify that they have a serious illness or condition that could become life threatening if service is disconnected.” In accordance with D.21-06-034, PG&E includes customers who have indicated they are “dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology” in an effort to identify customers “above and beyond those in the medical baseline population” to include persons reliant on electricity to maintain necessary life functions including for durable medical equipment and assistive technology. This designation remains on their account indefinitely.

¹⁸ D.19-05-042.

¹⁹ Phase 3 D.21-06-034, Appendix A, page A9, Section G. MBL and AFN Communities, No. 4, Each electric investor-owned utility must provide proactive notification and impacted zip code information to paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a CRC during a PSPS.

²⁰ Other Public Safety Partners refers to first/emergency responders at the local, state, and federal level, water, wastewater, and communication service providers, affected CCAs, publicly owned utilities/electrical cooperatives, the CPUC, the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, and the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection.

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Links to the PSPS Portal where event-specific maps and information are available. ● Local PG&E representatives called potentially impacted County OES and select Tribes to inform them that PG&E is monitoring an increased potential of PSPS.
WATCH NOTIFICATION: 24-48 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers), transmission level customers, and municipal utilities	<p>During this time, the following was completed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● PG&E submitted a PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES. ● PG&E sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners, transmission level customers, municipal utilities, and all customers via call, text message and e-mail; these notifications included the following information: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Estimated window of the de-energization time. ○ When the adverse weather is anticipated to pass. ○ ETOR. ○ For Public Safety Partners only: Links to the PSPS Portal. ○ For Customers only: Potentially impacted addresses, links to PSPS Updates webpage with CRC information, and resources for AFN customers, including but not limited to information on the MBL Program, language support, and the Portable Battery Program. ○ For transmission-level customers only: Transmission Substation Name and Line name serving substation. ● PG&E sent notifications to MBL Program customers, including tenants of master metered accounts, and SIV Program customers every hour until the customer confirmed receipt of the notification. ● PG&E also sent Cancellation Notifications to Public Safety Partners and customers within two hours of being removed from scope; this was to inform them that power would not be shut off. <p>Customer notifications were provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications were provided in English.</p>
WARNING NOTIFICATION:	Public Safety Partners, CBOs,	During this time, the following was completed:

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
1-4 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization, if possible	and All Customers (including MBL Program customers, SIV Program customers), transmission level customers, and municipal utilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PG&E submitted a PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E has made the decision to de-energize. PG&E sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners, transmission-level customers, and customers; these notifications included the same key PSPS timing information and resource links as the “Watch Notification.” PG&E sent notifications to MBL Program customers, including tenants of master metered accounts, and SIV Program customers every hour until the customer confirmed receipt of the notification. PG&E also sent Cancellation Notifications to Public Safety Partners and customers within two hours of being removed from scope; this was to inform them that power would be shut off. <p>Customer notifications were provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications were provided in English.</p>
POWER OFF NOTIFICATION: When de-energization is initiated	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers), transmission level customers ²¹ , and municipal utilities	<p>When shut off was initiated, the following was completed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> PG&E submitted a PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC to notify them that de-energization has been initiated. Agency Representatives of PG&E conducted a live call and/or sent an e-mail, as appropriate, to County OES representatives that were within the potential PSPS scope area and select Tribes and cities to inform them that customers within their jurisdiction were beginning to be de-energized. PG&E Grid Control Center (GCC) conducted live agent calls to impacted transmission-level customers. PG&E sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners, municipal utilities, transmission level customers and customers via call, text messages, and e-mail, which included: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Impacted addresses (for customers only). De-energization time. When the adverse weather is anticipated to pass.

²¹ Transmission-level customers receive a GCC live call before de-energization and prior to re-energization.

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ For Customers Only: Links to the PSPS Updates webpage with CRC information, and resources for AFN customers, including but not limited to information on the MBL Program, Meals on Wheels, language support, and the Portable Battery Program. <p>Customer notifications were provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications were provided in English.</p>
WEATHER “ALL-CLEAR”/ETOR UPDATE NOTIFICATION: Immediately before re-energization begins	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers), transmission level customers, and municipal utilities	<p>After the weather event had passed and the area is deemed safe to begin patrols and restoration, PG&E completed the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Submitted a PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E is initiating re-energization patrols. • Sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners, transmission level customers,²² municipal utilities and customers via call, text message and e-mail; these notifications included the ETOR. • Sent “PSPS update” notifications to customers if their ETOR changed; two ways that an ETOR may change include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ New field or meteorology conditions. ○ Damage was found during patrols and repair is needed. <p>Customer notifications were provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications were provided in English.</p>
RESTORATION NOTIFICATION: When re-energization is complete	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL Program customers and SIV Program	GCC conducted live agent calls to notify impacted transmission-level customers of restoration. Once customers, including MBL Program customers and SIV customers, were restored, they received notifications via call, text and e-mail. This was done using an automated process that issued customer notifications every 15 minutes upon restoration of service. Customer notifications were provided in English, with information on how to receive

²² Transmission lines serving impacted Transmission-level Customers and Municipal Utilities may cut across multiple Fire Index Areas (FIAs) and will only be notified when all those FIAs that the line cuts across have been given the All-Clear.

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
	customers), transmission level customers, and municipal utilities	<p>PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications.</p> <p>Once all customers were restored, PG&E submitted the final PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES, sent an e-mail to the CPUC confirming restoration of PSPS outages and reclassification of customers if applicable, and sent a notification to Public Safety Partners via call, text and e-mail. Public Safety Partner notifications were provided in English.</p>

In addition to providing notifications to Tribal/Local Governments, Public Safety Partners, CBOs (including paratransit agencies) and impacted customers, PG&E alerted the public in advance of de-energization, via media and PG&E's website.

Media Engagement

From the time PG&E publicly announced the potential PSPS until power was restored, PG&E engaged with customers and the public through the media as described below.

- Proactively issued seven local news releases or written information directly to news outlets regarding the PSPS. This included:
 - Two to integrated multicultural news outlets.
 - Five to local or national news outlets.
- Responded to 54 media inquiries, either from media outlets that contacted PG&E's 24-hour media line, or direct calls/emails to field media representatives. This included:
 - Two integrated multicultural news outlets.
 - 52 local or national news outlets.
- Participated in 34 media interviews (i.e. live, recorded or unrecorded phone interviews) to provide situational updates and preparedness messages for the PSPS. This included:
 - Two integrated multicultural news outlets.
 - 32 local or national news outlets.
- As of October 1, 2024, identified 136 unique print, online, and broadcast stories. This included:
 - Two integrated multicultural news outlets.
 - 134 local or national news outlets.

PG&E Website

During this PSPS, PG&E placed an Informational Alert on the [pge.com](https://www.pge.com) home page that drove traffic to PG&E's PSPS site and implemented tools to drive traffic to and maintain stability of the PSPS emergency website/PSPS updates page pgealerts.alerts.pge.com/psps-updates. Visits to the emergency website peaked on Monday, September 30, 2024, with 74,946 visits and 163,828 page views. The emergency website received a total of 211,744 visits and 459,904 page views from the time the PSPS began to the time all customers had been restored to power.

We remain committed to the continuous improvement of our websites to better meet the diverse needs of its customers. As we launch new features and functionality to pge.com and to pgealerts.alerts.pge.com, we test to help ensure compliance with updated WCAG 2.1AA standards. We also seek to improve customer experience with user testing for key components. Where possible, we remediate accessibility issues that customers or stakeholders have brought to our attention.

The following content was available on PG&E’s PSPS updates pages or on links from those pages:

- Straightforward, simplified PSPS information available in 16 languages, with clear updates about the planned scope of the event, including location (e.g., list of impacted Tribes, cities, and counties), duration of the PSPS, including estimated times of de-energization and re-energization at the individual address level, and overall, for the event.
- PDFs of potentially impacted areas, shape and KMZ files for Public Safety Partners to use with their own mapping applications, and city/county lists with shutoff and restoration summaries.
- CRC details made available as soon as sites were confirmed, including locations listed by county, resources available at each center, type of CRC (e.g., indoor, outdoor), health and safety policies, and operating hours. CRC locations were also indicated on the PSPS impact map.
- Links to additional resources including Electric Vehicle (EV) charging location map, videos in ASL (American Sign Language), locations of ILCs, resources for customers with accessibility, financial, language, and aging needs, backup power safety tips, MBL Program information, and more.
- Webpage, available in 15 non-English languages, that describes our language support services for customers during a PSPS at pge.com/pspslanguagehelp.
- Survey to provide input about the website and PSPS communications.
- Address look-up tool that a customer and the public could use to identify specific potential PSPS impacts.
- Address-level alerts, available in 15 non-English languages, that allow non-PG&E-account holders to receive notifications via a phone call or SMS text for any address where they do not receive a bill (e.g., workplace, child’s school, renters, mobile home parks, etc.). This is also a valuable communication tool for renters and tenants of master metered accounts, such as mobile home parks. See pgealerts.alerts.pge.com/outage-tools/get-psps-alerts/ and Figure 15 below.

Figure 15: PG&E PSPS Address Alert Sign-Up Webpage

Get Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) alerts

Get a phone call or SMS text in the event a power shutoff is needed to prevent a wildfire.

For my account ▼

For another address (e.g., your work, your child's school, a relative's home) ▲

Service Address Report an issue Find meter ID

Start typing an address... Q

Can't find your address? [Report it](#) or call 1-800-743-5002

To unsubscribe from automated call address alerts, call 1-800-896-9654 using the phone number you enrolled.

To unsubscribe from SMS text address alerts, text UNENROLL to 97633.

Section 5.2 – Notification timeline including prior to de-energization, initiation, restoration, and cancellation, if applicable. The timeline should include the required minimum timeline and approximate time notifications were sent. (D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A8-A9, D.21-06-034, page A11)

Response:

Table 4 describes notifications and the time the notification were sent in accordance with the minimum timelines set forth by the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines,²³ to Tribal/Local Governments, Public Safety Partners, and all customers prior to de-energization, initiation, and restoration.

Table 4: Customer Notification Timeline Summary

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁴	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Distributed by:
Pre-De-energization (Prior)	72-48 hours	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	09/28/2024 3:37	Priority		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/28/2024 3:41	Priority		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/28/2024 4:37	Priority		PG&E
	48-24 hours	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	09/28/2024 14:35	Watch		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	09/29/2024 3:21	Watch		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/28/2024 14:13	Watch		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/29/2024 3:27	Watch		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/28/2024 15:20	Watch		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/29/2024 3:26	Watch		PG&E
	24-12 hours ²⁵	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	09/29/2024 10:40	Watch		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/29/2024 10:45	Watch		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/29/2024 10:44	Watch		PG&E

²³ D.19-05-042.

²⁴ D.19-05-042, Appendix A, Timing of Notification.

²⁵ While not a CPUC requirement, PG&E provides an additional 24-12 hour notification to Tribal/Local Governments, Public Safety Partners and Customers.

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁴	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Distributed by:
	4-1 hours	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	09/30/2024 1:44	Warning		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	09/30/2024 2:39	Warning		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	09/30/2024 16:03	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 1:50	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 2:43	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 16:14	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 1:47	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 2:42	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 16:07	Warning		PG&E
Initiation (During)	When De-energization is initiated	Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 2:15	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 4:46	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 5:01	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 5:30	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 5:46	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 6:01	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 6:16	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 6:32	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 6:45	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 8:01	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 8:16	Power Off		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁴	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Distributed by:
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 8:30	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 8:47	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 9:32	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 9:46	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 13:12	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 13:13	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 13:15	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 13:19	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/1/2024 8:46	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 2:15	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 4:46	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 5:01	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 5:30	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 5:46	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 6:01	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 6:16	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 6:32	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 6:45	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 8:01	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 8:16	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 8:30	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 8:47	Power Off		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁴	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Distributed by:
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 9:32	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 9:46	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 13:12	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 13:13	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 13:15	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 13:19	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/1/2024 8:46	Power Off		PG&E
	Immediately before re-energization	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	9/30/2024 16:22	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear	First All-Clear Notification sent.	PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	9/30/2024 16:29	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear	Last All-Clear Notification sent.	PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 2:18	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear	First All-Clear Notification sent.	PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 13:48	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 14:02	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 14:19	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/1/2024 11:48	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/1/2024 13:18	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear	Last All-Clear Notification sent.	PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁴	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Distributed by:
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 2:18	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear	First All-Clear Notification sent.	PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 13:48	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 14:02	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 14:19	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/1/2024 11:48	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/1/2024 13:18	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear	Last All-Clear Notification sent.	PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 13:16	ETOR Update	First ETOR Update Notification sent.	PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 14:20	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 15:34	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 15:50	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 16:04	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 16:20	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 16:35	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 17:05	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 17:19	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 17:34	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 17:50	ETOR Update		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁴	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Distributed by:
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 18:04	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 18:20	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 19:04	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 19:49	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 20:19	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 20:50	ETOR Update	Last ETOR Update Notification sent.	PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 13:16	ETOR Update	First ETOR Update Notification sent.	PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 14:20	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 15:34	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 15:50	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 16:04	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 16:20	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 16:35	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 17:05	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 17:19	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 17:34	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 17:50	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 18:04	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 18:20	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 19:04	ETOR Update		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁴	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Distributed by:
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 19:49	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 20:19	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 20:50	ETOR Update	Last ETOR Update Notification sent.	PG&E
Restoration (After)	After re-energization was completed	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	10/1/2024 13:29	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	9/30/2024 3:17	Restore	First initial Restoration Notification sent.	PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/1/2024 13:32	Restore	Last initial Restoration Notification sent.	PG&E
		All Customers***	9/30/2024 3:17	Restore	First Restoration Notification sent.	PG&E
		All Customers***	10/1/2024 13:32	Restore	Last Restoration Notification sent.	PG&E
Cancellation	Within 2 hours of decision to cancel	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	9/29/2024 9:42	Cancel	Only Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs removed from scope received cancel notification. The decision to descope these customers was made 9/29/2024 9:05 AM.	PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁴	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Distributed by:
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	9/30/2024 14:17	Cancel		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	10/1/2024 9:31	Cancel		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	09/29/2024 09:52	Cancel	Only Public Safety Partners removed from scope received the cancel notification. The decision to descope these customers was made 9/29/2024 9:05 AM.	PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	09/30/2024 14:29	Cancel	Only Public Safety Partners removed from scope received the cancel notification. The decision to descope these customers was made 9/30/2024 13:45.	PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/01/2024 9:32	Cancel	Only Public Safety Partners removed from scope received the cancel	PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁴	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Distributed by:
					notification. The decision to descope these customers was made 10/1/2024 8:36.	
		All Customers***	09/29/2024 09:52	Cancel	Only Public Safety Partners removed from scope received the cancel notification. The decision to descope these customers was made 9/29/2024 9:05 .	PG&E
		All Customers***	09/30/2024 14:29	Cancel	Only Public Safety Partners removed from scope received the cancel notification. The decision to descope these customers was made 9/30/2024 13:45.	PG&E
		All Customers***	10/01/2024 9:32	Cancel	Only Public Safety Partners removed	PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁴	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Distributed by:
					from scope received the cancel notification. The decision to descope these customers was made 10/1/2024 8:36.	
Ad Hoc Notification	N/A	Customers at risk of a second de-energization window	09/30/2024 17:29	Ad Hoc	Only customers at risk of a second de-energization received this ad hoc notification.	PG&E

*A subset of Public Safety Partners, including Tribes, cities, counties, and community choice aggregators.

**A subset of Public Safety Partners, including water, wastewater, and communication service providers.

***All Customers, including MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers.

Section 5.3 - For those customers where positive or affirmative notification was attempted, use the following template to report the accounting of the customers (which tariff and/or access and functional needs population designation), the number of notification attempts made, the timing of attempts, who made the notification attempt (utility or public safety partner) and the number of customers for whom positive notification was achieved. (D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A23, SED Additional Information.)

“Notification attempts made” and “Successful positive notification” must include the unique number of customer counts. When the actual notification attempts made is less than the number of customers that need positive notifications, the utilities must explain the reason. In addition, the utilities must explain the reason of any unsuccessful positive notifications. (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

Table 5 below includes metrics associated with PG&E notifications provided to customers where positive or affirmative notification was attempted. PG&E interprets the number of customers that need positive or affirmative notification as customers the company seeks confirmation from, namely MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers.

Table 5: Notifications to Customers where Positive or Affirmative Notification was Attempted²⁶

Designation	Total Number of customers ²⁷	Notification Attempts Made ²⁸	Timing of Attempts ²⁹ (PDT)	Who made the Notification Attempt	Successful Positive Notification ³⁰
MBL ³¹	1,173	1,169 Watch Notifications	9/28/2024 14:14	PG&E	1,126 Watch Notifications
		1,042 Warning Notifications	9/29/2024 20:42		899 Warning Notifications
		2,211 Overall Notifications	9/28/2024 14:14		2,025 Overall Notifications
MBL behind a master meter ³²	17	17 Watch Notifications	9/28/2024 14:22	PG&E	3 Watch Notifications
		17 Warning Notifications	9/30/2024 1:49		2 Warning Notifications
		34 Overall Notifications	9/28/2024 14:22		5 Overall Notifications
SIV	454	449 Watch Notifications	9/28/2024 14:14	PG&E	423 Watch Notifications
		410 Warning Notifications	9/29/2024 8:44		336 Warning Notifications
		859 Overall Notifications	9/28/2024 14:14		759 Overall Notifications

For this PSPS, MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers received automated calls, texts and emails at the same intervals as the general customer notifications. PG&E provided

²⁶ Counts of Notification Attempts Made will not reflect the actual total of customers notified as both MBL and SIV Program customers can appear in both subset groups.

²⁷ Total number of customers notified where notification was attempted. Count includes customers that may have been removed from scope or received Cancellation Notifications prior to de-energization, but still received Watch and/or Warning notifications.

²⁸ Count of Warning Notifications includes doorbell rings and Live Agent phone calls.

²⁹ Initial start time notification was sent.

³⁰ PG&E considers successful positive notifications as those in which the notification was successfully delivered to the customer (i.e., no bounce back) and the customer acknowledges receipt of the notification.

³¹ Residential tenants of master-metered customers can also qualify for Medical Baseline quantities. The Medical Baseline category for the purposes of Table 5 does not include MBL Program customers who are master meter tenants.

³² PG&E has additional processes in place to ensure MBL customers are notified. Master meter tenants are contacted directly to be considered a positive notification. Contacting the property or building manager does not count as a positive notification.

unique PSPS Watch and PSPS Warning Notifications to MBL Program customers³³ and SIV Program customers.

These customer groups also received additional calls and texts at hourly intervals until the customer confirmed receipt of the automated notifications by either answering the phone, responding to the text, or opening the email. If confirmation was not received, a PG&E representative visited the customer’s home to check on the customer (referred to as the “doorbell ring” process) while hourly notification retries continued. If the customer did not provide confirmation to PG&E following the check-in, the PG&E representative left a door hanger providing additional PSPS notification and information at the home to indicate PG&E had visited. In each case, the additional door hanger notification was considered successful.³⁴

At times, PG&E also made Live Agent phone calls in parallel to the automated notifications and doorbell rings, as an additional attempt to reach the customer prior to and/or after de-energization.

PG&E shared the lists of the MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers who had not confirmed receipt of their notifications with the appropriate county and Tribal emergency managers twice daily via the PSPS Portal. PG&E proactively notified agencies that the data was available on the PSPS Portal and encouraged them to inform these customers of the resources available to them. PG&E is unable to track and report on notifications made by Public Safety Partners, as notification systems and/or platforms used by Public Safety Partners are out of PG&E’s purview. PG&E encourages Public Safety Partners to include PSPS messages on all of their platforms. PG&E describes its engagement with Public Safety Partners in Section 6.

Table 6 and Table 7 include metrics associated with the notifications to de-energized MBL Program customers.

Table 6: Outcomes of Notifications to De-energized Medical Baseline Program Customers

Count	Type of Notifications to De-energized MBL Customers ³⁵	Description
853	Total De-energized MBL Program Customers	The number of customers de-energized who participate in PG&E’s MBL Program.
853	Total Notifications Attempted/Sent	The total sum of automated notifications attempted via call, text, and e-mail, in-person doorbell ring visit attempts and/or Live Agent phone calls.
0	<i>Total Notifications Not Attempted/Sent</i>	<i>Total MBL Program customers de-energized that PG&E did not attempt to notify.</i>
847	Total Notifications Delivered	The total sum of automated notifications sent via call, text, and e-mail.
6	<i>Total Notifications Not Delivered³⁶</i>	<i>Total MBL Program customers de-energized whose notification was not delivered.</i>

³³ Including MBL Program customers who are master-metered tenants (e.g., renters or tenants in mobile home park).

³⁵ Based on SPID.

³⁶ Customers received Doorbell Rings.

Count	Type of Notifications to De-energized MBL Customers ³⁵	Description
723	Total Notifications Initially Acknowledged	The total sum of automated notifications sent via call, text and email where notification was acknowledged.
736	Total In-Person Visits/Doorbell Rings and Live Agent Phone Calls	Total attempted doorbell ring for impacted MBL Program customers where PG&E made contact with the customer (either in person or via phone call in advance of visit) or left a door hanger. ³⁷ This includes call attempts made by Live Agent representatives to MBL Program customers that had not yet confirmed receipt of their automated notification or answered the door during PG&E's in-person visit. Refer to Table 7 for the detailed breakdown of this category.
828	Total Notifications Received	Customers who acknowledged their notification by taking one of the following actions: answered an automated or Live Agent phone call, responded to a text message, opened an e-mail, or greeted an in-person doorbell ring (excludes voicemails left, text message delivered only and not confirmed, door hanger left).
25	<i>Total Notifications Not Received</i>	<i>Total MBL Program customers who did not confirm receipt/acknowledge their automated notifications, Live Agent phone calls or in-person doorbell ring. Customers who did not answer a doorbell ring were left a door hanger.</i>

Table 7: Count and Type of Additional Notifications to De-energized Medical Baseline Program Customers

Count	Type of Additional Notifications to Impacted Medical Baseline Customers ³⁸	Description
186	Total In-Person Visits/Doorbell Rings	Doorbell ring attempts to impacted MBL Program customers where PG&E made contact with the customer (either in person or via phone call in advance of visit) or left a door hanger. ³⁹

³⁶ Customers received Doorbell Rings.

³⁷ Customers may have confirmed receipt of their notifications in multiple channels (e.g., automated notification and/or doorbell ring); therefore, the counts of total attempted and successful notifications are not mutually exclusive.

³⁸ Based on SPID.

³⁹ Customers may have confirmed receipt of their notifications in multiple channels (e.g., automated notification and/or doorbell ring); therefore, the counts of total attempted and successful notifications are not mutually exclusive.

Count	Type of Additional Notifications to Impacted Medical Baseline Customers ³⁸	Description
550	Live Agent Phone Calls	Calls made by Live Agent representatives to MBL Program customers that had not yet confirmed receipt of their automated notification or answered the door during PG&E's in-person visit.

Section 5.4 - A copy or scripts of all notifications with a list of all languages that each type of notification was provided in, the timing of notifications, the methods of notifications and who made the notifications (the utility or local public safety partners). (D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A23, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

Please reference attachment, “*PGE_PSPS_Event_Notifications_09302024.pdf*” for a copy of the notification templates, the timing of the notifications and methods of notifications that PG&E sent during the September 30 – October 1, 2024, PSPS. Additional information on the timing of notifications sent during this PSPS can be found in Section 5.2.

PG&E provides Tribal, city, county, CCAs, Public Safety Partner, transmission-level customers, and municipal utility notifications in English only. All other customer notifications are delivered in-language if a customer's language preference is on file. If there is no language preference on file, the notification is delivered in English, with information on how to get PSPS information in translated languages. Four non-English languages (Spanish, Chinese (Cantonese & Mandarin), Russian, Vietnamese) were requested for this PSPS. For more information on notifications provided to customers in customer-set language preferences, see Table 13.

Section 5.5 - If the utility fails to provide notifications according to the minimum timelines set forth in D.19-05-042 and D.21-06-034, using the following template to report a breakdown of the notification failure and an explanation of what caused the failure. (D.21-06-014 page 286, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

PG&E makes a substantial effort to provide notifications whenever possible in accordance with the PSPS Phase 1, Phase 3, and 2019 PSPS OII guidelines, weather and other factors permitting.

During this PSPS, 52 customers were unable to receive notifications as no valid contact information was provided by the customer to PG&E. These customers are not included in Table 8 below. PG&E will send these customers postcards and encourage them to update their contact information for future notifications.

Table 8: Notification Failure Causes

Notifications Sent to:	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Account	Explanation of Failure
Public Safety Partners excluding CFI⁴⁰	Entities who did not receive 48-to 72-hour priority notification	0	No failures.
	Entities who did not receive 1–4-hour imminent notification	0	No failures.
	Entities who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	0	No failures.
	Entities who were not notified immediately before re-energization	0	No failures.
	Entities who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	1	A manual error in creating data files resulted in a missed cancellations to one agency. PG&E will clarify process documentation and ensure that those responsible for preparing the notification files are aware of how scope changes affect incorporated and unincorporated territories.
CFI⁴¹	Facilities who did not receive 48-to 72-hour priority notification	0	No failures.
	Facilities who did not receive 1–4-hour imminent notification	0	No failures.
	Facilities who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	0	No failures.
	Facilities who were not notified at de-energization initiation	16	See Table 8A and 8B.
	Facilities who were not notified immediately before re-energization	8	See Table 8A and 8C.

⁴⁰ Only includes Tribes, cities, counties, and CCAs.

⁴¹ Includes Public Safety Partners who are critical facilities and infrastructure customers.

Notifications Sent to:	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Account	Explanation of Failure
	Facilities who were not notified when re-energization is complete	1	See Table 8A.
	Facilities who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	0	No failures.
All other affected customers	Customers who did not receive 24–48-hour advance notifications	1	This customer's transformer was recently installed and was not properly reflected in PG&E's datasets used to determine planned PSPS impacts. As a result, this customer was not identified as a planned impact for this PSPS, and thus did not receive any PSPS notifications prior to de-energization.
	Customers who did not receive 1–4-hour imminent notifications	1	
	Customers who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	1	
	Customers who were not notified at de-energization initiation	479 (includes 47 MBL)	See Table 8A and 8B.
	Customers who were not notified immediately before re-energization	454 (includes 45 MBL)	See Table 8A and 8C.
	Customers who were not notified when re-energization is complete	11	See Table 8A.
	Customers who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	0	No failures.

Table 8A: Explanation of Failures for Critical Facility and Infrastructure and All Other Affected Customers Who Were Not Notified at De-energization Initiation, Immediately Before Re-energization, and When Re-energization was Complete

Count of Critical Facilities	Count of All Other Affected Customers	Explanation
0	2	These customers were assigned to the wrong transformer in the data system used for in-outage and post-outage notifications. The transformer they were incorrectly assigned to was experiencing an extended outage.

Count of Critical Facilities	Count of All Other Affected Customers	Explanation
		<p>As a result, these customers were not identified as impacted customers for the PSPS outages, and thus did not receive notifications at de-energization initiation, immediately before re-energization and when re-energization was complete. However, these customers did receive pre-outage PSPS notifications.</p> <p>A field check will be performed to identify the correct transformer assignment for these customers.</p>
0	3	<p>These customers did not receive notifications at de-energization initiation, immediately before re-energization and when re-energization was complete. This occurred because these customers were not included in the table of customer contact information used to launch automated notifications through our internal outage platform. As a result, they could not be notified. The root cause of their exclusion from this table is under investigation.</p>
1	0	<p>This facility did not receive notifications at de-energization initiation, immediately before re-energization and when re-energization was complete due to incorrect categorization. The categorization indicated this facility was not in service on our internal data platform used for in-outage and post-outage notifications. A mapping correction was processed to fix the error and has been completed prior to submission of this report.</p> <p>These customers did receive pre-outage PSPS notifications.</p>
0	2	<p>These customers did not receive notifications at de-energization initiation, immediately before re-energization and when re-energization was complete.</p> <p>Recent structure damage was modeled incorrectly in the system used for in-outage and post-outage notifications. As a result, these customers were inadvertently categorized as experiencing an extended outage, and thus did not receive the notifications that would be sent to customers impacted by a PSPS outage.</p> <p>These customers did receive pre-outage PSPS notifications.</p> <p>A field check will be performed to resolve the error.</p>
0	4	<p>These customers did not receive notifications at de-energization initiation, immediately before re-energization and when re-energization was complete due to being impacted by an extended outage.</p>

Count of Critical Facilities	Count of All Other Affected Customers	Explanation
		<p>The extended outage was restored prior to the start of the PSPS, but our data systems for in-outage and post-outage notifications were not updated to reflect this restoration. As a result, these customers did not receive the notifications that would be sent to customers impacted by a PSPS outage.</p> <p>These customers did receive pre-outage PSPS notifications.</p>

Table 8B: Explanation of Failures for Critical Facility and Infrastructure and All Other Affected Customers Who Received Delayed Notifications at De-Energization Initiation

Count of Critical Facilities	Count of All Other Affected Customers	Explanation
15	468 (includes 47 MBL)	<p>These customers received a delayed notification for de-energization initiation due to a vendor error.</p> <p>The notification vendor, Message Broadcast, experienced a network disruption causing notification launch delays. As a result, these notifications were sent between three to four and a half hours after the time of de-energization initiation.</p>

Table 8C: Explanation of Failures for Critical Facility and Infrastructure and All Other Affected Customers Who Were Not Notified Immediately Before Re-energization

Count of Critical Facilities	Count of All Other Affected Customers	Explanation
0	2	These customers were not notified immediately before re-energization due to a categorization error in our internal outage platform.
7	441 (includes 45 MBL)	These customers were not notified immediately before re-energization due to a systems issue. Our internal outage management tool is automatically checked for updates at regular intervals for the purpose of generating PSPS in-outage and post-outage notifications. The notification immediately before re-energization for these customers was triggered during a one-second gap between these automatic checks, which meant this notification was not caught by these checks and thus was not generated.

Section 5.6 - Explain how the utility will correct the notification failures. (D.21-06-014, page 286.)

Response:

We have reviewed the notifications for this PSPS and have identified or are in the process of identifying corrective actions as discussed in Table 8.

Regarding the delayed Power Off notifications, our vendor, Message Broadcast, has committed to implementing a monitoring system that will alert the vendor when a system interruption arises causing notifications to not launch.

Section 5.7 - Enumerate and explain the cause of any false communications citing the sources of changing data. (D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 4.)

Response:

For this PSPS, we identified 358 cases of false positive communications, including:

- Nine non-critical facility customers were notified that a PSPS de-energization would occur but did not experience an outage.
- 349 critical facilities and other affected customers were de-energized for a non-PSPS outage but were incorrectly notified that their outage was due to a PSPS.

Explanations for these false positive communications are provided in Table 9 below. We did not identify any cases of false negative communications for this PSPS.

Table 9: Explanation of False Positive Communications

Impact	Count of Critical Facilities	Count of All Other Affected Customers	Explanation
Customers notified that PSPS de-energization would occur but did not experience an outage.	0	1 (no MBL)	This customer was linked to the wrong transformer in the data systems used for PSPS scoping, pre-outage, in-outage, and post-outage notifications. The transformer incorrectly linked to this customer was planned for and ultimately de-energized, but the actual transformer feeding this customer was not impacted by this PSPS. As a result, this customer received pre-, in-, and post-outage PSPS notifications without actually experiencing de-energization.
	0	5 (no MBL)	The transformer serving these customers was on an extended outage prior to and during this PSPS due to fire damage and should have been excluded from the planned PSPS impacts. However, these customers were incorrectly entered in our

Impact	Count of Critical Facilities	Count of All Other Affected Customers	Explanation
			<p>customer data system, which caused these customers to be included within the planned PSPS scope.</p> <p>As a result, these customers received pre-outage PSPS notifications indicating they would be de-energized. These customers did not receive in-outage and post-outage PSPS notifications.</p>
	0	3 (no MBL)	<p>The transformer serving these customers was experiencing an extended outage prior to the PSPS for non-fire related reasons and these customers were being energized by generator.</p> <p>These customers were not removed from the planned scope of PSPS impacts. As a result, they received pre-outage notifications indicating they would be impacted by the PSPS. These customers did not receive in-outage and post-outage PSPS notifications.</p>
Critical facilities and other affected customers de-energized for a non-PSPS outage but were incorrectly notified that their outage was due to PSPS.	8	341 (includes 2 MBL)	<p>Prior to de-energization, an unplanned EPSS outage occurred on a circuit that was not planned for PSPS impact. Due to a manual error, PSPS impacts were inadvertently assigned to the EPSS outage. As a result, these customers received PSPS-specific in-outage notifications rather than non-PSPS notifications associated with their outage.</p> <p>This error was discovered and addressed prior to restoration.</p>

Section 6 – Local and State Public Safety Partner Engagement

Section 6.1 - List the organization names of public safety partners including, but not limited to, local governments, tribal representatives, first responders and emergency management , and critical facilities and infrastructure the utility contacted prior to de-energization, the date and time on which they were contacted, and whether the areas affected by the de-energization are classified as Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 as per the definition in CPUC General Order 95, Rule 21.2-D. (Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

Please see Appendix D for a list of Public Safety Partners including Tribal representatives, local governments, first responders and emergency management, and critical facilities notified with the date and time of the initial notification, and whether the areas affected by the de-energization are classified as Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3.

As stated in our [2023 Safety Outage Decision Making Guide](#), we use a HFRA classification which PG&E utilizes in addition to HFTD to determine PSPS scope. In Appendix D, we begin by identifying HFTD areas assigned to Public Safety Partners. Any area outside of HFTD is re-classified as HFRA. PG&E's circuits can run miles long and span across multiple jurisdictions. Some Public Safety Partners outside of HFRA and HFTD were also in the potentially impacted scope in order to de-energize areas within HFRA and HFTD for safety.

Section 6.2 - List the names of all entities invited to the utility's Emergency Operations Center for a PSPS event, the method used to make this invitation, and whether a different form of communication was preferred by any entity invited to the utility's emergency operation center. (D.21-06-014, page 289.)

Response:

On September 28, 2024, at 02:27 PDT, PG&E invited the CPUC via email to virtually embed in the EOC for the duration of the activation. Filsinger Energy Partners, Inc., a county monitor, embedded two consultants into PG&E's EOC on October 1, 2024. Other entities preferred to work with their PG&E point of contact directly.

PG&E also provides communication service providers a dedicated PG&E contact in the EOC known as the CIL, who shares PSPS updates and answers specific questions. They can reach the CIL 24/7 during a PSPS by e-mail or phone at PG&E's Business Customer Service Center.

As part of our PSPS Pre-Season outreach,⁴² PG&E provides water infrastructure and communication service providers in PG&E's electrical service area with information on how to request representation at PG&E EOC's. Alternatively, some partners may also request PG&E representation at their jurisdiction's activated Operations Emergency Center (OEC).⁴³

⁴² See 2024 PSPS Pre-Season Report, pp 70-71.

⁴³ D.19-05-042.

Section 6.3 - A statement verifying the availability to public safety partners of accurate and timely geospatial information, and real time updates to the GIS shapefiles in preparation for an imminent PSPS event and during a PSPS event. (D.21-06-014, page 289.)

Response:

In preparation for a potential PSPS, PG&E sent automated notifications with links to the PSPS Portal, which provides PDF maps and GIS data to Public Safety Partners at the times outlined in Table 4. In addition, when PDF maps and GIS data were updated on the PSPS Portal due to scope changes, Portal users were notified via e-mail at the times outlined below in Table 10.

After the EOC was activated, PDF maps and GIS data on the PSPS Portal were determined accurate and updated in a timely manner following changes to geographic scope or customer impacts.

Table 10: PSPS Portal Time & Date for Map Sharing

Date	Time PDF and GIS Maps Shared (PDT)
09/28/2024	02:42
09/28/2024	13:19
09/29/2024	09:18
09/30/2024	01:43
09/30/2024	14:02
10/01/2024	08:57

Section 6.4 - A description and evaluation of engagement with local and state public safety partners in providing advanced outreach and notification during the PSPS event. (D.19-05-042, Appendix, page A23.)

Response:

Below is a description of the engagement with state CPUC, Cal OES, CAL FIRE (California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection) and local (i.e., Tribes, cities, counties) Public Safety Partners:

- Submitted the PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES twice a day (07:00 PDT and 15:00 PDT) if there was a significant change to scope and at least once for each of the five PSPS stages: Activating PSPS Protocols/Potential to De-energize (Stage 1), Decision to De-energize (Stage 2), De-energization Initiated (Stage 3), Initiating Re-energization Patrols (Stage 4) and All PSPS Lines Re-energized (Stage 5). See Table 11 below.

Table 11: PSPS Notifications Submitted to Cal OES

Date	Time PDF and GIS Maps Shared (PDT)
09/28/2024	02:12
09/28/2024	07:05
09/28/2024	14:54
09/29/2024	06:08
09/29/2024	09:24

Date	Time PDF and GIS Maps Shared (PDT)
09/29/2024	14:47
09/29/2024	22:46
09/30/2024	04:49
09/30/2024	06:05
09/30/2024	08:04
09/30/2024	14:03
10/01/2024	13:01

- Sent e-mails to the CPUC at least once for each of the five PSPS stages listed above. See Table 12 below.

Table 12: PSPS Notifications Submitted to Cal CPUC

Date	Time PDF and GIS Maps Shared (PDT)
09/28/2024	02:27
09/29/2024	09:57
09/29/2024	23:59
09/30/2024	04:24
09/30/2024	05:44
09/30/2024	09:22
09/30/2024	14:27
09/30/2024	16:40
10/01/2024	08:50
10/01/2024	13:27


- Hosted daily State Executive Briefings with invitees including Cal OES, CPUC, CAL FIRE, Governor’s Office, U.S. Forest Service, and other state agencies to provide the latest PSPS information and answer questions. A deck with key PSPS information was provided to participants.
- Hosted the daily Systemwide Cooperators Call, where all Public Safety Partners in the service area were invited to join for situational awareness.
- Hosted Tribal Cooperators Calls with potentially impacted Tribes to provide the latest PSPS information and answer questions.
- Hosted Operational Areas Cooperators Communication Calls to provide situational awareness updates and answer questions.⁴⁴
- Conducted ongoing coordination with Tribal and local County OES contacts through dedicated Agency Representatives. This includes but is not limited to providing the latest PSPS information, coordinating CRC locations, and resolving local issues in real-time.
- Provided links to the PSPS Portal that included planning and event-specific maps, situation reports, critical facility lists and MBL Program customer lists at each notification and when scope changed. Note that the Situation Report was provided twice a day and at scope changes prior to de-energization and hourly once restoration began.

⁴⁴ May vary in cadence & type based on County OES.

- Sent automated and live call notifications to agency partners before, during and after de-energization.
- Offered local and state agencies to be embedded in PG&E's EOC, as well as offered PG&E Agency Representatives to be embedded virtually in local EOCs.
- A dedicated State Operations Center Agency Representative provided ongoing support to Cal OES to ensure all questions were addressed.

PG&E considers the advanced outreach and notification to local and state Public Safety Partners during this EOC activation successful but with minor improvements needed. This is based on the number and various types of outreach conducted (see list above), the feedback received from Public Safety Partners through the post-PSPS survey and the success rate of automated agency notifications. Of the responses given, PG&E received the following positive comments from in-scope Public Safety Partners regarding PSPS outreach: "I have been involved in the PSPS program from the beginning, PG&E's engagement has improved tremendously overall, and our Public Safety Specialists have always been top notch."; and "Always a good experience, in spite of the subject matter. PG&E always represents and communicates well."

Leading up to potential de-energization, we sent 94% of our automated notifications to Tribal and local governments within the required timeframes. Figure 16 below shows the post-PSPS survey results when Public Safety Partners were asked to "evaluate PG&E engagement with your agency during the outage." Note that we received five responses to the survey. PG&E will continue to refine the agency notification process to ensure accurate and timely information sharing.



Section 6.5 - Specific engagement with local communities regarding the notification and support provided to the AFN community. (D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 8, SED Additional Information)

Response:

To ensure PG&E provides adequate support to AFN communities, we engage with local communities through paratransit agencies, media partnerships, and CBOs to share coordination efforts, notifications plans, CRC information, PSPS-specific information and more. See below for details on this engagement.

Engagement with Paratransit Agencies

In accordance with the Phase 3 Guidelines,⁴⁵ PG&E provided proactive notifications and impacted zip code information to paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a CRC during the PSPS. PG&E provided proactive notifications⁴⁶ to 134 paratransit agencies for the September 30 – October 1, 2024, PSPS. All notifications included a link to the PSPS emergency website updates page, pge.com/pspsupdates and a section called “Additional Resources” with a link to a map showing areas potentially affected by a shutoff. For more information on ADA compliant CRC locations, see Section 9.

Community Engagement

- We engaged with over 500 “information-based” CBOs during the PSPS, sharing courtesy notification updates, fact sheets, and other relevant information that they could share with their constituents to expand our reach of communications, including infographic videos with relevant PSPS updates in 16 languages and ASL that the organizations are able to use to educate their consumers.
- CBO resource partners were invited to the daily cooperator calls for Public Safety Partners, hosted by members from PG&E’s EOC who provided a situational update about the latest scope of the PSPS and an overview of the services available to customers. We hosted additional daily coordination calls with the CBO resource partners supporting the PSPS to provide an open forum to answer questions, offer suggestions regarding how they can best support their consumers, and facilitate more localized coordination among the partners.

Programs/Support for AFN Customers

PG&E provided a variety of resources to AFN customers before and during this PSPS. These resources include:

- Disability Disaster Access and Resource Program (DDAR):⁴⁷ We continued our collaboration with the California Foundation for Independent Living Centers (CFILC) to implement the DDAR Program for this PSPS. Through DDAR, we have supported AFN customers with the delivery of backup portable batteries (since July 2020) to qualify customers who need power during a PSPS. Through DDAR, PG&E provided the following resources for the September 30 – October 1, PSPS:
 - Eight local (ILCs) provided aid to 426 customers who rely on power for medical or independent living needs. PG&E is evaluating intervenor comments regarding how the ILCs aided customers reliant on power and will update the 2025 AFN Plan accordingly.
 - 575 batteries were previously distributed in affected counties, and no batteries were delivered during the activation to potentially impacted customers. PG&E is evaluating intervenor comments regarding engagement with customers and battery delivery requests through DDAR and will update the 2025 AFN Plan accordingly.

⁴⁵ D.21-06-034.

⁴⁶ For this PSPS, paratransit agencies received the Watch, Warning, Cancellation, and Restoration Notification. A list of zip codes was provided three times.

⁴⁷ For more information on the types of aid ILCs provided and how the delivery of aid was coordinated among DDAR, ILCs and the customers, refer to [PG&E’s 2024 AFN Plan](#).

- Portable Battery Program (PBP).⁴⁸ Our PBP provides free portable battery systems for customers who live in Tiers 2 and 3 HFTDs and are enrolled in the MBL Program. For this PSPS, 398 customers in scope were supported by batteries received through the PBP (delivered in 2020, 2021, 2022 and year-to-date). Since July 2020, a total of approximately 25,129 battery units have been delivered through the PBP across the entire PG&E service area.
- Food Bank Partnerships: We continued to fund local food banks to provide food replacement to families during the PSPS and three days following service restoration. For this PSPS, we partnered with seven local food banks⁴⁹ that serve 10 of the 13 impacted counties to provide boxes of food replacement for families.
- Meals on Wheels Partnerships: We continued our partnership with Meals on Wheels to provide additional support and services to customers in need during PSPS outages. For this PSPS, we partnered with 14 Meals on Wheels Organizations⁵⁰ that would be able to provide services to customers in scope for the de-energization in seven counties.
- 211 Referral Services: PG&E has a long-standing relationship with 211 through our charitable grant program. As of August 13, 2021, PG&E has a partnership with the California network of 211s to connect customers with resources before, during, and after PSPS outages. For this PSPS, PG&E worked with 211 to assist 61 customers with resources.⁵¹
- Accessible Transportation Partnerships: We are partnered with Accessible Transportation organizations to provide customers with transportation to and from PG&E's CRCs. For this PSPS, we successfully partnered with two organizations in preparation for the possibility of any transportation needs.⁵²

Communications to Customers with Limited English Proficiency

PG&E provided translated customer support through its customer notifications, website, call center, social media and engagement with CBOs, and multicultural media partnerships. Customers with their language preference set, received in-language (translated) notifications. For customers with no language preference set, notifications were provided in English with information on how to receive PSPS information in five non-English languages. See language preferences for this PSPS in Table 13 below.

⁴⁸ For more information about the PBP Program, refer to [PG&E's 2024 AFN Plan](#).

⁴⁹ Local Food Banks PG&E partnered for this PSPS: Food Bank of Contra Costa & Solano, Alameda County Food Bank, Community Action Agency of Butte County, Food for People, Redwood Empire Food Bank, Community Action of Napa Valley Food Bank, Dignity Health Connected Living.

⁵⁰ Meals on Wheels Organizations that PG&E Partnered for this PSPS: Meals on Wheels Diablo Region, Spectrum Community Services, Passages, Chico Meals on Wheels, J-Sei, Community Action Agency of Napa Valley, Dignity Health Connected Living, Coastal Seniors, Council on Aging- Sonoma County, Petaluma People Services, Tehama County Community Action Agency, West Contra Costa Meals on Wheels.

⁵¹ Additional information on 211s is not available within the PSPS Post-Event Report timeline. More information will be available in the [PG&E's 2024 AFN Plan](#).

⁵² PG&E partnered with Dignity Health Connected Living and Vivalon during this PSPS.

Table 13: Customer Notifications Based on Language Preference

Language	Total Notifications ⁵³	Percent
English	630,149	99.34%
Spanish	3,700	0.58%
Chinese (Mandarin & Cantonese)	447	0.07%
Russian	27	0.004%
Vietnamese	16	0.003%
Total	634,339	100%

Customers with limited English proficiency have access to translation phone numbers on our PSPS website with translation services available in over 200 languages. Table 14 includes call center-related metrics associated with this PSPS.

Table 14: Call Center Support Services⁵⁴

Total Calls Handled	PSPS Calls Handled	Average Response Time for PSPS-related Calls (seconds)	Number of Calls Handled by Call Center Translation Services	Number of Languages Supported by Call Center Translation Services
42,899	529	8	813	240

PG&E continued support and engagement with multi-cultural media organizations and in-language CBOs to maximize the reach of in-language communications to the public. Prior to the PSPS, we reached out to 24 multicultural media organizations and 24 CBOs regarding outreach in translated languages. These organizations covered the translated languages above and languages spoken by communities that occupy significant roles in California’s agricultural economy (e.g., Nahuatl). Additionally, we shared information and updates on PSPS with these media outlets, including news releases and social media infographics in English, translated languages and ASL, for their use and distribution. We also shared our new PSPS Language Resources page (www.pge.com/pspslanguagehelp available in 16 languages) with organizations to share with their constituents. Highlights from our coordination with multicultural media organizations and CBOs during this PSPS includes coverage from [Crossings TV online update in English](#).⁵⁵ See Figure 17 below.

⁵³ Total notifications do not include doorbell rings and Live Agent phone calls.

⁵⁴ Metrics are provided from September 28, 2024, through October 1, 2024.

⁵⁵ [Crossings TV Online Update in English](#).

Figure 17: Crossings TV Online Update in English



Section 6.6 - Provide the following information on backup power (including mobile backup power) with the name and email address of a utility contact for customers for each of the following topics: (D.21-06-014, page 300.)

Response:

The information requested is included in Sections 6.6a – 6.6f. For questions related to backup power, customers can email TempGenPSPSSupport@pge.com.

Section 6.6a. Description of the backup generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

Response:

Table 15 lists the generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

Table 15: Generators Available for Critical Facilities and Infrastructure Customers

Generator Type	Number of Units	Individual Size (MW)	Run Time (Hrs.) ⁵⁶	Description
Diesel Generator	2	.065	31	2 units on reserve in San Leandro.
Diesel Generator	5	.1	25.3	5 units on reserve in Sacramento.
Diesel Generator	1	.125	25	1 unit on reserve in San Leandro.
Diesel Generator	6	.2	22.9	6 units on reserve in San Leandro.
Diesel Generator	1	.275	26	1 unit on reserve in Sacramento.
Diesel Generator	2	.570	24	2 units on reserve at San Leandro.
Diesel Generator	7	1.5	10	7 units on reserve in Martinez.
Diesel Generator	8	1.0	35	3 units pre-staged at ICU Hospitals and 5 units on reserve at Sacramento.
Diesel Generator	8	1.140	24	8 on reserve in San Leandro
Diesel Generator	17	2.0	27.7	17 units on reserve total, 7 in Sacramento and 10 at San Leandro.

⁵⁶ Estimated based on a 75% load. Barring mechanical failure and refueling the temporary generators have the ability to operate continuously throughout a typical PSPS.

6.6b. The capacity and estimated maximum duration of operation of the backup generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

Response:

Table 16 lists the power capacity and maximum duration of operation of the generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

6.6c. The total number of backup generators provided to critical facility and infrastructure customer's site immediately before and during the PSPS.

Response:

During and immediately before the PSPS, one backup generator was activated to energize critical facility and infrastructure customers that did not have an existing mitigation in place.

6.6d. How the utility deployed this backup generation to the critical facility and infrastructure customer's site.

Response:

As a general policy, PG&E does not offer backup generation to individual facilities. However, PG&E's policy allows for granting exceptions for critical facilities when a prolonged outage could have a significant, adverse impact to public health or safety.

Deployment of temporary generation is contingent upon the following circumstances: the expected duration to perform permanent repairs is significantly longer than the expected duration to install backup generation, the expected customer outage is 50,000 or more customer minutes, and the outage affects a distribution circuit serving multiple customers without a functional back-tie.⁵⁷

PG&E has pre-arranged commitments with critical facility and infrastructure customers to provide temporary generation in case of a PSPS and evaluated requests received during the PSPS according to the prioritization described in Section 6.6e.

6.6e. An explanation of how the utility prioritized how to distribute available backup generation.

Response:

PG&E prioritizes the deployment of available generation by first meeting existing commitments to individual facilities in the following order:

- Intensive care unit (ICU) hospitals, pre-identified by PG&E in partnership with the California Hospital Association (CHA) and Hospital Council of Northern and Central California (HC).
- Pandemic Response sites classified as medical stations and shelters. Additional facilities prepared to support public safety such as but not limited to First/emergency responders at the Tribal, local, state, and federal level, water, wastewater, and

⁵⁷ 50,000 customer minutes is approximately equivalent to 100 customers for about 8 hours.

communication service providers, affected community choice aggregators, publicly-owned utilities/electrical cooperatives, the CPUC, the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services and the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection.⁵⁸

- Deployment of available generation is then followed by customers with special needs in the following order:
 - Life support, MBL, and temperature sensitive.
 - Large customers, economic damage customers, and danger to health and safety customers.
- Deployment of available generation is then followed by other customers based on maximizing relief based on the number of customers times expected duration.

6.6f. Identify the critical facility and infrastructure customers that received backup generation.

Response:

During this PSPS, PG&E utilized its rental fleet of temporary generators to mitigate the impacts of PSPS on its customers. This fleet was used to support one stand-alone facility serving public safety, and one indoor CRC. Critical facility and infrastructure customers that received backup generation are listed in Table 16.

Table 16: Critical Facility and Infrastructure Customers Energized with Backup Generation

County	Site Type	Generation Deployed	Duration of Operation (PDT)	Reason Deployed
Shasta	CAL FIRE Happy Valley Fire Center	.1 MW	25:15 hours	Public Safety

⁵⁸ The term “emergency response providers” includes federal, state, and local governmental and non-governmental public safety, fire, law enforcement, emergency response, emergency medical services providers (including hospital emergency facilities), and related personnel, agencies, and authorities.

Section 7 – Complaints & Claims

Section 7.1 - The number and nature of complaints received as the result of the de-energization event and claims that are filed against the utility because of de-energization. The utility must completely report all the informal and formal complaints, meaning any expression of grief, pain, or dissatisfaction, from various sources, filed either with CPUC or received by the utility as a result of the PSPS event. (Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, D.21-06-014, page 304.)

Response:

Table 17 provides the number and nature of complaints received from customers and Public Safety Partners, submitted to both the CPUC and PG&E, for the September 30 – October 1, 2024, PSPS.⁵⁹ Any complaints received after October 1, 2024, for this PSPS will be included in the 2024 PSPS Post-Season Report.

Table 17: Number and Nature of Complaints due to the September 30 – October 1, 2024 PSPS

Nature of Complaints	Number of Complaints
Communications/Notifications Including, but not limited to complaints regarding lack of notice, excessive notices, confusing notice, false alarm notice, problems with getting up-to-date information, inaccurate information provided, not being able to get information in the prevalent languages and/or information accessibility, complaints about website, Public Safety Partner Portal, Representational State Transfer (REST)/Digital Asset Manager (DAM) sites (as applicable).	16
PSPS Frequency/Duration Including, but not limited to complaints regarding the frequency and/or duration of PSPS, including delays in restoring power, scope of PSPS and dynamic of weather conditions.	18
Safety/Health Concern Including, but not limited to complaints regarding difficulties experienced by AFN/MBL populations, traffic accidents due to non-operating traffic lights, inability to get medical help, well water or access to clean water, inability to keep property cool/warm during outage raising health concern.	1
General PSPS Dissatisfaction/Other Including, but not limited to complaints about being without power during PSPS and related hardships such as food loss, income loss, inability to work/attend school, plus any PSPS-related complaints that do not fall into any other category.	35
Outreach/Assistance Including, but not limited to complaints regarding CRCs, community crew vehicles, backup power, hotel vouchers, other assistance provided by utility to mitigate impact of PSPS.	1

⁵⁹ PG&E Post-Event Reports are based on the CPUC template. Additional information regarding complaints and claims will be provided in the PSPS Post-Season Report.

Claims

As of October 7, 2024, PG&E received three claims for the September 30 – October 1, 2024, PSPS.

Table 18: Count and Type of Claim(s) Received

Description of Claims	Number of Claims
Business Interruption/Economic Loss	1
Food Loss Only	1
Property Damage	1

Section 8 – Power Restoration


Section 8.1 - A detailed explanation of the steps the utility took to restore power (*Resolution ESRB-8 page 5*)

Response:

During the PSPS, PG&E Incident Command and meteorology teams monitor real-time and forecasted weather conditions based on weather models, weather station data, and field observations while patrol crews and helicopters are pre-positioned in anticipation of the Weather “All-Clear” to begin patrols. Weather “All-Clears” are called based on pre-defined, geographic areas and mapping of each weather station in each zone to that area. This is known as the All-Clear Zone methodology, which based on past PSPS outages, was an improvement compared to issuing Weather “All-Clear” by FIAs.

All-Clear Zones align with known meteorological phenomena, such as mountain tops and wind gaps which may experience longer periods of extreme weather. This allows for further granularity in calling Weather “All-Clears” thereby helping areas less prone to wind gusts or adverse conditions to be cleared and restored more quickly. PG&E monitors the conditions in each of these All-Clear Zones and as they fall below our minimum fire potential conditions the PG&E meteorologists will recommend areas for restoration.

Figure 18: Map of FIA & TPs De-energized for September 30 – October 1, 2024 PSPS



As Weather “All-Clears” are issued, restoration crews patrol electrical facilities to identify and repair or clear any damage or hazard before re-energizing. Using the Incident Command System (ICS) as a base response framework, each circuit is assigned a taskforce consisting of supervisors, crews, trouble men, and inspectors. This structure allows PG&E to patrol and perform step restoration in alignment with the centralized control centers.

During restoration, PG&E issued two Weather “All-Clears” and deployed approximately 39 personnel and 26 helicopters to patrol the lines in advance of restoration. Patrols were conducted on approximately 819 miles of distribution circuits and 92 miles of transmission lines that had

been de-energized. Power was restored to customers as patrol completion verified the safe condition of each line.

Section 8.2 - The timeline for power restoration, broken down by phase if applicable (D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A24, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

PG&E issued Weather “All-Clears” for All-Clear Zones at the times noted in Table 19.

Table 19: Weather All-Clear Times

All-Clear Zones	Weather All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)
241C, 244A, 244B, 247A	09/30/2024 12:13
170B, 177A, 241A, 245A, 245B, 245C, 246A, 246C, 246F, 246G, 246H, 246I, 248A, 249, 280C, 280G, 280H, 285A	09/30/2024 13:30

Section 8.3 - For any circuits that require more than 24 hours to restore, the utility shall explain why it was unable to restore each circuit within this timeframe. (D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 6.)

Response:

PG&E was able to restore all impacted customers within 24 hours of the Weather All-Clear.

Section 9 – Community Resource Centers

Section 9.1 - The address of each location during a de-energization event, the location (in a building, a trailer, etc.), the assistance available at each location, the days and hours that it was open, and attendance (i.e., number of visitors) (*Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

During the September 30 – October 1, 2024, PSPS, PG&E opened 11 CRCs. The 11 sites were visited by 464 people. A full list of CRC locations, assistance available, operating days and hours, and attendance is reported in Appendix F.

CRCs are typically open from 08:00 to 22:00 PDT during the time the power is shut off until customers are restored. Visitors were provided with PSPS information by dedicated staff, ADA-compliant restrooms, physically distanced tables and chairs, power strips to meet basic charging needs for personal medical devices and other electronics, snacks, bottled water, Wi-Fi, and cellular service access. For visitors who did not wish to remain on site, “Grab and Go” bags with a PSPS information card, water, non-perishable snacks, a mobile battery charger, and a blanket were available. Bagged ice and privacy screens were also available at indoor locations.

During this PSPS, onsite visitors requested and received:⁶⁰

- 524 snacks
- 461 bottled waters
- 442 device chargers
- 115 bags of ice
- 74 blankets

451 visitors did not remain on site and were provided “Grab and Go” bags.

Additional information about our CRC operations, including coordination with Tribal and local governments, CRC types and resources, and more is available in the CRC Plan located in Appendix A of [PG&E’s 2024 Pre-Season Report](#), pp. 47-61.

Section 9.2 - Any deviations and explanations from the CRC requirement including operation hours, ADA accessibility, and equipment. (*SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

Due to the timing of power restoration on September 30 and October 1, the hours of operation at CRCs listed in Appendix F deviated from standard operating hours of 08:00 to 22:00 PDT.


⁶⁰ PG&E does not provide hotel vouchers at CRC locations. For more information on vouchers, see Section 6.5.

Section 9.3 - A map identifying the location of each CRC and the de-energized areas (*SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

See Figure 19 below for a map of the CRC locations. Based on the CRC survey conducted for this PSPS, 11 respondents answered that they traveled an average of two miles to the nearest CRC location. Additional CRC location information can be found at [PG&E Emergency Site – View Outage Map](#). Customers can find specific information using the ‘Address Search’ or ‘City/County Search’ functions.

Figure 19: Location of CRCs Readied During September 30 – October 1, 2024 PSPS



Section 10 – Mitigations to Reduce Impact


Section 10.1 - Mitigation actions and impacts (both waterfall graph and map) including: sectionalization devices, temporary generation, microgrids, permanent backup generation, transmission switching, covered conductor, and any other grid hardening that mitigated the impact of the event (*D.21-06-014, page 285, SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

Mitigations to Reduce Impact

PG&E employed multiple measures to avoid de-energizing approximately 10,458 customers. Figure 20 depicts the impact each mitigation measure had on the total number of customers.

Figure 20: Reduction in Number of Impacted Customers Driven by Mitigation Efforts



Community Microgrids

A community microgrid is a group of customers and Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) within clearly defined electrical boundaries with the ability to disconnect from and reconnect to the grid. These microgrids are typically designed to serve the portions of communities that include community resources, like hospitals, police and fire stations, and gas stations and markets. PG&E continues to own and operate the distribution system within the microgrid. More information about PG&E's microgrid solutions or how to begin developing a community microgrid can be found at www.pge.com/cmep. During this PSPS, no community microgrids were utilized.

Transmission Line Segmentation

Transmission lines are segmented using switches enabled with Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), when possible, if only a portion of a line is required to be de-energized due to PSPS. Leaving segments of transmission lines energized allows PG&E to still reduce fire risk where needed and provide service to stations fed off the non-impacted segments during the PSPS.

Two transmission lines were segmented during this PSPS. One section of one of the lines was in scope due to asset health but with no customer impacts, while the other two sections were

determined to be low impact, therefore, also had no customer impacts. The other line's section distribution substation was de-energized, therefore had no customer impacts.

Distribution Switching

Depending on fire risk patterns, distribution switch locations and switching plans maintain service to customers on lines that fall outside the high-risk area but are served by lines that pass through the fire risk area. Depending on PSPS scope, we may be able to use back-tie switching to bypass the distribution circuits that pass through the de-energization area to keep customers energized from a different set of lines. During this PSPS, distribution switching was not used as a mitigation as there were no opportunities available.

Sectionalization

PG&E has installed new sectionalization devices near the borders of the CPUC-designated HFTD Tier 2 and Tier 3 to reduce the number of customers affected by PSPS outages. PG&E used sectionalization devices on 15 circuits which reduced the customer impact by approximately 10,230 customers for this PSPS.

Islanding

In some cases, PG&E can leverage islanding capabilities to keep some customers islanded apart from the rest of PG&E's transmission system and energized by generation located within the island. During this PSPS, no transmission islanding was used.

Temporary Substation Generation

The objective of temporary substation microgrids is to enable some community resources to continue serving the surrounding population during a PSPS at distribution substations resulting from transmission line outages. An interconnection is made at the substation, energizing entire circuits where downstream assets are not at weather risk and generator capacity is sufficient. If there are downstream assets at risk, this mitigation is combined with distribution sectionalization to energize only safe areas. For reporting purposes, customers mitigated in the latter case will be documented in this mitigation category and not in the sectionalization mitigation category to avoid duplication. On average, customers served by temporary substation microgrids experience de-energization periods of under 30 minutes for the power source to switchover from transmission to temporary generation and go-back from temporary generation to transmission. PG&E used temporary substation generation to reduce the customer impact by 227 customers for this PSPS.

Table 20: Temporary Substation Generation

County	Site Type	Generation Deployed	Duration of Operation	Reason Deployed
Glenn	Elk Creek Substation	6 MW	51:20 hours	Customer Mitigation

Temporary Microgrids

The objective of temporary microgrids is to enable some community resources to continue serving the surrounding population during PSPS outages where it is safe to do so, using pre-installed interconnection hubs to safely and rapidly interconnect temporary generation. PG&E temporary distribution microgrids were not in scope for this PSPS. While temporary microgrids do not often support large numbers of customers, the community resources served by temporary microgrids include fire stations, local water and waste companies, markets, post offices, and medical facilities. On average, when utilized, customers served by temporary microgrids experience de-energization periods of under 30 minutes for the switchover from grid to microgrid and go-back from microgrid to the grid. Thirteen temporary microgrid sites are currently ready for operation in PG&E's service area. PG&E temporary distribution microgrids were not in scope for this PSPS.

Backup Power Support

PG&E used temporary generation to support one stand-alone customer. Table 16 lists the facility that received backup power support during the September 30 – October 1, 2024, PSPS.

Covered Conductor

The effects of grid-hardening and covered conductors are accounted for in our IPW model, which predicts the probability of utility-caused ignitions. Overhead system hardening is expected to reduce the probability of outages and ignitions in recently hardened sections. The IPW model more heavily weighs ignition and outage rates in recent years which will result in areas with fewer ignitions (e.g., areas that may have been recently hardened, being less likely to be de-energized for PSPS as there is a lower chance of ignition based on historical ignitions and outages).

Section 11 – Lessons Learned from this Event

Section 11.1 - Threshold analysis and the results of the utility’s examination of whether its thresholds are adequate and correctly applied in the de-energized areas. (D.21-06-014, page 305-306.)

Response:

This section addresses our examination of the adequacy of our PSPS protocols and guidance thresholds. As prescribed in ESRB-8, the decision to de-energize electric facilities for public safety is based on the best judgment of the IOU and is dependent on many factors including and not limited to fuel moisture; aerial and ground firefighting capabilities; active fires that indicate fire conditions; situational awareness provided by agencies; and local meteorological conditions of humidity and winds.⁶¹ Based on our current PSPS modeling and thresholds, as applied in this PSPS and explained in Section 2, we believe our current PSPS thresholds continue to be adequate and were correctly applied for the September 30 – October 1, 2024, PSPS. See Appendix A for detailed information on our PSPS criteria and thresholds.

PG&E begins its threshold evaluation with a robust historical analysis that is described in detail below. This established the guidance values to be applied for PSPS, which has been optimized to capture data from past catastrophic fires to mitigate customer impacts. To do so, Meteorologists use internal and external tools and subject matter expertise to decide.

Typically, before de-energization, the PSPS customer risk is also evaluated against the wildfire risk on a per circuit basis to further evaluate the accuracy of the PSPS. During the PSPS, the advanced weather modeling systems from our network of more than 1,300 weather stations, forecast and track weather conditions in real time. Finally, data and post-PSPS analysis results are collected and provided as part of the PSPS Post-Event Report process.

Establishing Threshold through Historical Analysis

Our PSPS guidance was established by calibrating a granular, historical dataset. We built our verification dataset by creating, or “backcasting,” the PSPS guidance through our historical dataset. We extracted values for all recent fires that have occurred in PG&E’s service area from 2012 to 2020. We aimed to capture as many historical fires as possible that were caused by PG&E equipment during high wind events (e.g., Camp, Nuns, Kincade, Zogg) while limiting the number of historical PSPS outages to minimize customer impacts. Our analysis included:

- Hourly review of past incidents
- Verification of hypothetical PSPS dates
- PSPS guidance values testing
- A robust guidance sensitivity and calibration analysis

Historical Analysis: CFPD Quantification

Based on this analysis, PG&E uses a CFPD value of nine as the quantitative threshold guidance value to consider for PSPS on PG&E’s distribution system.

To establish the CFPD threshold of nine, we performed multiple sensitivity studies in “backcast” mode for calibration and validation. This involved running 68 different versions of the combined

⁶¹ See Resolution ESRB-8, p. 8-9.

distribution PSPS guidance through hourly historical data throughout multiple years to calibrate PSPS guidance. This included simulating and learning from more than 2,500 virtual PSPS outages. Through this “lookback” analysis, we evaluated:


- The potential size, scope, and frequency of PSPS outages
- Potential customer impacts
- The days PSPS outages would have occurred
- Whether utility infrastructure would have qualified for de-energization

The mFPC and CFP_D guidance that is determined from Technosylva was also evaluated using this process. The CFP_D guidance value of nine is shown in Figure 21 below with respect to recent large fires.

Any fires above nine that met the basic mFPC indicate PSPS would have been executed, had these models and guidance been in use during these historic events. The results show that deployment of this model could have prevented wildfires, such as Camp, Tubbs, Nuns, Atlas, Kincade and Zogg fires, if implemented at the time. Please note that the inclusion of a fire in this analysis does not indicate that PG&E is directly responsible for or caused a fire. Instead, the fires are included for the purpose of analyzing the impact of PG&E’s current PSPS Protocols.

The red “✗” symbols in Figure 21 below represent fires that were captured by the both the CFP_D and Technosylva CFB. The blue dots under the line represent fires below the CFP_D guidance. Blue dots “●” above the line represent events that did not meet the mFPC criteria.

Figure 21: CFP_D Guidance



This analysis was a critical step to ensure the most catastrophic historical incidents are identified by PSPS guidance while considering the significant impacts to customers from PSPS outages across multiple dimensions (e.g., duration and frequency). This ensures that future PSPS outages

will capture conditions similarly during the most catastrophic fires while also balancing impacts to customers.

Historical Analysis: Execution

To execute the analysis at this scale, we utilized cloud computing resources to run PSPS model guidance for every hour at every 2 x 2 km grid cell across the historical data set to determine the number of times and locations PSPS guidance is exceeded. Each location exceeding guidance is then grouped into events to determine the location and size of each PSPS given the weather and fuels present at that time under the parameters of the study version. This allows us to determine if synoptic-driven events (e.g., Diablo wind events) are being identified, and if historical fires attributable to PG&E equipment may have been mitigated.

Verification of PSPS Protocols

In addition to these sensitivity studies, PG&E performed extensive verification of the PSPS protocols using several internal and external datasets. The goal of these analyses was to first determine if certain weather events are being captured (e.g., Diablo and offshore wind events), and second, to determine if lines that have been implicated in historic catastrophic fires would have been identified by the guidance.

The following internal datasets were used in the analysis:

- Climatology of Diablo wind events.
- Hourly high-resolution wind maps from the climatology data set.
- Distribution and transmission outage history.
- The weather signal database.
- Exploratory and dynamic dashboards created with internal and external data.

The following external datasets were used in the analysis:

- National Center for Environmental Prediction (NCEP) North American Regional Reanalysis Archive (NARR) synoptic weather maps.
- Historical fire occurrence data compiled by federal agencies.
- RFWs from the NWS.
- High risk of potential large fires due to wind from the GACC.

The paragraphs below explain how we leveraged external and internal data to verify our PSPS protocols guidance thresholds.

NARR Archive

PG&E has acquired the NARR archive data dating back to 1995 and produced over two million maps that can be utilized to study past events. These maps are also useful to study the past conditions leading up to the PSPS, such as the extent of precipitation events and heat waves. When the PSPS models are run through the climatology, each PSPS identified is compared against the NARR archive by a Meteorologist to determine the large-scale atmospheric features present for each event.

Climatology of Diablo Wind Events

PG&E also leverages the latest academic research on Diablo wind events that use surface-based observations to create a climatology of Diablo wind events. We adapted the criteria and

processed it hour-by-hour through the 31-year weather climatology to determine the frequency, magnitude, and timing of Diablo winds. The output of this analysis was a 31-year calendar of Diablo wind events experienced in the PG&E service area. As it relates to PSPS directly, the strongest Diablo wind events were evaluated to verify if PSPS guidance also selects these days for potential PSPS outages. Using the days identified by PSPS guidance and the Diablo PSPS list, a high-level comparison was completed to evaluate overlap of the events.

Any events that did not meet PSPS guidance were evaluated further using additional data sources described in this section. For example, the NARR archive proved useful, as antecedent conditions such as rainfall before a PSPS and the magnitude of the PSPS could be evaluated.

PG&E's Weather Signal Database

PG&E's Meteorology team built, and continues to maintain, a 'weather signal' database that flags each day from January 1, 1995, to present that experienced any weather-related outages on the distribution system. It also lists the main weather driver (e.g., heat, low-elevation snow, northeast wind, winter storm, etc.) for these outages. If distribution outage activity is not driven by weather, the day is classified as a "Blue Sky"⁶² day. This dataset combines weather and distribution outage activity that allows rapid filtering of events based on the main weather drivers. To validate PSPS guidance, we used a combination of "Northeast" wind days and "Blue-Sky" days.

The PSPS guidance was validated against all Northeast wind days in the database. This is similar, but complimentary to the Diablo PSPS analysis as it also accounts for outage activity observed on those days. Events were also compared against "Blue Sky" days to ensure that PSPS would not be recommended for a high percentage of non-weather-impact days where little to no outage activity was observed.

Red Flag Warnings from the National Weather Service

PG&E also validated PSPS guidance against RFWs from the NWS. RFWs mean warm temperatures, very low humidity, and stronger winds are expected to combine to produce an increased risk of fire danger. These RFWs were collected for the past six years (2015 – 2020) in shapefile format and used to evaluate the timing and spatial extent of historical RFWs against PSPS guidance. It should be noted that each NWS office in the PG&E service area has different RFW criteria, making direct and quantifiable comparison challenging. However, this dataset is used to evaluate whether RFWs were issued when PSPS guidance was met. Based on historical PSPS analysis, RFWs are expected to occur more frequently and cover a broader area than the area covered by PSPS outages.

High Risk of Potential Large Fires due to Wind from the Geographic Area Coordination Center

PG&E also validated PSPS guidance against historical "High Risk" days from the GACC. The GACCs issue High Risk Day alerts when fuel and weather conditions are predicted that historically have resulted in a significantly higher than normal chance for a new large fire or for significant growth on existing fires. Examples of critical weather conditions are high winds, low humidity, an unstable atmosphere, and very hot weather. Similar to the RFW analysis, this dataset was used to evaluate if High Risk days were issued when PSPS guidance was high. Blue Sky Day is defined as "The same as a non-weather impact day (no or very limited impacts due to

⁶² The definition of a Blue Sky Day is as follows: "Blue Sky Day is defined the same as a non-weather impact day (no or very limited impacts due to weather)."

weather).” Similar to RFWs, based on historical PSPS analysis, High Risk Days are expected to occur more frequently and cover a broader area than PSPS.

Hourly High-Resolution Wind Maps from PG&E Climatology Data Set

PG&E created hourly maps from high-resolution climatology and a web-based application to display any hour across 30 years. For each PSPS that meets PSPS guidance in the climatology, these maps were evaluated by a Meteorologist to better understand the nature of the event, wind speeds, antecedent conditions, and the spatial extent of strong winds. It’s important to note forecast wind speeds are available in the same exact format, allowing Operational Meteorologists to put forecast events in perspective with historical events using the same model.

Detailed PSPS Dashboards

To evaluate the thresholds, Meteorologists and data scientists utilized the data sources described above to evaluate historical PSPS hour-by-hour to verify the locations and times that are being flagged as meeting PSPS guidance. These dashboards determine if historical fire events would have been flagged by PSPS guidance. Meteorologists evaluated these data sources hourly to verify model performance of the IPW model and suitability for operations. The PSPS guidance can be evaluated spatially using the dashboard map integration, while the size and timing of the PSPS can be evaluated using the time series integration.

Section 11.2 - Any lessons learned that will lead to future improvement for the utility (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

PG&E collects lessons learned input from staff during and after every PSPS EOC activation to identify best practices and opportunities for improvement. See Table 21 below for lessons learned from the September 30 – October 1, 2024, PSPS.

Table 21: Lessons Learned from the PSPS

Issue	Discussion	Resolution
Customer Notification	Customers were incorrectly mapped, which resulted in missed notifications. ⁶³	We corrected the customer’s mapping to prevent future missed notifications and continue to refine our process.
Customer Notification	Customers were de-energized for a non-PSPS outage unrelated to this PSPS but were incorrectly notified that their outage was due to a PSPS. ⁶⁴	We corrected the outage classification in the system as soon as the issue was identified. We plan to review processes with personnel responsible and consider additional training.
Customer Notifications	The notification vendor experienced a service interruption, which caused a	We are coordinating with the vendor to implement a monitoring system that will

⁶³ See Table 8A and Table 9 for more information.

⁶⁴ See Table 9 for more information.

Issue	Discussion	Resolution
	delay in launching some notifications. ⁶⁵	provide alerts when this type of issue arises as well as working to improve the resilience of the data preparation process.
Public Safety Partner Notifications	A manual error occurred when creating data files that resulted in a missed cancellation notification to one jurisdiction. ⁶⁶	We plan to clarify process documentation and ensure that those responsible for preparing notification files are aware of how scope changes affect incorporated and unincorporated territories.

⁶⁵ See Table 8B for more information.

⁶⁶ See Table 8 for more information.

Section 12 – Other Relevant Information


Maximum Wind Gusts

Table 22 and Figure 22 show the maximum wind gust speeds recorded by weather stations in each county within PSPS scope.

Table 22: Maximum Wind Gusts Recorded September 30 – October 1, 2024 in Impacted Counties

County	Maximum Wind Gust (mph)	Station ID	Station Name
Butte	46 mph	JBGC1	Jarbo Gap
Colusa	26 mph	PG598	Rail Canyon Road
Glenn	36 mph	PG845	Road 65
Shasta	43 mph	PC073	Slate Creek
Tehama	37 mph	PG855	Black Butte Lake

Figure 22: Maximum Wind Gusts Recorded September 30 – October 1, 2024 in Impacted Counties



APPENDIX

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
APPENDIX A
SECTION 2 – DECISION MAKING PROCESS

Appendix A: DECISION MAKING PROCESS¹

Table A-1.1: Factors Considered in the Decision to Shut Off Power for Each Distribution Circuit De-energized During the September 30 – October 1, 2024 PSPS

* Please see Table A-1.2 for the description of each column header, as well as the unit and value provided.

** Note: PSPS decision making on Distribution does not occur at a per-circuit level, and instead occurs at the level of our 2 x 2 km weather and fuels model grid. These outputs are used in a GIS system to visualize the areas of concern by area, which meteorologists and Distribution Assets Health Specialists review to scope the event. The data provided here is representative of our high-resolution weather model data, which is driven by the Weather Research and Forecasting **model**. It is not inclusive of other model information reviewed by meteorologists that include external, public global and high-resolution weather models. This temporal and areal review of the risk, the operational timeline required to create the scope as well as any areas that were added based on subject matter expertise of meteorologists may lead to some circuits being de-energized that do not strictly exceed PSPS guidance.

Circuit Name	Time Place	Forecast																	Agency				Observed													
		ws_mph	ws_mph_50m	wg_mph	temp_2m_f	flame_length_ft_2hr	rate_of_spread_chhr_2hr	area_acres_8hr	rh_2m	vpd2m_mb	prob_cat	dfm_10hr	dfm_1000hr	lfm_herb	lfm_woody	lfm_chamise_new	sum_tree_ovr	prob_ignition	efpd	HWW	HWA	RFW	GACC_High Risk	ws_mph	wg_mph	temp_f	RH_%	ws_mph_AC	wg_mph_AC	temp_f_AC	RH_%_AC	open_psp_tags	Tx impacts (yes/no)	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	PSPS Potential Benefit	
ANTLER 1101	TP2	19	33	45	90	25.1	31.3	1547.9	10.9	43.1	0.936	0.038	0.064	0.085	38	74	68	49813.6	0.0024101	14.5	No	No	No	No	13	27	95	15	10	18	87	15	Yes	No	0.1	20.9
BIG BEND 1101	TP17	21	34	49	92	13.2	69.1	4650	9.6	46	0.979	0.035	0.06	0.079	32	70	67	54176.2	0.0042988	30.1	No	No	No	Yes	31	46	96	12	24	44	88	13	Yes	No	0.3	530.7
CEDAR CREEK 1101	TP1	33	44	64	91	41	48	2916.6	10.2	44.2	0.951	0.038	0.062	0.083	37	76	69	87136.2	0.0070787	33.2	No	No	No	No	20	41	97	11	9	16	77	19	Yes	No	0.2	70.1
CLARK ROAD 1102	TP17	29	37	48	96	17.2	86.5	7077.5	8.7	52.3	0.981	0.033	0.059	0.077	31	76	65	21285.1	0.003877	30.1	No	No	No	Yes	31	46	96	12	23	44	89	13	Yes	No	0.2	1105.8
COTTONWOOD 1102	TP3	18	26	39	96	10	85.8	9423.4	9	52.2	0.913	0.035	0.062	0.076	31	58	62	5633.5	0.0011352	6.9	No	No	No	Yes	18	31	91	12	20	29	91	12	Yes	No	1.0	200.4
CRESTA 1101	TP17	19	30	45	90	7.5	35.3	2722.7	10.3	43.8	0.954	0.037	0.063	0.082	41	77	69	3924.9	0.0013381	9.1	No	No	No	No	22	30	83	12	24	44	79	16	Yes	No	0.3	371.4
ELK CREEK 1101	TP5	23	33	44	97	14.5	117.7	39036	8.2	54.6	0.97	0.031	0.057	0.067	30	58	57	3559.7	0.0011858	9.3	No	No	No	Yes	21	28	94	11	14	22	94	11	Yes	No	0.6	602.4
GIRVAN 1101	TP3	21	31	47	96	13.3	87.5	17299	8.9	53.2	0.967	0.034	0.06	0.071	30	65	61	23867.7	0.0033553	24.3	No	No	No	Yes	23	40	92	10	20	29	92	10	Yes	No	0.2	358.8
GIRVAN 1102	TP3	20	29	42	96	11.7	54.9	4427	9.1	51.6	0.947	0.035	0.062	0.083	36	69	65	20596.5	0.0024649	15.4	No	No	No	Yes	18	35	92	11	20	29	92	11	Yes	No	0.1	1294.8

¹ Transmission circuits for this PSPS were only de-energized when all distribution circuits in the downstream substations were de-energized. Because these transmission circuit de-energizations were not directly PSPS related and there were no customer impacts related to the de-energization of the transmission assets, this appendix does not report on them.

GLENN 1101	TP5	24	32	43	98	11.9	151.5	50957	8.2	56.7	0.958	0.032	0.058	0.068	30	67	58	14.6	0.0021486	10.9	No	No	No	Yes	26	37	91	10	19	27	92	9	Yes	No	0.1	4.3
JESSUP 1101	TP3	18	28	43	96	13.3	57.8	4745	8.9	53.2	0.961	0.035	0.062	0.073	32	67	64	16150.9	0.0020012	13.5	No	No	No	Yes	23	40	91	10	20	29	92	10	Yes	No	0.1	10.5
JESSUP 1102	TP3	20	30	42	96	9.6	66.5	5895	9	52.2	0.94	0.035	0.063	0.081	35	75	64	16150.9	0.0020594	14.1	No	No	No	Yes	18	31	90	11	20	29	92	11	Yes	No	0.1	10.6
KESWICK 1101	TP3	20	33	48	95	16.6	74.7	6044.1	9.6	49.9	0.976	0.035	0.062	0.077	38	68	67	2943	0.0023145	17.4	No	No	No	Yes	18	35	97	6	13	23	97	6	Yes	No	1.1	376.9
LOGAN CREEK 2102	TP5	26	32	43	99	12.1	155.1	63238	8.1	57.9	0.919	0.031	0.059	0.074	30	63	58	547	0.0016714	10.8	No	No	No	Yes	27	36	92	12	18	25	93	12	Yes	No	0.2	19.9
OREGON TRAIL 1102	TP2	21	31	45	96	13.4	55.2	3414.8	8.4	52.9	0.964	0.033	0.058	0.08	35	67	66	26609.3	0.0034862	18.7	No	No	No	Yes	15	30	97	11	13	23	97	11	Yes	No	0.1	21.3
PIT NO 3 2101	TP1	22	34	51	89	43.6	33.4	1046.3	11.6	40.6	0.863	0.042	0.067	0.093	50	83	69	57069.9	0.0036951	19.1	No	No	No	No	9	23	94	1	5	12	65	1	Yes	No	1.6	1262.5
ROUND MOUNTAIN 1101	TP1	27	35	43	87	37.2	37.3	1971.5	11.4	38.6	0.765	0.041	0.067	0.086	43	81	70	9575.7	0.0018407	7.1	No	No	No	No	20	41	89	14	9	16	72	19	Yes	No	0.5	1661.6
STILLWATER 1101	TP2	22	31	48	95	12.7	48.9	1792.2	9.4	50.4	0.947	0.035	0.062	0.079	35	73	66	36401.9	0.0034862	19.9	No	No	No	Yes	26	38	97	11	19	29	97	11	Yes	No	0.3	140.1
STILLWATER 1102	TP2	22	33	46	96	8	52.3	4457.6	8.9	52.2	0.963	0.035	0.06	0.078	34	68	66	26610.9	0.0034862	25.4	No	No	No	Yes	26	38	97	11	19	29	97	11	Yes	No	1.8	1217.7
WHITMORE 1101	TP1	21	33	49	88	12.3	29.5	1427.7	10.9	40.5	0.904	0.037	0.062	0.085	42	80	68	68805.8	0.0040004	21.2	No	No	No	Yes	10	26	95	12	3	7	83	20	Yes	No	1.6	2004.4

Table A-1.2: Description, Units, and Value provided for Factors Considered in the Decision to Shut Off Power for Each Distribution Circuit De-energized During the September 30 – October 1, 2024 PSPS

Forecast / Agency / Observed	Value	Name	Unit	Value Provided	Description
Agency	HWW	High Wind Warning	N/A	Yes/No during event	High Wind Warning from the Federal National Weather Service.
Agency	HWA	High Wind Advisory	N/A	Yes/No during event	High Wind Advisory from the Federal National Weather Service.
Agency	RFW	Red Flag Warning	N/A	Yes/No during event	Red Flag Warning from the Federal National Weather Service.
Agency	GACC_HighRisk	GACC High Risk	N/A	Yes/No during event	High Risk issued by the Federal North or South Operations Predictive Services.
Observed	Observed ws_mph	Observed Sustained Wind Speed during Event	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind speed recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated all-clear time.
Observed	Observed wg_mph	Observed Peak Wind Gust during Event	mph	max	The maximum wind gust recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated all-clear time.
Observed	Observed temp_f	Observed Temperature during Event	degrees F	max	The maximum temperature recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated all-clear time.
Observed	Observed RH_%	Observed Relative Humidity During Event	%	min	Minimum relative humidity recorded by all weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated all-clear time.
Observed	Observed ws_mph_AC	Observed Sustained Wind Speed at All Clear	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind speed recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the all-clear time.
Observed	Observed wg_mph_AC	Observed Peak Wind Gust at All Clear	mph	max	The maximum wind gust recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the all-clear time.
Observed	Observed temp_f_AC	Observed Temperature at All Clear	degrees F	max	The maximum temperature recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the all-clear time.
Observed	Observed RH_%_AC	Observed Relative Humidity at All Clear	%	min	Minimum relative humidity recorded by all weather stations mapped to each circuit at the all-clear time.

Forecast / Agency / Observed	Value	Name	Unit	Value Provided	Description
Observed	open_pspstags	Open PSPS Qualified Tags	N/A	Yes/No During Event	PSPS-Qualified Tags include P1 (tree represents an immediate risk) and P2 (tree is damaged or diseased and could fall into nearby power lines) tree tags and Electric Corrective tags (Priority A - emergency, B - urgent, and E/F - risk-based).
Observed	Tx_impacts_yes_no	Impacted by Transmission	N/A	Yes/No During Event	Distribution lines that would have been de-energized due to de-energization of upstream transmission lines, regardless of whether those distribution lines would have also been de-energized due to direct distribution PSPS.
Observed	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	MAVF Score	Yes/No During Event	Measure of the adverse impact to customers due to de-energization.
Observed	PSPS Potential Benefit	PSPS Potential Benefit	MAVF Score	Yes/No During Event	Measure of the adverse impact to customers due to a catastrophic fire.
Forecast	ws_mph	Sustained wind speeds	mph	max	Sustained windspeed in miles per hour at 10 meters above ground level.
Forecast	ws_mph_50m	Sustained wind speeds at 50 m	mph	max	Sustained windspeed in miles per hour at 50 meters above ground level.
Forecast	wg_ec_mph	Forecasted Peak Wind Gust	mph	max	Wind gust in miles per hour at 10 meters above ground level.
Forecast	temp_2m_f	Temperature	degrees F	max	Temperature in Fahrenheit at 2 meters above ground level.
Forecast	flame_length_ft_2hr	Flame length	ft	max	Flame length in feet on fire front for first 2 hours of fire spread simulation from Technosylva.
Forecast	rate_of_spread_chhr_2hr	Rate of spread	chains/hr	max	Rate of fire spread in chains per hour for first 2 hours of fire spread simulation from Technosylva.
Forecast	area_acres_8hr	Acres burned	acres	max	Acres burned in the 8-hour fire spread simulation from Technosylva.
Forecast	rh_2m	Relative Humidity	%	min	Relative Humidity in percent at 2 meters above ground level.
Forecast	vpd2m_mb	Vapor Pressure Deficit	mb	max	Vapor Pressure Deficit in millibar at 2m above surface.
Forecast	prob_cat	Fire Potential Index (FPI)	probability outputs	max	Fire Potential Index (FPI) Model Output - Probability of a catastrophic fire if an ignition were to occur. FPI component of the CFPD model.
Forecast	dfm_10hr	Dead Fuel Moisture Content 10 hrs	fuel moisture fraction	min	Dead Fuel Moisture in 10-hour fuel moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100.
Forecast		Dead Fuel Moisture Content	fuel moisture		Dead Fuel Moisture in 100-hour moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by

Forecast / Agency / Observed	Value	Name	Unit	Value Provided	Description
	dfm_100hr	100 hrs	fraction	min	100.
Forecast	dfm_1000hr	Dead Fuel Moisture Content 1000 hrs	fuel moisture fraction	min	Dead Fuel Moisture in 1000-hour moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100.
Forecast	lfm_herb	Live Fuel Moisture Content-herbacous	%	min	Live Fuel Moisture Percentage of herbaceous plant species (% of species that is comprised of water).
Forecast	lfm_woody	Live Fuel Moisture Content-woody	%	min	Live Fuel Moisture Percentage of woody plant species (% of species that is comprised of water).
Forecast	lfm_chamise_new	Live Fuel Moisture Content-shrub	%	min	Live Fuel Moisture Percentage of Chamise (shrub) plant species. (% of species that is comprised of water).
Forecast	sum_tree_ovr	Tree Overstrike	ft	max	Sum of tree overstrike in a 2 x 2 km grid cell area in ft.
Forecast	prob_ignition	Ignition Probability Weather (IPW) Model Output	Probability	max	Ignition Probability Weather (IPW) Model Output - Probability of Ignition based on the probability of outages by cause. Ignition component of the CFPD model. Ignition Probability Weather Model - A model that provides estimates of the probability of an ignition given an outage on an hourly basis
Forecast	cfpd	Catastrophic Fire Probability (CFPD)	Scaled Probability	max	The product of probability of catastrophic fire (Prob_Cat) and IPW - probability of ignition (prob_ignition). This product is called the (CFPD) Catastrophic Fire Probability distribution. Scaled by 1000 to convert to an integer value.

Table A-2.1: Factors Considered in the Decision to Shut Off Power for Each Transmission Circuit De-energized During the September 30 – October 1, 2024 PSPS

* Please see Table A-2.2 for the description of each column header, as well as the unit and value provided.

** Note: PSPS decision making on Transmission does not occur at a per-circuit level, and instead occurs at the granularity of each transmission structure. These outputs are used in a GIS system and dashboard to visualize the areas of concern by area, which meteorologists and Transmission Asset Health Specialists review to scope the event. This includes a review of lines that have little to no impact to customers and electric grid reliability. The data provided here is representative of our high-resolution weather model data, which is driven by the Weather Research and Forecasting model. It is not inclusive of other model information reviewed by meteorologists that include external, public global and high-resolution weather models. This temporal and areal review of the risk, the operational timeline required to create the scope as well as any areas that were added based on subject matter expertise of meteorologists may lead to some circuits being de-energized that do not strictly exceed PSPS guidance.

Circuit	Forecast									Agency				Forecast										Observed										Risk vs Benefit		
	ws_mph	ws_mph_50m	wg_ec_mph	temp_2m_f	flame_length_ft_2hr	rate_of_spread_chhr_2hr	area_acres_2hr	rh_2m	vpd2_m_mb	HWW	HWA	RFW	GACC_High_Risk	prob_cat	dfm_10hr	dfm_100hr	dfm_1000hr	lfm_herb	lfm_woody	lfm_chamise_new	sum_tree_ovr	OA	CFPt	ws_mph	wg_mph	temp_f	RH_%	ws_mph_AC	wg_mph_AC	temp_f_AC	RH_%_AC	High Fire Risk Area (Y/N)	High Risk Vegetation Present on Circuit (Y/N)	Tx impacts (yes/no)	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	PSPS Potential Benefit
CASCADE-BENTON-DESCHUTES	20	No	34	88	7	40	1596	11	40	No	No	No	No	0.556	0.048	0.069	No	36	No	66	No	0.0116	3.45	23	40	97	9	15	27	100	9	Yes	No	No	0.1	790.9
ELK CREEK TAP	25	No	43	92	12	138	53230	9	47	No	No	No	No	0.348	0.041	0.07	No	30	No	60	No	0.014	1.62	23	31	93	11	16	22	94	11	Yes	No	No	0.1	66.8
KILARC-CEDAR CREEK	26	No	44	81	13	30	1703	14	32	No	No	No	No	0.687	0.049	0.071	No	42	No	69	No	0.00365	*2	20	41	85	17	15	29	86	16	Yes	No	No	0.1	94.8
PIT #4 TAP	22	No	37	72	16	21	1047	18	22	No	No	No	No	0.507	0.056	0.074	No	49	No	70	10.1	4.78E-11	0	9	23	79	15	7	18	81	16	Yes	Yes	No	0.1	9.8
PIT #6 TAP	19	No	37	66	10	17	903	21	18	No	No	No	No	0.402	0.063	0.078	No	49	No	70	7.2	0.00000123	0	5	13	74	19	4	13	76	18	Yes	Yes	No	0.1	9.6

² This information is not available at the time of submission and is currently under review. We will provide an update in the 2024 PSPS Post-Season Report.

Table A-2.2: Description, Units, and Value provided for Factors Considered in the Decision to Shut Off Power for Each Transmission Circuit De-energized During the September 30 – October 1, 2024 PSPS

Forecast / Agency / Observed	Value	Name	Unit	Value Provided	Description
Forecast	ws_mph	Sustained wind speeds	mph	max	Sustained windspeed in miles per hour at 10 meters above ground level.
Forecast	ws_mph_50m	Sustained wind speeds at 50 m	mph	max	Sustained windspeed in miles per hour at 50 meters above ground level.
Forecast	wg_ec_mph	Gust wind speeds	mph	max	Wind gust in miles per hour at 10 meters above ground level.
Forecast	temp_2m_f	Temperature	degrees F	max	Temperature in Fahrenheit at 2 meters above ground level.
Forecast	flame_length_ft_2hr	Flame length	ft	max	Flame length in feet on fire front for first 2 hours of fire spread simulation from Technosylva.
Forecast	rate_of_spread_chhr_2hr	Rate of spread	chains/hr	max	Rate of fire spread in chains per hour for first 2 hours of fire spread simulation from Technosylva.
Forecast	area_acres_8hr	Acres burned	acres	max	Acres burned in the 8-hour fire spread simulation from Technosylva.
Forecast	rh_2m	Relative Humidity	%	min	Relative Humidity in percent at 2 meters above ground level.
Forecast	vpd2m_mb	Vapor Pressure Deficit	mb	max	Vapor Pressure Deficit in millibar at 2m above surface
Agency	HWW	High Wind Warning	N/A	Yes/No during event	High Wind Warning from the Federal National Weather Service.
Agency	HWA	High Wind Advisory	N/A	Yes/No during event	High Wind Advisory from the Federal National Weather Service.
Agency	RFW	Red Flag Warning	N/A	Yes/No during event	Red Flag Warning from the Federal National Weather Service.
Agency	GACC_HighRisk	GACC High Risk	N/A	Yes/No during event	High Risk issued by the Federal North or South Operations Predictive Services.
Forecast	prob_cat	Fire Potential Index (FPI)	probability outputs	max	Fire Potential Index (FPI) Model Output - Probability of a catastrophic fire if an ignition were to occur. FPI component of the CFP _D model.
Forecast	dfm_10hr	Dead Fuel Moisture Content 10 hrs (%)	fuel moisture fraction	min	Dead Fuel Moisture in 10-hour fuel moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100.

Forecast / Agency / Observed	Value	Name	Unit	Value Provided	Description
Forecast	dfm_100hr	Dead Fuel Moisture Content 100 hrs (%)	fuel moisture fraction	min	Dead Fuel Moisture in 100-hour moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100.
Forecast	dfm_1000hr	Dead Fuel Moisture Content 1000 hrs (%)	fuel moisture fraction	min	Dead Fuel Moisture in 1000-hour moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100. PG&E does not utilize this factor in the decision to shutoff power.
Forecast	lfm_herb	Live Fuel Moisture Content-herbacous	%	min	Live Fuel Moisture Percentage of herbaceous plant species. (% of species that is comprised of water)
Forecast	lfm_woody	Live Fuel Moisture Content-woody	%	min	Live Fuel Moisture Percentage of woody plant species. (% of species that is comprised of water). PG&E does not utilize this factor in the decision to shutoff power.
Forecast	lfm_chamise_new	Live Fuel Moisture Content-shrub	%	min	Live Fuel Moisture Percentage of Chamise (shrub) plant species. (% of species that is comprised of water)
Forecast	sum_tree_ovr	Tree Overstike	ft	max	Sum of tree overstrike in a 2 x 2 km grid cell area in ft. PG&E does not utilize this factor in the decision to shutoff power.
Forecast	cfpt_vegsum	Catastrophic Fire Potential Vegetation	ft	mas	A risk-based assessment of the probability of tree fall-ins combined with the probability of catastrophic fires. Not included in Table A-2.1 per CPUC template, however, PG&E utilizes it as a decision making factor.
Forecast	OA	Transmission Operability Assessment (OA)	Probability	max	Ignition Probability Weather (IPW) Model Output - Probability of Ignition based on the probability of outages by cause. Ignition component of the CFPD model. Ignition Probability Weather Model - A model that provides estimates of the probability of an ignition given an outage on an hourly basis
Forecast	CFPt	Catastrophic Fire Potential (CFP _T)	Scaled Probability	max	The product of probability of catastrophic fire (Prob_Cat) and IPW - probability of ignition (prob_ignition). This product is called the (CFP _D) Catastrophic Fire Probability distribution model. Scaled by 1000 to covert to an integer value.

Forecast / Agency / Observed	Value	Name	Unit	Value Provided	Description
Forecast	ustar_frc_vel	Shear Velocity	mps	max	Wind shear stress in velocity terms. Not included in Table A-2.1 per CPUC template, however, PG&E utilizes it as a decision making factor.
Observed	Observed ws_mph	Observed Sustained Wind Speed during Event	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind speed recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from de-energization time to all-clear time.
Observed	Observed wg_mph	Observed Wind gust during Event	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind gust recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from de-energization time to all-clear time.
Observed	Observed temp_f	Observed Temperature during event	degrees F	max	The maximum temperature recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from de-energization time to all-clear time.
Observed	Observed RH_%	Observed Relative Humidity During Event	%	min	Minimum relative humidity recorded by all weather stations mapped to each circuit from de-energization time to all-clear time.
Observed	Observed ws_mph_AC	Observed Sustained Wind Speed at All Clear	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind speed recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the all-clear time.
Observed	Observed wg_mph_AC	Observed Sustained Wind gust at All Clear	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind gust recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the all-clear time.
Observed	Observed temp_f_AC	Observed Temperature at All Clear-	degrees F	max	The maximum temperature recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the all-clear time.
Observed	Observed RH_%_AC	Observed Relative Humidity at All Clear	%	min	Minimum relative humidity recorded by all weather stations mapped to each circuit at the all-clear time.
Observed	High Fire Risk Area	High Fire Risk Area	N/A	Yes/No During Event	Labeled 'Yes' when Circuit goes through High Fire Risk Area.
Observed	High Risk Vegetation Present on Circuit	High Risk Vegetation Present on Circuit	N/A	Yes/No During Event	High risk vegetation present on the circuit. PG&E does not utilize this factor in the decision to shutoff power.
Observed	Transmission_impacts_yes_no	Impacted by Transmission	N/A	Yes/No During Event	Distribution lines that would have been de-energized due to de-energization of upstream transmission lines, regardless of whether those distribution lines would have also been de-energized due to direct distribution PSPS.

Forecast / Agency / Observed	Value	Name	Unit	Value Provided	Description
Observed	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	MAVF Score	Yes/No During Event	Measure of the adverse impact to customers due to de-energization.
Observed	PSPS Potential Benefit	PSPS Potential Benefit	MAVF Score	Yes/No During Event	Measure of the adverse impact to customers due to a catastrophic fire.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

APPENDIX B

SECTION 3 – DE-ENERGIZED TIME, PLACE, DURATION AND CUSTOMERS

Appendix B: DE-ENERGIZED TIME, PLACE, DURATION AND CUSTOMERS

Table B-1. Circuits De-Energized During the September 30 – October 1, 2024 PSPS

Circuits labeled as “non-HFTD” are located outside of the CPUC High Fire-Threat District (HFTD). These circuits or portions of circuits are impacted for one of two reasons: (1) indirect impacts from transmission lines being de-energized or (2) the non-HFTD portion of the circuit are conductive to the HFTD at some point in the path to service.

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time	All-Clear Date and Time	Restoration Date and Time	Key Communities	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Customers	AFN other than MBL Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	ANTLER 1101	9/30/2024 8:18	9/30/2024 12:13	9/30/2024 14:32	SHASTA	Tier 2	65	63	2	6	17	0
Distribution	BIG BEND 1101	9/30/2024 4:40	9/30/2024 13:30	9/30/2024 19:04	BUTTE	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	196	173	21	15	58	2
Distribution	CEDAR CREEK 1101	9/30/2024 5:44	9/30/2024 12:13	10/1/2024 10:36	SHASTA	Tier 3, Tier 2	684	618	61	58	203	5
Distribution	CLARK ROAD 1102	9/30/2024 4:44	9/30/2024 13:30	9/30/2024 18:25	BUTTE	Tier 3, Tier 2	212	193	16	18	64	3
Distribution	COTTONWOOD 1102	9/30/2024 9:30	9/30/2024 13:30	9/30/2024 16:23	SHASTA	Tier 2	58	51	4	5	19	3
Distribution	CRESTA 1101	9/30/2024 4:38	9/30/2024 13:30	9/30/2024 18:26	BUTTE	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	6	1	3	0	0	2
Distribution	ELK CREEK 1101	9/30/2024 7:56	9/30/2024 13:30	9/30/2024 19:16	COLUSA, GLENN	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	658	547	89	39	143	22
Distribution	GIRVAN 1101	9/30/2024 9:27	9/30/2024 13:30	9/30/2024 18:18	SHASTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	1215	1104	105	122	220	6
Distribution	GIRVAN 1102	9/30/2024 9:24	9/30/2024 13:30	9/30/2024 16:41	SHASTA	Tier 3	339	332	7	28	75	0
Distribution	GLENN 1101	9/30/2024 7:59	9/30/2024 13:30	9/30/2024 17:43	GLENN, TEHAMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	149	83	43	4	18	23
Distribution	JESSUP 1101	9/30/2024 9:27	9/30/2024 13:30	9/30/2024 16:33	SHASTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	1355	1321	32	156	446	2
Distribution	JESSUP 1102	9/30/2024 9:33	9/30/2024 13:30	9/30/2024 18:26	SHASTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	1190	1152	35	108	407	3
Distribution	KESWICK 1101	9/30/2024 10:01	9/30/2024 13:30	10/1/2024 0:01	SHASTA	Tier 3	22	4	17	0	1	1
Distribution	LOGAN CREEK 2102	9/30/2024 7:57	9/30/2024 13:30	9/30/2024 16:40	GLENN	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	59	27	13	0	0	19
Distribution	OREGON TRAIL 1102	9/30/2024 8:21	9/30/2024 13:30	9/30/2024 18:14	SHASTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	810	759	51	84	222	0
Distribution	PIT NO 3 2101	9/30/2024 5:44	9/30/2024 13:30	10/1/2024 10:01	SHASTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	24	19	5	0	0	0

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time	All-Clear Date and Time	Restoration Date and Time	Key Communities	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Customers	AFN other than MBL Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	ROUND MOUNTAIN 1101	9/30/2024 5:51	9/30/2024 12:13	9/30/2024 13:53	SHASTA	Outside HFTD	0	0	0	0	0	0
Distribution	STILLWATER 1101	9/30/2024 8:17	9/30/2024 13:30	9/30/2024 19:07	SHASTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	659	576	77	71	210	6
Distribution	STILLWATER 1102	9/30/2024 8:18	9/30/2024 13:30	9/30/2024 17:30	SHASTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	1364	1328	36	126	360	0
Distribution	WHITMORE 1101	9/30/2024 5:45	9/30/2024 12:13	9/30/2024 17:50	SHASTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	110	101	8	13	36	1
Transmission	CASCADE-BENTON-DESCHUTES	9/30/2024 9:08	9/30/2024 13:30	9/30/2024 15:38	SHASTA	Partially Outside HFTD, HFTD Tier 2, HFTD Tier 1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	ELK CREEK TAP	9/30/2024 8:30	9/30/2024 13:30	9/30/2024 17:48	GLENN	Partially Outside HFTD, HFTD Tier 2, HFTD Tier 1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	KILARC-CEDAR CREEK	9/30/2024 6:14	9/30/2024 12:13	9/30/2024 15:40	SHASTA	HFTD Tier 3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	PIT #4 TAP	9/30/2024 6:48	9/30/2024 12:13	9/30/2024 17:02	SHASTA	HFTD Tier 2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	PIT #6 TAP	9/30/2024 6:45	9/30/2024 12:13	9/30/2024 16:43	SHASTA	HFTD Tier 2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total							9176	8452	625	853	2499	98

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

APPENDIX C

SECTION 4 – DAMAGE AND HAZARDS TO OVERHEAD FACILITIES

Appendix C: DAMAGE AND HAZARDS TO OVERHEAD FACILITIES

Table C-1. Damages & Hazards Found Within the De-Energized Areas

Circuit Name	County	Structure Identifier	Tier 2/3 or Non-HFTD	Damage/Hazard	Type of Damage/Hazard	Description of Damage
Cedar Creek 1101	Shasta	101547319	Tier 2	Damage	Wind related	Broken tie wire

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

APPENDIX D

SECTION 6 – PUBLIC SAFETY PARTNERS CONTACTED

Appendix D: PUBLIC SAFETY PARTNERS CONTACTED

Table D-1. Public Safety Partners Contacted

Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier³	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Alameda County	County Administration	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Alameda County	Board President	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Alameda County	Board Vice President	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Alameda County	County Administrator	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Alameda County	County Clerk Recorder	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Alameda County	Division Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:38 PDT
Alameda County	Division Chief of Operations/ Emergency Management	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Alameda County	EMS Disaster and WMD Coordinator	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Alameda County	Emergency Preparedness Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Alameda County	Fire Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:38 PDT
Alameda County	General	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:38 PDT
Alameda County	Main Line	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:38 PDT
Alameda County	OES Capt	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Alameda County	OES EOC Lead	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Alameda County	President of the Board	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Alameda County	Safety & Emergency Preparedness Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Alameda County	Senior Emergency Services Coordinator	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Alameda County	Sheriff	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Alameda County	Superintendent of Water Distribution	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Alameda County	Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Alameda County	Technician	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT

³ Catastrophic Fire Behavior runs both in and outside of High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA). The PG&E Meteorology Team evaluates non-HFRA areas for catastrophic wildfire risk in unusual circumstances.

Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ³	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Alameda County	Train Ops	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:38 PDT
Alameda County	Watch Commander	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:38 PDT
Alameda County	Water Operations Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Alameda County CCA	General	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Alameda County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 3	09/28/2024 04:38 PDT
Alameda County Communication Facility	Clearview Systems Inc	Tier 2	09/28/2024 04:38 PDT
Alameda County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West LLC	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Alameda County Communication Facility	Verizon	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Alameda County Livermore	Chief of Police	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Alameda County Livermore	City Manager	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Alameda County Livermore	Council Member	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Alameda County Livermore	Deputy City Manager	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Alameda County Livermore	Deputy Fire Chief	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Alameda County Livermore	Emergency Manager	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Alameda County Livermore	Mayor	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Alameda County Livermore	Police Chief	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Alameda County Livermore	Vice Mayor	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Butte County	County Administration	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Butte County	Admin Analyst II	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Butte County	Board Chair	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Butte County	Chief	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Butte County	Chief Administrative Officer	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Butte County	County Clerk-Recorder	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Butte County	Deputy Chief	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:38 PDT
Butte County	Director	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ³	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Butte County	Division Chief	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Butte County	General	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Butte County	General Services Director	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Butte County	Interim OEM Director	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Butte County	Lieutenant	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Butte County	Public Health Director	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Butte County	Sergeant	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Butte County	Supervisor	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Butte County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility	Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Butte County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 3, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Butte County Communication Facility	Comcast	Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Butte County Communication Facility	Comcast Cable Communications Management, LLC	HFRA, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Butte County Communication Facility	Comcast Fresno LLC	HFRA, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Butte County Communication Facility	Comcast Inc	HFRA	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Butte County Communication Facility	GTE Mobile Net of California LP	Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Butte County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West LLC	Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Butte County Emergency Services Facility	County of Butte	Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Butte County Other Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Butte County Paradise	Fire Department	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:38 PDT
Butte County Paradise	Chief	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:38 PDT
Butte County Paradise	Council Member	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Butte County Paradise	Councilman	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Butte County Paradise	Councilmember	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Butte County Paradise	Deputy Chief	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Butte County Paradise	Division Chief	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:38 PDT

³ Catastrophic Fire Behavior runs both in and outside of High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA). The PG&E Meteorology Team evaluates non-HFRA areas for catastrophic wildfire risk in unusual circumstances.

Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ³	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Butte County Paradise	Fire Prevention Inspector 2	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Butte County Paradise	General	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:38 PDT
Butte County Paradise	Lieutenant	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Butte County Paradise	Mayor	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Butte County Paradise	Police Chief	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Butte County Paradise	Town Clerk	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Butte County Paradise	Town Manager	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Butte County Tribal	Chairwoman	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	09/30/2024 16:29 PDT
Butte County Tribal	Director of Environmental Planning and Protection	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	09/30/2024 16:29 PDT
Butte County Tribal	Executive Assistant	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	09/30/2024 16:29 PDT
Butte County Tribal	Land Manager	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	09/30/2024 16:30 PDT
Butte County Tribal	Tribal Chairman	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	09/30/2024 16:29 PDT
Butte County Tribal	Vice Chairwoman	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	09/30/2024 16:29 PDT
Colusa County	Fire Department	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Colusa County	Board Chair	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Colusa County	County Clerk/Recorder	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Colusa County	County Supervisor	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Colusa County	Deputy Chief	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:38 PDT
Colusa County	Director	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Colusa County	Division Chief	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Colusa County	Emergency Service Technician	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Colusa County	General	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:38 PDT
Colusa County	MHOAC	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:38 PDT
Colusa County	Sheriff	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Colusa County	Supervisor	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT

³ Catastrophic Fire Behavior runs both in and outside of High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA). The PG&E Meteorology Team evaluates non-HFRA areas for catastrophic wildfire risk in unusual circumstances.

Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ³	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Colusa County	Vice Chair	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Colusa County Communication Facility	AT&T	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Colusa County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Colusa County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Colusa County Communication Facility	Frontier Communications Corporation Dip	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Colusa County Communication Facility	GTE Mobile Net of California LP	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Colusa County Emergency Services Facility	California Department of Forestry	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Colusa County Emergency Services Facility	County of Colusa	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Colusa County Emergency Services Facility	Indian Valley - Bear Valley Fire Protection District	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	09/28/2024 03:42 PDT
Colusa County Emergency Services Facility	Indian Valley Fire Protection District	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	09/28/2024 03:42 PDT
Colusa County Energy Sector Facility	City of Santa Clara	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	09/28/2024 14:22 PDT
Colusa County Energy Sector Facility	Western Area Power Administration	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Colusa County Water And Waste Water Facility	California Department of Forestry	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Colusa County Water And Waste Water Facility	County of Colusa	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Contra Costa County	County Administrator	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Contra Costa County	Board Chair	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Contra Costa County	Board Vice Chair	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Contra Costa County	Chair of the Board	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Contra Costa County	Chief of Staff	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Contra Costa County	County Administrator	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Contra Costa County	County Clerk Recorder	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Contra Costa County	Deputy Fire Chief, Mutual Aid Coordinator	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Contra Costa County	Duty Officer	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Contra Costa County	Duty Officer - 24/7 Staff call line	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Contra Costa County	Emergency Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT

³ Catastrophic Fire Behavior runs both in and outside of High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA). The PG&E Meteorology Team evaluates non-HFRA areas for catastrophic wildfire risk in unusual circumstances.

Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ³	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Contra Costa County	Emergency Preparedness Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:38 PDT
Contra Costa County	Fire Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Contra Costa County	OES Warning System	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Contra Costa County	Sheriff	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Contra Costa County	Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	County of Contra Costa	Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	US Coast Guard	Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Contra Costa County Emergency Services Facility	San Ramon Valley Fire District	Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Contra Costa County CCA	General	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Contra Costa County Tribal	Chairperson	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/30/2024 14:17 PDT
Contra Costa County Tribal	Tribal Administrator	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/30/2024 14:17 PDT
Glenn County	CAO	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Glenn County	County Administrative Officer	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Glenn County	Deputy Director OES	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Glenn County	Director of Public Works Agency	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Glenn County	Fire Chief	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Glenn County	General	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Glenn County	Sheriff	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Glenn County Communication Facility	American Tower Corporation	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Glenn County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Glenn County Communication Facility	GTE Mobile Net of California LP	HFRA	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Glenn County Communication Facility	Verizon	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Glenn County Emergency Services Facility	County of Glenn	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Glenn County Emergency Services Facility	Elk Creek Fire District	Tier 2	09/28/2024 14:22 PDT

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ³	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Glenn County Energy Sector Facility	City of Santa Clara	HFRA	09/29/2024 10:44 PDT
Glenn County Orland	City Clerk	HFRA, Tier 2	09/29/2024 10:40 PDT
Glenn County Orland	City Manager	HFRA, Tier 2	09/29/2024 10:40 PDT
Glenn County Orland	Fire Chief	HFRA, Tier 2	09/29/2024 10:40 PDT
Glenn County Orland	General	HFRA, Tier 2	09/29/2024 10:41 PDT
Glenn County Orland	Public Works Director	HFRA, Tier 2	09/29/2024 10:40 PDT
Glenn County Other Facility	US Army Corps of Engineers	HFRA	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Glenn County Water And Waste Water Facility	Elk Creek Community Service	Tier 2	09/28/2024 14:22 PDT
Glenn County Water And Waste Water Facility	US Army Corps of Engineers	HFRA	09/29/2024 10:44 PDT
Glenn County Tribal	Interim Tribal Secretary	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 14:35 PDT
Glenn County Tribal	Tribal Administrator	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 14:35 PDT
Humboldt County	1st District County Supervisor	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Humboldt County	Board of Supervisors	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Humboldt County	Corrections Lieutenant	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Humboldt County	Executive Assistant	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Humboldt County	Field Representative	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Humboldt County	Fire Chief	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Humboldt County	MHOAC	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Humboldt County	OES Director	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Humboldt County	Operations Lieutenant	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Humboldt County	Senior Environmental Analyst	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Humboldt County	Sheriff	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Humboldt County	State Senator	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Humboldt County	Supervisor	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Humboldt County	Unit Chief	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ³	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Humboldt County CCA	General	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Napa County	County Administration	Tier 3, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Napa County	Board Chair	Tier 3, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Napa County	County Clerk/Recorder	Tier 3, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Napa County	Emergency Services Officer	Tier 3, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Napa County	Fire Chief	Tier 3, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Napa County	GIS	Tier 3, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Napa County	General	Tier 3, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Napa County	Interim County Executive Officer	Tier 3, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Napa County	MHOAC	Tier 3, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:38 PDT
Napa County	Sheriff	Tier 3, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Napa County	Supervisor	Tier 3, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Napa County	Under-Sheriff	Tier 3, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Napa County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 3, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Napa County Communication Facility	California Highway Patrol	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Napa County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West Corporation	Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Napa County CCA	General	Tier 3, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
San Luis Obispo County	Duty Chief	Tier 3, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:38 PDT
San Luis Obispo County	Duty Officer	Tier 3, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
San Luis Obispo County	Emergency Services Manager	Tier 3, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
San Luis Obispo County	Fire Chief	Tier 3, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
San Luis Obispo County	General	Tier 3, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:38 PDT
San Luis Obispo County	OES Duty Officer	Tier 3, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
San Luis Obispo County	Watch Commander	Tier 3, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:38 PDT
San Luis Obispo County CCA	General	Tier 3, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ³	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Santa Barbara County	Fire Chief	Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Santa Barbara County	OEM Duty Officer	Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Santa Barbara County	OES Director	Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Santa Barbara County	Sheriff	Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Santa Barbara County Communication Facility	Frontier Communications Corporation Dip	Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Santa Barbara County CCA	General	Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Shasta County	EMS	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Shasta County	Fire Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Shasta County	General	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Shasta County	Interim Tribal Administrator	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:38 PDT
Shasta County	Lieutenant	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Shasta County	Office of Emergency Services Coordinator	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:38 PDT
Shasta County	Operations Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Shasta County	Sergeant	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Shasta County	Sheriff-Coroner	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Shasta County	Staff Chief, Northern Operations	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Shasta County	Tribal Chairman	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:38 PDT
Shasta County Anderson	Chief Plant Operator (Wastewater Treatment Plant)	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Shasta County Anderson	City Manager	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Shasta County Anderson	Deputy Public Works Director	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Shasta County Anderson	Fire Chief	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	AT&T	Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 3, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	Charter Communications Holding Company LLC	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ³	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Shasta County Communication Facility	Cingular Wireless Services, Inc	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	Frontier Communications Corporation Dip	Tier 3, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	GTE Mobile Net of California LP	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	Happy Valley Telephone Co	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	Metro PCS Inc	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	Sprint Corporation	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	TDS Telecom	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	US Department of Agriculture	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	Verizon	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	Verizon Wireless	Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Shasta County Emergency Services Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Shasta County Emergency Services Facility	County of Shasta	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Shasta County Emergency Services Facility	Happy Valley Fire Protection District	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Shasta County Emergency Services Facility	US Department of Agriculture	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Shasta County Other Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Shasta County Other Facility	Happy Valley Telephone Co	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Shasta County Tribal	Tribal Administrator	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Shasta County Tribal	Administrative Assistant	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/30/2024 16:23 PDT
Shasta County Tribal	Interim Tribal Administrator	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:38 PDT
Shasta County Tribal	Maintenance Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/30/2024 16:23 PDT
Shasta County Tribal	OES Director	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Shasta County Tribal	Office of Emergency Services Coordinator	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:38 PDT
Shasta County Tribal	Senior Director	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/30/2024 16:23 PDT
Shasta County Tribal	Tribal Chairman	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Sonoma County	County Administration	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT

³ Catastrophic Fire Behavior runs both in and outside of High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA). The PG&E Meteorology Team evaluates non-HFRA areas for catastrophic wildfire risk in unusual circumstances.

Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ³	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Sonoma County	1st District Sonoma County Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:38 PDT
Sonoma County	Board Chair	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Sonoma County	Board Vice Chair	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Sonoma County	Community Alert & Warning Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:38 PDT
Sonoma County	Deputy Director	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Sonoma County	Director	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Sonoma County	Division Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Sonoma County	EMS	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Sonoma County	EMS Dispatch	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Sonoma County	Fire Captain	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Sonoma County	MHOAC	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Sonoma County	Main Office	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:38 PDT
Sonoma County	Sheriff	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Sonoma County	Sheriff Dispatch	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Sonoma County	Sheriff's Liaison	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Sonoma County	Staff Duty Officer	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Sonoma County	Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Sonoma County Communication Facility	Comcast Fresno LLC	Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Sonoma County CCA	General	Tier 2, Tier 3	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Sonoma County Tribal	Chairman	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/01/2024 09:32 PDT
Sonoma County Tribal	Chairperson	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/01/2024 09:31 PDT
Sonoma County Tribal	Grants Administrator	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/01/2024 09:31 PDT
Sonoma County Tribal	TANF Director	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/01/2024 09:31 PDT
Sonoma County Tribal	Tribal Administrator	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/01/2024 09:31 PDT
Sonoma County Tribal	Tribal Preservation Officer	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/01/2024 09:31 PDT

³ Catastrophic Fire Behavior runs both in and outside of High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA). The PG&E Meteorology Team evaluates non-HFRA areas for catastrophic wildfire risk in unusual circumstances.

Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ³	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Sonoma County Tribal	Vice Chairperson	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/01/2024 09:31 PDT
Tehama County	Chief Administrator	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Tehama County	Communications Supervisor	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Tehama County	County Clerk / Recorder	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Tehama County	Lieutenant and OES manager	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Tehama County	OES Director	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Tehama County	Sheriff	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Tehama County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Tehama County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Tehama County Communication Facility	Ducor Telephone Co	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Tehama County Communication Facility	Ducor Telephone Corp	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Tehama County Communication Facility	Frontier Communications Corporation Dip	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Tehama County Corning	City Clerk	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Tehama County Corning	City Manager	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Tehama County Corning	Police Chief	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Tehama County Emergency Services Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Tehama County Government - Jail Facility	California Department of Corrections	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Tehama County Other Facility	Burns, Sherri	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Tehama County Other Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT
Tehama County Red Bluff	Chief of Police	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Tehama County Red Bluff	City Manager	Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Trinity County	Deputy Director	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Trinity County	District Ranger, TRMU	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Trinity County	General	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Trinity County	Health Officer	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT

³ Catastrophic Fire Behavior runs both in and outside of High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA). The PG&E Meteorology Team evaluates non-HFRA areas for catastrophic wildfire risk in unusual circumstances.

Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ³	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Trinity County	OES Manager	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:37 PDT
Trinity County Communication Facility	Frontier Communications Corporation Dip	HFRA, Tier 2	09/28/2024 03:41 PDT

³ Catastrophic Fire Behavior runs both in and outside of High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA). The PG&E Meteorology Team evaluates non-HFRA areas for catastrophic wildfire risk in unusual circumstances.


PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

APPENDIX E

SECTION 8 – ALL CLEAR ZONE MAP

Appendix E: ALL CLEAR ZONE MAP

Figure E-1. All Clear Zone Map



PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

APPENDIX F

SECTION 9 – COMMUNITY RESOURCE CENTER LOCATIONS

Appendix F: LIST OF PG&E COMMUNITY RESOURCE CENTERS

Table F-1. Community Resource Centers Provided by PG&E

The table below provided details of the 11 CRCs that PG&E mobilized during the September 30 – October 1, 2024, PSPS, including specific locations, dates and times opened and closed, total attendance for each location, and amenities provided.

#	County	Site Name	Address	Operating Hours (PDT)		Total Visitors	Indoor / Outdoor	Amenities Provided
				Day 1	Day 2			
				30-Sep	1-Oct			
1	Butte	Concow Elementary School	11679 Nelson Bar Rd	8:00 – 22:00	8:00 – 9:30	12	Outdoor	*Wi-Fi, Restrooms, Water and Snacks, Device Charging, Medical Device Charging, Cooling & Heating, Seating, Ice
2	Colusa	Stonyford Community Hall	229 Market St	8:00 – 15:00	No	10	Indoor	Wi-Fi, Restrooms, Water and Snacks, Device Charging, Medical Device Charging, Cooling & Heating, Seating, Ice
3	Glenn	Elk Creek Junior Senior High School	3430 Co Rd 309	8:00 – 20:00	No	35	Outdoor	*Wi-Fi, Restrooms, Water and Snacks, Device Charging, Medical Device Charging, Cooling & Heating, Seating, Ice
4	Glenn	Orland Shopping Center	1016 South St	8:00 – 18:30	No	23	Outdoor	*Wi-Fi, Restrooms, Water and Snacks, Device Charging, Medical Device Charging, Cooling & Heating, Seating, Ice
5	Napa	Calistoga Community Center	1307 Washington Street	8:00 – 22:00	8:00 – 9:30	25	Indoor	Wi-Fi, Restrooms, Water and Snacks, Device Charging, Medical Device Charging, Cooling & Heating, Seating, Ice
6	Shasta	Frontier Senior Center	2081 Frontier Trail	8:00 – 20:00	No	29	Indoor	Wi-Fi, Restrooms, Water and Snacks, Device Charging, Medical Device Charging, Cooling & Heating, Seating, Ice
7	Shasta	Dignity Health Mercy Oaks	100 Mercy Oaks Dr	8:00 – 21:00	No	28	Indoor	Wi-Fi, Restrooms, Water and Snacks, Device Charging, Medical Device

#	County	Site Name	Address	Operating Hours (PDT)		Total Visitors	Indoor / Outdoor	Amenities Provided
				Day 1	Day 2			
				30-Sep	1-Oct			
								Charging, Cooling & Heating, Seating, Ice
8	Shasta	Hill Country Health and Wellness Center	29632 CA-299	8:00 – 22:00	8:00 – 12:00	129	Outdoor	*Wi-Fi, Restrooms, Water and Snacks, Device Charging, Medical Device Charging, Cooling & Heating, Seating, Ice
9	Tehama	Rancho Tehama Association	17605 Park Terrace Road	8:00 – 15:00	No	144	Outdoor	*Wi-Fi, Restrooms, Water and Snacks, Device Charging, Medical Device Charging, Cooling & Heating, Seating, Ice
10	Tehama	Lassen Mineral Lodge	18961 Husky Way	8:00 – 15:00	No	23	Outdoor	*Wi-Fi, Restrooms, Water and Snacks, Device Charging, Medical Device Charging, Cooling & Heating, Seating, Ice
11	Trinity	Southern Trinity High School	600 Van Duzen Rd	8:00 – 20:00	No	6	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, Restrooms, Water and Snacks, Device Charging, Medical Device Charging, Seating

*Cooling and ice were added as additional amenities due to high temperatures.

VERIFICATION

I, undersigned, say:

I am an officer of PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, a corporation, and am authorized to make this verification for that reason.

I have read the foregoing “PG&E Public Safety Power Shutoff Report to the CPUC” for the September 30 – October 1, 2024, PSPS and I am informed and believe the matters stated therein to be true.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed at Oakland, California this 15th day of October 2024.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Mark Quinlan", is written over a horizontal line.

MARK QUINLAN

SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT

WILDFIRE, EMERGENCY & OPERATIONS