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November 13, 2026

VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL

Koko Tomassian
Director, Safety Enforcement Division
California Public Utilities Commission
505 Van Ness Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94102

Dear Mr. Tomassian:

As required by Resolution Electric Safety and Reliability Branch-8 (ESRB-8) and in accordance with Ordering Paragraph 1 of California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Decision (D.) 19-05-042, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) respectfully submits this report for the October 14, 2026 Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS). This report has been verified by a PG&E officer in accordance with Rule 1.11 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure.

Members of the public may submit both formal and informal comments on this report to the CPUC by following instructions on the CPUC's website (www.cpuc.ca.gov). The CPUC's Public Advisor's Office has established procedures for providing such comments, including via online form. Comments may also be submitted directly to the Director of the Safety and Enforcement Division (SED) of the CPUC using the contact information below.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,



Spencer Olinek
Director of Liaison, Regulatory Operations and Engagement

Enclosures

cc: Anthony Noll, SED
ESRB_ComplianceFilings@cpuc.ca.gov
EnergyDivisionCentralFiles@cpuc.ca.gov

Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E)
Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) Report to the
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)
October 14, 2026 De-energization

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PG&E PSPS Report to the CPUC
October 14, 2026 De-energization

Section 1 – Executive Summary

Section 1.1 - Brief description of the PSPS event starting from the time when the utility's Emergency Operation Center is activated until service to all customers has been restored. *(D.21-06-014, page 286, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
High winds can cause tree branches and debris to contact energized electric lines and potentially lead to a wind-driven wildfire. As a result, we may need to turn off power during severe weather to help prevent wildfires. This is called a Public Safety Power Shutoff, or PSPS. We recognize that it is disruptive for our customers to be without power, therefore, we initiate a PSPS when the weather forecast is so severe that public safety, lives, homes and businesses may be in danger of wildfires. It is not a decision we take lightly. For the safety of our customers and communities, PSPS continues to be a necessary tool as a last resort. Due to the rapid succession of events in early October and the scale of the event described in this document, PG&E sought and received a due-date extension for this report from the CPUC's Executive Director.

Timeline
During the October 8-12, 2026 PSPS, our Meteorology Team continued monitoring weather reports and began tracking additional unfavorable weather, including offshore winds and dry conditions, forecast for October 14-17, 2026. Due to the ongoing severe weather, the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) remained activated following the end of the October 10, 2026 PSPS. Once the PSPS scope was confirmed on October 13, approximately one day before potential de-energization, we notified Public Safety Partners and customers in the areas anticipated to be impacted, readied the grid, and prepared Community Resource Centers (CRCs) and other customer support.

We also began coordinating with Southern California Edison (SCE) as "shared customers" were anticipated to be impacted. Shared customers in this instance are SCE customers that are served by one of our circuits. Throughout this EOC activation, we were in regular contact with SCE related to scope and notifications for customers in these areas.

On October 12, we developed the first scope of the PSPS which contained 20 Time Places (TPs). Later that afternoon, we developed Version 2. On October 13, we further refined scope (Version 3) and identified 24 TPs across our service area.

We closely monitored weather conditions across these TPs, as shown in Figure 1, and on October 14 at 16:06 PDT, we made the initial decision to de-energize customers for safety, due to meteorological conditions, PSPS thresholds being met, and real-time Hazard Awareness and Warning Center (HAWC) reports. Based on ongoing weather monitoring and operational assessments, de-energization and restoration actions occurred on the following dates:

- On October 14, we de-energized 10 of the 24 TPs.
- On October 15, we de-energized 11 of the 24 TPs and cancelled one TP (TP 2).

- On October 16, we de-energized two of the 24 TPs and issued the first Weather All-Clear for circuits in TPs 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 13; five additional Weather All-Clears were issued throughout the day.
- On October 17, we issued five additional Weather All-Clears, the last of which was declared at 12:54 PDT (TPs 17 and 24).


Through the course of the event, meteorological, fuels and PSPS thresholds were monitored, and we ultimately de-energized 85,863 customers across 29 counties and 23 TPs between October 14 – 17.

Through various mitigation efforts, we avoided the de-energization of approximately 186,290 customers in the final scope for de-energization. For more information regarding our mitigation efforts for this PSPS, see Section 10.

Inspections
During patrol and inspections, we identified six damages and four hazards caused by weather. For more information regarding the Technosylva fire spread simulation, see Section 2.2. For more information regarding damages and hazards, see Section 4.

Following patrol and inspections, customers were restored safely and as quickly as possible. Within 24 hours of the Weather All-Clear service to 99% of customers had been restored. The average restoration time was approximately 4.6 hours.

Figure 1: PSPS Timeline



Section 1.2 - A table including the maximum numbers of customers notified and actually de-energized; number of counties de-energized; number of tribes de-energized; number of Medical Baseline customers de-energized; number of transmission and distribution circuits de-energized; damage/hazard count; number of critical facilities and infrastructure de-energized. Hazards are conditions discovered during restoration patrolling or operations that might have caused damages or posed an electrical arcing or ignition risk had PSPS not been executed. Table 1 must contain unique data counts from event. *(D.21-06-034, Appendix A, page A15, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
Table 1 identifies the maximum number of customers notified, de-energized and canceled; number of Medical Baseline (MBL) customers de-energized; number of counties de-energized; number of tribes de-energized; number of Critical Facilities and Infrastructure (CFI) de-energized; number of Transmission lines and Distribution circuits de-energized; and damage/hazard count.

Table 1: PSPS Event Summary[1]

Total Customers Notified	Total Customers De-energized	Total Customers Canceled	MBL Customers De-energized	Counties De-energized	Tribes De-energized	CFI De-energized	Transmission De-energized	Unique Distribution Circuits in Scope	Distribution Circuits De-energized	Damage/ Hazard Count
102,745[2]	85,863[3]	14,506[4]	5,307	29	6	1,864	21	168	157	6 damages 4 hazards

[1] The information, times, and figures referenced in this report are based on the best available information available at the time of this report's submission. The information, times and figures herein are subject to revision based on further analysis and validation.
[2] Of the customers who received notifications that their power may be de-energized, 2,836 customers were not de-energized and not cancelled: see Section 5.7 for more information.
[3] Of the customers de-energized, 455 customers did not receive any notifications regarding planned de-energization. See Section 5.5 for more information. Two additional de-energized customers were notified of planned de-energization after their outage already started: they are reported as notification failures in Table 5A and Table 6D but are also included in the "Total Customers Notified" count.
[4] Of the customers notified of cancellation without de-energization, five customers were solely notified of cancellation without prior notification of planned de-energization: although the cancellation notification was unnecessary, it was not a false negative communication because these customers were not de-energized for PSPS. This count also includes 1,117 customers who received a cancellation notification but are still reported as false positive communications because notification attempts for prior notifications extended past the time of their cancellation notifications: see Section 5.7 for more information.

Section 1.3 - A PDF map depicting the de-energized area(s) *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
During the October 14, 2026 PSPS, we de-energized 85,863 customers in 23 TP(s) across 29 counties. The final de-energization footprint is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: PSPS De-Energization Footprint Map



Section 2 – Decision Making Process

Section 2.1 - A table showing all factors considered in the decision to shut off power for each circuit de-energized, including but not limited to, sustained and gust wind speeds, temperature, humidity, and moisture in the vicinity of the de-energized circuits *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, Appendix A-1.1 and A-2.1 in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20261014*" provides a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope for the October 14, 2026 PSPS.

Section 2.2 - Use the following format to provide decision-making criteria detailing circuit level analysis and comparison between threshold, forecast, and actual readings utilized during the scoping process and de-energization process. Also include a PSPS decision-making diagram(s)/flowchart(s) or equivalent along with narrative description *(D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A22, D.21-06-014, page 284, SED Additional Information.)*


Response:
As the CPUC noted in ESRB-8, the decision to de-energize electric facilities for public safety is complex and dependent on many factors including but not limited to fuel moisture, aerial and ground firefighting capabilities, active fires that indicate fire conditions, situational awareness provided by fire agencies, the National Weather Service (NWS) and the United States Forest Service, and local meteorological conditions of humidity and winds.[5]

Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, this section provides an overview of our decision-making criteria and threshold evaluation process that were used in the decision to de-energize customers during the October 14, 2026 PSPS. For event-specific thresholds and a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope for the October 14, 2026 PSPS, see Appendix A-1.1 and A-2.1 in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20261014.*"

PSPS Preparation and Scoping Process
At a high level, Figure 3 shows the process used to prepare for a PSPS. PG&E utilized and referenced the following protocols and tools during the October 14, 2026 PSPS to determine the latest forecasted weather parameters versus actual weather. Appendix A-1.1 and A-2.1 in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20261014*" includes anticipated parameters based on the latest forecast used to develop the planned de-energization scope versus actual weather parameters for each circuit.

[5] ESRB-8, pp. 8 – 9.

Figure 3: PG&E's High-Level PSPS Process Steps



We consider executing a PSPS when strong gusty winds, critically low humidity levels, and low fuel moisture levels pose an unacceptable risk of causing fast-spreading, catastrophic wildfires. Assessments begin several days before the weather event is forecasted to take place.

We identify weather conditions that could create high fire potential by using a combination of outage and ignition probabilities, high-resolution internal and external weather forecasting models and data from federal agencies that include the following:

- *Ignition Probability Weather (IPW)*: Determines the potential of an outage due to weather conditions, and then for that outage to lead to an ignition.
- *Fire Potential Index (FPI)*: Determines the potential for catastrophic fire development.
- *Technosylva*: Provides fire spread modeling via data inputs.

Through partnerships with external experts, we developed our machine learning models using historic datasets and advanced forecast models that provide a better understanding of historical weather events and improve our weather forecasting. These models use the following:

- Data storage and processing via the PG&E-Amazon Web Services Cloud.
- Hourly weather data such as temperature, relative humidity, wind speed, precipitation, pressure, and dead and live fuel moisture.
- Over 100 trillion data points of historical weather and fuel.
- Precise location data points across our service area to conduct hourly weather analyses using high-resolution, historical data.

Our thresholds and guidance for identifying critical fire risk and outage/ignition potential are determined by analyzing and rigorously testing our current PSPS protocols and criteria against decades of historical weather data in and around California.

External forecast information from the NWS (e.g., Red Flag Warnings [RFWs]) and other forecast agencies are also examined carefully. Furthermore, we coordinate with these agencies during high-risk periods via daily conference calls to ultimately decide whether to de-energize portions of the grid for public safety.


Tools and Technology

PG&E partners with Technosylva, an external expert in the wildfire modeling field to test and deploy cloud-based wildfire spread model capabilities. This helps us to better understand where we might need to turn off power.

Each day, PG&E delivers our wildfire condition datasets to Technosylva, who then perform over 100 million fire spread simulations to provide fire spread scenarios that help to identify circuits that may be at risk during dry, windy weather. These are done every three hours, for the five days ahead.

Figures 4 - 11 shows the Technosylva fire spread simulation demonstrating what a wildfire might have looked like, and the potential damages or impacts caused, if the October 14, 2026 PSPS had not been initiated. For more information regarding damages and hazards, see Section 4.


Figure 4: Fire Spread Simulation Damage in Calaveras County – Broken Conductor




Impact Analysis

Size (ac)	388.29
Initial Attack Assessment	1 - Low
No. of Buildings	252
Total Population	39
No. of Places	0

Figure 5: Fire Spread Simulation Damage in Alameda County – Damaged Conductor







Impact Analysis

Size (ac)	1,584.07
Initial Attack Assessment	1 - Low
No. of Buildings	77
Total Population	55
No. of Places	0

Figure 6: Fire Spread Simulation Damage in Calaveras County – Damaged Conductor






Impact Analysis

Size (ac)	110.72
Initial Attack Assessment	1 - Low
No. of Buildings	83
Total Population	51
No. of Places	0


Figure 7: Fire Spread Simulation Damage in Lake County – Broken Insulator




Impact Analysis

Size (ac)	0.81
Initial Attack Assessment	1 - Low
No. of Buildings	0
Total Population	0
No. of Places	0

Figure 8: Fire Spread Simulation Hazard to Equipment in El Dorado County – Tree Leaning Into Line






Impact Analysis

Size (ac)	2,811.46
Initial Attack Assessment	1 - Low
No. of Buildings	584
Total Population	746
No. of Places	4


Figure 9: Fire Spread Simulation Hazard to Equipment in Amador County– Tree Branch on Line



Impact Analysis

Size (ac)	756.65
Initial Attack Assessment	1 - Low
No. of Buildings	240
Total Population	421
No. of Places	0


Figure 10: Fire Spread Simulation Hazard to Equipment in Alameda County – Tree Bark on Line




Impact Analysis

Size (ac)	386.34
Initial Attack Assessment	1 - Low
No. of Buildings	202
Total Population	422
No. of Places	1

Figure 11: Fire Spread Simulation Hazard to Equipment in El Dorado County – Tree Branch on Line






Impact Analysis

Size (ac)	1,005.69
Initial Attack Assessment	1 - Low
No. of Buildings	499
Total Population	858
No. of Places	1

Decision Criteria and Thresholds for Distribution PSPS Protocols

We begin determining whether to turn off power for safety by first evaluating the Distribution system. These powerlines are closer to communities and are generally more susceptible to dry, windy weather threats. Our process is outlined in Figure 12. The values presented in Figure 12 were developed using 31 years of PG&E's high-resolution climate data to help understand wildfire risk and the potential customer impacts of PSPS. We evaluate within a small geographic area (0.7 square kilometers) and if any of the measures are forecasted to be met, we scope the circuit segments within that region for de-energization. There is no single criterion or threshold that will require turning off power to a Distribution circuit. For event-specific thresholds and a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope, see Appendix A-1.1 in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20261014.*"

Figure 12: PSPS Protocols for Distribution



Step 1: Minimum Fire Potential Conditions (mFPC)

The first step to determine the scope of a PSPS is evaluating the mFPC. This ensures that PSPS is only executed during wind events when atmospheric conditions and fuels are dry. A PSPS is evaluated if the mFPC noted in Step 1 of Figure 12 above is met.

These values were established from a combination of analyses including:

- Historical fire occurrence in our service area.
- PSPS sensitivity studies how PSPS criteria impacted the frequency of PSPS events and total customer impact.
- Information published by federal agencies regarding fire behavior and criteria used to issue warnings to the public.


Fire Potential Index (FPI 5.5): FPI 5.5 is a machine-learning fire-consequence model that estimates, by location and hour, the probability that a fire will become small, moderate/large, critical, or catastrophic if an ignition occurs. FPI 5.5 has been operational since August 12, 2025, and uses updated fire-observation data and the POMMS v4 weather-model inputs.

Step 2: In-Depth Review of Fire Risk

If all, or nearly all, minimum fire conditions are met, we conduct an in-depth review of fire risk using multiple separate measures. If the criteria for any of these measures are met, we may need to turn off power for safety. We evaluate all the factors below together, rather than isolating any specific factor to assess fire risk against the potential harms of de-energization. For event-specific thresholds and a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope for the October 10, 2026, PSPS, see Appendix A-1.1 in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20261014.*"

- *Catastrophic Fire Probability (CFP_D)*: This model combines the probability of fire ignitions due to weather impacting the electric system with the probability that a fire will be catastrophic if it starts. It is the combination of the IPW and the FPI. The CFP_D model accounts for changes over time based on actual performance data. Thus, the model will address positive and negative trends in grid performance and reliability year-over-year, incorporating grid improvements such as system hardening, and enhanced vegetation management based on their performance at mitigating outages over time.
    - IPW Model: A system comprised of two machine learning models. These models are used to evaluate the probability of outages across several outage classes (Outage Probability Weather [OPW] model) and the probability of that outage becoming an ignition (Ignition Given Outage Probability Weather Model [IOPW]). These models are combined for each location at each hour to ascertain the ignition probability. These machine learning models use 17 years of weather data to correlate approximately 650,000 outages occurring on PG&E's Distribution grid. The model analyzes the potential for several types of power outages in each weather event, as well as the potential for that outage to be the source of an ignition. IPW learns from and accounts for changes on the grid from year-to-year.
    - FPI Model: This model outputs the probability that a fire will become large or catastrophic and is used as a daily and hourly tool to drive operational decisions to reduce the risk of utility caused fires.
- *Tree Stike Considerations*: Our PSPS protocols utilize a machine learning model to integrate the potential for trees to strike the lines into our OPW Model and IPW Model. This helps our Meteorology Team more accurately analyze risk posed by trees and how that translates to increased ignition probability. For more information regarding OPW modeling, see Figure 13. Scenarios with a high risk of an IPW and a high FPI value will always warrant a PSPS. However, power may be turned off in other scenarios to avoid catastrophic wildfires.

Figure 13: Incorporation of Tree Strike Potential into PSPS Modeling



- *Catastrophic Fire Behavior (CFB)*: We also evaluate areas that are meeting mFPC (windy and dry conditions) but are not meeting our CFP guidance values by utilizing dynamic wildfire spread simulations from Technosylva. This allows us to consider potential ignition events that are rarer and more difficult to forecast such as animal and third-party contacts, or external debris impacting electrical lines. These locations are only considered once the mFPC are met, ensuring that conditions are sufficiently windy and dry.
- *Fireline Intensity*: The U.S. Forest Service Rocky Mountain Research Station performed a study of fire line intensity which is determined by the size and components of flames. It is measured as the rate of heat energy released British Thermal Unit (Btu) per unit length of the fire line Feet (ft) per unit(s). It is also calculated by estimating the flame length, the distance measured from the average flame tip to the middle of the fire's base. Internal studies that evaluated historical fire simulation outputs to actual fire events, damages, and fatalities showed that outputs of flame length and rate of spread were best correlated to historical fire outcomes. Studies, as mentioned above, have shown that more intense fires with higher flame lengths and higher rates of spread are more difficult to control. Thus, we evaluate fire simulation data that indicates where fast-spreading and intense fires could manifest and incorporate that into our PSPS decision making process.
- *Vegetation and Electric Asset Criteria Considerations*: We review locations from recent inspections where high-priority trees or electric compliance issues may increase the risk of ignition. If an area is forecasted to experience minimum fire conditions and there are known issues with equipment or vegetation that have not yet been addressed, we may need to turn off power.

PSPS Protocols for Transmission

In addition to analyzing Distribution circuits that may need to be de-energized for safety, we also review the Transmission lines and structures in areas experiencing dry and windy weather conditions. Transmission lines are like the freeways of the electric system, carrying high voltage energy across long distances. Similar to our Distribution protocols, there is no single factor or threshold that will require turning off power to a Transmission line. For event-specific thresholds and a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope, see Appendix A-1.2 in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20261014."*

Step 1: mFPC

When determining whether to turn off power for safety on Transmission lines, we review the same mFPC as with Distribution circuits. If these conditions are met, we will review the criteria below to determine whether a Transmission line must be turned off.

Fire Potential Index (FPI 5.5): FPI 5.5 is a machine-learning fire-consequence model that estimates, by location and hour, the probability that a fire will become small, moderate/large, critical, or catastrophic if an ignition occurs. FPI 5.5 has been operational since August 12, 2025, and uses updated fire-observation data and the POMMS v4 weather-model inputs.


Step 2: In-Depth Review of Fire Risk

Once we identify the initial scope, we work with the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) to ensure the initial scope is appropriate. This includes analyzing whether it will compromise the power supply to other jurisdictions, utilities or facilities connected to our system. This important step can last several hours, which is why the potential scope of a PSPS may change as we get closer to the forecasted weather event.

- *Catastrophic Fire Probability – Asset (CFPT – Asset*): We use computer models to assess the likelihood of equipment failure during a given weather event, and the subsequent risk of catastrophic wildfires if a failure occurs. This model uses a combination of the Operability Assessment (OA) and FPI Models, both in time and space, at every Transmission structure to form the Transmission CFPT model for asset failures. The OA Model combines historical wind speeds for each structure, historical outage activity, Bayesian updating, and the condition of assets based on inspection programs to help understand the wind-related failure probability of each structure. The OA Model can be driven with forecast wind speeds to output the probability of failure at the structure level.
- *Catastrophic Fire Probability – Vegetation (CFPT – Veg):* The Transmission-specific vegetation risk model is a calibrated probability of vegetation risk built internally using data collected and managed by PG&E Vegetation Management and external contractors such as NV5 and Formation Environmental. This model leverages aerial LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) data to map the location and attributes of trees near Transmission lines. The Transmission vegetation risk model is based on several factors such as overstrike, the amount of unobstructed fall paths to a wire, the slope between a tree and a conductor, and tree exposure. The Transmission vegetation risk model is combined with the FPI Model in space and time to form CFPT – Veg.
- *CFB:* We may de-energize customers where the consequence of a potential wildfire ignition would be extreme, even if the probability of a power line or equipment failure is low.

- *Vegetation and Electric Asset Criteria Considerations:* We review locations from recent inspections where high-priority trees or electric compliance issues are present that may increase the risk of ignition. Figure 14 provides a quantitative summary of our PSPS Protocols for Transmission.

Figure 14: PSPS Protocols for Transmission



Step 3: Determining the Outage Area

Transmission lines meeting the criteria above pass to the next stage of review. We conduct a Power Flow Analysis on the in-scope Transmission lines (if applicable) to analyze any potential downstream impacts of load shedding.

Reviewing Impact and Forecasted Weather

After determining the outage area both for Distribution and Transmission, PG&E reviews the forecasted customer impacts of each circuit against the forecasted wildfire risk of each circuit. If there is reasonable risk for ignition on the Distribution circuits or Transmission lines during the forecasted weather event, it is included in the PSPS scope. During key decision-making points, we internally share this analysis to inform PSPS decision-making and further risk modeling.

Starting 12 hours before the forecasted PSPS de-energization time, we transition from evaluating forecast data to observing the weather in real-time. Based on real-time observations and analysis, we continually evaluate all the outage areas identified in the previous steps and use external tools and analysis to determine whether to initiate PSPS de-energization.

Decision-Making and Analysis to Validate if PSPS is Necessary
During high-risk periods, our Meteorologists participate in daily interagency conference calls that commonly include multiple NWS local offices, the NWS western region headquarters, and representatives from the Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC), also known as Predictive Services. This call is hosted by the Northern California and/or Southern California GACC offices.

During these calls, the external agencies present their expert assessment on the upcoming periods and locations of risk, wind speeds and fuel moisture levels, and any other relevant factors to consider.

During a PSPS, our Lead Meteorologist, called the Meteorologist-in-Charge (MIC), summarizes these forecasts and discussions for the Officer-in-Charge (OIC), who ultimately makes the decision to execute a PSPS.

The following sources and tools are considered before initiating a PSPS by the MIC:

- Daily interagency conference call with agencies during high-risk periods;
- External weather model data;
- Field observer information;
- Fire Weather Watches and RFW (NWS – Federal);
- Live weather data from weather stations;
- Location of existing fires;
- Significant fire potential for wind (GACC – Federal) and;
- Storm Prediction Center (SPC) (part of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) – Federal).

Based on the analyses above, we can determine how many customers may be subject to de-energization, and further investigate mitigation options, such as advanced switching solutions, sectionalization, the use of islanding, alternative grid solutions and temporary generation, to support customers who could lose upstream power sources but are in areas that may be safe to keep energized.

We monitor and forecast weather over a multi-day horizon, so we can anticipate when a PSPS may be needed and activate our EOC as far in advance as possible. Our internal weather model and external modeling are updated multiple times per day. Our Meteorology Team constantly evaluates both internal and external weather models for changes in weather timing, strength, and potential locations impacted. We then incorporate these changes into a new weather scope generally once per day.

Weather shifts may force changes to PSPS scope and impacts at any point in time during PSPS planning and execution; this may allow us to avoid de-energization in some areas if fire-critical conditions lessen but can also cause some areas and customers to move into de-energization scope late in the process if forecasted fire-critical weather footprints change or increase. Possible changes in PSPS scope and impact are driven by the inherent uncertainty in weather forecast models.

Section 2.3 - A thorough and detailed description of the quantitative and qualitative factors it considered in calling, sustaining, or curtailing each de-energization event including any fire risk or PSPS risk modeling results and information regarding why the de-energization event was a last resort, and a specification of the factors that led to the conclusion of the de-energization event. *(D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 9, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
The quantitative factors that were used to determine de-energizing customers for safety are provided in Appendix A-1.1 and A-2.1 in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20261014*." Below, we outline a detailed description of the qualitative factors provided by our Meteorology Team when we were determining whether to de-energize customers.

As forecast weather models do not provide absolute certainty of the future, our Meteorologists evaluate several external forecasts, external models and machine learning wind speed modeling at a station-by-station basis to determine PSPS scope. Other factors include forecasts by the NWS, such as RFWs.

PG&E Meteorology Team Review
On Sunday, October 11, 2026, weather models indicated potential for dry offshore winds developing between October 14 – 17. Our Meteorology Team, Emergency Planning and Response Team, and EOC Commander met to discuss the potential need for a PSPS.

Based on the emerging risk of weather conditions, the EOC remained activated following the October 10, 2026 PSPS Event.

The initial PSPS scope was developed on October 12, reflecting the risk of dry and gusty offshore winds across the Sierra Nevada, elevated terrain in North Bay and East Bay, and the Tehachapi/Southern Mountains. We continued to monitor the weather forecast and PSPS models.

On October 13-15, federal forecast agencies began to highlight the upcoming weather conditions. All federal agencies kept this posture throughout the period of concern. See "External PSPS Decision Inputs" below for external agency forecasts.

Offshore winds trended stronger in subsequent weather model runs between October 12-13. As a result, the scope was further increased on the October 12, and again on October 13, first adding additional TPs to the Southern Mountains and Sierra, then expanding the size of several TPs in the Sierra and North Bay.

On October 14 at 16:06 PDT, we made the decision to de-energize customers for safety, due to increased fire potential conditions resulting from gusty northwest winds, low humidity, output from fire spread models, and real-time Hazard Awareness and Warning Center (HAWC) reports. we ultimately de-energized 85,863 customers across 29 counties and 23 TPs between October 14-17.

Once winds subsided on October 16 at 09:46 PDT, the first Weather All-Clear was issued for circuits segments in TPs 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9. Five additional all-clears would take place on October

16, followed by another five on October 17. The last Weather All-Clear was declared on October 17th at 12:54 PDT for TPs 17 and 24.

High Resolution PSPS Models Guidance
The tools and models outlined in Section 2.2 are part of the decision criteria that our Meteorologists consider when determining PSPS scope. Longer range weather forecast model data are used to determine the location and timing of a PSPS. Typically, these weather forecasts are less certain the farther they are from the observed date. This is akin to the well-known hurricane "cone of uncertainty" in which the potential track of a hurricane is represented by an area that expands farther out in time, which resembles an expanding cone. Therefore, there is an inherent tradeoff between the further out the forecasts are for a PSPS and the uncertainty in the PSPS scope and waiting until forecasts become more certain. Forecast uncertainty leads to changes in PSPS scope as weather forecast models are updated, and the scope is refined closer to the period of concern.

As the PSPS unfolds in real-time, our Meteorologists transition to real-time observations of weather stations, satellite data, pressure gradients, and live feeds from Alert Wildfire Cameras. These observations help to evaluate if the weather is behaving as expected. In many instances, models trend stronger or weaker with each model iteration leading up to a PSPS.

External PSPS Decision Inputs
Meteorological analyses establish that high winds in California create significant fire threat and exacerbate fire spread. The NWS issues a RFW to indicate critical fire weather conditions under which any fire that develops will likely spread rapidly. California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) states, "the types of weather patterns that cause a watch or warning include low relative humidity, strong winds, dry fuels, the possibility of dry lightning strikes, or any combination of the above." As noted previously, our decision to initiate a PSPS consistently occurs during periods and in areas where federal, state, and local authorities have identified as having extreme fire risk including the presence of strong winds.

As discussed above and in Section 2.2, we compare our fire risk forecasts against those of external agencies to validate that there is shared recognition of high fire risk across the California meteorology community. Between October 14 – 17, our analysis of fire risk justifying a PSPS were validated by several sources and warnings:

- North Ops Predictive Services issued 7-day outlook showing High Risk for the Northern Sierras Predictive Service Area on October 15 and 16.
- South Ops Predictive Services issued 7-day outlook showing High Risk for the Western Mountains and South Coast Predictive Service Areas on October 15 and 16.
- RFWs from the NWS were issued from 5 local NWS offices (Figure 15).
- The Sacramento, Eureka, Monterey, Hanford, and Oxnard NWS offices issued Red Flag Warnings for portions of the North Bay/Lake County, Sierra Nevada, and mountains along the southern extent of PG&E's service territory. Warnings in the Sierra Nevada began at 00:00 and 03:00 on October 15 and in Lake County and the Southern Mountains at 04:00 and 06:00 on October 15. The remaining RFW in the North Bay was issued at 22:00 on October 15.
- The Storm Prediction Center (SPC) at NOAA indicated Elevated risk across large portions of PG&E territory and Critical risk in Southern California in their Fire Weather Outlook. (Figure 16).

Figure 15: NWS RFW Coverage from the Multiple Weather Offices




Figure 16: NOAA – SPC Forecasts of Elevated and Critical Fire Weather Risk



Figure 17: GACC Forecasts of High Risk Significant Fire Potential



We also review forecasted wind speeds in the potentially impacted counties to evaluate the need for a PSPS. Figure 18 shows the Utility FPI Ratings for Fire Index Areas (FIAs) in our service area between October 14 – 16. We determine the scope for a PSPS within those FIAs with fire risk rating R5-Plus from PG&E's FPI model. Additionally, Figure 19 compares the PSPS scope with other agencies to vet the fire weather risk.

Figure 18: PG&E's Utility Fire Potential Index Ratings





Figure 19: Comparison of Federal Agency Fire Weather Warning and Final PSPS Scope



Section 2.4 - An explanation of how the utility determined that the benefit of de-energization outweighed potential public safety risks, and analysis of the risks of de-energization against not de-energizing for each circuit or segment. The utility must identify and quantify customer, resident, and the general public risks and harms from de-energization and clearly explain risk models, risk assessment processes, and provide further documentation on how the power disruptions to customers, residents, and the general public is weighed against the benefits of a proactive de-energization *(D.19-05- 042, Appendix A, page A24, D.21-06-014, page 284, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
For the October 14, 2026 PSPS, we used our PSPS Risk Model with the latest scope prior to making the decision to de-energization. For a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope, including risk factors, see Appendix A-1.1 and A-2.1 in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20261014.*"

Our PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool addresses the CPUC's requirements presented in the 2019 PSPS OII.[6] This decision states California investor-owned utilities (IOUs) are required to quantify the risk/benefits associated with initiating or not initiating a PSPS for our customers.

PG&E incorporated this risk-benefit analysis into our PSPS execution process to help inform our PSPS decision-making process. Our Risk-Benefit Tool aligns with the California IOUs Cost Benefit Approach (CBA) framework, as defined through the Safety Modeling Assessment Proceeding (SMAP), CPUC's Risk Based Decision-Making Framework (R.20-07-013), which specifies how various consequences are factored into a risk calculation. Utilizing this framework, we incorporate PSPS forecast information into the tool, which is further described in the "Risk Assessment" section below.

The output of the tool is a ratio that compares the calculated PSPS potential benefit from initiating de-energization (i.e., mitigation of catastrophic wildfire consequence) to the risks associated with PSPS (i.e., impact to customers resulting from a PSPS). Key inputs in the risk-benefit analysis include results from Technosylva wildfire simulations specific to the Distribution circuit and Transmission lines in scope for a potential de-energization, the number of customers forecasted to be de-energized, and the forecasted number of customer minutes across each identified circuit in scope for a potential de-energization.

After the potential de-energization scope is determined, including the potentially impacted circuits identified for the potential PSPS, this scope and the Technosylva wildfire simulation outputs are used as inputs into the Risk-Benefit Tool, which quantifies the potential public safety risk and wildfire risk resulting from the forecasted impacts of the pending PSPS. Note that the Wildfire Risk Score is based on an eight-hour simulation from Technosylva and while useful, in some cases this can significantly understate the risk. As a result, the MIC may still recommend to de-energize circuits where the Risk-Benefit Tool shows higher PSPS risk than wildfire risk.

[6] D. 21-06-014

Risk Assessment

As referenced above, PG&E's PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool follows California IOU agreed approach to utilize the CBA framework that captures the safety, reliability, and financial impact of identified potential risk events, as outlined in our Enterprise Risk Register.[7] The tool's calculations use a non-linear scaling of consequences reflecting our focus on low-frequency/high-consequence risk events without neglecting high-probability/low-consequence risk events. Developed by the PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool, CBA scores are used to compare the potential de-energization risk from a forecasted PSPS to the potential risk of catastrophic wildfires from keeping the circuits energized, specific to the potentially impacted circuits being considered for a PSPS.

The following inputs are used in calculations to build CBA risk scores for a PSPS and wildfires, which are ultimately weighed against one another:

- *Customer Category and Critical Customer Adjustment Factor*: The type of customer (e.g., MBL Program) using a "critical customer adjustment factor." This is applied to the customer outage duration to reflect a higher risk score for customers who are at a greater adverse risk of a potential PSPS.
- *Customers Impacted*: Forecasted number of customers anticipated to be impacted by the potential PSPS.
- *Customer Minutes*: Forecasted outage duration the customers will experience during the potential PSPS.
- *Forecasted Circuits*: The final list of the Distribution circuits and Transmission lines identified to be in scope for a potential PSPS.
- *Technosylva Wildfire Simulation Data*: Fire simulation forecasts on the consequence of a potential wildfire's impact on customers, wildlife, and infrastructures on each circuit for every three hours. These values are based on Technosylva's wildfire modeling, using real-time weather, state-of-the-art fuel, and eight-hour fire spread modeling.

Once the data above is made available and incorporated into the tool, the modeling considerations described in Table 2 are used to estimate the consequence of the potential wildfire risk and PSPS risk at the per-circuit level. Within the tool, a variety of modeling considerations are made to facilitate calculations, included in Table 2 and summarized in Figure 20.

[7] Full details of the CBA methodology are provided through the 2024 Risk Assessment and Mitigation Phase (RAMP) and 2027 General Rate Case (GRC) filings.

Table 2: 2026 PG&E's PSPS Risk-Benefit Consequence Modeling Considerations

Consequence Type	Wildfire Consequence Considerations	PSPS Consequence Considerations
Safety	Calculated based on maximum population impacts derived from Technosylva wildfire simulation models and a fatality ratio based on National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) data.	Calculated from an estimate of Equivalent Fatalities (EF) per Million Customer Minutes Interrupted (MMCI). The EF/MMCI ratio is estimated from previous PG&E PSPS outages and other large external outages.[8]
Reliability	None.	Calculated directly from the potential number of customers impacted and outage duration based on customer minutes interrupted.
Financial	Calculated based on maximum building impacts derived from Technosylva wildfire simulation models and a cost per structure burned previously evaluated in 2024 RAMP Report.[9]	Calculated based on two financial estimates, 1) distribution of a lump sum cost of execution across all relevant circuits and 2) an estimated proxy cost per customer in scope per PSPS.[10]

Potential Wildfire Risk
Wildfire consequence impacts are calculated based on the outputs of the Technosylva simulations. Variables include 1) population impacted by wildfire and 2) structures impacted by wildfire used to calculate natural unit values for two consequence components:

- *Wildfire Safety Consequence:* EF
- *Wildfire Financial Consequence:* Financial Cost of Wildfire (in dollars)

Potential PSPS Risk
PSPS consequence impacts are based on the following values: duration of de-energization by circuit, and number of customers impacted by de-energization on each circuit. These input values are used to calculate natural unit values for three consequence components:

- *PSPS Safety Consequence:* EF as an output of Customer Minutes interrupted
- *PSPS Electric Reliability Consequence:* Customer Minutes Interrupted × Critical Customer Adjustment Factor
- *PSPS Financial Consequence:* Financial Cost of PSPS (in dollars) × Critical Customer Adjustment Factor

Once the consequence values (safety, reliability, financial) are estimated they are converted into CBA risk scores. Once the Risk-Benefit Tool calculates the impacts between the PSPS and a

[8] Includes 2019-2021 PSPS outages, the 2003 Northeast Blackout in New York City, 2011 Southwest Blackout in San Diego, 2012 Derecho Windstorms, 2012 Superstorm Sandy, 2017 Hurricane Irma and 2021 Blackout event.
[9] A.24-05-008.
[10] The assumptions used in these calculations, including the proxy cost per customer per PSPS, are subject to be updated and are not intended to prejudge or create precedent with regard to the development of more precise values of resiliency or cost of PSPS metrics being considered in other ongoing proceedings at the CPUC, such as the Risk-Based Decision-Making Rulemaking [R.20.07.013] and the Microgrid and Resiliency Strategies.

wildfire, it is summarized in Figure 20 and 21 by indicating if the adverse impact from a PSPS outweighs the risk of a wildfire.

Figure 20: Representation of PG&E's PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool




Figure 21: PSPS Potential Benefit Versus PSPS Potential Risk Consequence[11]

PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	142,367
PSPS Potential Benefit (Wildfire Mitigation)	2707
Potential Benefit : Potential Risk	53
Recommended Approach	Indicates potential PSPS benefit outweighs risk
Risk Ratio Per Circuit (>1, PSPS Benefit Outweighs Risk) As defined in PLAN_D-03	Dx Circuits: 162 (of 162) Tx Circuits: 23 (of 23)[1]

Aggregated to event-level

[1] *This count increases to 28 Transmission Lines when including for 5 foreign transmission lines. The 28 are included in final Risk-Benefit analysis.*

$\frac{PSPS\ Potential\ Benefit\ (wildfire\ risk)}{PSPS\ Potential\ Risk} > 1$ — Indicates potential PSPS benefit outweighs risk

$\frac{PSPS\ Potential\ Benefit\ (wildfire\ risk)}{PSPS\ Potential\ Risk} < 1$ — Indicates potential risk may outweigh potential benefit

Key Factors

- **PSPS Consequence**
  - Safety consequence factors in planned and unplanned widespread outage events across the US.
  - Reliability consequence based on customer minutes interrupted
  - Financial consequence based on execution and fixed customer cost per event
  - Assumes maximum duration for each customer per circuit
- **PSPS Benefit (Wildfire Mitigation)**
  - Safety consequence based on population impacted from fire spread simulation
  - Reliability consequence not considered
  - Financial consequence based on buildings impacted from fire spread simulation
  - Assumes an ignition on each circuit based on the maximum consequence modeled by TechnoSylva

[11] The risk values in Figure 21 represents associated costs.

Our PSPS Risk Model supported initiating a PSPS based on the October 14, 2026 PSPS scope and forecasted impact information. The model indicated that each of the 162[12] Distribution circuits and 23[13] Transmission lines in the latest scope surpassed the analysis threshold of "one" to support a PSPS.

Section 2.5 - Explanation of alternatives considered and evaluation of each alternative. *(D.19-05-042 Appendix A, page A22.)*

Response:
After reviewing the meteorological information that indicated potential for catastrophic wildfire and the impacts on customers through de-energization, we considered whether alternatives to de-energizing, such as additional vegetation management and disabling automatic reclosers, could adequately reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire thus lowering the need for de-energization. We determined these measures alone did not reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire in areas within the PSPS scope sufficiently to protect public safety.

[12] This counts all distribution circuits which normally serve the in-scope customers. One circuit containing in-scope customers was abnormally fed from a different circuit: those customers are consolidated into a single circuit for other figures in this report.
[13] Two of the 23 lines (DRUM-SUMMIT #1 and DRUM-SUMMIT#2) were removed from the de-energized Tx lines list because they were already de-energized for non-PSPS reasons.

Section 3 – De-energized Time, Place, Duration and Customers

Section 3.1 - The summary of time, place and duration of the event, broken down by phase if applicable *(Resolution ESRB-8 page 3, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
The PSPS occurred on October 14, 2026, in 23 TPs across 29 counties.

Section 3.2 - A consolidated zipped geodatabase (.gdb) file that includes all PSPS event data requested in Section 3.2 and Section 4.3. Use WGS 1984 Web Mercator Auxiliary Sphere projected coordinate system (WKID: Esri 3857) for the geodatabase. The geodatabase must include PSPS polygon feature classes of de-energized areas with items that are required in Section 3.3. In addition, the geodatabase must contain one consolidated event single polygon feature class with the following exact fields (dates will be formatted XX/XX/XX): (SED Additional Information.)

- **Event Name: [same PSPS Event Name used during the event and shared with public safety partners]**
- **First Date of POC: [first date of initial period of concern]**
- **IOU: [PGE, SCE, SDGE, Liberty, PacifiCorp, or BVES]**
- **De-energization Start Date: [XX/XX/XX]**
- **Full Restoration Date: [XX/XX/XX]**
- **Customers De-energized: [unique count matching Table 1]**
- **De-energization: [Yes or No]**

Response:
Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, attachment *"PGE_PSPS_Polygons_of_De-energized_Areas_and_Damage_Hazard_Points_20261014.gdb.zip*" provides a consolidated zipped geodatabase file that includes PSPS polygons of final de-energized areas combined with PSPS data as well as damages and hazards.

Section 3.3 - A list of circuits de-energized, with the following information for each circuit. If a circuit is de-energized multiple times during an event, the following information must be provided for each de-energization. This information should be provided in both a PDF and excel spreadsheet *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.)*

- **County**
- **De-energization date/time**
- **Restoration date/time**
- **"All Clear" declaration date/time**
- **General Order (GO) 95, Rule 21.2-D Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 classification or non-High Fire Threat District**
- **Total customers de-energized**
- **Residential customers de-energized**
- **Commercial/Industrial Customers de-energized**
- **Medical Baseline (MBL) customers de-energized**
- **Access and Functional Needs (AFN) other than MBL customers de-energized**
- **Other Customers**
- **Distribution or transmission classification**

Response:
Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, Appendix B provides a list of de-energized circuits and the relevant information relating to each circuit.

Additionally, 21 Transmission lines were de-energized which impacted eight Transmission-level[14] customers.

[14] PG&E defines Transmission-level customers as customers being served by 50 kV assets or higher.

Section 4 – Damages and Hazards to Overhead Facilities

Section 4.1 – Description of all found wind-related damages or hazards to the utility's overhead facilities in the areas where power was shut off. *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
During this PSPS, weather stations near the areas in the de-energized scope recorded wind gusts as high as 64 mph. Recorded wind gusts are shown in Table 21 and Figure 38 in Section 12.

During patrols of the de-energized circuits prior to restoring power, we found six incidents of wind-related damage and four hazards. Damages are conditions that occurred during the PSPS, likely wind-related, necessitating repair or replacement of an asset, such as a wire down or a fallen pole. Hazards are conditions that might have caused damages, or posed an electrical arcing or ignition risk, had PSPS not been executed (e.g., a tree limb found suspended in electrical wires). The damage and hazard locations are illustrated in Figure 22 - 31 and mapped in Figure 32.

Figure 22: Damage in Calaveras – Broken Conductor



Figure 23: Damage in Alameda – Broken Conductor



Figure 24: Damage in Calaveras – Damaged Conductor



Figure 25: Damage in Alameda – Broken Pin




Figure 26: Damage in San Luis Obispo – Broken Conductor



Figure 27: Damage in Lake – Broken Insulator



Figure 28: Hazard in El Dorado – Tree Leaning Into Line



Figure 29: Hazard in Amador – Tree Branch On Line



Figure 30: Hazard in Alameda – Tree Bark On Line



Figure 31: Hazard in El Dorado – Tree Branch On Line



Section 4.2 - A table showing circuit name and structure identifier (if applicable) for each damage or hazard, County that each damage or hazard is located in, whether the damage or hazard is in a High Fire-Threat District (HFTD) or non-HFTD, Type of damage/hazard of damage. *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
For a list of damages and hazards within the de-energized areas, see Appendix C in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20261014*".


Section 4.3 - The consolidated zipped geodatabase file from Section 3.2 must include the PSPS event damage and hazard points, if applicable. The file should include items that are required in Section 4.2. *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
For a zipped geodatabase file that includes the PSPS damage and hazard points, see the attachment, *"PGE_ PSPS_Polygons_of_De-energized_Areas_and_Damage_Hazard _Points_20261014.gdb.zip."*

Section 4.4 - A PDF map identifying the location of each damage or hazard. *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
See Figure 32 for a map identifying the location of the damages and hazards.

Figure 32: Damages and Hazards Incidents Map



Section 5 – Notifications

Section 5.1 - A description of the notice to California Independent System Operator (as needed), public safety partners, local/tribal governments, paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a community resource center, multi-family building account holders/building managers in the AFN community, and all customers, including the means by which utilities provide notice to customers of the locations/hours/services available for CRCs, and where to access electricity during the hours the CRC is closed. *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 3 D19-05-042, page A26, D21-06-034, Appendix A, page A2, A9-A10, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
Throughout the PSPS, we followed the Notification Plan included in our 2026 PSPS Pre-Season Report, Appendix C, pp. 57 – 67 and made significant efforts to notify tribal and local Governments, Public Safety Partners, Community Based Organizations (CBOs) (including paratransit agencies) and impacted customers in accordance with the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines.[15] See Table 3 for a description of the notifications we sent to stakeholders in accordance with the minimum timelines set forth by the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines.[16]

In accordance with D.21-06-034, we provide CRC information to customers in PSPS notifications via hyperlink to the PSPS Updates Page. This webpage includes up-to-date CRC locations, services available and hours of operation as well as how customers can find local CRCs and where to access electricity during the hours CRCs are closed. Due to text message character constraints and the dynamic nature of CRCs information, providing a link to the PSPS Updates Page ensures that all impacted customers and local agencies have access to the latest CRC information at all times. For more information on CRCs, see Section 9.

Multi-family building account holders/building managers in the AFN community are considered part of our All Customers (including MBL customers and Self-Identified Vulnerable (SIV) customers) recipient group. For information on our outreach and community engagement with master-metered owners, property managers, and building account holders, see PG&E's AFN Quarterly Progress Reports for activities between July 1, 2026, and September 30, 2026.

In addition to providing direct notifications to stakeholders, PG&E alerted the public in advance of de-energization via the media and PG&E's website.

[15] D.19-05-042.
[16] D.19-05-042.

Media Engagement
From the time we publicly announced the PSPS until power was restored, we engaged with the public through the media by:

- Responding to approximately 61 media inquiries, either from media outlets that contacted PG&E's 24-hour media line, or direct calls/emails to field media.
- Participating in 87 media interviews (i.e. live, recorded or unrecorded phone interviews) to provide situational updates and preparedness messages.
- Proactively issuing six local news releases and updates directly to news outlets.

As of October 23, 2026, we identified 423 unique print, online and broadcast stories.

PG&E Website
We placed an Informational Alert on the www.pge.com home page that directed the public to PG&E's PSPS site. From the start of the PSPS to full restoration, the PSPS Updates Page received a total of 1,935,168 page views and 460,168 site visits.

Among other resources noted throughout this report, PG&E's PSPS Updates Page includes information regarding Electric Vehicle (EV), American Sign Language (ASL), Independent Living Centers (ILCs), Backup Power, AFN customer resources, MBL Program information and more. Additionally, the address look-up tool and address-level alerts, are available on our website, in 16 languages, that allow non-PG&E-account holders to receive notifications for any address where they do not receive a bill (e.g., workplace, child's school, renters, mobile home parks, etc.).

On October 15, PG&E's PSPS emergency website did not have the latest outage data between 22:22 PDT and 23:34 PDT. This was due to a technical issue caused by the large number of outages. After the corrections were made, PG&E implemented additional monitoring for the remainder of the event.

At 00:00 PDT, October 17, PG&E's seven-day PSPS forecast was showing "Warning" status for counties that had initially planned to be restored on October 17 but were restored early. PG&E removed these counties from the seven-day PSPS forecast at 09:56 PDT.

We remain committed to the continuous improvement of our websites to better meet the needs of customers. As we launch new features to www.pge.com and to www.pgealerts.alerts.pge.com, we test to ensure compliance with Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.1AA standards and improve customer experience. Where possible, we remediate accessibility issues that customers or stakeholders have brought to our attention.

Table 3: Notification Descriptions

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
PRIORITY NOTIFICATION: 48-72 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization	Public Safety Partners and CBOs[17] Transmission-level customers, and municipal utilities	On October 11, our Meteorology Team noted a potential PSPS and updated the weather forecast on pge.com/weather to "elevated" in certain parts of the service area. At this time, agency representatives called each County Office of Emergency Services (OES) in PG&E's electrical service area and select tribes and cities to inform them that PG&E was monitoring an increased potential for a PSPS. Following the EOC activation, we completed the following: • Notified CAISO of the potential PSPS (on October 12 at 10:20 PDT) and shared additional information via email (on October 13 at 10:24 PDT) • Submitted a PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E's EOC has been activated and that PG&E is monitoring for a potential PSPS. • Agency representatives called potentially impacted County OES and select tribes and cities to inform them that PG&E is monitoring a potential PSPS. • Sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners,[18] via call, text and e-mail, which included information such as: o Estimated window of the de-energization time. o When weather is anticipated to pass. o Estimated Time of Restoration (ETOR). o For agency partners and distribution level customers: Links to the PSPS Data Portal where PSPS-specific maps and information are available. o For Transmission-level customers only: Transmission Substation Name and Line name serving substation.
WATCH NOTIFICATION: 24-48 hours in advance of	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL	During this time, we completed the following: • Submitted a PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E's EOC has been activated and that PG&E is monitoring for a potential PSPS.

[17] D.21-06-034, Appendix A, page A9, Section G. MBL Program and AFN Communities, No. 4, Each electric investor-owned utility must provide proactive notification and impacted zip code information to paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a CRC during a PSPS.

[18] Other Public Safety Partners refers to first/emergency responders at the local, state, and federal level, water, wastewater, and communication service providers, affected CCAs, publicly owned utilities/electrical cooperatives, the CPUC, the California Governor's Office of Emergency Services, and the CAL FIRE.

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
anticipated de-energization	and SIV customers) Transmission-level customers, and municipal utilities	• Sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners,[19] Transmission-level customers, municipal utilities, and customers via call, text and e-mail, which included information such as: ○ Estimated window of the de-energization time. ○ When weather is anticipated to pass. ○ Estimated Time of Restoration (ETOR). ○ For Public Safety Partners Only: Links to the PSPS Data Portal where PSPS-specific maps and information are available. ○ For customers only: Potentially impacted addresses, links to PSPS Updates Page with CRC information, and resources for AFN customers, including but not limited to information on the MBL Program, language support, and the Portable Battery Program (PBP). ○ For Transmission-level customers only: Transmission Substation Name and Line name serving substation. • Sent notifications to MBL customers, including tenants of master metered accounts, and SIV customers. For more information regarding MBL Program notifications, see Section 5.3. • Sent Cancellation Notifications to Public Safety Partners and customers within, two hours of being removed from scope, to inform them that their power would not be shut off. Customer notifications are provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications are provided in English.
WARNING NOTIFICATION: 1-4 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization, if possible	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL and SIV customers)	During this time, we completed the following: • Submitted a PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E has made the decision to de-energize. • Sent notifications to Public Safety Partners Transmission-level customers, municipal utilities, and

[19] Other Public Safety Partners refers to first/emergency responders at the local, state, and federal level, water, wastewater, and communication service providers, affected CCAs, publicly owned utilities/electrical cooperatives, the CPUC, the California Governor's OES and the CAL FIRE.

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
	Transmission-level customers, and municipal utilities	customers which included the same key information and resources as Watch Notifications. • Sent notifications to MBL customers, including tenants of master metered accounts, and SIV customers. For more information regarding MBL Program notifications, see Section 5.3. • Sent Cancellation Notifications to Public Safety Partners and customers within two hours of being removed from scope to inform them that their power would not be shut off. • Provided an additional call to Transmission-level customers within 46 minutes of de-energization when possible in order to allow Transmission-level customers sufficient time to properly ramp down any processes and shut down equipment. Customer notifications are provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications are provided in English.

POWER OFF NOTIFICATION: When de-energization is initiated	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL and SIV customers) Transmission-level customers[20], and municipal utilities	When de-energization was initiated, we completed the following:
		• Submitted a PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC to notify them that de-energization has been initiated.
		• Conducted live agent calls to impacted Transmission-level customers.
		• Sent notifications to Public Safety Partners Transmission-level customers, municipal utilities and customers via call, text messages and e-mail, which included:
		  ○ De-energization time.
		  ○ When weather is anticipated to pass.
		  ○ For customers only: Impacted addresses.
		  ○ For customers only: Links to the PSPS emergency website with CRC information, and resources for AFN customers, including but not limited to information on the MBL Program, Meals on Wheels, language support, and the PBP.
		• Sent notifications to MBL customers, including tenants of master metered accounts, and SIV customers. For

[20] Transmission-level customers receive a GCC live call before de-energization and prior to restoration.

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
		more information regarding MBL Program notifications, see Section 5.3. Customer notifications are provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications are provided in English.

WEATHER "ALL-CLEAR"/ETOR UPDATE NOTIFICATION: Immediately before re-energization begins	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL and SIV customers) Transmission-level customers[21], and municipal utilities	After weather conditions had passed and areas were deemed safe to begin patrols and restoration, we completed the following:
		• Submitted a PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E is initiating re-energization patrols.
		• Sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners: Transmission-level customers, municipal utilities and customers, via call, text message and e-mail, which included the ETOR.
		• Sent "update" notifications to customers if their ETOR changed. Two ways that an ETOR may change include:
		  ○ New field or meteorology conditions.
		  ○ Damage found during patrols and repair was needed.
		
		Customer notifications are provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications are provided in English.

RESTORATION NOTIFICATION: When re-energization is complete	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL and SIV customers) Transmission-level customers, and municipal utilities	Once all customers were restored, we completed the following: • Sent a notification to Public Safety Partners via call, text and e-mail. • Submitted the final PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES. • Sent an e-mail to the CPUC confirming restoration of PSPS outages and reclassification of customers if applicable.

[21] Transmission lines serving impacted Transmission-level Customers and Municipal Utilities may cut across multiple FIAs and will only be notified when all those FIAs that the line cuts across have been given the All-Clear.

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
		Once customers, including MBL and SIV customers, were restored, they received automated notifications via call, text, and e-mail. Conducted live agent calls to notify impacted Transmission-level customers of restoration. Customer notifications are provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications are provided in English.

Section 5.2 – Notification timeline including prior to de-energization or Period of Concern (if no de-energization), initiation, restoration, and cancellation, if applicable, for each circuit or circuit segment. The timeline should include the required minimum timeline and approximate time notifications were sent for each de-energization if a circuit was de-energized multiple times. *(D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A8-A9, D.21-06-034, page A11)*

Response:
Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, Table 4 in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20261014*" provides the time notifications were sent in accordance with the minimum timelines set forth by the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines,[22] to tribal/local Governments, Public Safety Partners, and all customers prior to de-energization, initiation, cancellation, and restoration. The advanced notification guidelines set forth in the Phase 1 Guidelines are not based on a strict liability standard and state that "recognizing that there may be times when advanced notice is not possible due to emergency conditions beyond the electric investor owned utilities' control, the electric investor-owned utilities should, whenever possible, provide advance notification to all populations potentially affected by a de-energization event."[23]

Table 4: Notification Timeline Summary
See Table 4 in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20261014.*"

Section 5.3 - For those customers where positive or affirmative notification was attempted, use the following template to report the accounting of the customers (which tariff and/or access and functional needs population designation), the number of notification attempts made, the timing of attempts, who made the notification attempt (utility or public safety partner) and the number of customers for whom positive notification was achieved. *(D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A23, SED Additional Information.)*

[22] D.19-05-042.
[23] D.19-05-042, Appendix A

"Notification attempts made" and "Successful positive notification" must include the unique number of customer counts. When the actual notification attempts made is less than the number of customers in scope, the utility must explain the reason. In addition, the utility must explain the reason of any unsuccessful positive notifications. Utilities may not mark N/A and must answer 5.3 regardless if the utility did not de-energize customers. *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, Table 5 includes metrics associated with notifications PG&E provided to customers where positive or affirmative notification was attempted. PG&E interprets the number of customers that need positive or affirmative notification as customers the company seeks confirmation from, namely MBL and SIV customers. PG&E tracks positive confirmation from MBL/SIV customers via text, phone call, email, doorbell rings, live agent phone calls or door hanger at all stages of notifications. If a notification is acknowledged at any stage and/or a door hanger is left, that is considered a successful positive notification. For more information, see PG&E's AFN Quarterly Progress Reports.

Table 5: Positive Notification

Designation	Total Number of Customers	Number of Notification Attempts Made[24]	Timing of Attempts	Who Made the Notification Attempt	Successful Positive Notification
MBL in scope[25]	6,580	6,572	Daily	PG&E	6,522
SIV	3,111	3,101	Daily	PG&E	3,056

As informed by our discussions with SED to clarify reporting requirements, the counts reported in Table 5 and its supplemental tables include both 1) MBL or SIV customers scoped for this event and 2) MBL or SIV customers who were de-energized but not included in planned scope. Please see Table 5A for explanations of why MBL or SIV customers did not receive attempted or successful positive notification.

Some service points changed their MBL or SIV status while they were scoped or de-energized: customers are included in this count if they were MBL or SIV at any point while in-scope or at the start of de-energization. Service points may also change status between MBL and SIV during an event: those customers would be included in both the MBL and SIV counts. Thus, the unique count of MBL and SIV customers may be smaller than the sum of the separate MBL and SIV counts.

[24] Count of "Notification Attempts Made" includes doorbell rings and Live Agent phone calls.
[25] Residential tenants of master-metered customers can also qualify for MBL quantities. The MBL category for the purposes of Table 5 includes MBL customers who are master meter tenants.

Table 5A: Explanation of MBL and SIV Customers Without Successful Positive Notifications

Notification Outcome	De-energized or Descoped?	Count of MBL	Count of SIV	Explanation
No pre-outage notification attempts	De-energized	6	3	PG&E did not attempt to notify these customers prior de-energization because PG&E was not aware they would be de-energized for PSPS. This was due to data errors in PG&E's PSPS scoping systems: the resultant notification failures are discussed in Section 5.5.
No pre-outage notification attempts	De-energized	1	0	PG&E did not attempt to notify this customer prior to de-energization because their responsibility for service started after the end of the 1-4 Hour Imminent notification window, but before de-energization initiation. It would not be feasible for PG&E to achieve successful positive notification at that point due to the short time before de-energization. This customer is included in the notification failure counts for Section 5.5. *
No pre-outage notification attempts	De-energized	0	1	PG&E did not attempt to notify this customer through our standard notification process because no valid contact info was provided for the main customer of record. This customer was not targeted for an in-person doorbell ring because they were not MBL or SIV during any of our pre-de-energization scopes: their SIV status started shortly prior to de-energization. It would not be feasible for PG&E to achieve successful positive notification at that point due to the short time before de-energization. This customer is included in the notification failure counts for Section 5.5. *
No pre-outage notification attempts	De-energized	0	2	PG&E did not attempt to notify these customers through our standard notification process because no valid contact info was provided for the main customer of record.

				PG&E later achieved successful positive contact with live phone calls made using contact info not associated with the main customer of record, but these calls were only made after the de-energization had already started. PG&E is still investigating why doorbell rings were not used to establish successful positive notification prior to de-energization and will report findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report. These customers are included in the notification failure counts for Section 5.5.
No pre-outage notification attempts	De-energized	0	3	PG&E did not attempt to notify these customers through our standard notification process because no valid contact info was provided for the main customer of record. PG&E is still investigating why doorbell rings were not used to establish successful positive notification prior to de-energization and will report findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report. These customers are included in the notification failure counts for Section 5.5.
No pre-outage notification attempts	Descoped	1	0	PG&E did not attempt to notify this customer because they were removed from scope prior to the end of the 24-48 Hour Watch notification window: while they were in scope during the 72-48 Hour Priority window, we did not attempt to notify them because non-CFI customers do not require Priority notifications. *
No pre-outage notification attempts	Descoped	0	1	PG&E did not attempt to notify this customer through our standard notification process because no valid contact info was provided for the main customer of record.

				This customer was then removed from scope: PG&E did not establish successful positive notification with doorbell rings prior to that point and would not need to continue those attempts for descoped customers. This customer is included in the notification failure counts for Section 5.5.*
Pre-outage notifications attempted but did not achieve successful positive contact	Descoped	38	28	PG&E attempted to notify these customers through our standard notification process but was unable to achieve successful positive contact with those notifications. These customers were then removed from scope: PG&E did not establish successful positive notification with doorbell rings prior to that point and would not need to continue those attempts for descoped customers.*
Pre-outage notifications attempted but did not achieve successful positive contact	De-energized	0	2	PG&E attempted to notify these customers through our standard notification process but was unable to achieve successful positive contact with those notifications. PG&E then deployed doorbell rings to establish successful positive contact, but the personnel performing the doorbell ring were unable to locate the SIV premise or customer.
Pre-outage notifications attempted but did not achieve successful positive contact	De-energized	0	1	PG&E attempted to notify this customer through our standard notification process but was unable to achieve successful positive contact with those notifications. PG&E then deployed doorbell rings to establish successful positive contact, but a locked gate 1.2 miles from the premise prevented access to the property for completing the doorbell ring.
Pre-outage notifications	De-energized	1	0	PG&E attempted to notify this customer through our standard

attempted but did not achieve successful positive contact				notification process but was unable to achieve successful positive contact with those notifications. PG&E then deployed doorbell rings to establish successful positive contact: the personnel performing the doorbell ring arrived onsite but were unable to leave a door hanger because their truck had no door hangers available.
Pre-outage notifications attempted but did not achieve successful positive contact	De-energized	11	14	PG&E attempted to notify these customers through our standard notification process but was unable to achieve successful positive contact with those notifications. PG&E is still investigating why doorbell rings were not used to establish successful positive notification prior to de-energization and will report findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report.

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06 034.)

For this PSPS, MBL and SIV customers received automated calls, texts, and emails at the same intervals as the general customer notifications. PG&E provided unique PSPS Watch and PSPS Warning Notifications to MBL customers[26] and SIV customers.

These customer groups also received additional calls and texts at hourly intervals until the customer confirmed receipt of the automated notifications by either answering the phone, responding to the text, or opening the email. If confirmation was not received, a PG&E representative visited the customer's home to check on the customer (referred to as the "doorbell ring" process) while hourly notification retries continued. If the customer did not provide confirmation to PG&E following the check-in, the PG&E representative left a door hanger providing additional PSPS notification and information at the home to indicate PG&E had visited. In each case, the additional door hanger notification was considered a positive successful notification.[27]

At times, PG&E also made Live Agent phone calls in parallel to the automated notifications and doorbell rings, as an additional attempt to reach the customer prior to and/or after de-energization.

[26] Including MBL customers who are master-metered tenants (e.g., renters or tenants in mobile home park).
[27] For MBL and SIV customers, an in-person door ring visit where a door hanger is left, but no contact is made with the customer is considered "successful contact," but not "received." If the PG&E representative makes contact with the customer, then it is considered "received."

PG&E shared the lists of the MBL and SIV customers who had not confirmed receipt of their notifications with the appropriate county and tribal emergency managers twice daily via the PSPS Portal. PG&E proactively notified agencies that the data was available on the PSPS Portal and encouraged them to inform these customers of the resources available to them. PG&E is unable to track and report on notifications made by Public Safety Partners, as notification systems and/or platforms used by Public Safety Partners are out of PG&E's purview; PG&E encourages Public Safety Partners to include PSPS messages on all of their platforms. PG&E describes its engagement with Public Safety Partners in Section 6.

Section 5.4 - A copy or scripts of all notifications with a list of all languages that each type of notification was provided in, the timing of notifications, the methods of notifications and who made the notifications (the utility or local public safety partners). *(D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A23, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
For a copy of the notification templates, the timing of the notifications and methods of notifications that PG&E sent during the October 14, 2026, PSPS, see attachment, "*PGE_PSPS_Notifications _20261014.pdf.*" For additional information on the timing of notifications sent during this PSPS, see Table 4 in the attachment *"PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20261014."*

PG&E provides tribal, county, city, CCAs, Public Safety Partner, and Transmission-level customer notifications in English only. All other customer notifications are delivered in-language if a customer's language preference is on file. If there is no language preference on file, the notification is delivered in English, with information on how to access and receive PSPS information in translated languages. Non-English languages requested for this PSPS were Spanish, Chinese (Mandarin and Cantonese), Russian, Korean, Farsi, Hmong, Vietnamese, Thai, Tagalog.

Section 5.5 - If the utility fails to provide notifications according to the minimum timelines set forth in D.19-05-042 and D.21-06-034, using the following template to report a breakdown of the notification failure and an explanation of what caused the failure. This applies to both de-energization and non de-energization events. For non-de-energization event, the starting time of the first Period of Concern is the anticipated de-energization time to assess notification failure. If a circuit is de-energized multiple times during an event, the utility must include notification failures for the multiple de-energizations. The explanation must be specific. (D.21-06-014 page 286, SED Additional Information.)

Response:
PG&E makes a substantial effort to provide notifications whenever possible and to the extent it is operationally feasible in accordance with the PSPS Phase 1, Phase 3 and 2019 PSPS OII guidelines within the CPUC's minimum timeline requirements, weather and other factors permitting.[28] The notification guidelines set forth in the Phase 1 Guidelines are not a strict liability standard and state that "the electric investor owned utilities should, whenever possible, adhere to the following minimum notification timeline…" Additionally, pursuant to ESRB-8, the CPUC has stated that it is not practicable to have an absolute requirement that electric IOUs provide advanced

[28] D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.

notifications to customers prior to a PSPS and that "it is an impossible feat of anticipating every emergency situation resulting in pro-active de-energization."[29]

Table 6: Breakdown of Notification Failure

Notifications Sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Account	Explanation of Failure
Public Safety Partners excluding CFI[30]	**Entities who did not receive 48-to 72-hour priority notification**	100*	See Table 6A for explanations.
	Entities who did not receive 24-48 hour advance notification	8*	See Table 6B for explanations.
	Entities who did not receive 1-4-hour imminent notification	28	See Table 6C for explanations.
	Entities who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	0	No failures.
	Entities who were not notified at de-energization initiation	28	See Table 6E for explanations.
	Entities who were not notified immediately before re-energization	5	See Table 6F for explanations.
	Entities who were not notified when re-energization is complete	62	See Table 6G for explanations.
	Entities who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	2	See Table 6H for explanations.
CFI[31]	**Facilities who did not receive 48-72-hour priority notification**	1,341*	See Table 6A for explanations.
	Facilities who did not receive 24-48 hour advance notification	479	See Table 6B for explanations.
	Facilities who did not receive 1-4-hour imminent notification	230	See Table 6C for explanations.
	Facilities who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	6**	See Table 6D for explanations.

[29] ESRB-8, p. 5, D.19-05-042, pp. 84-86, Finding of Fact 22 at p. 118.
[30] Only includes tribes, cities, counties, and CCAs.
[31] Includes Public Safety Partners who are CFI customers.

Notifications Sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Account	Explanation of Failure
	Facilities who were not notified at de-energization initiation	68	See Table 6E for explanations.
	Facilities who were not notified immediately before re-energization	28	See Table 6F for explanations.
	Facilities who were not notified when re-energization is complete	84	See Table 6G for explanations.
	Facilities who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	0	No failures.
All other affected customers	**Customers who did not receive 24-48-hour advance notifications**	25,412	See Table 6B for explanations.
	Customers who did not receive 1-4-hour imminent notifications	5,903	See Table 6C for explanations.
	Customers who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	451**	See Table 6D for explanations.
	Customers who were not notified at de-energization initiation	2,887	See Table 6E for explanations.
	Customers who were not notified immediately before re-energization	840	See Table 6F for explanations.
	Customers who were not notified when re-energization is complete	3,178	See Table 6G for explanations.
	Customers who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	14	See Table 6H for explanations.

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

**This category is duplicative with other notification failure categories in this report, meaning all customers reported in this category are already included in the count of notification failures PG&E reported for the more specific notification categories. As a result, the count from this category should not be included in the sum of total notification failures for this PSPS.

Table 6A: Explanation of Failures for Agency Entities and CFI Who Did Not Receive 48- to 72-Hour Priority Notification.

Total Agency Entities	Total CFI	Explanation
100	1,331	These Public Safety Partners were added to PSPS scope based on updated weather forecasts after the applicable Priority Notification window had passed. As a result, it was not possible to issue Priority Notifications to these Public Safety Partners. *
0	10	PG&E was unable to send these customers notifications as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06 034.)

Table 6B: Explanation of Failures for Agency Entities, CFI, and All Other Customers Who Did Not Receive 24-to 48-Hour Watch Notification.

Total Agency Entities	Total CFI	Total Other Customers	Explanation
0	3	66	These customers did not receive any notifications prior to de-energization: due to data errors in PG&E's PSPS scoping systems, we were not aware that these customers would be impacted by this PSPS until after the start of their PSPS outage.
0	1	0	This transmission-level entity was not notified during the 24-to 48-Hour window because they were not included in the notification file. However, PG&E sent a premature Watch notification to this customer approximately 96 minutes prior to the start of this compliance window, and also notified this customer approximately 4 hours after the end of this compliance window. PG&E is still investigating the root cause of this error and will report our findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report.
0	2	0	These transmission-level entities did not receive any notifications through PG&E's normal notification process because they were not included in our notification files. PG&E is still investigating the root cause of this error and will report our findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report. These customers were later removed from scope and were not de-energized for this PSPS.

0	0	60	PG&E is still investigating the cause of this error and will report findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report.
8	467	24,897	These agencies and customers were added to PSPS scope based on updated weather forecasts after the applicable Watch Notification window had passed. As a result, it was not possible to issue Watch Notifications to these agencies and customers. *
0	6	376	PG&E was unable to send these customers notifications as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*
0	0	13	There was no active customer to notify during this notification window. Responsibility for service began after this notification window. *

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06 034.)

Table 6C: Explanation of Failures for Agency Entities, CFI, and All Other Customers Who Did Not Receive 1-to 4-Hour Imminent Notification.

Total Agency Entities	Total CFI	Total Other Customers	Explanation
0	4	120	These customers did not receive any notifications prior to de-energization: due to data errors in PG&E's PSPS scoping systems, we were not aware that these customers would be impacted by this PSPS until after the start of their PSPS outage.
15	0	0	These agencies did not receive 1-4 Hour Imminent Notification because they were not included in PG&E's notification files. PG&E is still investigating the root cause of this error and will report our findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report.
8	0	0	These agencies received premature 1-4 Hour Imminent Notification due to a data error – a customer with earlier planned de-energization time was incorrectly assigned to the agency's jurisdiction. Since PG&E only notifies each agency of 1-4 Hour Imminent Notification once, based on the timing of the earliest customer outage within their jurisdiction, this meant the 1-4 Hour Imminent Notification was sent prematurely and not re-sent during the correct notification window.
0	0	1	This customer did not receive any notifications prior to de-energization due to

			data errors in PG&E's active customer datasets: those incorrectly indicated this customer had not started service yet.
0	104	102	PG&E is still investigating the cause of this error and will report findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report.
5	120	5,340	These agencies and customers did not receive 1-4 Hour Imminent notifications due to real time weather materializing faster than forecasted, which required de energization to occur significantly earlier than initially scoped and before PG&E could launch these notifications.*
0	2	326	PG&E was unable to send these customers notifications as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*
0	0	10	These customers were active during this compliance window but started service after PG&E's last plan used for pre-outage notifications and thus could not be notified prior to de-energization.*
0	0	4	There was no active customer to notify during this notification window. Responsibility for service began after this notification window but prior to de-energization. *

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06 034.)

Table 6D: Explanation of Failures for CFI and All Other Customers Who Did Not Receive Any Notifications Before De-Energization.

Total CFI	Total Other Customers	Explanation
4	120	These customers did not receive any notifications prior to de-energization: due to data errors in PG&E's PSPS scoping systems, we were not aware that these customers would be impacted by this PSPS until after the start of their PSPS outage.
0	1	This customer did not receive any notifications prior to de-energization due to data errors in PG&E's active customer datasets: those incorrectly indicated this customer had not started service yet.
0	5	PG&E is still investigating the cause of this error and will report findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report.

2	312	PG&E was unable to send these customers notifications as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*
0	9	These customers started service after PG&E's last plan used for pre-outage notifications and thus could not be notified prior to de-energization. However, they started service prior to de-energization so are still reported as de-energized customers.*
0	4	There was no active customer to notify during any of the pre-outage notification windows. Responsibility for service began after the last pre-outage notification window but prior to de-energization. *

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06 034.)

Table 6E: Explanation of Failures for Agency Entities, CFI, and All Other Customers Who Did Not Receive Power Off Notification.

Total Agency Entities	Total CFI	Total Other Customers	Explanation
4	0	0	These CCA contacts received delayed Power Off notification due to a system logic error in PG&E's automated in-outage notification systems.
1	0	0	This agency received a premature Power Off Notification due to a data error – a customer with earlier actual de-energization time was incorrectly assigned to the agency's jurisdiction. Since PG&E only notifies each agency of de-energization initiation once, based on the timing of the earliest customer outage within their jurisdiction, this meant the Power Off Notification was sent prematurely and not re-sent during the correct notification window.
5	0	0	These agencies received premature Power Off notification due to human error – a non-PSPS outage was manually designated as PSPS within PG&E's outage management platform, which triggered automated Power Off notifications to these agencies. These agencies then did not receive a Power Off when PSPS outages actually began within their jurisdiction.
0	29	1,236	A manual step needed to deploy these notifications was delayed due to human error.
0	21	944	These customers received a late Power Off notification due to a delay in manually

			reporting their de-energization initiation in PG&E's outage management platform. The subsequent manual step to trigger their Power Off notification was completed promptly after the de-energization initiation was reported.
0	9	316	These customers did not receive any notifications during or after their outage: due to data errors in PG&E's outage management platform, these customers were not registered as experiencing any outage and thus no automated notifications were generated for them. One of these CFI was a COL customer and was notified immediately before re-energization with a manual notification.
18	1	2	These customers received a late Power Off notification because their de-energization was initiated by a third party, and PG&E was not informed of de-energization in time to meet Power Off notifications requirements.* We are only able to manually report their de-energization in PG&E's internal outage management system to trigger Power Off notifications after PG&E is informed by the non-PG&E party.
0	6	72	PG&E is still investigating the cause of this error and will report findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report.
0	2	317	PG&E was unable to send these customers notifications as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06 034.)

Table 6F: Explanation of Failures for Agency Entities, CFI, and All Other Customers Not Notified Immediately Before Re-Energization.

Total Agency Entities	Total CFI	Total Other Customers	Explanation
5	0	0	These agencies were not notified immediately before re-energization due to a system logic error with PG&E's automatic in-outage notification system.
0	8	316	These customers did not receive any automated notifications during or after their outage: due to data errors in PG&E's outage management platform, these customers were not registered as experiencing any outage and thus no automated notifications were generated for them.
0	9	139	During this PSPS, PG&E became aware of a system logic error in our notification vendor's systems which would result in some customers receiving an estimated time of restoration (ETOR) of January 1, 2027. This error only impacted a particular type of notification generated by PG&E's automated in-outage notification systems. To prevent additional customers from receiving this incorrect ETOR, PG&E chose to stop automated in-outage notifications for some customers and notify them using an alternative manual method. Most customers targeted for the manual notifications were successfully notified immediately before re-energization. However, these 9 critical and 139 non-critical customers did not receive that manual notification and thus were not notified immediately before re-energization because the manual notification honored customer opt-outs and other communication preferences.
0	9	76	PG&E is still investigating the cause of this error and will report findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report.
0	2	309	PG&E was unable to send these customers notifications as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06 034.)

Table 6G: Explanation of Failures for Agency Entities, CFI, and All Other Customers Not Notified When Re-Energization is Complete.

Total Agency Entities	Total CFI	Total Other Customers	Explanation
45	0	0	These agencies received a delayed notification after re-energization was complete in their jurisdictions: they were not automatically notified when re-energization was complete due to a system logic error with PG&E's automatic in-outage notification system. Once PG&E detected this issue, we generated manual notifications to these agencies but these were delayed. PG&E is still investigating the root cause of this error and will report our findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report.
14	0	0	These agencies were not automatically notified when re-energization was complete due to a system logic error with PG&E's automatic in-outage notification system. PG&E is still investigating the root cause of this error and will report our findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report.
1	0	0	This agency received a delayed Restore Notification due to a data error – a customer with later re-energization time was incorrectly assigned to the agency's jurisdiction. Since PG&E only notifies each agency of re-energization once, based on the timing of the last customer to be restored within their jurisdiction, this meant the Restore Notification wasn't sent until the incorrectly-assigned customer was restored.
2	0	0	These CCA contacts received a premature Restore notification due to a system logic error in PG&E's automated in-outage notification systems. A Restore notification was not re-sent after re-energization was completed in that CCA's county.
0	9	316	These customers did not receive any automated notifications during or after their outage: due to data errors in PG&E's outage management platform, these customers were

			not registered as experiencing any outage and thus no automated notifications were generated for them. One of these CFI was a COL customer and was notified immediately before re-energization with a manual notification.
0	29	967	These customers received a delayed notification of outage restoration because the transfer or launch of this notification was delayed due to system issues.
0	13	513	These customers received a delayed notification of outage restoration due to a delay in manually reporting their outage restoration in PG&E's outage management platform – that step is what triggers automated outage restoration notifications for the recently-restored customers.
0	31	1,069	PG&E is still investigating the cause of this error and will report findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report.
0	2	313	PG&E was unable to send these customers notifications as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06 034.)

Table 6H: Explanation of Failures for Agency Entities and All Other Customers Not Notified Within Two Hours of the Decision to Cancel.

Total Agency Entities	Total Other Customers	Explanation
2	0	These agencies did not receive a cancel notification due to data errors: PG&E made the decision to descope all customers within the incorporated city and sent cancellation notifications for those customers. However, a customer outside the incorporated city was incorrectly assigned to that city – thus, PG&E did not realize at the time that this city had been descoped and thus did not send cancel notifications to these city agencies.
0	13	PG&E is still investigating the cause of this error and will report findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report.

0	1	This customer was removed from scope because they stopped service, therefore, there was no active customer to notify of cancellation. * This customer then became active again prior to de-energization: thus, they are considered a de-energized customer and are not a false positive communication.

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06 034.)

Section 5.6 - Explain how the utility will correct the notification failures. *(D.21-06-014, page 286.)*

Response:
We have reviewed the notification failures and false communications for this PSPS and have begun to identify the following corrective actions in Table 7.

Table 7: Notification Failure and False Communications Corrective Actions

Issue	Discussion	Resolution	Status
PSPS Scoping System Data Error	These customers did not receive any notifications prior to de-energization. Due to data errors in PG&E's PSPS scoping systems, we were not aware these customers would be impacted by the PSPS until after the start of their PSPS outage.	Update our transformer mapping data used for PSPS scoping for these customers.	In Progress
Delayed Power Off Notification	A manual step needed to deploy these notifications was delayed due to human error.	Formalize process for in-outage monitoring and correction to resolve this error before it can cause a significant notification delay.	In Progress
Outage Data Management Platform Data Errors	These customers did not receive any automated notifications during or after their outage: due to data errors in PG&E's outage management platform, these customers were not registered as experiencing any outage and thus no automated notifications were generated for them	Update our transformer mapping data used by PG&E's outage management platform for these customers to correct this data error.	In Progress
System Logic Error in Notification Vendor's System	During this PSPS, PG&E became aware of a system logic error in our notification vendor's systems which would result in some customers receiving an estimated time of	Notification vendor updated their internal system logic.	Completed

Issue	Discussion	Resolution	Status
	restoration (ETOR) of January 1, 2027.		
Customer Data Error	Some city agencies experienced notification failures and false communications because customers located outside the incorporated city were incorrectly assigned to the city.	Updating city notification logic to use asset-based location data.	In Progress

Beyond the corrective actions identified above, we are in the process of identifying additional corrective actions for other notification failures and false communications identified in Section 5.5 and Section 5.7 and will be included this information in our 2026 PSPS Post-Season Report.

Section 5.7 - Enumerate and explain the cause of any false communications citing the sources of changing data. Describe the situations at-issue, which involve the level of perceived defect in notice, in specific detail. *(D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 4.)*

Response:
For this PSPS, we identified 5,086 cases of false positive communications and 1,984 cases of false negative communications. See Table 8 and 9 for explanations of false positive and negative communications.

Table 8: Explanations of False Positive Communications

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Explanation
0	49	2,591	These customers were notified of PSPS but were not de-energized and were not cancelled. These customers were not within PSPS scope and therefore could not be removed from scope. Thus, they did not require any PSPS notifications and did not incur any notifications failures. However, because they were notified of PSPS impact but were not de-energized, this resulted in false positive communications.
0	0	13	These customers were notified of future PSPS impact but were not counted as de-energized PSPS customers and did not receive cancellation notifications. The reason they did not receive cancellation notifications is still under investigation, as discussed in Table 6H.
2	0	0	These agencies failed to receive cancellation notifications due to a data error, as discussed in Table 6H. These agencies also received false positive communication of active de-energization due to the same data error.

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Explanation
5	7	438	These agencies and customers received Power Off notifications after their PSPS outage was already restored, which falsely notified of a new PSPS de-energization. In reality, these agencies and customers were only de-energized once during this PSPS. PG&E is still investigating the cause of this error and will report findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report.
0	3	399	These customers were not planned for PSPS de-energization in our final scope, but experienced an outage of approximately 7.7 hours because they were abnormally fed from a different circuit that was de-energized for PSPS. Since these customers were not in scope for PSPS, PG&E was able to re-energize them after detecting this issue. PG&E does not consider these customers to be de-energized for PSPS because they were not in scope for PSPS and because their outage duration was much shorter than what they would have experienced if de-energized for this PSPS. However, these customers received PSPS Power Off notifications because they were downstream of a PSPS outage in PG&E's outage management platform, and thus are considered false positive communications. Furthermore, 40 non-critical customers in this group also received false positive communications of future planned PSPS impact prior to their non-PSPS outage: these customers were previously in scope and notified of potential PSPS impact, then descoped and received cancelation notifications. However, the Watch notification retries or in-person doorbell rings for these 40 customers extended past their cancel notification – thus, the last notification received by these 40 customers prior to their non-PSPS outage was a false positive Watch or doorbell ring instead of the intended cancel notification.

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Explanation
2	0	0	These agencies received a false positive notification of de-energization initiation due to a data error: a de-energized customer was incorrectly associated with their city and triggered these agency Power Off notifications when the customer's Power Off notification were created. None of the customers de-energized for this PSPS were actually within this incorporated city.
9	0	0	These tribes received a false positive notification of de-energization initiation due a system logic error with PG&E's automated in-outage notification system, which resulted in PSPS in-outage notifications to tribes which were not actually de-energized for PSPS.
0	0	15	These customers received false positive notification of de-energization initiation but were not de-energized for PSPS. PG&E is still investigating the cause of this error and will report findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report.
1	0	0	As explained in Table 6E: this agency received a premature Power Off Notification due to a data error – a customer with earlier actual de-energization time was incorrectly assigned to the agency's jurisdiction. As a result, this agency was falsely informed of active de-energization while not actively de-energized for PSPS.
5	3	278	These customers experienced a non-PSPS outage prior to their PSPS outage, but this non-PSPS outage was incorrectly classified as a PSPS outage due to human error which triggered false positive Power Off notifications for these customers. Since no real PSPS de-energizations had occurred in their county yet, these customer false positive communications also triggered false positive Power Off notifications for the 5 agencies in that county. These customers and the county agencies were later de-energized for PSPS during this event. However, Power Off notifications were not sent again for these 5 agencies, resulting in a notification failure as reported in Table 6E.
0	0	1,077	These MBL and SIV customers were notified of planned PSPS de-energization, then removed from

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Explanation
			scope and sent cancelation notifications. However, PG&E's additional notification attempts and in-person doorbell ring visits for MBL and SIV customers did not stop when these cancelation notifications were sent. As a result, the last notification these customers received from PG&E was a false positive notification of planned de-energization from one of these lingering attempts, instead of the cancelation notification which had been the last new notification launched by PG&E.
0	1	0	This transmission-level entity mitigated from PSPS impact by PG&E's Caribou transmission island but was notified of planned PSPS impact. This transmission-level entity was never planned for full PSPS de-energization and thus was not removed from scope and did not require cancelation notifications.
0	1	27	These customers were incorrectly scoped for PSPS impact: due to data errors in PG&E's PSPS scoping systems, we expected these customers to be de-energized in this PSPS and only discovered the error when these customers remained energized after de-energization initiation for their circuit segments. These customers did not require cancelation notifications because PG&E never made the decision to remove them from scope. However, our notifications of planned PSPS impact are now considered false positive communications because these customers were not de-energized.
0	13	134	These customers were mitigated from PSPS de energization using PG&E-provided backup generation. However, they received PSPS notifications both prior to and during their avoided PSPS de-energization. PG&E does not believe this is a compliance violation as the recipients of backup generation would be aware of their mitigation from PSPS and thus would not be negatively impacted by the PSPS pre outage and in outage notifications. Furthermore, they did not

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Explanation
			require Cancellation Notifications because PG&E did not remove them from scope. *
0	1	0	This customer was partially mitigated from PSPS de-energization using PG&E-provided backup generation. The mitigation ended before their portion of their circuit was restored from PSPS: as a result, this customer experienced a shorter PSPS outage which started when the mitigation ended and ended when their portion of the circuit was restored from PSPS. However, this customer received a notification of de-energization initiation when their portion of the circuit was de-energized, which is significantly earlier than the start of their unmitigated outage period. Thus, this premature notification of de-energization initiation appears to be false positive. However, PG&E does not believe this is a compliance violation as the recipients of backup generation would be aware of their mitigation from PSPS and thus would not be negatively impacted by that premature notification of de-energization initiation. *
0	0	4	These customers were notified of planned PSPS impact and remained in PG&E's planned PSPS scope but their responsibility for service stopped before de-energization. These customers did not require cancelation notifications because PG&E never made the decision to remove them from scope. Our notifications of planned PSPS impact now appear to be false positive communications because inactive customers are not considered de-energized customers: however, PG&E does not consider these to be false positive communications because there is no longer an active customer at those locations to be negatively impacted.*
0	1	0	This transmission-level entity had already been disconnected prior to the PSPS event, and thus did not experience any new outage from the PSPS. They received notifications of planned de-energization which now appear to be false positive

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Explanation
			communications because this transmission-level entity is not considered a de-energized customer. However, PG&E does not consider these to be false positive communications because the transmission-level entity would be aware that they were already disconnected prior to the PSPS and thus would not be negatively impacted by the notifications of planned de-energization. *
0	2	0	These transmission-level entities were required to come off-line to ensure stability of the Caribou transmission island, but were not de-energized for PSPS. However, they were notified of planned PSPS de-energization, which then become false positive communications because these customers were not de-energized for PSPS.
1	0	0	This city was de-energized but had no agency contacts signed up to receive PSPS notifications. PG&E uses agency contact signups to determine the list of agencies associated with each jurisdiction. Due to confusion over agency and jurisdiction associations, this agency was manually notified of de-energization initiation for this city despite not signing up for PSPS notifications for this city. PG&E does not consider this a false communication because the notification was factually accurate, even though it was unnecessary. *
1	0	0	This agency only had one contact signed up to receive PSPS notifications. After receiving 1-4 Hour Imminent notifications but prior to de-energization for their jurisdiction, this agency contact (and thus their agency overall) was no longer signed up to receive PSPS notifications. Since PG&E uses agency contact signups to determine the list of agencies associated with each jurisdiction, this creates an apparent false positive communication because the count of notified agencies for that jurisdiction is now 1 agency higher than the count of de-energized agencies. However, PG&E does not consider this a true false positive communication because this mid-event change in agency contact signups does not

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Explanation
			represent a true error in PG&E's notification performance.*
0	0	3	These customers were not active at de-energization initiation so they are not considered de-energized for PSPS, but were notified of active de-energization because our active customer datasets used for PSPS notifications prematurely reflected their start of service or delayed implementation of their end of service. PG&E does not believe this to be a false communication because the customer would be aware that their service had not started yet or had already ended, and thus should not be negatively impacted by these notifications.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be false communications as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Table 9: Explanations of False Negative Communications

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Explanation
7	48	1,929	These agencies and customers received a premature notification of outage restoration, falsely communicating that the PSPS outage had ended. PG&E is still investigating the cause of this error and will report our findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report.

*PG&E does not consider these to be false communications as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Section 6 – Local and State Public Safety Partner Engagement

Section 6.1 – List the organization names of public safety partners including, but not limited to, local governments, tribal representatives, first responders and emergency management, and critical facilities and infrastructure the utility contacted in anticipation to de-energization of Period of Concern, the date and time on which they were contacted, and whether the areas affected by the de-energization are classified as Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 as per the definition in CPUC General Order 95, Rule 21.2-D. *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
For a list of Public Safety Partners including tribal representatives, local governments, first responders and emergency management, and critical facilities notified with the date and time of the initial notification, and whether the areas affected by the de-energization are classified as Zone 1, Tier 2 or Tier 3, see Appendix D in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_ 20261014.*"

As seen in Appendix D, attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20261014,*" we use a High Fire Risk Area (HFRA) classification which we utilize in addition to HFTD to determine PSPS scope. PG&E's circuits can run miles long and span across multiple jurisdictions. Some Public Safety Partners outside of HFRA and HFTD were also in the potentially impacted scope in order to de-energize areas within HFRA and HFTD for safety.

Section 6.2 - List the names of all entities invited to the utility's Emergency Operations Center for a PSPS event, the method used to make this invitation, and whether a different form of communication was preferred by any entity invited to the utility's emergency operation center. *(D.21-06-014, page 289.)*

Response:
PG&E invited the CPUC via email to virtually embed in the EOC for the duration of the activation on October 12, 2026, at 16:07 PDT. The EOC originally opened on October 8, 2026, for the October 10, 2026 PSPS, and remained activated for the October 14, 2026 PSPS.

Cal OES Coastal Region embedded 4 observers, a regional administrator and three emergency services coordinators, into PG&E's EOC on October 12, 2026. Other entities preferred to work with their PG&E point of contact directly and not embed in the EOC.

Additionally, telecommunications service providers are appointed a dedicated 24/7 PG&E contact in the EOC, the Critical Infrastructure Lead (CIL), who shared up-to-date PSPS information and answered individual questions. We proactively reached out to 19 telecommunications service providers[32] via email or phone as weather changes or new information regarding the PSPS became available.

[32] American Tower Corporation, AT&T Corporation, Cal Net Inc, CenturyLink Companies, Charter Communications, Comcast Corporation, Crown Castle International, Frontier Communications Corp, Mediacom California LLC, Northland Cable Television Inc, SBA Towers, Sebastian Communications, Suddenlink Communications, T-Mobile - Sprint, Verizon Wireless, Vertical Bridge - Verticle Bridge Towers, Volcano Enterprises, Wave Telecom, Western State Teleport

As part of our PSPS Pre-Season outreach,[33] we provide water infrastructure entities and communication services in PG&E's electrical service area with information on how to request representation at PG&E's EOC, when activated for PSPS. Alternatively, some partners may also request PG&E representation at their jurisdiction's activated Operations Emergency Center (OEC).[34] None of the entities invited to embed into our EOC indicated a preference for a different form of communication other than the ones already utilized.

Section 6.3 - A statement verifying the availability to public safety partners of accurate and timely geospatial information, and real time updates to the GIS shapefiles in preparation for an imminent PSPS event and during a PSPS event. In addition, list any accuracy or timeliness issues in making available the GIS shapefiles to public safety partners during the PSPS event from activation to full restoration. *(D.21-06-014, page 289.)*

Response:
In preparation for a potential PSPS, PG&E sent automated notifications with links to the PSPS Data Portal, which provides PDF maps and Geographic Information System (GIS) data to Public Safety Partners at the times outlined in Table 4 in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20261014.*" In addition, when PDF maps and GIS data were updated on the PSPS Data Portal due to scope changes, users were notified via e-mail at the times outlined in Table 10.

PDF maps and GIS data on the PSPS Data Portal were determined to be accurate and updated in a timely manner following changes to geographic scope or customer impacts.

Table 10: PSPS Data Portal Map Sharing (Date and Time)

Date	Time PDF and GIS Maps Shared (PDT)
10/12/2026	17:29
10/13/2026	09:15
10/14/2026	01:51
10/15/2026	13:09
10/15/2026	17:25

Section 6.4 - A description and evaluation of engagement with local and state public safety partners in providing advanced outreach and notification during the PSPS event. *(D.19-05-042, Appendix, page A23.)*

Response:
Below is a description of the engagement with state CPUC, Cal OES, CAL FIRE, and local (i.e., tribes, counties, and cities) Public Safety Partners:

- Submitted the PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES twice a day (07:00 PDT and 15:00 PDT), if there was a significant change to scope and at least once for each of the five PSPS stages: Activating PSPS Protocols/Potential to De-energize (Stage 1), Decision to De-energize (Stage 2), De-energization Initiated (Stage 3), Initiating Re-energization

[33] See PG&E's 2026 PSPS Pre-Season Report, pp. 59 – 60.
[34] D.19-05-042.

Patrols (Stage 4) and All PSPS Lines Re-energized (Stage 5). See Table 11 for the date and time of notifications submitted to Cal OES.

Table 11: Notifications Submitted to Cal OES (Date and Time)

Date	Time Submitted (PDT)
10/12/2026	15:43
10/13/2026	07:00
10/13/2026	11:07
10/13/2026	14:21
10/14/2026	01:06
10/14/2026	06:45
10/14/2026	14:31
10/14/2026	17:31
10/14/2026	19:49
10/14/2026	20:19
10/14/2026	20:54
10/14/2026	22:55
10/14/2026	23:49
10/15/2026	00:57
10/15/2026	03:04
10/15/2026	04:02
10/15/2026	05:05
10/15/2026	06:49
10/15/2026	11:12
10/15/2026	14:50
10/16/2026	00:06
10/16/2026	06:55
10/16/2026	14:58
10/17/2026	06:59
10/17/2026	14:57
10/17/2026	19:37

- Sent e-mails to the CPUC at least once for each of the five PSPS stages listed above. See Table 12 for the date and time of notifications submitted to the CPUC.

Table 12: Notifications Submitted to CPUC (Date and Time)

Date	Time Submitted (PDT)
10/12/2026	16:07
10/13/2026	19:45
10/14/2026	01:34
10/14/2026	14:11
10/14/2026	17:01
10/14/2026	17:31
10/14/2026	19:45
10/14/2026	20:22

10/14/2026	20:54
10/14/2026	21:57
10/14/2026	22:44
10/14/2026	23:58
10/15/2026	00:43
10/15/2026	02:58
10/15/2026	03:40
10/15/2026	05:07
10/15/2026	07:49
10/15/2026	08:28
10/15/2026	10:59
10/15/2026	14:27
10/15/2026	23:55
10/16/2026	04:25
10/16/2026	05:09
10/16/2026	10:07
10/17/2026	19:31

- Hosted daily State Executive Briefings with invitees including Cal OES, CPUC, CAL FIRE, the Governor's Office, and other federal and state agencies to provide the latest PSPS information and answer questions. A presentation deck with key PSPS information was provided to participants.
- Hosted a daily Systemwide Cooperators Call, where all Public Safety Partners in the service area were invited to join for situational awareness.
- Hosted tribal Cooperators Calls with potentially impacted tribes to provide the latest PSPS information and answer questions.
- Hosted Operational Areas Cooperators Communication Calls to provide situational awareness updates and answer questions.[35]
- Conducted ongoing coordination with tribal and local county OES contacts through dedicated Agency Representatives. This includes but is not limited to providing the latest PSPS information, coordinating CRC locations, and resolving local issues in real-time.
- Provided links to the PSPS Data Portal that included planning and event-specific maps, situation reports, critical facility lists and MBL customer lists at each notification and when scope changed. The Situation Report was provided twice a day and at scope changes prior to de-energization and hourly once restoration began.
- Sent automated and live call notifications to agency partners before, during and after de-energization.
- Offered state and local agencies to be embedded in PG&E's EOC and offered PG&E Agency Representatives to embed virtually in local EOCs.

We consider our level of engagement with local and state Public Safety Partners during this EOC activation to be successful. This evaluation is based on the number and various types of outreach conducted (see list above), the feedback received from Public Safety Partners through the post-


[35] May vary in cadence and type based on County OES.

PSPS survey and the success rate of automated agency notifications. The following is a subset of comments PG&E received from in-scope Public Safety Partners regarding PSPS outreach:

- "We felt very supported. Our school was provided a temp power generation solution, allowing us to operate during the shutoff."
- "The battery packs are much appreciated and useful."
- "This one was ridiculous. We didn't even have a slight breeze."

Figure 33 shows the post-PSPS survey results when Public Safety Partners were asked to "evaluate PG&E engagement with your agency during the outage." We received 34 responses to the survey. We will report any late submissions to the survey in our 2026 PSPS Post-Season Report. We continue to look for opportunities for improvement and refine agency notifications to ensure accuracy and timely information sharing.

Figure 33: Evaluation of Public Safety Partner Engagement



Section 6.5 - Specific engagement with local communities regarding the notification and support provided to the AFN community. *(D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 8, SED Additional Information)*

Response:
To ensure PG&E provides adequate support to AFN customers, we engage with local communities through paratransit agencies, media partnerships, and CBOs to share coordination efforts, notifications plans, CRC information, PSPS-specific information and more. See below for details on this engagement.

Engagement with Paratransit Agencies

In accordance with the Phase 3 Guidelines,[36]PG&E provided proactive notifications and impacted zip code information to paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a CRC during the PSPS. All notifications included a link to PG&E's PSPSUpdates Page, and an "Additional Resources" link to maps showing potentially affected areas. For more information on Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) compliant CRC locations, see Section 9.

Community Engagement

We engaged with approximately 375 "information-based" CBOs during this PSPS, sharing courtesy notification updates, fact sheets, and other relevant information to share with their constituents to expand our reach of communications, including videos, social media and other relevant PSPS support services, that organizations could use to educate their consumers. CBO resource partners were invited to the daily cooperator calls provided to Public Safety Partners. These calls are hosted by members from PG&E who provided a situational update about the latest scope of the PSPS and an overview of the services available to customers. We hosted additional daily coordination calls with CBO resource partners supporting the PSPS to provide an open forum to answer questions, offer suggestions regarding how they can best support their consumer supports and facilitate more localized coordination among the partners.

Programs/Support for AFN Customers
We are dedicated to providing a variety of resources and programs to AFN customers before and during a PSPS through several partnerships and contracts maintained by PG&E. For more information about these resources and partnerships, see the 2026 AFN Plan.

See Table 13 for the support provided during the October 14, 2026 PSPS.

[36] D.21-06-034.

Table 13: AFN Customer Programs and Support

Resource/Program	Resources Provided
Disability Disaster Access and Resource Program (DDAR)	Partnered with 9 local ILCs across 29 counties to provide aid to 951 customers who rely on power for medical or independent living needs, including: • 54 hotel accommodations • 42 food voucher(s) • 89 generator fuel voucher(s) • 2 accessible transportation • 52 batteries • 144 batteries previously distributed in impacted counties
PBP	Supported 1,803 customers in scope by providing batteries through the PBP. Since July 2020, over 30,540 battery units have been delivered through the PBP across our service area.
Food Bank Partnerships	Partnered with 29 local food banks that serve 25 counties to provide boxes of food for families.
Meals on Wheels Partnerships	Partnered with 20 Meals on Wheels Organizations in 12 counties to provide services to customers in scope for the de-energization.
California 211 (CA 211) Providers Network	Partnered with 12 CA 211 network centers across 26 counties to assist 1,972 customers with resources. The direct assistance resources provided during this activation included: • 834 food voucher(s) • 81 hotel accommodations • 10 water bladder • 111 generator fuel voucher(s) • 4 accessible transportation • 4 temp controlled storage bags • 3 50 ft extension cords
Accessible Transportation Partnerships	Partnered with four organizations across eight counties in preparation for the possibility of any transportation needs.[37] Any area that was not in scope for our accessible transportation partners is deferred as AFN transportation requests to our DDAR and CA 211 Network Providers, who also provide transportation assistance.
Haven of Hope on Wheels	We partnered with Haven of Hope on Wheels in Butte County to deploy services including portable laundry and shower services.
Ad-Hoc AFN Backup Generation Solutions	We granted temporary generation exceptions to five AFN customers experiencing critical circumstances. This included transportation limitations and medical device requirements that CBO resources were unable to resolve during this PSPS. After exploring all viable options, PG&E delivered backup generation to these individuals

[37] PG&E partnered with Fresno Economic Opportunities Commission, El Dorado Transit, Dignity Health Connected Living, and Vivalon during this PSPS.

Resource/Program	Resources Provided
	who rely on power for their health and safety. These specific situations do not meet our typical temporary generation process and procedures standards. However, given the unique circumstances, we went beyond our usual practices to ensure safety for our customers.

Communications to Customers with Limited English Proficiency

We provided translated customer support through our customer notifications, website, call center, social media, engagement with CBOs, and multicultural media partnerships. Customers with their language preference set received in-language (translated) notifications.
For customers with no language preference set, notifications were provided in English with information on how to receive PSPS information in 15 non-English languages. Customers with limited English proficiency have access to translation phone numbers on our PSPS website, highlighting that translation services are available in over 200 languages.

We will provide number of requests we received for information in non-English languages supported by our Call Center Translation Services in our 2026 PSPS Post-Season Data Report.

PG&E continued support and engagement with multi-cultural media organizations and in-language CBOs to maximize the reach of in-language communications to the public. Prior to the PSPS, we reached out to 41 multicultural media organizations to provide outreach in translated languages throughout the impacted counties. Additionally, we shared information and updates on PSPS with these media outlets, including news releases and social media infographics in English, translated languages and ASL, for their use and distribution. We also shared our new (available in 16 languages) with organizations to share with their constituents.

Section 6.6 - Provide the following information on backup power (including mobile backup power) with the name and email address of a utility contact for customers for each of the following topics: (D.21-06-014, page 300.)

Response:
The information requested is included in Sections 6.6a – 6.6f. For questions related to backup power, customers can email TempGenPSPSSupport@pge.com.

Section 6.6a. Description of the backup generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

Response:
Table 14 lists the generators available for CFI customers before and during this PSPS.

Table 14: Generators Available for CFI Customers

Number of Units	Individual Size (MW)	Run Time (Hrs.)[38]	Description
2	0.032	37.6	Two units on reserve in Sacramento
1	0.036	37.6	One unit on reserve in Sacramento
1	0.056	50.0	One unit on reserve in Sacramento
3	0.065	31.0	Three units on reserve in San Leandro
5	0.100	25.3	Five units on reserve in Sacramento
1	0.125	25.0	One unit on reserve in San Leandro
3	0.150	30.3	Three units on reserve in Sacramento
4	0.200	22.9	Four units on reserve in San Leandro
1	0.230	22.9	One unit on reserve in San Leandro
1	0.275	26.0	One unit on reserve in Sacramento
3	0.500	24.1	Three units on reserve in Sacramento
7	1.00	35.0	Seven units on reserve in Sacramento
6	1.140	24.0	Six units on reserve in San Leandro
7	1.500	10.0	Seven units on reserve in Benicia
22	2.000	27.7	Twenty-two units on reserve (eight in Sacramento and twelve in San Leandro)

6.6b. The capacity and estimated maximum duration of operation of the backup generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

Response:
Table 14 lists the power capacity and maximum duration of operation of the generators available for CFI customers before and during this PSPS.

6.6c. The total number of backup generators provided to critical facility and infrastructure customer's site immediately before and during the PSPS.

Response:

[38] Estimated based on a 75% load. Barring mechanical failure and refueling the temporary generators have the ability to operate continuously throughout a typical PSPS.

During and immediately before the PSPS, 12 backup generators were activated to energize CFI customers that did not have an existing mitigation plan in place.

6.6d. How the utility deployed this backup generation to the critical facility and infrastructure customer's site.

Response:
As a general policy, PG&E does not offer backup generation to individual facilities. However, PG&E's policy grants exceptions for critical facilities when a prolonged outage could have a significant adverse impact to public health or safety.

Deployment of temporary generation is contingent upon the following circumstances: the expected duration to perform permanent repairs is significantly longer than the expected duration to install backup generation, the expected customer outage is collectively 50,000 or more customer minutes, and the outage affects a Distribution circuit serving multiple customers without a functional back-tie.[39]

PG&E has pre-arranged commitments with critical facility and infrastructure customers to provide temporary generation in case of a PSPS and evaluated requests received during this PSPS according to the prioritization described in Section 6.6e.

6.6e. An explanation of how the utility prioritized how to distribute available backup generation.

Response:
PG&E prioritizes the deployment of available generation by first meeting existing commitments to individual facilities in the following order:

- High Risk to Public Safety (Examples):
  - Facilities that support public safety, such as but not limited to, first/ emergencyresponders at the tribal, local, state, and federal level, water, wastewater assets, and city or county EOC.
- High Risk of Environmental Hazard (Examples):
  - Chemical plant which may risk spilling into a local river.
- High Risk to Essential Emergency Response and Supporting Facilities (Examples):
  - 911 call center.
  - Water pump availability compromises active firefighting by emergency service personnel.
  - Critical telecommunications equipment or other support businesses that directly affect emergency services provisions.
  - Affected community choice aggregators, publicly owned utilities/electrical cooperatives, the CPUC, the California Governor's OES, city or county EOC,and the CAL FIRE.

[39] 50,000 customer minutes is approximately equivalent to 100 customers for about eight hours.

Deployment of available generation is then followed by customers with special needs in the following order:

- Life support, MBL Program, and temperature sensitivity.
- Large customers, economic damage customers, and danger to health and safety customers.

Deployment of available generation is then followed by other customers based on maximizing relief based on the number of customers times expected duration.

6.6f. Identify the critical facility and infrastructure customers that received backup generation.

Response:
During this PSPS, PG&E utilized its rental fleet of temporary generators to mitigate the impacts of PSPS on its customers. This fleet was used to deploy 13 units to support 11 stand-alone facilities serving public safety. CFI customers that received backup generation are listed in Table 15.

Table 15: CFI Customers that Received Backup Generation

County	Site Type	Generation Deployed (MW)	Duration of Operation (Hours)	Reason Deployed
Alameda	Berkeley Unified	0.200	38:09:00	Public Safety
Amador	Amador County Unified School District	0.125	35:56:00	Public Safety
Calaveras*	Vallecito Union School District	0.150	42:39:00	Public Safety
Calaveras*	Vallecito Union School District	0.150	42:39:00	Public Safety
Fresno	Kings Canyon Unified	0.230	20:54:00	Public Safety
Fresno	Kings Canyon Unified	0.200	19:42:00	Public Safety
Kern	West Kern Water District	0.065	0:00	High Risk to Public Safety
Kern	El Tejon School	0.100	Intermittent	Public Safety
Lake	Konocti Unified School District	0.500	32:10:00	Public Safety
Napa	St. Helena Hospital Domestic Water Plant	0.100	27:12:00	High Risk to Public Safety
Santa Barbara	Cuyama Elementary School	0.400	42:28:00	Public Safety
Tehama	Antelope School District	0.100	43:44:00	Public Safety
Tuolumne	Mi Wuk Village Water Co.	0.350	29:00:00	High Risk to Public Safety

*Two same-sized Backup Generators were deployed to one site and ran for the same duration.

Section 7 – Complaints & Claims

Section 7.1 - The number and nature of complaints received as the result of the de-energization event and claims that are filed against the utility because of de-energization. The utility must completely report all the informal and formal complaints, meaning any expression of grief, pain, or dissatisfaction, from various sources, filed either with CPUC or received by the utility as a result of the PSPS event. *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, D.21-06- 014, page 304.)*

Response:
Table 16 provides the number and nature of complaints received from customers and Public Safety Partners, submitted to both the CPUC and PG&E, for the October 14, 2026, PSPS.[40] Any complaints received after November 4, 2026 will be included in the 2026 PSPS Post-Season Report.

Table 16: Number and Nature of Complaints

Nature of Complaints	Number of Complaints
Communications/Notifications Including, but not limited to, complaints regarding lack of notice, excessive notices, confusing notice, false alarm notice, problems with getting up-to-date information, inaccurate information provided, not being able to access information in the prevalent languages and/or information accessibility, complaints about website, Public Safety Partner Portal, Representational State Transfer (REST)/Digital Asset Manager (DAM) sites (as applicable).	418
PSPS Frequency/Duration Including, but not limited to, complaints regarding the frequency and/or duration of PSPS, including delays in restoring power, scope of PSPS and dynamic of weather conditions.	446
Safety/Health Concern Including, but not limited to, complaints regarding difficulties experienced by AFN/MBL populations, traffic accidents due to non-operating traffic lights, inability to get medical help, well water or access to clean water, inability to keep property cool/warm during outage raising health concern.	229
General PSPS Dissatisfaction/Other Including, but not limited to complaints about being without power during PSPS and related hardships such as food loss, income loss, inability to work/attend school, plus any PSPS-related complaints that do not fall into any other category.	1446
Outreach/Assistance Including, but not limited to, complaints regarding CRCs, community crew vehicles, backup power, hotel vouchers, and other assistance provided by utility to mitigate impact of PSPS.	69

[40] PG&E's PSPS Post-Event Reports are based on the required CPUC-issued template. Additional information regarding complaints and claims will be provided in subsequent PSPS Post-Season Reports.

Claims

As of October 22, 2026, PG&E received 171 claims for the October 14, 2026, PSPS.

Table 17: Count and Type of Claims Received

Description of Claims	Number of Claims
Bodily Injury	1
Business Interruption / Economic Loss	21
Food Loss Only	135
Property Damage with Business Interruption / Economic Loss	1
Property Damage	13

Section 8 – Power Restoration

Section 8.1 - A detailed explanation of the steps the utility took to restore power *(Resolution ESRB-8 page 5)*

Response:
During this PSPS, PG&E's EOC Command and Meteorology teams monitor real-time and forecasted weather conditions based on weather models, weather station data, and field observations while patrol crews and helicopters are pre-positioned in anticipation of the Weather All-Clear to begin patrols. Weather All-Clears are called based on circuit segments.

This allows us to issue Weather All-Clears more granularly so we can restore power faster in areas less prone to wind gusts or adverse conditions. We monitor the conditions for each impacted circuit segment and as they fall below our mFPC to consider areas for restoration.

As Weather All-Clears are issued, restoration crews patrol electrical facilities to identify and repair or clear any damage or hazard before restoring power. Using the Incident Command System (ICS) as a base response framework, each circuit is assigned a taskforce consisting of supervisors, crews, trouble men and inspectors. This structure allows us to patrol and perform step restoration in alignment with the centralized control centers.

During restoration, we issued 11 Weather All-Clears and deployed approximately 220 personnel and 45 helicopters to patrol the lines in advance of restoration. Patrols were conducted on approximately 4,871 miles of Distribution circuits and 508 miles of Transmission lines that had been de-energized. Power was restored to customers as patrol completion verified the safe condition of each line.

Section 8.2 - The timeline for power restoration, broken down by phase if applicable *(D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A24, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
For detailed information on restoration on each circuit, including restoration date, restoration time and total customer count on each circuit, see Appendix B.

Section 8.3 - For any circuits that require more than 24 hours to restore, the utility shall use the following template to explain why it was unable to restore each circuit within this timeframe, using the format below. *(D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 6.)*

Response:
PG&E was unable to restore five circuits within 24 hours of the Weather All-Clear, which impacted approximately 531 customers. These customers were restored between one minute to over six hours past the 24-hour mark.

Table 18: Circuits Requiring More than 24 Hours to Restore

Circuit Name	Reason the Utility was Unable to Restore the Circuit Within 24 Hours
ECHO SUMMIT 1101	PG&E requested four helicopters to support aerial patrols of over 300 miles of de-energized facilities; however, only three helicopters were available limiting the aerial resources available to complete patrols and support restoration. Additionally, per our procedures[41], we are not able to perform helicopter patrols past sunset due to safety concerns. Therefore, we reconvened patrols during sunrise on October 17, 2026. Restoration of the entire circuit was completed around 12:14 PDT.
EL DORADO PH 2101	PG&E requested four helicopters to support aerial patrols of over 300 miles of de-energized facilities; however, only three helicopters were available limiting the aerial resources available to complete patrols and support restoration. Additionally, per our procedures[42], we are not able to perform helicopter patrols past sunset due to safety concerns. Therefore, we reconvened patrols during sunrise on October 17, 2026. Restoration of the entire circuit was completed around 10:04 PDT.
ROUND MOUNTAIN 1101	Crews completed patrol of the Round Mountain 1101, however, patrol completion was not reported until the following day. No customers were de-energized, and no damage was identified. Because there were no customers awaiting restoration, the delayed reporting of patrol completion did not result in additional customer outage impacts.
SALT SPRINGS 2101	One customer on Salt Springs 2101 was not restored within 24 hours due to required replacement of equipment prior to re-energization.
WEST POINT 1102	A portion of West Point 1102 was not restored within 24 hours due to rugged mountainous terrain in portions of the circuit. Additionally, per our procedures[43], we are not able to perform helicopter patrols past sunset due to safety concerns. Therefore, we reconvened patrols during sunrise on October 17, 2026. Restoration of the entire circuit was completed around 09:47 PDT or one minute past the 24 hour mark.

[41] Helicopter Operations Field Manual AVI-3001M Rev 2, Section 1.14.2, dated 11-13-24
[42] Helicopter Operations Field Manual AVI-3001M Rev 2, Section 1.14.2, dated 11-13-24
[43] Helicopter Operations Field Manual AVI-3001M Rev 2, Section 1.14.2, dated 11-13-24

Section 9 – Community Resource Centers

Section 9.1 - The address (including city and zip code) of each location during a de-energization event, the location (in a building, a trailer, etc.), the assistance available at each location, the days and hours that it was open, and attendance (i.e., number of visitors) *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
During the October 14, 2026, PSPS, 44 CRCs were opened. These CRCs served 9,449 visitors, of which 8,133 did not remain on site and were provided "Grab and Go" bags. "Grab and Go" bags include a PSPS information card, water, non-perishable snacks, mobile battery charger and a blanket. For a list of CRC locations, assistance available, operating days and hours, and attendance, see Appendix E in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20261014*."

Visitors were provided with PSPS information by dedicated staff, ADA-compliant restrooms, tables and chairs, power strips to meet basic charging needs for personal medical devices and other electronics, snacks, bottled water, Wi-Fi and cellular service access. Bags of ice and privacy screens were also available at indoor locations.

Some visitors may request and are provided with information regarding how to obtain hotel vouchers. In these instances, visitors are referred to CA 211 to confirm eligibility and are connected with local resources.

PG&E coordinates with county Offices of Emergency Management to determine the best locations for CRCs for all PSPS events. For this PSPS, in agreement with counties, CRCs were not opened in Mendocino, Solano, Tulare, Yolo due to low customer impact.

For our CRC Plan and more information regarding CRC operations, including coordination with tribal and local governments, CRC types and resources, see PG&E's 2026 PSPS Pre-Season Report, Appendix A, pp. 42 – 55.

Section 9.2 - Any deviations and explanations from the CRC requirement including operation hours, ADA accessibility, and equipment. *(SED Additional Information.)*


Response:
Due to the timing of de-energization and restoration, CRC hours of operation, listed in Appendix E, deviated from the standard operating hours of 8:00 to 22:00 PDT.

Section 9.3 - A map identifying the location of each CRC and the de-energized areas *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
See Figure 34 for a map of CRC locations opened during this PSPS. Based on the CRC survey conducted for this PSPS, most respondents traveled approximately less than 10 miles to the nearest CRC location.

Additional CRC location information can be found at PG&E Emergency Site – View Outage Map where customers can find specific information using the 'Address Search' or 'City/County Search' functions.

Figure 34: CRC Locations Map



Section 10 – Mitigations to Reduce Impact

Section 10.1 - A description of how sectionalization, i.e. separating loads within a circuit, was considered and implemented and the extent to which it impacted the size and scope of the de-energization event (D.19-05-042, page A23).

Response:

PG&E utilized measures to avoid de-energizing approximately 186,290 customers during the October 14, 2026 PSPS including distribution sectionalization, backup power support, temporary microgrids, distribution switching, and transmission sectionalization.

Backup Power Support

Backup power support provides temporary generation to select devices (i.e. medical equipment) or limited areas. However, it does not mitigate PSPS impacts completely given its segmented scope. For more information on backup power support, see www.pge.com/backuppower. During this PSPS, temporary generation was considered and utilized to mitigate approximately 59 stand-alone customers based on the PSPS scope and available resources.

Distribution Sectionalization

We have installed new Distribution sectionalization devices near the borders of the CPUC-designated HFTD Tier 2 and Tier 3 to reduce the number of customers affected by PSPS. During this PSPS, Distribution sectionalization was considered and utilized on 95 circuits to mitigate approximately 172,515 customers based on PSPS scope and available resources.

Distribution Switching

Depending on fire risk patterns, Distribution switch locations and switching plans maintain service to customers on lines that fall outside the high-risk area but are served by lines that pass through the fire risk area. Depending on PSPS scope, we may be able to use back-tie switching to bypass the Distribution circuits that pass through the de-energization area to keep customers energized from a different set of lines. During this PSPS, Distribution switching was used to mitigate approximately 1,083 customers.

Transmission Line Sectionalization

Transmission lines are segmented using switches enabled with Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), when possible, if only a portion of a line is required to be de-energized due to PSPS. Leaving segments of Transmission lines energized allows us to still reduce fire risk where needed and provide service to stations fed off the non-impacted segments during PSPS events. During this PSPS, Transmission line sectionalization enabled 3 Distribution substations, which reduced impacts by approximately 1,566 customers.

Transmission Islanding

In some cases, we can leverage islanding capabilities to keep some customers islanded apart from the rest of PG&E’s Transmission system and energized by generation located within the island.

During this PSPS, we used generation from the Caribou powerhouses with associated Transmission to keep over 10,980 customers from being deenergized. Local Transmission-level entities were either connected to PG&E's Caribou Island or islanded with their own load and

generation at the request of PG&E, to protect grid stability and reliability for the customers within the Caribou island.

Temporary Microgrids
Temporary microgrids can enable some community resources to continue serving the surrounding population during a PSPS where it is safe to do so, using pre-installed interconnection hubs to safely and rapidly interconnect temporary generation. While temporary microgrids do not often support large numbers of customers, the community resources served by temporary microgrids include fire stations, local water and waste companies, markets, post offices, and medical facilities. On average, when utilized, customers served by temporary microgrids experience de-energization periods of under 30 minutes. Currently, there are 12 temporary microgrid sites that are currently ready for immediate operation in PG&E's service area.

We safely provided power to portions of 1 de-energized communities where we pre-installed equipment to safely island and energize temporary microgrids. Table 19 lists the temporary microgrids operated during this PSPS.

Table 19: Temporary Microgrids

Temporary Microgrid	Generation Deployed	Customers Energized
Arnold Distribution Microgrid	1.140 MW	89

Covered Conductor
The effects of grid-hardening and covered conductors are accounted for in our IPW model, which predicts the probability of utility-caused ignitions. Overhead system hardening is expected to reduce the probability of outages and ignitions in recently hardened sections. The IPW model more heavily weighs ignition and outage rates in recent years which will result in areas with fewer ignitions (e.g., areas that may have been recently hardened, being less likely to be de-energized for PSPS as there is a lower chance of ignition based on historical ignitions and outages).

We considered but did not utilize the following mitigation measures below as there were no identified opportunities to avoid de-energizing customers using these efforts during this PSPS.

Community Microgrids
A community microgrid is a group of customers and Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) within clearly defined electrical boundaries with the ability to disconnect from and reconnect to the grid. These microgrids are typically designed to serve the portions of communities that include community resources, like hospitals, police and fire stations, and gas stations and markets. We continue to own and operate the Distribution system within the microgrid. For more information about PG&E's microgrid solutions or how to begin developing a community microgrid, see www.pge.com/cmep.

For this PSPS, we did not deploy community microgrids as there were not any identified opportunities to serve our customers within the de-energization scope.

Temporary Substation Generation

Temporary substation generation can enable some community resources to continue serving the surrounding population during a PSPS at Distribution substations resulting from Transmission line outages. An interconnection is made at the substation, energizing entire circuits where downstream assets are not at weather risk and generator capacity is sufficient. If there are downstream assets at risk, this mitigation is combined with Distribution sectionalization to energize only safe areas. For reporting purposes, customers mitigated in the latter case will be documented in this category and not in sectionalization to avoid duplication. On average, customers served by temporary substation generation experience de-energization periods of under 30 minutes.

For this PSPS, PG&E did not deploy Temporary substation generation as there were not any identified opportunities to serve our customers within the de-energization scope.

Section 10.2 - Mitigation actions and impacts (both waterfall graph and map) including: sectionalization devices, temporary generation, microgrids, permanent backup generations, transmission switching, covered conductor, and any other grid hardening that mitigated the impact of the event *(D.21-06-014, page 285, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
Figure 35 depicts the impact each mitigation measure had on the total number of customers. Customer locations where mitigation efforts were utilized are mapped in Figure 36.

Figure 35: Reduction of Impacted Customers Due to Mitigation Efforts





Figure 36: Mitigation Locations Map



Section 11 – Lessons Learned from this Event

Section 11.1 - Threshold analysis and the results of the utility's examination of whether its thresholds are adequate and correctly applied in the de-energized areas. The utility must include specific information pertaining to the event. *(D.21-06-014, page 305-306.)*

Response:
This section addresses our examination of the adequacy of our PSPS protocols, criteria and guidance thresholds. As a preliminary matter, the CPUC recognizes the statutory authority of the IOUs to de-energize electric facilities when necessary for public safety and further acknowledges that such decision-making is complex and dependent on many factors.[44] As prescribed in ESRB-8, the decision to de-energize electric facilities for public safety is based on the best judgment of the IOU and is dependent on many factors, including but not limited to, fuel moisture, aerial and ground firefighting capabilities, active fires that indicate fire conditions, situational awareness provided by agencies and local meteorological conditions of humidity and winds.[45] The CPUC has declined to establish a minimum windspeed threshold below which an IOU would be prohibited from shutting off power and instead left the decision-making to the IOU's discretion on the basis that the IOU has the detailed knowledge of its facilities necessary to make this decision in real time given contemporaneous weather conditions.[46]

Based on our current PSPS modeling, guidance and criteria as applied in this PSPS and explained in Section 2.3, our current PSPS guidance continues to be adequate and was effectively applied for the October 14, 2026, PSPS. For detailed information on our PSPS criteria and thresholds, see Appendix A-1.1 and A-2.1 in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20261014.*"

Before de-energization, customer risk was also evaluated against wildfire risk on a per circuit basis to further evaluate the adequateness of the PSPS. See Section 2.4 above for more information.

Establishing Threshold through Historical Analysis
Our PSPS guidance was established by calibrating a granular, historical dataset. We built our verification dataset by creating, or "backcasting," the PSPS guidance through our historical dataset. We extracted values for all recent fires that have occurred in PG&E's service area from 2012 to 2023. We aimed to capture as many historical fires as possible that were caused by PG&E equipment during high wind events (e.g., Camp, Nuns, Kincade, Zogg) while limiting the number of historical PSPS outages to minimize customer impacts. Our analysis included:

- Hourly review of past incidents
- Verification of hypothetical PSPS dates
- PSPS guidance values testing
- A robust guidance sensitivity and calibration analysis

Historical Analysis: CFP_D Quantification

[44] ESRB-8
[45] See Resolution ESRB-8, p. 8-9.
[46] D.12-04-024


Based on this historical analysis and as described in Section 2.3 above, PG&E uses a CFP_D value of six as the quantitative threshold guidance value to consider for PSPS on PG&E's Distribution system.

To establish the CFP_D threshold, we performed multiple sensitivity studies in "backcast" mode for calibration and validation. This involved running 68 different versions of the combined Distribution PSPS guidance through hourly historical data throughout multiple years to calibrate PSPS guidance. This included simulating and learning from more than 2,500 virtual PSPS events. Through this "lookback" analysis, we evaluated:

- Potential customer impacts
- The potential size, scope, and frequency of PSPS outages
- Whether utility infrastructure would have qualified for de-energization
- Avoided historical catastrophic fires

The CFP_D guidance value of six is shown in Figure 37 with respect to recent large fires since 2012. Fires to the right of the CFP_D 6 line tend to be wind driven fires, while non-wind driven fires tend to exist left of the CFP_D 6 line. Any fires above six that meet mFPC indicate PSPS would have been executed, had these models and guidance been in use during these historic events. The results show that deployment of this model could have prevented such wildfires as the Camp, Nuns, Atlas, and Zogg, if implemented in 2012.[47]

Figure 37: CFP_D Guidance



This analysis was a critical step to ensure the most catastrophic wind-driven historical incidents are identified by PSPS guidance while considering the significant impacts to customers from PSPS outages across multiple dimensions (e.g., duration and frequency). This ensures that future PSPS outages will capture conditions similarly during the most catastrophic fires while also balancing

[47] Note that the inclusion of a fire in this analysis does not indicate that PG&E is directly responsible for or caused a fire. Instead, the fires are included for the purpose of analyzing the impact of PG&E's current PSPS Protocols.

impacts to customers. It also illuminates that PSPS would not have eliminated all historical fires as they can occur during low-wind scenarios (e.g., Dixie, Butte). Therefore, other mitigations must also be considered.

Historical Analysis: Execution
To execute the analysis at this scale, we utilized cloud computing resources to run PSPS model guidance for every hour at every 2 x 2 km grid cell across the historical data set to determine the number of times and locations PSPS guidance is exceeded. Each location exceeding guidance is then grouped into events to determine the location and size of each PSPS given the weather and fuels present at that time under the parameters of the study version. This allows us to determine if synoptic-driven events (e.g., Diablo wind events) are being identified, and if historical fires attributable to PG&E equipment may have been mitigated.

Verification of PSPS Protocols
In addition to these sensitivity studies, PG&E performed extensive verification of the PSPS protocols using several internal and external datasets. The goal of these analyses was to first determine if certain weather events are being captured (e.g., Diablo and offshore wind events), and second, to determine if power lines that have been implicated in historic catastrophic fires would have been identified by the guidance.

The following internal datasets were used in the analysis:

- Distribution and Transmission outage history
- Exploratory and dynamic dashboards created with internal and external data
- Hourly high-resolution wind maps from the climatology data set
- The weather signal database atmospheric reanalysis of the global climate (ERA5)

The following external datasets were used in the analysis:

- High risk of potential large fires due to wind from the GACC
- The fifth generation of the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts
- Historical fire occurrence data compiled by federal agencies

The paragraphs below explain how we leveraged external and internal data to verify our PSPS protocols guidance thresholds.

ERA5 Archives
PG&E works with San Jose State University to acquire, process and make available the ERA5 archive data dating back to 1940[48]. Millions of maps that can be utilized to study past events. These maps are also useful to study the past events leading up to a PSPS, such as the extent of precipitation events and heat waves. When the PSPS models are run through the climatology, each PSPS identified is compared against the archive by our Meteorology Team to determine the large-scale atmospheric features present for each event.

[48] https://www.met.sjsu.edu/weather/wirc-dev/archive/era5-viewer/current-monthly.html

Climatology of Diablo Wind Events
PG&E also leverages the latest academic research on Diablo wind events that use surface-based observations to create a climatology of Diablo wind events. We adapted the criteria and processed it hour-by-hour through the 30+ year weather climatology to determine the frequency, magnitude, and timing of Diablo winds. The output of this analysis was a 30+ year calendar of Diablo wind events experienced in the PG&E service area. As it relates to PSPS directly, the strongest Diablo wind events were evaluated to verify if PSPS guidance also selects these days for potential PSPS outages. Using the days identified by PSPS guidance and the Diablo PSPS list, a high-level comparison was completed to evaluate overlap of the events.

Any events that did not meet PSPS guidance were further evaluated using additional data sources described in this section. For example, the ERA5 archive proved useful, as antecedent conditions such as rainfall before a PSPS and the magnitude of the PSPS could be evaluated.

PG&E's Weather Signal Database
PG&E's Meteorology Team built, and continues to maintain, a "weather signal" database that flags each day from January 1, 1995, to present that experienced any weather-related outages on the Distribution system. It also lists the main weather driver (e.g., heat, low-elevation snow, northeast wind, winter storm, etc.) for these outages. If Distribution outage activity is not driven by weather, the day is classified as a "Blue Sky"[49] day. This dataset combines weather and Distribution outage activity that allows rapid filtering of events based on the main weather drivers. To validate PSPS guidance, we used a combination of "Northeast" wind days and "Blue-Sky" days.

The PSPS guidance was validated against all Northeast wind days in the database. This is similar, but complementary to the Diablo PSPS analysis as it also accounts for outage activity observed on those days. Events were also compared against "Blue Sky" days to ensure that PSPS would not be recommended for a high percentage of non-weather-impact days where little to no outage activity was observed.

RFWs from the NWS
PG&E also validates PSPS guidance against RFWs from the NWS. RFWs mean warm temperatures, very low humidity, and stronger winds are expected to combine and produce an increased risk of fire danger. Historical RFWs were collected and used to evaluate the timing and spatial extent of historical RFWs against our PSPS guidance. It should be noted that each NWS office in the PG&E service area has different RFW criteria, making direct and quantifiable comparisons challenging. However, this dataset is used to evaluate whether RFWs were issued when PSPS guidance was met. Based on historical PSPS analysis, RFWs are expected to occur more frequently and cover a broader area than the area covered by PSPS outages.

High Risk of Potential Large Fires due to Wind from GACC
PG&E also validated PSPS guidance against historical "High Risk" days from the GACC. The GACCs issues High Risk Day alerts when fuel and weather conditions are predicted which historically have resulted in a significantly higher than normal chance for a new large fire or for significant growth on existing fires. Examples of critical weather conditions are high winds, low humidity, an unstable atmosphere, and very hot weather. Similar to the RFW analysis, this dataset

[49] A "Blue Sky Day" is defined the same as a non-weather impact day (no or very limited impacts due to weather).

was used to evaluate if High Risk days were issued when PSPS guidance was high. Blue Sky Day is defined as "The same as a non-weather impact day (no or very limited impacts due to weather)." Similar to RFWs, based on historical PSPS analysis, High Risk Days are expected to occur more frequently and cover a broader area than PSPS.

Hourly High-Resolution Wind Maps from PG&E Climatology Data Set
PG&E created hourly maps from high-resolution climatology and a web-based application to display any hour across 30 years. For each PSPS that meets PSPS guidance in the climatology, these maps were evaluated by a Meteorologist to better understand the nature of the event, wind speeds, antecedent conditions, and the spatial extent of strong winds. It's important to note forecast wind speeds are available in the same exact format, allowing Operational Meteorologists to put forecast events in perspective with historical events using the same model.

Detailed PSPS Dashboards
To evaluate the PSPS thresholds, our Meteorology Team and data scientists utilized the data sources described above to evaluate historical PSPS hour-by-hour to verify the locations and times that are being flagged as meeting PSPS guidance. These dashboards determine if historical fire events would have been flagged by PSPS guidance. Our Meteorologists evaluated these data sources hourly to verify model performance of the IPW model and suitability for operations. The PSPS guidance can be evaluated spatially using the dashboard map integration, while the size and timing of the PSPS can be evaluated using the time series integration.

The analysis described above includes evaluating locations that were just below verbatim PSPS protocols as determined and reported by our high-resolution forecast model and data set included in this PSPS Post-Event Report. For example, this may include evaluating areas where the wind speed is -two mph below guidance if all other mFPC or RFW are met. It is well documented that high resolution weather model forecasts of wind speed from Weather Research and Forecasting model (WRF) tend to underpredict at high wind speeds.[50] Thus it is within reason to anticipate that the actual wind speed could be one mph higher than model forecast. If these areas are not scoped for PSPS and the winds materialize stronger than forecast, it could lead to PSPS execution with very little to no advanced notifications to customers and Public Safety Partners. Therefore, as explained in detail above, not one single factor or threshold is determinative of our final PSPS scoping. Based on multiple factors, data and analysis, the final PSPS scope is ultimately based on the judgement of our OIC.

[50] https://doi.org/10.1016/j.atmosres.2021.105673; https://doi.org/10.3390/atmos15050533; https://doi.org/10.3390/atmos15101244; https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoinf.2024.102898

Section 11.2 - Use the below format to report any lessons learned that will lead to future improvement for the utility *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
PG&E collects lessons learned input from staff during and after every PSPS EOC activation to identify best practices and opportunities for improvement. See Table 20 for lessons learned from the October 14, 2026 PSPS.

Table 20: Lessons Learned

Issue	Discussion	Resolution
Customer Notifications	Approximately 1,200 Power Off notifications delayed because Public Safety Cause Code not assigned in a timely manner at de-energization.	Relevant job aids and trainings are being updated to ensure required cause codes are promptly applied to support timely customer notifications.


Section 12 – Other Relevant Information

Response:
Table 21 and Figure 38 show the maximum wind gust speeds recorded by weather stations in each county within PSPS scope.

Table 21: Maximum Wind Gusts Recorded Between October 15 – 17, 2026

County	Maximum Wind Gust (mph)	Station Name
Alameda	32	Rose Peak
Alpine	38	Bloods Ridge
Amador	37	Tiger Penstock Top
Butte	49	Concow Road
Calaveras	53	Cottage
Contra Costa	40	Diablo-Blackhawk
El Dorado	53	Leek Spring Hill
Fresno	42	Mount Tom
Kern	64	Digier Road Hilltop
Lake	60	Santa Fe Geothermal
Lassen	39	Snag Hill Lookout
Madera	41	Minarets
Mariposa	33	Miami
Mendocino	38	Pine Mountain
Napa	38	Mt. Hood
Nevada	45	Grouse Ridge Lookout
Placer	67	Hell Hole
Plumas	38	Lower Bucks Lake Tower
San Luis Obispo	55	Fellows VOR
Santa Barbara	49	Santa Cruz Island Reserve
Shasta	48	West Prospect Lookout
Sierra	49	Saddleback
Solano	37	Blue Ridge Road South
Sonoma	61	Pine Flat Road
Tehama	42	Ponderosa Sky
Tulare	57	Bear Peak
Tuolumne	34	Mount Elizabeth
Yolo	39	Bald Mountain Tower
Yuba	39	Pike County Lookout

Figure 38: Maximum Wind Gusts Recorded Map Between October 15 – 17, 2026



APPENDIX

APPENDIX A
SECTION 2 – DECISION MAKING PROCESS

See Appendix A-1.1 and Appendix A-2.1 in the attachment
"*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20261014.*"

See Appendix F for the description of each column header, as well as the unit and value provided.

APPENDIX B
SECTION 3 – DE-ENERGIZED TIME, PLACE, DURATION AND CUSTOMERS

See Appendix B in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20261014"*

APPENDIX B: DE-ENERGIZED TIME, PLACE, DURATION AND CUSTOMERS

Circuits De-Energized During the October 14, 2026, PSPS

Circuits labeled as "non-HFTD" are located outside of the CPUC High Fire-Threat District (HFTD). We use a High Fire Risk Area (HFRA) classification which PG&E utilizes in addition to HFTD to determine PSPS scope – these circuits intersected PG&E's HFRA despite not entering HFTD Tier 2 or Tier 3.

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Counties	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	ALLEGHANY 1101	10/14/2026 20:47	10/16/2026 11:40	10/16/2026 18:21	Sierra, Plumas	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1	987	837	148	43	130	2
Distribution	ALLEGHANY 1102*	10/14/2026 20:36	10/16/2026 11:40	10/16/2026 16:13	Sierra, Nevada	Tier 3	192	163	28	5	45	1
Distribution	ALPINE 1101	10/14/2026 21:26	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 17:26	Alpine	Partially Outside HFTD, Zone 1	280	275	5	4	12	0
Distribution	ALPINE 1102	10/14/2026 21:26	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 17:41	Alpine	Partially Outside HFTD, Zone 1	304	271	33	3	14	0
Distribution	APPLE HILL 1104*	10/15/2026 3:03	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 19:45	El Dorado	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	2353	2204	140	182	556	9
Distribution	APPLE HILL 2102*	10/15/2026 2:53	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 16:08	El Dorado	Tier 2, Tier 3	438	413	21	35	100	4
Distribution	ARVIN 1101*	10/16/2026 6:14	10/17/2026 7:47	10/17/2026 9:09	Kern	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	5	0	3	0	0	2
Distribution	ATASCADERO 1103*	10/15/2026 0:21	10/17/2026 11:36	10/17/2026 14:21	San Luis Obispo	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	567	534	31	41	64	2
Distribution	AUBERRY 1101*	10/15/2026 14:35	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 16:16	Fresno	Tier 2, Tier 3	1278	1138	133	81	189	7
Distribution	BALCH NO 1 1101	10/15/2026 15:37	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 11:39	Fresno	Tier 2	18	5	13	0	0	0
Distribution	BAYWOOD 1101	10/15/2026 0:28	10/17/2026 11:36	10/17/2026 16:11	San Luis Obispo	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	271	144	102	8	17	25

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Counties	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	BIG BEND 1101	10/14/2026 20:07	10/16/2026 14:03	10/16/2026 18:12	Butte	Tier 2, Tier 3	278	253	23	26	96	2
Distribution	BIG BEND 1102	10/14/2026 20:12	10/16/2026 14:03	10/16/2026 15:47	Butte	Tier 3	173	153	16	12	41	4
Distribution	BONNIE NOOK 1101	10/14/2026 20:50	10/16/2026 11:40	10/16/2026 15:51	Placer	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3	440	389	44	32	72	7
Distribution	BONNIE NOOK 1102	10/14/2026 20:50	10/16/2026 11:40	10/16/2026 18:05	Placer	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3	471	416	50	38	69	5
Distribution	BRUNSWICK 1105*	10/14/2026 20:17	10/16/2026 11:40	10/16/2026 13:56	Nevada	Tier 3	161	155	5	12	20	1
Distribution	BUCKS CREEK 1103*	10/14/2026 20:16	10/16/2026 14:03	10/16/2026 17:28	Plumas	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	348	286	60	10	24	2
Distribution	CAL WATER 1102*	10/16/2026 5:28	10/17/2026 7:47	10/17/2026 13:39	Kern	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	13	0	10	0	0	3
Distribution	CALISTOGA 1101*	10/14/2026 20:15	10/16/2026 12:35	10/16/2026 19:41	Sonoma, Napa, Lake	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	285	197	53	7	15	35
Distribution	CALPINE 1144	10/14/2026 16:10	10/16/2026 12:35	10/16/2026 17:38	Sonoma, Lake	Tier 2, Tier 3	5	2	3	0	0	0
Distribution	CALPINE 1146	10/14/2026 16:10	10/16/2026 12:35	10/16/2026 17:38	Lake	Tier 3	1	0	1	0	0	0
Distribution	CARRIZO PLAINS 1101	10/16/2026 0:16	10/17/2026 11:36	10/17/2026 16:53	Kern, San Luis Obispo	Outside HFTD	278	216	44	8	74	18
Distribution	CASTRO VALLEY 1108*	10/14/2026 17:43	10/16/2026 10:40	10/16/2026 13:03	Alameda	Tier 3	75	60	12	2	5	3
Distribution	CAYETANO 2109*	10/14/2026 17:47	10/16/2026 12:35	10/16/2026 14:02	Contra Costa	Tier 3	59	41	18	8	2	0
Distribution	CAYUCOS 1102*	10/15/2026 0:36	10/17/2026 11:36	10/17/2026 14:50	San Luis Obispo	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	153	94	25	1	8	34
Distribution	CEDAR CREEK 1101	10/14/2026 17:34	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 15:06	Shasta	Tier 2, Tier 3	692	626	61	66	209	5

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Counties	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	CHALLENGE 1101*	10/14/2026 20:20	10/16/2026 11:40	10/16/2026 14:16	Butte, Yuba, Plumas	Tier 2, Tier 3	433	388	45	27	30	0
Distribution	CHOLAME 1101*	10/16/2026 0:06	10/17/2026 9:09	10/17/2026 15:14	San Luis Obispo	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	50	16	21	0	1	13
Distribution	CHOLAME 2102*	10/16/2026 0:14	10/17/2026 9:09	10/17/2026 13:11	Kern, San Luis Obispo	Outside HFTD	148	47	81	0	6	20
Distribution	CLARK ROAD 1102*	10/14/2026 20:09	10/16/2026 14:03	10/16/2026 18:49	Butte	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	500	451	43	44	92	6
Distribution	CLAYTON 2212*	10/14/2026 17:53	10/16/2026 12:35	10/16/2026 14:01	Contra Costa	Tier 3	145	137	8	9	19	0
Distribution	CLAYTON 2215*	10/14/2026 17:41	10/16/2026 12:35	10/16/2026 14:55	Contra Costa	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	291	274	15	28	17	2
Distribution	CLOVERDALE 1102*	10/14/2026 23:12	10/16/2026 10:40	10/16/2026 13:58	Sonoma, Mendocino	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	479	373	65	22	64	41
Distribution	CMC 1101	10/15/2026 0:00	10/17/2026 10:35	10/17/2026 13:39	San Luis Obispo	Tier 2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Distribution	CMC 1102	10/15/2026 0:10	10/17/2026 10:35	10/17/2026 13:35	San Luis Obispo	Tier 2	1	0	0	0	0	1
Distribution	COARSEGOLD 2102	10/15/2026 15:03	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 16:59	Madera	Tier 2, Tier 3	1556	1461	95	131	289	0
Distribution	COLUMBIA HILL 1101	10/14/2026 21:13	10/16/2026 11:40	10/16/2026 18:02	Yuba, Nevada	Tier 2, Tier 3	1120	988	120	51	315	12
Distribution	CRESTA 1101	10/14/2026 20:09	10/16/2026 14:03	10/16/2026 16:06	Butte	Tier 2, Tier 3	6	1	3	0	0	2
Distribution	CURTIS 1702*	10/14/2026 21:51	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 13:32	Tuolumne	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1	1112	1018	92	99	342	2
Distribution	CURTIS 1703*	10/14/2026 22:11	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 12:10	Mariposa, Tuolumne	Tier 2	141	80	58	3	9	3
Distribution	CURTIS 1705*	10/14/2026 22:18	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 15:42	Tuolumne	Tier 2, Tier 3	722	666	55	54	158	1

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Counties	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	CUYAMA 1103*	10/16/2026 0:18	10/17/2026 9:09	10/17/2026 17:48	San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	347	243	55	11	102	49
Distribution	CUYAMA 1104	10/16/2026 0:14	10/17/2026 9:09	10/17/2026 13:02	Santa Barbara	Outside HFTD	40	19	7	0	1	14
Distribution	CUYAMA 2101	10/16/2026 0:21	10/17/2026 9:09	10/17/2026 14:23	San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	251	126	25	10	23	100
Distribution	CUYAMA 2102	10/16/2026 0:21	10/17/2026 9:09	10/17/2026 13:07	Kern, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara	Outside HFTD	91	40	17	1	12	34
Distribution	DRUM 1101	10/14/2026 20:10	10/16/2026 11:40	10/16/2026 14:47	Placer, Nevada	Tier 3	179	139	33	6	22	7
Distribution	DUNBAR 1101*	10/15/2026 4:37	10/16/2026 10:40	10/16/2026 15:53	Sonoma, Napa	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	262	205	40	6	17	17
Distribution	DUNBAR 1103*	10/15/2026 4:18	10/16/2026 10:40	10/16/2026 16:05	Sonoma	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	161	124	25	5	4	12
Distribution	DUNLAP 1102	10/15/2026 15:35	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 16:26	Tulare, Fresno	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Zone 1	651	593	50	38	98	8
Distribution	DUNLAP 1103	10/15/2026 15:56	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 21:14	Tulare, Fresno	Tier 2	860	744	105	43	155	11
Distribution	ECHO SUMMIT 1101*	10/15/2026 2:51	10/16/2026 9:46	10/17/2026 12:14	El Dorado	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Zone 1	38	25	11	0	1	2
Distribution	EL CERRITO G 1105	10/15/2026 8:45	10/16/2026 10:40	10/16/2026 15:03	Alameda, Contra Costa	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	1737	1689	47	70	123	1
Distribution	EL DORADO PH 2101*	10/15/2026 3:09	10/16/2026 9:46	10/17/2026 10:04	El Dorado	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1	3791	3599	186	309	683	6
Distribution	EL DORADO PH 2102	10/15/2026 3:02	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 16:41	El Dorado	Tier 3	1562	1455	105	137	385	2

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Counties	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	FELLOWS 2104*	10/16/2026 0:17	10/17/2026 9:09	10/17/2026 17:27	Kern, San Luis Obispo	Outside HFTD	22	2	18	0	0	2
Distribution	FORESTHILL 1101*	10/14/2026 20:26	10/16/2026 11:40	10/16/2026 17:58	Placer	Tier 2, Tier 3	2250	2117	132	216	450	1
Distribution	FORESTHILL 1102	10/14/2026 20:16	10/16/2026 11:40	10/16/2026 17:57	Placer	Tier 2, Tier 3	428	409	19	41	64	0
Distribution	GEYSERVILLE 1102*	10/14/2026 23:17	10/16/2026 12:35	10/16/2026 15:09	Sonoma	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	63	29	10	2	2	24
Distribution	GOLDTREE 1105*	10/15/2026 0:20	10/17/2026 10:35	10/17/2026 14:00	San Luis Obispo	Tier 2	16	9	6	0	1	1
Distribution	HAAS 2101	10/15/2026 15:32	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 12:20	Fresno	Partially Outside HFTD, Zone 1	12	2	10	0	0	0
Distribution	HIGHLANDS 1102*	10/14/2026 22:12	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 12:51	Lake	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1	567	494	65	53	253	8
Distribution	HIGHLANDS 1103*	10/14/2026 22:13	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 12:54	Lake	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	49	34	11	4	9	4
Distribution	HOPLAND 1101*	10/14/2026 23:16	10/16/2026 10:40	10/16/2026 13:55	Mendocino, Lake	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	486	344	96	40	66	46
Distribution	INDIAN FLAT 1104*	10/14/2026 22:39	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 20:24	Mariposa	Tier 2	306	264	42	5	15	0
Distribution	KANAKA 1101*	10/14/2026 20:26	10/16/2026 11:40	10/16/2026 14:50	Butte	Tier 3	22	20	1	2	10	1
Distribution	KERCKHOFF 1101	10/15/2026 15:49	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 14:14	Fresno, Madera	Tier 2	246	217	26	26	61	3
Distribution	LAKEVILLE 1102*	10/15/2026 2:39	10/16/2026 10:40	10/16/2026 16:39	Sonoma	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	140	94	19	7	5	27
Distribution	LAMONT 1104*	10/16/2026 5:34	10/17/2026 7:47	10/17/2026 10:40	Kern	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	93	8	42	0	0	43
Distribution	MAGUNDEN 1108*	10/16/2026 5:24	10/17/2026 7:47	10/17/2026 17:15	Kern	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	31	15	6	3	1	10
Distribution	MARICOPA 1102*	10/16/2026 0:31	10/17/2026 9:09	10/17/2026 14:19	Kern	Outside HFTD	173	154	17	13	76	2

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Counties	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	MARIPOSA 2101*	10/15/2026 14:52	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 15:35	Mariposa	Tier 2, Tier 3	395	379	16	41	81	0
Distribution	MC ARTHUR 1101*	10/14/2026 17:35	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 16:22	Lassen	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	88	58	14	5	29	16
Distribution	MCKITTRICK 1101*	10/16/2026 0:26	10/17/2026 9:09	10/17/2026 18:02	Kern	Outside HFTD	33	6	19	0	0	8
Distribution	MESA 1101	10/16/2026 0:32	10/17/2026 7:47	10/17/2026 15:08	San Luis Obispo	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	2024	1594	317	84	394	113
Distribution	MIDDLETOWN 1101*	10/14/2026 19:33	10/16/2026 12:35	10/16/2026 14:10	Sonoma, Lake	Tier 3	30	25	5	0	1	0
Distribution	MIWUK 1701	10/14/2026 22:44	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 17:49	Tuolumne	Tier 2, Tier 3	3628	3400	223	201	501	5
Distribution	MONTICELLO 1101*	10/15/2026 3:45	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 10:48	Yolo	Tier 2	8	0	7	0	0	1
Distribution	MORAGA 1101*	10/15/2026 8:18	10/16/2026 10:40	10/16/2026 13:34	Contra Costa	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3	11	0	8	0	0	3
Distribution	MORRO BAY 1101*	10/15/2026 0:45	10/17/2026 11:36	10/17/2026 13:26	San Luis Obispo	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	323	200	72	25	41	51
Distribution	OAKHURST 1103	10/15/2026 14:32	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 16:15	Mariposa, Madera	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1	3475	2873	596	205	483	6
Distribution	OAKLAND D 1112*	10/15/2026 8:31	10/16/2026 10:40	10/16/2026 13:29	Alameda	Tier 3	80	75	5	3	5	0
Distribution	OAKLAND K 1102	10/15/2026 8:18	10/16/2026 10:40	10/16/2026 16:19	Alameda, Contra Costa	Tier 2, Tier 3	2537	2435	96	124	157	6
Distribution	ORO FINO 1102*	10/14/2026 20:11	10/16/2026 11:40	10/16/2026 14:24	Butte	Tier 2, Tier 3	463	429	32	24	87	2
Distribution	PARADISE 1104	10/14/2026 20:08	10/16/2026 11:40	10/16/2026 16:32	Butte	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	1319	1258	61	106	356	0
Distribution	PENNGROVE 1101*	10/15/2026 4:07	10/16/2026 10:40	10/16/2026 16:21	Sonoma	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	251	230	17	11	20	4

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Counties	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	PERRY 1101*	10/15/2026 7:35	10/17/2026 12:54	10/17/2026 19:19	San Luis Obispo	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1	2148	2050	65	86	248	33
Distribution	PERRY 1104*	10/15/2026 7:48	10/17/2026 12:54	10/17/2026 16:04	San Luis Obispo	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	49	30	17	1	6	2
Distribution	PIKE CITY 1101	10/14/2026 20:18	10/16/2026 11:40	10/16/2026 17:12	Yuba, Sierra	Tier 3	383	340	41	39	127	2
Distribution	PIKE CITY 1102	10/14/2026 20:13	10/16/2026 11:40	10/16/2026 15:51	Sierra	Tier 3	18	11	6	0	1	1
Distribution	PINE GROVE 1102*	10/14/2026 21:19	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 15:06	Amador	Tier 2, Tier 3	2539	2339	197	227	629	3
Distribution	PINECREST 0401	10/14/2026 22:24	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 15:19	Tuolumne	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1	205	177	28	6	6	0
Distribution	PIT NO 3 2101*	10/14/2026 17:35	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 12:30	Shasta	Tier 2	21	19	2	0	0	0
Distribution	PLACERVILLE 2106*	10/14/2026 21:16	10/16/2026 11:40	10/16/2026 16:37	El Dorado	Tier 3	632	576	49	63	130	7
Distribution	POSO MOUNTAIN 2101*	10/16/2026 5:22	10/17/2026 7:47	10/17/2026 15:22	Kern	Tier 2	74	60	9	4	9	5
Distribution	POSO MOUNTAIN 2103	10/16/2026 5:32	10/17/2026 7:47	10/17/2026 10:36	Kern	Tier 2	21	9	9	0	1	3
Distribution	POSO MOUNTAIN 2104*	10/16/2026 5:27	10/17/2026 7:47	10/17/2026 16:56	Kern	Tier 2	7	1	6	0	0	0
Distribution	PUEBLO 1104*	10/15/2026 3:51	10/16/2026 10:40	10/16/2026 13:24	Napa	Tier 2	134	101	19	16	9	14
Distribution	PUEBLO 1105*	10/15/2026 4:03	10/16/2026 10:40	10/16/2026 14:01	Napa	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	147	94	29	0	9	24
Distribution	PUEBLO 2102*	10/15/2026 3:54	10/16/2026 10:40	10/16/2026 18:00	Sonoma, Napa	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3	168	138	19	5	13	11

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Counties	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	PUEBLO 2103*	10/15/2026 3:50	10/16/2026 10:40	10/16/2026 17:49	Napa	Tier 3	47	28	10	2	3	9
Distribution	REDBUD 1101*	10/14/2026 22:05	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 12:58	Lake	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	350	334	16	49	130	0
Distribution	REDBUD 1102	10/14/2026 22:02	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 12:28	Lake	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	2606	2471	114	238	945	21
Distribution	RIDGE 0401	10/15/2026 8:45	10/16/2026 10:40	10/16/2026 13:59	Alameda	Tier 2	397	392	5	17	33	0
Distribution	ROSSMOOR 1109	10/14/2026 17:57	10/16/2026 10:40	10/16/2026 13:08	Contra Costa	Tier 2, Tier 3	148	142	6	8	7	0
Distribution	ROUND MOUNTAIN 1101	10/14/2026 17:44	10/16/2026 9:46	10/17/2026 11:36	Shasta	Tier 2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Distribution	SALT SPRINGS 2101	10/14/2026 21:10	10/16/2026 9:46	10/17/2026 16:25	Amador, Calaveras, Alpine	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Zone 1	384	335	48	17	27	1
Distribution	SALT SPRINGS 2102	10/14/2026 21:10	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 18:47	Calaveras	Tier 2, Tier 3	1996	1921	72	59	138	3
Distribution	SAN BERNARD 1101*	10/16/2026 5:20	10/17/2026 7:47	10/17/2026 15:38	Kern	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	13	0	10	0	0	3
Distribution	SAN JOAQUIN #2 1103	10/15/2026 14:32	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 17:52	Madera	Tier 2, Tier 3	814	746	61	78	225	7
Distribution	SAN JOAQUIN #3 1101	10/15/2026 14:55	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 18:19	Madera	Tier 2, Tier 3	694	589	105	41	34	0
Distribution	SAN JOAQUIN #3 1102	10/15/2026 15:20	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 14:45	Madera	Tier 2, Tier 3	254	245	9	24	60	0
Distribution	SAN JOAQUIN #3 1103	10/15/2026 14:55	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 14:41	Madera	Tier 2, Tier 3	1037	870	166	79	260	1
Distribution	SAN LUIS OBISPO 1101*	10/15/2026 0:10	10/17/2026 11:36	10/17/2026 13:57	San Luis Obispo	Tier 2, Tier 3	190	97	87	4	13	6
Distribution	SAN LUIS OBISPO 1103*	10/15/2026 0:03	10/17/2026 7:47	10/17/2026 9:49	San Luis Obispo	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	82	55	6	1	2	21

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Counties	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	SAN LUIS OBISPO 1104*	10/14/2026 23:51	10/17/2026 7:47	10/17/2026 11:12	San Luis Obispo	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	418	281	74	11	21	63
Distribution	SAN RAMON 2108*	10/14/2026 17:34	10/16/2026 12:35	10/16/2026 13:27	Contra Costa	Tier 3	93	71	22	3	7	0
Distribution	SANTA MARIA 1108*	10/16/2026 0:44	10/17/2026 7:47	10/17/2026 13:29	San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	425	343	48	22	41	34
Distribution	SHADY GLEN 1102*	10/14/2026 20:50	10/16/2026 11:40	10/16/2026 15:44	Placer, Nevada	Tier 2, Tier 3	276	246	29	27	63	1
Distribution	SILVERADO 2102*	10/14/2026 19:30	10/16/2026 12:35	10/16/2026 22:45	Napa	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	346	190	76	7	10	80
Distribution	SILVERADO 2103*	10/15/2026 4:04	10/16/2026 10:40	10/16/2026 12:38	Sonoma	Tier 3	3	0	3	0	0	0
Distribution	SILVERADO 2104	10/14/2026 19:30	10/16/2026 12:35	10/16/2026 23:46	Napa	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	1822	1513	181	101	261	128
Distribution	SILVERADO 2105*	10/15/2026 3:57	10/16/2026 10:40	10/16/2026 13:06	Sonoma, Napa	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3	197	136	39	0	12	22
Distribution	SISQUOC 1102*	10/15/2026 23:57	10/17/2026 7:47	10/17/2026 10:25	San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3	70	47	16	3	6	7
Distribution	SISQUOC 1103*	10/16/2026 0:07	10/17/2026 10:35	10/17/2026 14:58	San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	274	150	84	2	17	40
Distribution	SO. CAL. EDISON #3 1101	10/15/2026 16:29	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 18:25	Madera	Tier 2, Tier 3	16	15	1	1	3	0
Distribution	SONOMA 1102*	10/15/2026 4:11	10/16/2026 10:40	10/16/2026 15:20	Sonoma	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3	111	96	8	1	10	7
Distribution	SONOMA 1103*	10/15/2026 4:13	10/16/2026 10:40	10/16/2026 13:52	Sonoma	Tier 3	77	63	4	6	5	10
Distribution	SONOMA 1104*	10/15/2026 4:10	10/16/2026 10:40	10/16/2026 13:27	Sonoma	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	348	303	39	19	10	6

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Distribution	SPAULDING 1101*	10/14/2026 20:10	10/16/2026 11:40	10/16/2026 17:21	Placer, Nevada	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1	135	81	46	2	10	8
Distribution	SPRING GAP 1702*	10/14/2026 22:24	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 15:17	Tuolumne	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1	1457	1335	120	40	97	2
Distribution	STANISLAUS 1701	10/14/2026 22:27	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 14:08	Calaveras	Tier 2, Tier 3	871	754	115	64	144	2
Distribution	STANISLAUS 1702*	10/14/2026 22:15	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 17:44	Calaveras	Tier 2, Tier 3	4807	4590	215	211	503	2
Distribution	SUMMIT 1101	10/14/2026 20:14	10/16/2026 11:40	10/16/2026 19:00	Placer, Nevada	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Zone 1	1088	1000	82	22	38	6
Distribution	SUMMIT 1102	10/14/2026 20:14	10/16/2026 11:40	10/16/2026 17:48	Placer, Nevada	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	287	224	63	3	7	0
Distribution	TAMARACK 1101*	10/14/2026 20:20	10/16/2026 11:40	10/16/2026 15:37	Placer, Nevada	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Zone 1	456	421	29	12	38	6
Distribution	TAMARACK 1102	10/14/2026 20:21	10/16/2026 11:40	10/16/2026 15:48	Placer	Partially Outside HFTD, Zone 1	132	105	21	3	2	6
Distribution	TASSAJARA 2103*	10/14/2026 17:54	10/16/2026 12:35	10/16/2026 15:19	Contra Costa	Tier 2	9	6	3	0	0	0
Distribution	TASSAJARA 2104*	10/14/2026 17:58	10/16/2026 12:35	10/16/2026 13:48	Contra Costa	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	133	112	19	10	15	2
Distribution	TASSAJARA 2112*	10/14/2026 17:38	10/16/2026 12:35	10/16/2026 14:31	Contra Costa	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	594	540	54	23	34	0
Distribution	TEJON 1102	10/15/2026 10:49	10/17/2026 12:54	10/17/2026 14:55	Kern	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	577	474	91	27	178	12

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Counties	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	TEJON 1103*	10/16/2026 5:28	10/17/2026 7:47	10/17/2026 9:07	Kern	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	14	4	9	1	0	1
Distribution	TEMBLOR 1104*	10/16/2026 0:13	10/17/2026 11:36	10/17/2026 15:58	Kern, San Luis Obispo	Outside HFTD	10	3	5	0	0	2
Distribution	TEMPLETON 2110*	10/15/2026 7:39	10/17/2026 12:54	10/17/2026 16:31	San Luis Obispo	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	267	209	38	9	24	20
Distribution	TEMPLETON 2113*	10/16/2026 0:35	10/17/2026 9:09	10/17/2026 15:47	San Luis Obispo	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1	1249	1009	162	51	162	78
Distribution	TIGER CREEK 0201	10/14/2026 22:47	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 16:04	Amador	Tier 3	6	4	2	0	0	0
Distribution	TIVY VALLEY 1107*	10/15/2026 15:28	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 15:22	Fresno	Tier 2	282	261	18	39	59	3
Distribution	TRIDAM POWERHOUSE 2101*	10/14/2026 22:51	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 21:04	Tuolumne	Tier 3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Distribution	UKIAH 1114*	10/14/2026 23:07	10/16/2026 10:40	10/16/2026 13:40	Mendocino, Lake	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	245	197	38	13	54	10
Distribution	VACAVILLE 1108*	10/15/2026 0:43	10/16/2026 10:40	10/16/2026 12:21	Solano, Napa	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	43	16	23	1	2	4
Distribution	VOLTA 1101	10/15/2026 5:06	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 14:41	Tehama	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	835	714	97	60	113	24
Distribution	VOLTA 1102*	10/15/2026 5:13	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 13:03	Shasta	Tier 2	235	208	27	17	30	0
Distribution	WEST POINT 1101	10/14/2026 21:19	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 13:54	Amador	Tier 2, Tier 3	1959	1909	46	169	395	4
Distribution	WEST POINT 1102*	10/14/2026 21:11	10/16/2026 9:46	10/17/2026 9:47	Amador, Calaveras	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	2772	2538	209	209	764	25
Distribution	WHITMORE 1101*	10/14/2026 17:34	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 13:51	Shasta	Tier 2, Tier 3	497	449	40	46	125	8
Distribution	WYANDOTTE 1103*	10/14/2026 20:24	10/16/2026 11:40	10/16/2026 13:47	Butte	Tier 2, Tier 3	319	288	28	38	89	3

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Counties	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	ZACA 1101*	10/16/2026 4:31	10/17/2026 7:47	10/17/2026 11:32	Santa Barbara	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	117	40	66	0	1	11
Distribution	ZACA 1102*	10/16/2026 4:25	10/17/2026 7:47	10/17/2026 10:44	Santa Barbara	Tier 2, Tier 3	55	24	19	1	1	12
Transmission	BALCH-SANGER	10/15/2026 14:42	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 16:09	Fresno	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Zone 1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	BOTTLE ROCK TAP DWR	10/14/2026 23:57	10/16/2026 12:35	10/16/2026 14:55	Lake, Sonoma	Tier 3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	BUTT VALLEY-CARIBOU	10/14/2026 14:48	10/16/2026 14:03	10/16/2026 16:31	Plumas	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	CARIBOU-TABLE MTN	10/14/2026 14:48	10/16/2026 14:03	10/16/2026 16:31	Butte, Plumas	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	CASTAIC TAP	10/15/2026 10:42	10/17/2026 12:54	10/17/2026 14:23	Kern	Tier 2	1	0	0	0	0	1
Transmission	CLOVER CREEK TAP	10/14/2026 17:48	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 12:43	Shasta	Tier 3	1	0	0	0	0	1
Transmission	COLGATE-ALLEGHANY	10/14/2026 21:22	10/16/2026 11:40	10/16/2026 13:51	Nevada, Sierra, Yuba	Tier 2, Tier 3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	DRUM-GRASS VALLEY-WEIMAR	10/14/2026 11:06	10/16/2026 11:40	10/16/2026 16:54	Placer	Tier 2, Tier 3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	DRUM-HIGGINS	10/14/2026 12:10	10/16/2026 11:40	10/16/2026 16:18	Nevada, Placer	Tier 3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	GEYSERS #17-FULTON	10/14/2026 23:57	10/16/2026 12:35	10/16/2026 14:55	Sonoma	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	1	0	0	0	0	1
Transmission	GRAPEVINE TAP	10/15/2026 10:42	10/17/2026 12:54	10/17/2026 14:23	Kern	Tier 2	1	0	0	0	0	1
Transmission	KILARC-CEDAR CREEK	10/14/2026 17:48	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 12:43	Shasta	Tier 3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	KM GREEN TAP	10/14/2026 21:28	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 13:11	Amador	Tier 2	1	0	0	0	0	1
Transmission	LOWER LAKE-HOMESTAKE	10/14/2026 17:34	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 15:00	Lake, Napa	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	1	0	0	0	0	1

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Counties	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Transmission	PARADISE-TABLE MTN	10/14/2026 20:37	10/16/2026 14:03	10/16/2026 17:16	Butte	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	ROSE TAP	10/15/2026 10:42	10/17/2026 12:54	10/17/2026 14:23	Kern	Outside HFTD	1	0	0	0	0	1
Transmission	SALT SPRINGS-TIGER CREEK	10/14/2026 21:28	10/16/2026 9:46	10/16/2026 13:11	Amador, Calaveras	Tier 2, Tier 3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	SPAULDING-SUMMIT	10/14/2026 22:03	10/16/2026 11:40	10/16/2026 14:47	Nevada, Placer	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Zone 1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	TAFT-CUYAMA #1	10/16/2026 0:28	10/17/2026 9:09	10/17/2026 11:44	Kern, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara	Outside HFTD	1	0	0	0	0	1
Transmission	TAFT-CUYAMA #2	10/16/2026 0:23	10/17/2026 9:09	10/17/2026 11:19	Kern, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara	Outside HFTD	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	TEJON-LEBEC	10/15/2026 10:42	10/17/2026 12:54	10/17/2026 14:23	Kern	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	2	0	0	0	0	2
Total							**85,863**	**76,086**	**8,017**	**5,307**	**14,314**	**1,760**

APPENDIX C
SECTION 4 – DAMAGE AND HAZARDS TO OVERHEAD FACILITIES
See Appendix C in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20261014"*

APPENDIX D
SECTION 6 – PUBLIC SAFETY PARTNERS CONTACTED

See Appendix D in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20261014.*"

APPENDIX E
SECTION 9 – COMMUNITY RESOURCE CENTER LOCATIONS

See Appendix E in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20261014*."

APPENDIX F: DEFINITIONS

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
Access and Functional Needs (AFN) Populations	None	Includes individuals who have developmental or intellectual disabilities, physical disabilities, chronic conditions, injuries, limited English proficiency or who are non-English speaking, older adults, children, people living in institutionalized settings, or those who are low income, homeless, or transportation disadvantaged, including, but not limited to, those who are dependent on public transit or those who are pregnant.
AFN Characteristics	None	Includes blind/low vision, deaf/hard of hearing, senior, non-English speaking, durable medical equipment, assistive technology, low income, or life support. In accordance with D.21-06-034, PG&E includes customers who have voluntarily indicated they are "dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology" in an effort to identify customers "above and beyond those in the medical baseline population" or self-identified vulnerable population to include persons reliant on electricity to maintain necessary life functions including for durable medical equipment and assistive technology. This includes Assistive Technology, Blind, Disabled, Durable Medical Equipment, Hearing Disability–Deaf or Hard of Hearing, Senior or Vision Disability-Low Vision.
Benefit to Risk Ratio	Fraction – Max (Threshold, Forecast Factor)	Adverse impact to customers due to a catastrophic fire prevented by PSPS de-energization divided by adverse impact to customers due to PSPS de-energization. No observed value is available for this factor.
California Alternate Rates for Energy (CARE)	None	A state mandated program. As determined by PU Code Section 739.1(a), annual household must be no greater than 200% of the federal poverty guideline levels.
Catastrophic Fire Probability Distribution (CFP_D)	Scaled Probability – Max (Threshold, Forecast, Observed Factor)	The probability of fire ignitions due to weather impacting the Distribution electric system combined with the probability that a fire will be catastrophic if it starts. In Appendix A-1.1, this is the product of catastrophic fire (Prob Cat) and Ignition Probability Weather (IPW) minus probability of ignition (Prob Ignition). Scaled by 1000 to convert to an integer value.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
Catastrophic Fire Probability Transmission (CFP_T)	Scaled Probability – Max (Threshold, Forecast and Observed Factor)	In Appendix A-2.1, this is the product of probability of catastrophic fire (Prob Cat) and Operability Assessment Probability of Failure. This product is called the (CFP_T) Catastrophic Fire Probability Transmission model. Scaled by 1000 to convert to an integer value.
Critical Facilities and Infrastructure (CFI)	None	"Critical Facilities" and "Critical Infrastructure" refer to facilities and infrastructure that are essential to public safety and require additional assistance and advance planning to ensure resiliency during de-energization. The CPUC adopted the following interim list of CFI, as aligned with Department of Homeland Security's Critical Infrastructure Sectors: • **Emergency Services Sector**: Police Stations, Fire Stations, Emergency Operations Centers • **Government Facilities Sector**: Schools, Jails and Prisons • **Healthcare and Public Health Sector**: Public Health Departments, Medical facilities, including hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, nursing homes, blood banks, health care facilities, dialysis centers and hospice facilities • **Energy Sector**: Public and private utility facilities vital to maintaining or restoring normal service, including, but not limited to, interconnected publicly owned utilities and electric cooperatives • **Water and Wastewater Systems Sector**: Facilities associated with the provision of drinking water or processing of wastewater including facilities used to pump, divert, transport, store, treat and deliver water or wastewater • **Communications Sector**: Communication carrier infrastructure including selective routers, central offices, head ends, cellular switches, remote terminals and cellular sites • **Chemical Sector**: Facilities associated with the provision of manufacturing, maintaining, or distributing hazardous materials and chemicals • Note: Some customers meet the criteria of being both a Public Safety Partner & Critical Facility, which include Emergency services sector, water and wastewater providers, communication service providers and emergency hospitals.
Customer or Customer Accounts	None	Active service points or meter.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
Dead Fuel Moisture Content (DFM) 10hr	Fuel Moisture Fraction – Min (Threshold, Forecast, Observed Factor)	The amount of moisture in dead vegetation (i.e. fallen leaves, tree branches, and logs). In Appendix A-1.1, "DFM 10hr" is Dead Fuel Moisture provided in 10-hour fuel moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100.
Dead Fuel Moisture Content (DFM) 100hr	Fuel Moisture Fraction – Min (Threshold, Forecast Factor)	The amount of moisture in dead vegetation (i.e. fallen leaves, tree branches, and logs). In Appendix A-1.1, "DFM 100hr" is Dead Fuel Moisture provided in 100-hour moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100. No observed value is available for this factor.
Emergency Operations Center (EOC)	None	A central command and control facility responsible for carrying out the principles of emergency preparedness and emergency management, or disaster management functions at a strategic level during an emergency and ensuring the continuity of operation of a company.
EV charging station levels	None	• **Level 1 Charging:** 120-Volt; Connectors Used: J1772, NACS/J3400; Charging Speed: 3 to 5 Miles Per Hour • **Level 2 Charging:** 208-Volt to 240-Volt; Connectors Used: J1772, NACS/J3400; Charging Speed: 12 to 80 Miles Per Hour • **Level 3 Charging:** 400-Volt to 900-Volt (DC Fast Charge & Supercharging); Connectors Used: Combined Charging System (Combo), CHAdeMO & NACS/J3400; Charging Speed: 3 to 20 Miles Per Minute
Family Electric Rate Assistance Program (FERA)	None	CPUC established program for households of any size with incomes between 200% and 250% of federal poverty guidelines. (PU Code Section 739.12)
Fire Index Area (FIA)	None	Boundaries originally designated by the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection and United States Forest Service for the purpose of establishing a fire-danger rating for that area based on local conditions. There are 109 rating areas in PG&E's service area.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
Fire Index Rating	None	A rating used by fire agencies to determine the risk of fire and its likely behavior. Its calculation considers fuel moisture, humidity, wind speed, air temperature, and historical fire occurrence. These ratings are as follows: • **R1:** Very little or no fire danger • **R2:** Moderate fire danger • **R3:** When fire danger is so high that care must be taken using fire-starting equipment. Local conditions may limit the use of machinery and equipment to certain hours of the day • **R4:** Fire danger is critical. The use of equipment and open flames are limited to specific areas and times • **R5:** Fire danger is so critical that the use of equipment and open flames are not allowed at any time • **R5-Plus:** Fire danger is at R5 "plus" high risk weather trigger of strong wind
First/Emergency Responders	None	Individuals who, in the early stages of an incident, are responsible for the protection and preservation of life, property, evidence, and the environment, including emergency response providers. The term "emergency response providers" includes federal, state, and local governmental and nongovernmental public safety, fire, law enforcement, emergency response, emergency medical services providers (including hospital emergency facilities), and related personnel, agencies and authorities.
Flame Length ft 8hr	Feet – Max (Threshold, Forecast Factor)	Flame length in feet on fire front for first eight hours of fire spread simulation from Technosylva. No observed value is available for this factor.
Full-Scale Exercise (FSE)	None	A complex, resource-intensive operations-based exercise often involving multiple agencies, jurisdictions/organizations, and real-time movement of resources.
Functional Exercise (FE)	None	An operations-based exercise designed to test and evaluate capabilities and functions in a realistic, real-time environment. Movement of resources is usually simulated.
Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC)	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	High fire risk issued by the Federal North or South Operations Predictive Services.
Hazard Awareness and Center (HAWC)	None	The operations center that monitors for wildfires. HAWC leadership communicates and informs other PG&E Business Units and Executive Leadership about threats from wildfires in the service area.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
High Fire Risk Area (HFRA)	None	Area where risk factors for the potential of catastrophic fire from utility infrastructure ignition during offshore wind events is higher than others. HFRA boundaries were developed based on the CPUC's HFTD boundaries.
High Fire Threat Districts (HFTDs)	None	Per D.17-01-009, areas of the State designated by the CPUC and California Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) to have elevated wildfire risk, indicating where utilities must take additional action (per GO 95, GO 165, and GO 166) to mitigate wildfire risk. The districts have three levels: • **Zone 1:** High Hazard Zones on the U.S. Forest Service-California Department of Forestry and CAL FIRE joint map of Tree Mortality High Hazard Zones • **Tier 2:** Elevated risk for utility-associated wildfires • **Tier 3:** Extreme risk for utility-associated wildfires
High Impact Critical Customers	None	Non-residential customers that may present a significant community impact in the event they experience a sustained outage but do not meet the CPUC criteria for a Critical Facility Customer.
High Priority Vegetation Tag	None	**"**Priority 1" and "Priority 2" vegetation tags are created when trained vegetation inspectors identify trees or limbs that currently present elevated risk and must be worked on an expedited basis. Inspectors use Priority 1 tags for vegetation (i) in contact or showing signs of previous contact with a primary conductor; (ii) actively failing or at immediate risk of failing and which could strike PG&E's facilities; or (iii) presenting an immediate risk to PG&E's facilities. Inspectors use Priority 2 tags for vegetation that does not rise to the level of Priority 1 but has encroached within the PG&E minimum clearance requirements or has an identifiable potential safety issue requiring expedited work.
High Wind Advisory	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	Advisory of high winds issued by the Federal National Weather Service.
High Wind Warning (HWW)	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	Warning of high winds issued by the Federal National Weather Service.
Life Support	None	Customers that require critical life support equipment in their home.
Medical Baseline (MBL) Program	None	This program assists residential customers who rely on power for certain medical needs, as certified by a licensed medical practitioner. Eligible customers receive an extra monthly allotment of energy or discount, depending on their current rate plan. The program also includes additional notifications in advance of a PSPS.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
Monitoring Stage	None	The seven days ahead of a weather event when weather patterns are being monitored. Utility provides seven-day proactive de-energization potential rolling forecast or implements an escalating notification system similar to the National Weather Service's "weather watch" and "weather warning" system on its public website.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	Fire weather forecast issued by NOAA (SPC).
Officer-in-Charge (OIC)	None	A position specific to PSPS to engage higher-level management accountability in the decision to de-energize and restore power while also enabling rapid decision-making during real-time. The OIC approves all PSPS Decision Records and associated documentation following a PSPS.
Open PSPS Tags	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	PSPS-Qualified Tags include P1 (tree represents an immediate risk) and P2 (tree is damaged or diseased and could fall into nearby power lines) tree tags and Electric Corrective tags (Priority A - emergency, B - urgent, and E/F - risk-based).
Page View	None	The number of times a web page was viewed by individual users.
Patrol Inspection	None	In accordance with GO 165, a visual inspection of applicable utility equipment and structures that is designed to identify obvious structural problems and hazards. Patrol inspections may be carried out during other company business.
Prob Cat	Probability Outputs – Max (Threshold, Forecast, Observed Factor)	Fire Potential Index (FPI) Model Output minus Probability of a catastrophic fire if an ignition were to occur. FPI component of the CFPD model.
PSPS Mitigation	None	The efforts taken to avoid de-energization including backup generation, backup storage, distribution microgrid, islanding, patrols, sectionalization, switching, temporary substation microgrid, Transmission switching and vegetation management (expedite priority trees that prevent circuit from being removed from scope).

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
Public Safety Partner	None	First/emergency response providers at the federal, state and local levels including, water, wastewater and communication service providers, affected community choice aggregators, publicly owned utilities/electrical cooperatives, the CPUC, the California Governor's Office of Emergency Services (OES) and the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. The term "emergency response providers" includes federal, state, and local governmental and nongovernmental public safety, fire, law enforcement, emergency response, emergency medical services providers (including hospital emergency facilities), and related personnel, agencies and authorities.
Rate of Spread Chhr 8hr	Chains/Hour – Max (Threshold, Forecast Factor)	Rate of fire spread in chains per hour for first eight hours of fire spread simulation from Technosylva. No observed value is available for this factor.
Red Flag Warning (RFW)	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	Red Flag Warning from the Federal National Weather Service.
Relative Humidity (RH)	Percentage – Min (Threshold, Forecast, Observed Factor)	Relative Humidity in percent at two meters above ground level. For observed values, this is the minimum relative humidity recorded by all weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated All-Clear time.
Self-Identified Vulnerable (SIV)	None	Customers who have indicated they are "dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology" as well as customers that are not enrolled or qualify for the MBL Program and "certify that they have a serious illness or condition that could become life threatening if service is disconnected." In accordance with D.21-06-034, PG&E includes customers who have indicated they are "dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology" in an effort to identify customers "above and beyond those in the medical baseline population" to include persons reliant on electricity to maintain necessary life functions including for durable medical equipment and assistive technology. This designation remains on their account for one year, at which a customer can recertify their SIV Status.
Site Visit	None	A continuous session that begins when a user arrives on a site and ends after either 30 minutes of inactivity or 12 hours of continuous activity.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
SIV Program	None	A PG&E program inclusive of customers who have indicated they are "dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology" as well as customers that are not enrolled or qualify for the MBL Program and "certify that they have a serious illness or condition that could become life threatening if service is disconnected." In accordance with D.21-06-034, PG&E includes customers who have indicated they are "dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology" in an effort to identify customers "above and beyond those in the medical baseline population" to include persons reliant on electricity to maintain necessary life functions including for durable medical equipment and assistive technology. This designation remains on their account for one year, at which a customer can recertify their SIV Status.
Sustained Wind	None	The average observed wind speed value over a two-minute period.
Tabletop Exercise (TTX)	None	A discussion-based exercise in response to a scenario, intended to generate a dialogue of various issues to facilitate a conceptual understanding, identify strengths and areas for improvement, and/or achieve changes in perceptions about plans, policies, or procedures.
Time Place (TP)	None	A portion of the PG&E grid that is electrically and geographically coherent and is forecast to experience consistent timing for severe fire weather. TPs are identified for each PSPS and receive consistent treatment for notifications and de-energization. Once actual weather conditions occur, Weather "All-Clear" and service restoration times may vary due to actual weather conditions across various TPs as well as within a TP.
Transmission (Tx) Impacts	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	Distribution lines that would have been de-energized due to de-energization of upstream Transmission lines, regardless of whether those Distribution lines would have also been de-energized due to direct Distribution PSPS.
Vulnerable Populations	None	Individuals who have physical, developmental, intellectual disabilities; chronic conditions or injuries, are limited English proficient or non-English speaking; older adults, children, people living in institutionalized settings, low-income, homeless and/or transportation-disadvantaged (i.e., dependent on public transit) and pregnant women. This term is also used interchangeable with AFN.
Weather "All-Clear"	None	When severe weather has passed, the OIC gives approval to start patrols and restoration for all impacted areas at once or for specific areas.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
Wind Gust	None	A rapid fluctuation of wind speed with variations of ten knots or more between peaks and lulls, typically, determined by averaging observed values over a three-second period.
WS MPH	MPH – Max (Threshold, Forecast, Observed Factor)	Sustained windspeed in miles per hour at 10 meters above ground level. The observed values show the maximum sustained wind speed recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated All-Clear time.

VERIFICATION

I, undersigned, say:

I am an officer of PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, a corporation, and am authorized to make this verification for that reason.

I have read the foregoing "PG&E Public Safety Power Shutoff Report to the CPUC" for the October 14, 2026 PSPS and I am informed and believe the matters stated therein to be true.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed at Oakland, California this 13th day of November 2026.



ANDREW ABRANCHES
VICE PRESIDENT
WILDFIRE MITIGATION