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November 13, 2026

VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL

Koko Tomassian
Director, Safety Enforcement Division
California Public Utilities Commission
505 Van Ness Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94102

Dear Mr. Tomassian:

As required by Resolution Electric Safety and Reliability Branch-8 (ESRB-8) and in accordance with Ordering Paragraph 1 of California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Decision (D.) 19-05-042, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) respectfully submits this report for the October 10, 2026, Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS). This report has been verified by a PG&E officer in accordance with Rule 1.11 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure.

Members of the public may submit both formal and informal comments on this report to the CPUC by following instructions on the CPUC's website (www.cpuc.ca.gov). The CPUC's Public Advisor's Office has established procedures for providing such comments, including via online form. Comments may also be submitted directly to the Director of the Safety and Enforcement Division (SED) of the CPUC using the contact information below.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

Spencer Olinek
Director, Wildfire and Safety Relations

Enclosures

cc: Anthony Noll, SED
ESRB_ComplianceFilings@cpuc.ca.gov
EnergyDivisionCentralFiles@cpuc.ca.gov

Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E)
Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) Report to the
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)
October 10, 2026, De-energization

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PG&E PSPS Report to the CPUC
October 10, 2026, De-Energization

Section 1 – Executive Summary

Section 1.1 - Brief description of the PSPS event starting from the time when the utility's Emergency Operation Center is activated until service to all customers has been restored. *(D.21-06-014, page 286, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
High winds can cause tree branches and debris to contact energized electric lines and potentially lead to a wind-driven wildfire. As a result, we may need to turn off power during severe weather to help prevent wildfires. This is called a Public Safety Power Shutoff, or PSPS. We recognize that it is disruptive for our customers to be without power, therefore, we initiate a PSPS when the weather forecast is so severe that public safety, lives, homes and businesses may be in danger of wildfires. It is not a decision we take lightly. For the safety of our customers and communities, PSPS continues to be a necessary tool as a last resort. Due to the rapid succession of events in early October and the scale of the event following the PSPS described in this document, PG&E sought and received a due-date extension for this report from the CPUC's Executive Director.

Timeline
On Monday, October 5, 2026, PG&E's Meteorology Team identified weather in forecast models that indicated potential for wildfire conditions. Emergency response leadership was informed at this time.

On Wednesday, October 7, we entered readiness posture and activated our Emergency Operations Center (EOC) for a potential PSPS between October 8 – 12. Our teams began notifying Public Safety Partners in the areas anticipated to be impacted, readied the grid, and prepared Community Resource Centers (CRCs) and other customer support resources.

On Wednesday October 7, we developed the first scope of the PSPS that contained 15 Time Places (TPs).

On Thursday, October 8, we further refined the PSPS scope based on changing weather and updated meteorological forecasts, adding six additional TPs. The areas in scope for the PSPS included the elevated terrain on the north and west side of the Sacramento Valley, Feather River Canyon and wind corridors along elevated terrain adjacent to the west side of the San Joaquin Valley.

We closely monitored weather conditions across 21 TPs, as shown in Figure 1, and on October 9 at 12:30 PDT, we made the initial decision to de-energize customers for safety, due to meteorological conditions, PSPS thresholds being met and real-time Hazard Awareness and Warning Center (HAWC) reports.

Throughout the course of the PSPS, meteorological, fuels and PSPS thresholds were monitored, and we ultimately de-energized 11,493 customers across 13 counties and 17 TPs between October 9 F 11.


Through various mitigation efforts, we avoided the de-energization of approximately 27,024 customers in the final scope for de-energization. For more information regarding our mitigation efforts for this PSPS, see Section 10.

Inspections

During patrol and inspections, we identified one instance of damage caused by weather. For more information regarding the Technosylva fire spread simulation, see Section 2.2. For more information regarding damages and hazards, see Section 4.

Following patrol and inspections, customers were restored safely and as quickly as possible. Within 24 hours of the Weather All-Clear, service was restored to 100% of customers. The average restoration time was approximately 3.8 hours.

Figure 1: PSPS Timeline



Section 1.2 - A table including the maximum numbers of customers notified and actually de-energized; number of counties de-energized; number of tribes de-energized; number of Medical Baseline customers de-energized; number of transmission and distribution circuits de-energized; damage/hazard count; number of critical facilities and infrastructure de-energized. Hazards are conditions discovered during restoration patrolling or operations that might have caused damages or posed an electrical arcing or ignition risk had PSPS not been executed. Table 1 must contain unique data counts from event. *(D.21-06-034, Appendix A, page A15, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:

Table 1 identifies the maximum number of customers notified, de-energized and canceled; number of Medical Baseline (MBL) customers de-energized; number of counties de-energized; number of tribes de-energized; number of Critical Facilities and Infrastructure (CFI) de-energized; number of Transmission lines and Distribution circuits de-energized; and damage/hazard count.

Table 1: PSPS Event Summary[1]

Total Customers Notified	Total Customers De-energized	Total Customers Canceled	MBL Customers De-energized	Counties De-energized	Tribes De-energized	CFI De-energized	Transmission De-energized	Unique Distribution Circuits in Scope	Distribution Circuits De-energized	Damage/ Hazard Count
12,423[2]	11,493[3]	952	923	13	3	368	0	49	42	1 damage 0 hazards

[1] The information, times, and figures referenced in this report are based on the best available information available at the time of this report's submission. The information, times and figures herein are subject to revision based on further analysis and validation.

[2] Of the customers who received notifications that their power may be de-energized, 22 customers were not de-energized and not cancelled. See Section 5.7 for more information.

[3] Of the customers de-energized, 44 customers did not receive any notifications regarding planned de-energization. Note: Section 5.5 reports a per-window count of 45 customers not notified before de-energization, which differs from the unique count of 44 customers because one customer was notified of planned de-energization for one of their two outages. See Section 5.3 and Section 5.5 for more information.

Section 1.3 - A PDF map depicting the de-energized area(s) *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
During the October 10, 2026, PSPS, we de-energized 11,493 customers in 17 TPs across 13 counties. The final de-energization footprint is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: PSPS De-Energization Footprint Map



Section 2 – Decision Making Process

Section 2.1 - A table showing all factors considered in the decision to shut off power for each circuit de-energized, including but not limited to, sustained and gust wind speeds, temperature, humidity, and moisture in the vicinity of the de-energized circuits *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, Appendix A-1.1 in the attachment, *"PGE_PSPS_Post-Event Report Tables_20261010.xlsx"* provides a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope for the October 10, 2026, PSPS.

Section 2.2 - Use the following format to provide decision-making criteria detailing circuit level analysis and comparison between threshold, forecast, and actual readings utilized during the scoping process and de-energization process. Also include a PSPS decision-making diagram(s)/flowchart(s) or equivalent along with narrative description *(D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A22, D.21-06-014, page 284, SED Additional Information.)*


Response:
As the CPUC noted in ESRB-8, the decision to de-energize electric facilities for public safety is complex and dependent on many factors including but not limited to fuel moisture, aerial and ground firefighting capabilities, active fires that indicate fire conditions, situational awareness provided by fire agencies, the National Weather Service (NWS) and the United States Forest Service, and local meteorological conditions of humidity and winds.[4]

Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, this section provides an overview of our decision-making criteria and threshold evaluation process that were used in the decision to de-energize customers during the October 10, 2026, PSPS. For event-specific thresholds and a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope for the October 10, 2026, PSPS, see Appendix A-1.1 in the attachment, *"PGE_PSPS_ Post-Event Report Tables_20261010.xlsx."*

PSPS Preparation and Scoping Process
At a high level, Figure 3 shows the process used to prepare for a PSPS. PG&E utilized and referenced the following protocols and tools during the October 10, 2026, PSPS to determine the latest forecasted weather parameters versus actual weather. Appendix A-1.1, in the attachment *"PGE_PSPS_Post-Event Report Tables_20261010.xlsx,"* includes anticipated parameters based on the latest forecast used to develop the planned de-energization scope versus actual weather parameters for each circuit.

[4] ESRB-8, pp. 8 – 9.

Figure 3: PG&E's High-Level PSPS Process Steps



We consider executing a PSPS when strong gusty winds, low humidity levels, and low fuel moisture levels pose an unacceptable risk of causing fast-spreading, catastrophic wildfires. Assessments begin several days before the weather event is forecasted to take place.

We identify weather conditions that could create high fire potential by using a combination of outage and ignition probabilities, high-resolution internal and external weather forecasting models and data from federal agencies that include the following:

- *Ignition Probability Weather (IPW)*: Determines the potential of an outage due to weather conditions, and then for that outage to lead to an ignition.
- *Fire Potential Index (FPI)*: Determines the potential for catastrophic fire development.
- *Technosylva*: Provides fire spread modeling via data inputs.

Through partnerships with external experts, we developed our machine learning models using historic datasets and advanced forecast models that provide a better understanding of historical weather events and improve our weather forecasting. These models use the following:

- Data storage and processing via the PG&E-Amazon Web Services Cloud.
- Hourly weather data such as temperature, relative humidity, wind speed, precipitation, pressure, and dead and live fuel moisture.
- Over 100 trillion data points of historical weather and fuel.
- Precise location data points across our service area to conduct hourly weather analyses using high-resolution, historical data.


Our thresholds and guidance for identifying critical fire risk and outage/ignition potential are determined by analyzing and rigorously testing our current PSPS protocols and criteria against decades of historical weather data in and around California.
External forecast information from the NWS (e.g., Red Flag Warnings [RFWs]) and other forecast agencies are also examined carefully. Furthermore, we coordinate with these agencies during high-risk periods via daily conference calls to ultimately decide whether to de-energize portions of the grid for public safety.

Tools and Technology
PG&E partners with Technosylva, an external expert in the wildfire modeling field to test and deploy cloud-based wildfire spread model capabilities. This helps us to better understand where we might need to turn off power.

Each day, PG&E delivers our weather and fuel moisture condition datasets to Technosylva, who then performs over 100 million fire spread simulations to provide fire spread scenarios that help to identify circuits that may be at risk during dry, windy weather. These are done every three hours, for the five days ahead.

Decision Criteria and Thresholds for Distribution PSPS Protocols
We begin determining whether to turn off power for safety by first evaluating the Distribution System. These powerlines are closer to communities and are generally more susceptible to dry, windy weather threats. Our process is outlined in Figure 4. The values presented in Figure 4 were developed using 30+ years of PG&E's high-resolution climate data to help understand wildfire risk and the potential customer impacts of PSPS. We evaluate within a small geographic area (0.7 square kilometers) and if any of the measures are forecasted to be met, we scope the circuit segments within that region for de-energization. There is no single criterion or threshold that will require turning off power to a Distribution circuit. For event-specific thresholds and a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope, see Appendix A-1.1 in the attachment, *"PGE_PSPS_Post-Event Report Tables_20261010.xlsx."*

Figure 4: PSPS Protocols for Distribution



Step 1: Minimum Fire Potential Conditions (mFPC)
The first step to determine the scope of a PSPS is evaluating the mFPC. This ensures that PSPS is only executed during wind events when atmospheric conditions and fuels are dry. A PSPS is evaluated if the mFPC noted in Step 1 of Figure 4 above is met.

These values were established from a combination of analyses including:

- Historical fire occurrence in our service area.
- PSPS sensitivity studies how PSPS criteria impacted the frequency of PSPS events and total customer impact.
- Information published by federal agencies regarding fire behavior and criteria used to issue warnings to the public.

Fire Potential Index (FPI 5.5): FPI 5.5 is a machine-learning fire-consequence model that estimates, by location and hour, the probability that a fire will become small, moderate/large, critical, or catastrophic if an ignition occurs. FPI 5.5 has been operational since August 12, 2025, and uses updated fire-observation data and the POMMS v4 weather-model inputs.


Step 2: In-Depth Review of Fire Risk
If all, or nearly all, minimum fire conditions are met, we conduct an in-depth review of fire risk using multiple separate measures. If the criteria for any of these measures are met, we may need to turn off power for safety. We evaluate all the factors below together, rather than isolating any specific factor to assess fire risk against the potential harms of de-energization. For event-specific thresholds and a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope for the October 10, 2026, PSPS, see Appendix A-1.1 in the attachment, "*PGE_PSPS_Post-Event Report Tables_20261010.xlsx."*

- *Catastrophic Fire Probability (CFP_D)*: This model combines the probability of fire ignitions due to weather impacting the electric system with the probability that a fire will be catastrophic if it starts. It is the combination of the IPW and the FPI. The CFP_D model accounts for changes over time based on actual performance data. Thus, the model will address positive and negative trends in grid performance and reliability year-over-year, incorporating grid improvements such as system hardening, and enhanced vegetation management based on their performance at mitigating outages over time.
    - IPW Model: A system comprised of two machine learning models. These models are used to evaluate the probability of outages across several outage classes (Outage Probability Weather [OPW] model) and the probability of that outage becoming an ignition (Ignition Given Outage Probability Weather Model [IOPW]). These models are combined for each location at each hour to ascertain the ignition probability. These machine learning models use 17 years of weather data to correlate approximately 650,000 outages occurring on PG&E's Distribution grid. The model analyzes the potential for several types of power outages in each weather event, as well as the potential for that outage to be the source of an ignition. IPW learns from and accounts for changes on the grid from year-to-year.

- FPI Model: This model outputs the probability that a fire will become large or catastrophic and is used as a daily and hourly tool to drive operational decisions to reduce the risk of utility caused fires.

- *Tree Stike Considerations*: Our PSPS protocols utilize a machine learning model to integrate the potential for trees to strike the lines into our OPW Model and IPW Model. This helps our Meteorology Team more accurately analyze risk posed by trees and how that translates to increased ignition probability. For more information regarding OPW modeling, see Figure 5. Scenarios with a high risk of an IPW and a high FPI value will always warrant a PSPS. However, power may be turned off in other scenarios to avoid catastrophic wildfires.

Figure 5: Incorporation of Tree Strike Potential into PSPS Modeling



- *Catastrophic Fire Behavior (CFB)*: We also evaluate areas that are meeting mFPC (windy and dry conditions) but are not meeting our CFP guidance values by utilizing dynamic wildfire spread simulations from Technosylva. This allows us to consider potential ignition events that are rarer and more difficult to forecast such as animal and third-party contacts, or external debris impacting electrical lines. These locations are only considered once the mFPC are met, ensuring that conditions are sufficiently windy and dry.
- *Fireline Intensity*: The U.S. Forest Service Rocky Mountain Research Station performed a study of fire line intensity which is determined by the size and components of flames. It is measured as the rate of heat energy released British Thermal Unit (Btu) per unit length of the fire line feet (ft) per unit(s). It is also calculated by estimating the flame length, the distance measured from the average flame tip to the middle of the fire's base. Internal studies that evaluated historical fire simulation outputs to actual fire events, damages, and fatalities showed that outputs of flame length and rate of spread were best correlated to historical fire outcomes. Studies, as mentioned above, have shown that more intense fires

with higher flame lengths and higher rates of spread are more difficult to control. Thus, we evaluate fire simulation data that indicates where fast-spreading and intense fires could manifest and incorporate that into our PSPS decision making process.

- *Vegetation and Electric Asset Criteria Considerations*: We review locations from recent inspections where high-priority trees or electric compliance issues may increase the risk of ignition. If an area is forecasted to experience minimum fire conditions and there are known issues with equipment or vegetation that have not yet been addressed, we may need to turn off power.

PSPS Protocols for Transmission

In addition to analyzing Distribution circuits that may need to be de-energized for safety, we also review the Transmission lines and structures in areas experiencing dry and windy weather conditions. Transmission lines are like the freeways of the electric system, carrying high voltage energy across long distances. Similar to our Distribution protocols, there is no single factor or threshold that will require turning off power to a Transmission line.

Step 1: mFPC

When determining whether to turn off power for safety on Transmission lines, we review the same mFPC as with Distribution circuits. If these conditions are met, we will review the criteria below to determine whether a Transmission line must be turned off.

Fire Potential Index (FPI 5.5): FPI 5.5 is a machine-learning fire-consequence model that estimates, by location and hour, the probability that a fire will become small, moderate/large, critical, or catastrophic if an ignition occurs. FPI 5.5 has been operational since August 12, 2025, and uses updated fire-observation data and the POMMS v4 weather-model inputs.

Step 2: In-Depth Review of Fire Risk


Once we identify the initial scope, we work with the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) to ensure the initial scope is appropriate. This includes analyzing whether it will compromise the power supply to other jurisdictions, utilities, or facilities connected to our system. This important step can last several hours, which is why the potential scope of a PSPS may change as we get closer to the forecasted weather event.

- *Catastrophic Fire Probability – Asset (CFPT – Asset*): We use computer models to assess the likelihood of equipment failure during a given weather event, and the subsequent risk of catastrophic wildfires if a failure occurs. This model uses a combination of the Operability Assessment (OA) and FPI Models, both in time and space, at every Transmission structure to form the Transmission CFPT model for asset failures. The OA Model combines historical wind speeds for each structure, historical outage activity, Bayesian updating, and the condition of assets based on inspection programs to help understand the wind-related failure probability of each structure. The OA Model can be driven with forecast wind speeds to output the probability of failure at the structure level.
- *Catastrophic Fire Probability – Vegetation (CFPT – Veg):* The Transmission-specific vegetation risk model is a calibrated probability of vegetation risk built internally using data collected and managed by PG&E Vegetation Management and external contractors

such as NV5 and Formation Environmental. This model leverages aerial LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) data to map the location and attributes of trees near Transmission lines. The Transmission vegetation risk model is based on several factors such as overstrike, the amount of unobstructed fall paths to a wire, the slope between a tree and a conductor, and tree exposure. The Transmission vegetation risk model is combined with the FPI Model in space and time to form CFPT – Veg.

- *CFB:* We may de-energize customers where the consequence of a potential wildfire ignition would be extreme, even if the probability of a power line or equipment failure is low.
- *Vegetation and Electric Asset Criteria Considerations:* We review locations from recent inspections where high-priority trees or electric compliance issues are present that may increase the risk of ignition. Figure 6 provides a quantitative summary of our PSPS Protocols for Transmission.

Figure 6: PSPS Protocols for Transmission



Step 3: Determining the Outage Area

Transmission lines meeting the criteria above pass to the next stage of review. We conduct a Power Flow Analysis on the in-scope Transmission lines (if applicable) to analyze any potential downstream impacts of load shedding.

Reviewing Impact and Forecasted Weather

After determining the outage area both for Distribution and Transmission, PG&E reviews the forecasted customer impacts of each circuit against the forecasted wildfire risk of each circuit. If there is reasonable risk for ignition on the Distribution circuits or Transmission lines during the

forecasted weather event, it is included in the PSPS scope. During key decision-making points, we internally share this analysis to inform PSPS decision-making and further risk modeling.

Starting 12 hours before the forecasted PSPS de-energization time, we transition from evaluating forecast data to observing the weather in real-time. Based on real-time observations and analysis, we continually evaluate all the outage areas identified in the previous steps and use external tools and analysis to determine whether to initiate PSPS de-energization.

Decision-Making and Analysis to Validate if PSPS is Necessary
During high-risk periods, our Meteorologists participate in daily interagency conference calls that commonly include multiple NWS local offices, the NWS western region headquarters, and representatives from the Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC), also known as Predictive Services. This call is hosted by the Northern California and/or Southern California GACC offices.

During these calls, the external agencies present their expert assessment on the upcoming periods and locations of risk, wind speeds and fuel moisture levels, and any other relevant factors to consider.

During a PSPS, our Lead Meteorologist, called the Meteorologist-in-Charge (MIC), summarizes these forecasts and discussions for the Officer-in-Charge (OIC), who ultimately makes the decision to execute a PSPS.

The following sources and tools are considered before initiating a PSPS by the MIC:

- Daily interagency conference call with agencies during high-risk periods;
- External weather model data;
- Field observer information;
- Fire Weather Watches and RFW (NWS – Federal);
- Live weather data from weather stations;
- Location of existing fires;
- Significant fire potential for wind (GACC – Federal) and;
- Storm Prediction Center (SPC) (part of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) – Federal).

Based on the analyses above, we can determine how many customers may be subject to de-energization, and further investigate mitigation options, such as advanced switching solutions, sectionalization, the use of islanding, alternative grid solutions and temporary generation, to support customers who could lose upstream power sources but are in areas that may be safe to keep energized.

We monitor and forecast weather over a multi-day horizon, so we can anticipate when a PSPS may be needed and activate our EOC as far in advance as possible. Our internal weather model and external modeling are updated multiple times per day. Our Meteorology Team constantly evaluates both internal and external weather models for changes in weather timing, strength, and

potential locations impacted. We then incorporate these changes into a new weather scope generally once per day.

Weather shifts may force changes to PSPS scope and impacts at any point in time during PSPS planning and execution; this may allow us to avoid de-energization in some areas if fire-critical conditions lessen but can also cause some areas and customers to move into de-energization scope late in the process if forecasted fire-critical weather footprints change or increase. Possible changes in PSPS scope and impact are driven by the inherent uncertainty in weather forecast models.

Section 2.3 - A thorough and detailed description of the quantitative and qualitative factors it considered in calling, sustaining, or curtailing each de-energization event including any fire risk or PSPS risk modeling results and information regarding why the de-energization event was a last resort, and a specification of the factors that led to the conclusion of the de-energization event. *(D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 9, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
The quantitative factors that were used to determine de-energizing customers for safety are provided in Appendix A-1.1 in the attachment, *"PGE_PSPS_Post-Event Report Tables_20261010.xlsx."* Below, we outline a detailed description of the qualitative factors provided by our Meteorology Team when we were determining whether to de-energize customers.

As forecast weather models do not provide absolute certainty of the future, our Meteorologists evaluate several external forecasts, external models and machine learning wind speed modeling at a station-by-station basis to determine PSPS scope. Other factors include forecasts by the NWS such as RFWs.

PG&E Meteorology Team Review
On Wednesday, October 7, weather models indicated potential for periods of dry, windy conditions developing between October 9 – 12. Models initially indicated a period of gusty northerly winds would develop on October 10, but forecasts shifted to showing two periods of concern as the event drew closer. Models eventually forecasted that westerly winds would develop on October 9 as a weather system dropped in from the north, followed by a potential lull in the weather on October 10, followed by a period of gusty northerly winds on October 11 into October 12. The forecast was very uncertain due to the abnormal number of tropical systems in the Pacific that would ultimately affect the weather pattern. For example, Hurricane Rachel was forecasted to move directly through Southern California, there was an area of low pressure off the West Coast, and the main source of energy for this PSPS was due to a weather system descending south toward California from off the coast of British Columbia. Forecast models struggled to resolve how these three systems would eventually merge and where the band(s) of precipitation from Hurricane Rachel would end up. On October 7, at 12:06 PDT, the Sacramento NWS forecast discussion noted:

"There is still a high level of uncertainty regarding moisture, thunderstorms, overall wind speeds and the potential impacts to the region this weekend into early next week. Biggest question at this time will be how much moisture advects into the area…"

Aside from the Feather River Canyon, there was no rainfall recorded in the areas scoped for this PSPS within PG&E's service area due to moisture from Hurricane Rachael.

On Wednesday, October 7, our Meteorology Team, Emergency Planning and Response Team, and EOC Commander met to discuss the potential need for a PSPS and the high degree of

complexity in the forecast. Based on the emerging risk of weather conditions, we entered readiness posture at 17:00 PDT on October 7 and developed the first scope of the PSPS that contained 15 TPs.

On Thursday, October 8, we activated the EOC at 06:00 PDT and refined the PSPS scope based on changing forecasts to add six additional TPs.

The areas in scope in this PSPS included the elevated terrain on the north and west side of the Sacramento Valley, the Feather River Canyon and wind corridors along elevated terrain adjacent to the west side of the San Joaquin Valley.

On October 9, federal forecast agencies highlighted the upcoming weather conditions for the first wave of the event with Red Flag Warnings being posted generally east of our service area for gusty westerly winds and High-Risk warnings from North Ops Predictive Services for the Sierra Nevada. On October 11, North Ops forecast High-Risk across most of Northwest California including the Sacramento Valley for dry, northerly winds while NWS offices mainly highlighted elevated fire weather concerns. The NWS Sacramento Office forecast called for northerly wind gusts from 30 – 40 mph and daytime humidity values from 20 – 30%. Seet“ExternaltPSPSt DecisiontInputs”tbelowtfortexternaltagencytforecasts.

We closely monitored weather conditions across 21 TPs, as shown in Figure 1, and on October 9 at 12:30 PDT, we made the initial decision to de-energize customers for safety, due to PSPS thresholds being met and real-time Hazard Awareness and Warning Center (HAWC) reports. This included de-energizing TP 4 based on real-time observed weather conditions, including elevated wind speeds and decreasing relative humidity. Throughout the course of the PSPS, meteorological fuels and PSPS thresholds were monitored, and we ultimately de-energized 17 TPs between October 9 – 11.

Once winds subsided from Wave 1 (westerly winds) on October 10 at 08:28 PDT, the first Weather All-Clear was issued for all circuit segments in TPs 4, 16, 18, 19, 20 and 21. Weather All-Clear for Wave 2 was issued on October 12 at 10:11 PDT for TPs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11. All remaining TPs (1, 8, 9, 15) were declared All-Clear on October 12 at 10:48 PDT. Note that some TPs experienced both waves of adverse weather and were able to restored after the Wave 1 Weather All-Clear and prior to their Wave 2 (northerly winds) de-energization.

High Resolution PSPS Models Guidance

The tools and models outlined in Section 2.2 are part of the decision criteria that our Meteorologists consider when determining PSPS scope. Longer range weather forecast model data are used to determine the location and timing of a PSPS. Typically, these weather forecasts are less certain the farther they are from the observed date. This is akin to the well-knownthurricanet“conet of uncertainty”tintwhichtthetpotentialttracktoftathurricanetistrepresentedtbytantareatthattexpands farther out in time, which resembles an expanding cone. Therefore, there is an inherent tradeoff between the further out the forecasts are for a PSPS and the uncertainty in the PSPS scope and

waiting until forecasts become more certain. Forecast uncertainty leads to changes in PSPS scope as weather forecast models are updated, and the scope is refined closer to the period of concern.

As the PSPS unfolds in real-time, our Meteorologists transition to real-time observations of weather stations, satellite data, pressure gradients, and live feeds from Alert Wildfire Cameras. These observations help to evaluate if the weather is behaving as expected. In many instances, models trend stronger or weaker with each model iteration leading up to a PSPS.

External PSPS Decision Inputs


Meteorological analyses establish that high winds in California create significant fire threat and exacerbate fire spread. The NWS issues a RFW to indicate critical fire weather conditions under which any fire that develops will likely spread rapidly. California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) states, "the types of weather patterns that cause a watch or warning include low relative humidity, strong winds, dry fuels, the possibility of dry lightning strikes, or any combination of the above." As noted previously, our decision to initiate a PSPS consistently occurs during periods and in areas where federal, state, and local authorities have identified as having extreme fire risks including the presence of strong winds.

As discussed above and in Section 2.2, we compare our fire risk forecasts against those of external agencies to validate that there is shared recognition of high fire risk across the California meteorology community. Between October 9 – 11, our analysis of fire risk justifying a PSPS were validated by the following sources and warnings:

- North Ops Predictive Services issued their 7-day outlook showing High Risk for the Northern Sierras on October 9 and the Sacramento Valley Foothills, Mid-Coast to Mendocino, Northwestern Mtn, and North Coast on October 11.
- RFWs from the NWS were issued for October 9 for multiple areas adjacent to our territory to the east for gusty westerly winds.
- The Sacramento NWS office highlighted elevated fire conditions during the period of concern associated with Wave 2 (northerly winds) in their area forecast discussions, however, decided not to issue Fire Weather Watches or RFWs.

Figure 7: NWS RFW Coverage from Multiple Weather Offices for Wave 1 (a) and Wave 2 (b)

a.



b.





Figure 8: NOAA – SPC Forecasts of Elevated and Critical Fire Weather Conditions for Wave 1 (a) and Wave 2 (b)

a.



b.






Figure 9: GACC Forecasts of High Risk Significant Fire Potential for Wave 1 (a) and Wave 2 (b)

a.



b.



We also review forecasted wind speeds in the potentially impacted counties to evaluate the need for a PSPS. Figure 10 shows the Utility FPI Ratings for Fire Index Areas (FIAs) in our service area between October 9 – 11. We determine the scope for a PSPS within those FIAs with fire risk rating R5-Plus from PG&E's FPI model. Additionally, Figure 11 compares the PSPS scope with other agencies to vet the fire weather risk.

Figure 10: PG&E's Utility Fire Potential Index Ratings issued October 9, 2026





Figure 11: Comparison of Federal Agency Fire Weather Warning and Final PSPS Scope

GACC High Risk Wind **NWS RFW** **NOAA Fire Weather Outlook**



Section 2.4 - An explanation of how the utility determined that the benefit of de-energization outweighed potential public safety risks, and analysis of the risks of de-energization against not de-energizing for each circuit or segment. The utility must identify and quantify customer, resident, and the general public risks and harms from de-energization and clearly explain risk models, risk assessment processes, and provide further documentation on how the power disruptions to customers, residents, and the general public is weighed against the benefits of a proactive de-energization *(D.19-05- 042, Appendix A, page A24, D.21-06-014, page 284, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
For the October 10, 2026, PSPS, we used our PSPS Risk Model with the latest scope prior to making the decision to de-energization. For a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope, including risk factors, see Appendix A-1.1 in the attachment, *"PGE_PSPS_Post-Event Report Tables_20261010.xlsx."*

Our PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool addresses the CPUC's requirements presented in the 2019 PSPS OII.[5] This decision states California investor-owned utilities (IOUs) are required to quantify the risk/benefits associated with initiating or not initiating a PSPS for our customers.

PG&E incorporated this risk-benefit analysis into our PSPS execution process to help inform our PSPS decision-making process. Our Risk-Benefit Tool aligns with the California IOUs Cost Benefit Approach (CBA) framework, as defined through the Safety Modeling Assessment Proceeding (SMAP), CPUC's Risk Based Decision-Making Framework (R.20-07-013), which specifies how various consequences are factored into a risk calculation. Utilizing this framework, we incorporate PSPS forecast information into the tool, which is further described in the "Risk Assessment" section below.

The output of the tool is a ratio that compares the calculated PSPS potential benefit from initiating de-energization (i.e., mitigation of catastrophic wildfire consequence) to the risks associated with PSPS (i.e., impact to customers resulting from a PSPS). Key inputs in the risk-benefit analysis include results from Technosylva wildfire simulations specific to the Distribution circuit and Transmission lines in scope for a potential de-energization, the number of customers forecasted to be de-energized, and the forecasted number of customer minutes across each identified circuit in scope for a potential de-energization.

After the potential de-energization scope is determined, including the potentially impacted circuits identified for the potential PSPS, this scope and the Technosylva wildfire simulation outputs are used as inputs into the Risk-Benefit Tool, which quantifies the potential public safety risk and wildfire risk resulting from the forecasted impacts of the pending PSPS. Note that the Wildfire Risk Score is based on an eight-hour simulation from Technosylva and while useful, in some cases this can significantly understate the risk. As a result, the MIC may still recommend to de-energize circuits where the Risk-Benefit Tool shows higher PSPS risk than wildfire risk.

[5] D. 21-06-014.

Risk Assessment

As referenced above, PG&E's PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool follows California IOU agreed approach to utilize the CBA framework that captures the safety, reliability, and financial impact of identified potential risk events, as outlined in our Enterprise Risk Register.[6] The tool's calculations use a non-linear scaling of consequences reflecting our focus on low-frequency/high-consequence risk events without neglecting high-probability/low-consequence risk events. Developed by the PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool, CBA scores are used to compare the potential de-energization risk from a forecasted PSPS to the potential risk of catastrophic wildfires from keeping the circuits energized, specific to the potentially impacted circuits being considered for a PSPS.

The following inputs are used in calculations to build CBA risk scores for a PSPS and wildfires, which are ultimately weighed against one another:

- *Customer Category and Critical Customer Adjustment Factor*: The type of customer (e.g., MBL Program) using a "critical customer adjustment factor." This is applied to the customer outage duration to reflect a higher risk score for customers who are at a greater adverse risk of a potential PSPS.
- *Customers Impacted*: Forecasted number of customers anticipated to be impacted by the potential PSPS.
- *Customer Minutes*: Forecasted outage duration the customers will experience during the potential PSPS.
- *Forecasted Circuits*: The final list of the Distribution circuits and Transmission lines identified to be in scope for a potential PSPS.
- *Technosylva Wildfire Simulation Data*: Fire simulation forecasts on the consequence of a potential wildfire's impact on customers, wildlife and infrastructures on each circuit for every three hours. These values are based on Technosylva's wildfire modeling, using real-time weather, state-of-the-art fuel and eight-hour fire spread modeling.

Once the data above is made available and incorporated into the tool, the modeling considerations described in Table 2 are used to estimate the consequence of the potential wildfire risk and PSPS risk at the per-circuit level. Within the tool, a variety of modeling considerations are made to facilitate calculations, included in Table 2 and summarized in Figure 12.

[6] Full details of the CBA methodology are provided through the 2024 Risk Assessment and Mitigation Phase (RAMP) and 2027 General Rate Case (GRC) filings.

Table 2: 2026 PG&E's PSPS Risk-Benefit Consequence Modeling Considerations

Consequence Type	Wildfire Consequence Considerations	PSPS Consequence Considerations
Safety	Calculated based on maximum population impacts derived from Technosylva wildfire simulation models and a fatality ratio based on National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) data.	Calculated from an estimate of Equivalent Fatalities (EF) per Million Customer Minutes Interrupted (MMCI). The EF/MMCI ratio is estimated from previous PG&E PSPS outages and other large external outages.[7]
Reliability	None.	Calculated directly from the potential number of customers impacted and outage duration based on customer minutes interrupted.
Financial	Calculated based on maximum building impacts derived from Technosylva wildfire simulation models and a cost per structure burned previously evaluated in 2024 RAMP Report.[8]	Calculated based on two financial estimates, 1) distribution of a lump sum cost of execution across all relevant circuits and 2) an estimated proxy cost per customer in scope per PSPS.[9]

Potential Wildfire Risk
Wildfire consequence impacts are calculated based on the outputs of the Technosylva simulations. Variables include 1) population impacted by wildfire and 2) structures impacted by wildfire used to calculate natural unit values for two consequence components:

- *Wildfire Safety Consequence:* EF
- *Wildfire Financial Consequence:* Financial Cost of Wildfire (in dollars)

Potential PSPS Risk
PSPS consequence impacts are based on the following values: duration of de-energization by circuit, and number of customers impacted by de-energization on each circuit. These input values are used to calculate natural unit values for three consequence components:

- *PSPS Safety Consequence:* EF as an output of Customer Minutes interrupted
- *PSPS Electric Reliability Consequence:* Customer Minutes Interrupted × Critical Customer Adjustment Factor
- *PSPS Financial Consequence:* Financial Cost of PSPS (in dollars) × Critical Customer Adjustment Factor

[7] Includes 2019-2021 PSPS outages, the 2003 Northeast Blackout in New York City, 2011 Southwest Blackout in San Diego, 2012 Derecho Windstorms, 2012 Superstorm Sandy, 2017 Hurricane Irma and 2021 Blackout event.
[8] A.24-05-008.
[9] The assumptions used in these calculations, including the proxy cost per customer per PSPS, are subject to be updated and are not intended to prejudge or create precedent with regard to the development of more precise values of resiliency or cost of PSPS metrics being considered in other ongoing proceedings at the CPUC, such as the Risk-Based Decision-Making Rulemaking [R.20.07.013] and the Microgrid and Resiliency Strategies.

Once the consequence values (safety, reliability, financial) are estimated they are converted into CBA risk scores. Once the Risk-Benefit Tool calculates the impacts between the PSPS and a wildfire, it is summarized in Figure 12 and 13 by indicating if the adverse impact from a PSPS outweighs the risk of a wildfire.

Figure 12: Representation of PG&E's PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool





Figure 13: PSPS Potential Benefit Versus PSPS Potential Risk Consequence[10]



Our PSPS Risk Model supported initiating a PSPS based on the October 10, 2026, PSPS scope and forecasted impact information. The model indicated that each of the 48 Distribution circuits in the latest scope surpassed the analysis threshold of "one" to support a PSPS.

[10] The risk values in Figure 13 represents associated costs.

Section 2.5 - Explanation of alternatives considered and evaluation of each alternative.
(D.19-05-042 Appendix A, page A22.)

Response:
After reviewing the meteorological information that indicated potential for catastrophic wildfire and the impacts on customers through de-energization, we considered whether alternatives to de-energizing, such as additional vegetation management and disabling automatic reclosers, could adequately reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire thus lowering the need for de-energization. We determined these measures alone did not reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire in areas within the PSPS scope sufficiently to protect public safety.

Section 3 – De-energized Time, Place, Duration and Customers

Section 3.1 - The summary of time, place and duration of the event, broken down by phase if applicable *(Resolution ESRB-8 page 3, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
The PSPS occurred on October 10, 2026, in 17 TPs across 13 counties.

Due to meteorological complexity described in Section 2.2, this PSPS was executed in two waves (i.e., periods of concern). Below summarizes scoping and de-energizations per wave:

- **Wave 1**
  - De-Energized: TPs 4, 16, 18-21
    - These TPs were planned for a single outage spanning both waves. Meteorological conditions allowed these customers to be temporarily restored between waves. For TPs 16 and 18-21, forecast conditions ultimately resulted in cancellation for Wave 2. TP 4, however, was restored and de-energized again during Wave 2.
  - Cancelled: None
    - TPs 5 and 17 were scoped as part of a single outage spanning both waves. Meteorological conditions delayed the outage start time, and neither TP was de-energized during Wave 1. TP 5 was subsequently reassigned to, and de-energized during, Wave 2, while TP 17 was cancelled during Wave 2.
- **Wave 2**
  - De-Energized: TPs 1-11, 15
  - Cancelled: TPs 12-14, 16-21
    - TPs 12-14 were scoped for Wave 2 but ultimately cancelled based on updated forecast conditions. TPs 16 and 18-21 were previously de-energized during Wave 1 and restored between waves before being cancelled for Wave 2. TP 17 was delayed through Wave 1 and cancelled during Wave 2 without being de-energized.

Section 3.2 - A consolidated zipped geodatabase (.gdb) file that includes all PSPS event data requested in Section 3.2 and Section 4.3. Use WGS) 1984 Web Mercator Auxiliary Sphere projected coordinate system (WKID: Esri 3857) for the geodatabase. The geodatabase must include PSPS polygon feature classes of de-energized areas with items that are required in in Section 3.3. In addition, the geodatabase must contain one consolidated event single polygon feature class with the following exact fields (dates will be formatted XX/XX/XX): (SED Additional Information.)

- **Event Name: [same PSPS Event Name used during the event and shared with public safety partners]**
- **First Date of POC: [first date of initial period of concern]**
- **IOU: [PGE, SCE, SDGE, Liberty, PacifiCorp, or BVES]**
- **De-energization Start Date: [XX/XX/XX]**
- **Full Restoration Date: [XX/XX/XX]**
- **Customers De-energized: [unique count matching Table 1]**
- **De-energization: [Yes or No]**

Response:
Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, attachment, *"PGE_ PSPS_Polygons_of_De-energized_Areas_and_Damage_Points_20261010.gdb.zip"* provides a consolidated zipped geodatabase file that includes PSPS polygons of final de-energized areas combined with PSPS data as well as damages.

Section 3.3 - A list of circuits de-energized, with the following information for each circuit. If a circuit is de-energized multiple times during an event, the following information must be provided for each de-energization. This information should be provided in both a PDF and excel spreadsheet *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.)*

- **County**
- **De-energization date/time**
- **Restoration date/time**
- **"All Clear" declaration date/time**
- **General Order (GO) 95, Rule 21.2-D Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 classification or non-High Fire Threat District**
- **Total customers de-energized**
- **Residential customers de-energized**
- **Commercial/Industrial Customers de-energized**
- **Medical Baseline (MBL) customers de-energized**
- **Access and Functional Needs (AFN) other than MBL customers de-energized**
- **Other Customers**
- **Distribution or transmission classification**

Response:
Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, Appendix B provides a list of de-energized circuits and the relevant information relating to each circuit. Delayed restoration time due to reclassification and/or damages are further noted for each circuit.

There were no Transmission lines de-energized during this PSPS.

Section 4 – Damages and Hazards to Overhead Facilities

Section 4.1 – Description of all found wind-related damages or hazards to the utility's overhead facilities in the areas where power was shut off. *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
During this PSPS, weather stations near the areas in the de-energized scope recorded wind gusts as high as 64 mph. Recorded winds are shown in Table 18 and Figure 21 in Section 12.

During patrols of the de-energized circuits prior to restoring power, PG&E found one incident of wind-related damage and no hazards. Damages are conditions that occurred during the PSPS, likely wind-related, necessitating repair or replacement of PG&E's asset, such as a wire down or a fallen pole. Hazards are conditions that might have caused damages or posed an electrical arcing or ignition risk had PSPS not been executed, such as a tree limb found suspended in electrical wires. The damage location is illustrated in Figure 14 and mapped in Figure 15.

Figure 14: Damage in Fresno – Broken Crossarm



Section 4.2 - A table showing circuit name and structure identifier (if applicable) for each damage or hazard, County that each damage or hazard is located in, whether the damage or hazard is in a High Fire-Threat District (HFTD) or non-HFTD, Type of damage/hazard of damage. *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
For a list of damage within the de-energized areas, see Appendix C.

Section 4.3 - The consolidated zipped geodatabase file from Section 3.2 must include the PSPS event damage and hazard points, if applicable. The file should include items that are required in Section 4.2. *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
For a zipped geodatabase file that includes the PSPS damage point, see the attachment, *"PGE_PSPS_Polygons_of_De-energized_Areas_and_Damage_Point_20261010.gdb.zip."*

Section 4.4 - A PDF map identifying the location of each damage or hazard. *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
See Figure 15 for a map identifying the location of the damage.

Figure 15: Damage Incident Map



Section 5 – Notifications

Section 5.1 - A description of the notice to California Independent System Operator (as needed), public safety partners, local/tribal governments, paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a community resource center, multi-family building account holders/building managers in the AFN community, and all customers, including the means by which utilities provide notice to customers of the locations/hours/services available for CRCs, and where to access electricity during the hours the CRC is closed. *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 3 D19-05-042, page A26, D21-06-034, Appendix A, page A2, A9-A10, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
Throughout the PSPS, we followed the Notification Plan included in our 2026 PSPS Pre-Season Report, Appendix C, pp. 57 – 67 and made significant efforts to notify tribal and local Governments, Public Safety Partners, Community Based Organizations (CBOs) (including paratransit agencies) and impacted customers in accordance with the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines.[11] See Table 3 for a description of the notifications we sent to stakeholders in accordance with the minimum timelines set forth by the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines.[12]

In accordance with D.21-06-034, we provide CRC information to customers in PSPS notifications via hyperlink to the PSPS Updates Page. This webpage includes up-to-date CRC locations, services available and hours of operation as well as how customers can find local CRCs and where to access electricity during the hours CRCs are closed. Due to text message character constraints and the dynamic nature of CRCs information, providing a link to the PSPS Updates Page ensures that all impacted customers and local agencies have access to the latest CRC information at all times. For more information on CRCs, see Section 9.

Multi-family building account holders/building managers in the AFN community are considered part of our All Customers (including MBL customers and Self-Identified Vulnerable (SIV) customers) recipient group. For information on our outreach and community engagement with master-metered owners, property managers, and building account holders, see PG&E's AFN Quarterly Progress Reports for activities between July 1, 2026, and September 30, 2026.

In addition to providing direct notifications to stakeholders, PG&E alerted the public in advance of de-energization via the media and PG&E's website.

[11] D.19-05-042.
[12] D.19-05-042.

Media Engagement
From the time we publicly announced the PSPS until power was restored, we engaged with the public through the media by:

- Responding to approximately nine media inquiries, either from media outlets that contacted PG&E's 24-hour media line, or direct calls/emails to field media.
- Participating in nine media interviews (i.e., live, recorded, or unrecorded phone interviews) to provide situational updates and preparedness messages.
- Proactively issuing nine local news releases and updates directly to news outlets.

As of October 15, 2026, we identified 464 unique print, online and broadcast stories.

PG&E Website
We placed an Informational Alert on the www.pge.com home page that directed the public to PG&E's PSPS site. From the start of the PSPS to full restoration, the PSPS Updates Page received a total of 511,686 page views and 116,569 site visits.

Among other resources noted throughout this report, PG&E's PSPS Updates Page includes information regarding Electric Vehicle (EV), American Sign Language (ASL), Independent Living Centers (ILCs), Backup Power, AFN customer resources, MBL Program information and more. Additionally, the address look-up tool and address-level alerts, are available on our website, in 16 languages, that allow non-PG&E account holders to receive notifications for any address where they do not receive a bill (e.g., workplace, child's school, renters, mobile home parks, etc.).

During this PSPS, 1,585 customers experienced two different shutoff windows. Due to incorrect programming logic, after the second shutoff window started, the Address Lookup Tool displayed "No Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) planned" results instead of the intended message, "Your Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) is delayed." PG&E identified the issue a few hours after it occurred and corrected it the morning of October 11. No customer complaints were received related to this issue.

We remain committed to the continuous improvement of our websites to better meet the needs of customers. As we launch new features to www.pge.com and to www.pgealerts.alerts.pge.com, we test to ensure compliance with Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.1AA standards and improve customer experience. Where possible, we remediate accessibility issues that customers or stakeholders have brought to our attention.

Table 3: Notification Descriptions

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description

PRIORITY NOTIFICATION: 48-72 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization	Public Safety Partners and CBOs.	On October 5, our Meteorology Team noted a potential PSPS and updated the weather forecast on pge.com/weather to "elevated" in certain parts of the service area. At this time, agency representatives called each County Office of Emergency Services (OES) in PG&E's electrical service area and select tribes and cities to inform them that PG&E was monitoring an increased potential for a PSPS.
		
		Following the EOC activation, we completed the following:
		• Notified CAISO of the potential PSPS (on October 8 at 15:01 PDT) via email.
		• Submitted a PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E's EOC has been activated and that PG&E is monitoring for a potential PSPS.
		• Agency representatives called potentially impacted County OES and select tribes and cities to inform them that PG&E is monitoring a potential PSPS.
		• Sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners,[13] via call, text and e-mail, which included information such as:
		  ○ Estimated window of the de-energization time.
		  ○ When weather is anticipated to pass.
		  ○ Estimated Time of Restoration (ETOR).
		  ○ For agency partners and distribution level customers: Links to the PSPS Data Portal where PSPS-specific maps and information are available.
		  ○ For Transmission-level customers only: Transmission Substation Name and Line name serving substation.

WATCH NOTIFICATION: 24-48 hours in Advance Notice of	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL	During this time, we completed the following: • Submitted a PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E's EOC has been activated and that PG&E is monitoring for a potential PSPS.

[14]Other Public Safety Partners refers to first/emergency responders at the local, state, and federal level, water, wastewater, and communication service providers, affected CCAs, publicly owned utilities/electrical cooperatives, the CPUC, the California Governor's Office of Emergency Services, and the CAL FIRE.

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description

anticipated de-energization	and SIV customers).	• Sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners,[14] municipal utilities, and customers via call, text and e-mail, which included information such as:
		  ○ Estimated window of the de-energization time.
		  ○ When weather is anticipated to pass.
		  ○ Estimated Time of Restoration (ETOR).
		  ○ For Public Safety Partners Only: Links to the PSPS Data Portal where PSPS-specific maps and information are available.
		  ○ For customers only: Potentially impacted addresses, links to PSPS Updates Page with CRC information, and resources for AFN customers, including but not limited to information on the MBL Program, language support, and the Portable Battery Program (PBP).
		• Sent notifications to MBL customers, including tenants of master metered accounts, and SIV customers. For more information regarding MBL Program notifications, see Section 5.3.
		• Sent Cancellation Notifications to customers within two hours of being removed from scope, to inform them that their power would not be shut off.
		
		Customer notifications are provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications are provided in English.

WARNING NOTIFICATION: 1-4 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization, if possible	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL and SIV customers)	During this time, we completed the following: • Submitted a PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E has made the decision to de-energize. • Sent notifications to Public Safety Partners, and customers which included the same key information and resources as Watch Notifications. • Sent notifications to MBL customers, including tenants of master metered accounts, and SIV customers. For

[14] Other Public Safety Partners refers to first/emergency responders at the local, state, and federal level, water, wastewater, and communication service providers, affected CCAs, publicly owned utilities/electrical cooperatives, the CPUC, the California Governor's OES and the CAL FIRE.

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
		more information regarding MBL Program notifications, see Section 5.3. • Sent Cancellation Notifications to Public Safety Partners and customers within two hours of being removed from scope to inform them that their power would not be shut off. Customer notifications are provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications are provided in English.

POWER OFF NOTIFICATION: When de-energization is initiated	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL and SIV customers)	When de-energization was initiated, we completed the following:
		• Submitted a PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC to notify them that de-energization has been initiated.
		• Sent notifications to Public Safety Partners and customers via call, text messages and e-mail, which included:
		  ○ De-energization time.
		  ○ When weather is anticipated to pass.
		  ○ For customers only: Impacted addresses.
		  ○ For customers only: Links to the PSPS Updates Page with CRC information, and resources for AFN customers, including but not limited to information on the MBL Program, Meals on Wheels, language support, and the PBP.
		• Sent notifications to MBL customers, including tenants of master metered accounts, and SIV customers. For more information regarding MBL Program notifications, see Section 5.3.
		
		Customer notifications are provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications are provided in English.

WEATHER "ALL-CLEAR"/ETOR UPDATE	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All	After weather conditions had passed and areas were deemed safe to begin patrols and restoration, we completed the following:

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description

NOTIFICATION: Immediately before re-energization begins	Customers (including MBL and SIV customers)	• Submitted a PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E is initiating re-energization patrols.
		• Sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners and customers, via call, text message and e-mail, which included the ETOR.
		• Sent "update" notifications to customers if their ETOR changed. Two ways that an ETOR may change include:
		  ○ New field or meteorology conditions.
		  ○ Damage found during patrols and repair was needed.
		
		Customer notifications are provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications are provided in English.

RESTORATION NOTIFICATION: When re-energization is complete	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL and SIV customers)	Once all customers were restored, we completed the following: • Sent a notification to Public Safety Partners via call, text and e-mail. • Submitted the final PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES. • Sent an e-mail to the CPUC confirming restoration of PSPS outages and reclassification of customers if applicable. Once customers, including MBL and SIV customers, were restored, they received automated notifications via call, text, and e-mail. Customer notifications are provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications are provided in English.

Section 5.2 – Notification timeline including prior to de-energization or Period of Concern (if no de-energization), initiation, restoration, and cancellation, if applicable, for each circuit or circuit segment. The timeline should include the required minimum timeline and approximate time notifications were sent for each de-energization if a circuit was de-energized multiple times. *(D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A8-A9, D.21-06-034, page A11)*

Response:
Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, Table 4**.** in the attachment, *"PGE_PSPS_Post-Event Report Tables_20261010.xlsx"* provides the time notifications were sent in accordance with the minimum timelines set forth by the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines,[15] to tribal/local Governments, Public Safety Partners, and all customers prior to de-energization, initiation, cancellation, and restoration. The advanced notification guidelines set forth in the Phase 1 Guidelines are not based on a strict liability standard and state that "recognizing that there may be times when advanced notice is not possible due to emergency conditions beyond the electric investor owned utilities' control, the electric investor-owned utilities should, whenever possible, provide advance notification to all populations potentially affected by a de-energization event."[16]

Table 4: Notification Timeline Summary

See Table 4 in the attachment, *"PGE_PSPS_Post-Event Report Tables_20261010.xlsx."*

[15] D.19-05-042.
[16] D.19-05-042, Appendix A.

Section 5.3 - For those customers where positive or affirmative notification was attempted, use the following template to report the accounting of the customers (which tariff and/or access and functional needs population designation), the number of notification attempts made, the timing of attempts, who made the notification attempt (utility or public safety partner) and the number of customers for whom positive notification was achieved. *(D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A23, SED Additional Information.)*

"Notification attempts made" and "Successful positive notification" must include the unique number of customer counts. When the actual notification attempts made is less than the number of customers in scope, the utility must explain the reason. In addition, the utility must explain the reason of any unsuccessful positive notifications. Utilities may not mark N/A and must answer 5.3 regardless if the utility did not de-energize customers. *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, Table 5 includes metrics associated with notifications PG&E provided to customers where positive or affirmative notification was attempted. PG&E interprets the number of customers that need positive or affirmative notification as customers the company seeks confirmation from, namely MBL and SIV customers. PG&E tracks positive confirmation from MBL/SIV customers via text, phone call, email, doorbell rings, live agent phone calls or door hanger at all stages of notifications. If a notification is acknowledged at any stage and/or a door hanger is left, that is considered a successful positive notification. For more information, see PG&E's AFN Quarterly Progress Reports.

Table 5: Positive Notification

Designation	Total Number of Customers	Number of Notification Attempts Made[17]	Timing of Attempts	Who Made the Notification Attempt	Successful Positive Notification
MBL in scope[18]	982	981	Daily	PG&E	980
SIV	427	427	Daily	PG&E	427

As informed by our discussions with SED to clarify reporting requirements, the counts reported in Table 5 and its supplemental tables include both 1) MBL or SIV customers scoped for this event and 2) MBL or SIV customers who were de-energized but not included in planned scope. Please see Table 5A for a breakdown of MBL and SIV customer counts by de-energization

[17] Count of "Notification Attempts Made" includes doorbell rings and Live Agent phone calls.
[18] Residential tenants of master-metered customers can also qualify for MBL quantities. The MBL category for the purposes of Table 5 includes MBL customers who are master meter tenants.

window, and Table 5B for explanations of why MBL or SIV customers did not receive attempted or successful positive notification. For an explanation of Outage A vs. Outage B as displayed in Tables 5A and 5B, please see Section 5.5.

Some MBL or SIV customers were scoped or de-energized for more than one outage during this PSPS event. Table 5 shows unique customer counts, where a single MBL or SIV customer de energized for two outages would only be counted once. A unique MBL or SIV customer would be included in "Number of Notification Attempts Made" if a notification was attempted prior to at least one of their scoped or actual outages and included in the "Successful Positive Notification" count if at successful positive notification was achieved for at least one of their scoped or actual outages.

Some service points changed their MBL or SIV status while they were scoped or de-energized: customers are included in this count if they were MBL or SIV at any point while in-scope or at the start of de-energization. Service points may also change status between MBL and SIV during an event: those customers would be included in both the MBL and SIV counts. Thus, the unique count of MBL and SIV customers may be smaller than the sum of the separate MBL and SIV counts.

Table 5A: Positive Notifications By De-energization Window

Designation	Scoped or Actual Outage	Total Number of Customers	Number of Notification Attempts Made	Timing of Attempts	Who Made the Notification Attempt	Successful Positive Notification
MBL in scope	A	225	225	Daily	PG&E	224
	B	826	825	Daily	PG&E	807
SIV	A	105	105	Daily	PG&E	105
	B	365	364	Daily	PG&E	354

Table 5B: Explanation of MBL and SIV Customers Without Successful Positive Notifications

Notification Outcome	De-energized or Descoped?	Scoped or Actual Outage	Count of MBL	Count of SIV	Explanation
No pre-outage notification attempts	De-energized	B	1	0	As explained in Section 5.5, due to a data error in PG&E's active customer datasets, PG&E was not aware that this customer had started their responsibility for service until after the last plan used pre-de-energization notifications and thus did not notify this customer prior to de-energization.

					The customer's responsibility for service started during the 24-48 Hour Watch notification window and prior to the 1-4 Hour Imminent notification window. This customer is included in the notification failure counts for Section 5.5.
No pre-outage notification attempts	De-energized	B	0	1	This customer was planned for a single PSPS outage spanning two waves of weather. PG&E was able to achieve successful positive notification with a doorbell ring prior to the first de-energization. We were then able to restore this customer between the two waves of weather but had to de-energize them again when the second wave of weather arrived. PG&E did not attempt to notify this customer prior to the second de-energization because no valid contact info was provided for the main customer of record, and PG&E did not send a separate doorbell ring to achieve successful positive notification for the second de-energization. However, for the reasons explained in Section 5.5, PG&E does not believe the lack of attempted notification and successful positive notification for the second de-energization to be a notification failure: the successful positive notification prior to the first outage would have communicated an outage duration covering both eventual outages and thus

					adequately prepared this customer for the duration of both outages. This customer is included in the notification failure counts for Section 5.5.*
Pre-outage notifications attempted but did not achieve successful positive contact	Descoped	A	1	0	PG&E attempted to notify this customer through our standard notification process but was unable to achieve successful positive contact with those notifications. PG&E then deployed doorbell rings to establish successful positive contact, but was unable to access the property and complete the doorbell ring because the road was blocked 0.5 miles prior to due tree-cutting crews. This customer was later removed from scope and was not de-energized for this PSPS.*
Pre-outage notifications attempted but did not achieve successful positive contact	De-energized	B	11	8	These customers were planned for a single PSPS outage spanning two waves of weather. PG&E was able to achieve successful positive notification for these customers prior to the first de-energization. We were then able to restore these customers between the two waves of weather but had to de-energize them again when the second wave of weather arrived. PG&E attempted to re-notify these customers through our standard notification process prior to the second de-energization, but was unable to achieve successful positive contact with those notifications. PG&E did not send a separate doorbell ring to achieve

					successful positive notification for the second de-energization. However, for the reasons explained in Section 5.5, PG&E does not believe the lack of successful positive notification for the second de-energization to be a notification failure: the successful positive notification prior to the first outage would have communicated an outage duration covering both eventual outages and thus adequately prepared these customers for the duration of both outages.*
Pre-outage notifications attempted but did not achieve successful positive contact	Descoped	B	7	2	These customers were planned for a single PSPS outage spanning two waves of weather. PG&E was able to achieve successful positive notification for these customers prior to the first de-energization. We were then able to restore these customers between the two waves of weather but planned to re-de-energize them for the second wave of weather. These customers were ultimately descoped from the second planned de-energization. PG&E attempted to re-notify these customers through our standard notification process prior to their second planned de-energization, but was unable to achieve successful positive contact with those notifications. PG&E did not send a separate doorbell ring to achieve successful positive notification for the second planned de-energization. However, for the reasons explained in Section 5.5, PG&E does not believe the lack of successful

					positive notification for the second planned de-energization to be a notification failure: the successful positive notification prior to the first outage would have communicated an outage duration which also covers the second planned outage and thus adequately prepared these customers for the duration of both outages.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

For this PSPS, MBL and SIV customers received automated calls, texts, and emails at the same intervals as the general customer notifications. PG&E provided unique PSPS Watch and PSPS Warning Notifications to MBL customers[19] and SIV customers.

These customer groups also received additional calls and texts at hourly intervals until the customer confirmed receipt of the automated notifications by either answering the phone, responding to the text, or opening the email. If confirmation was not received, a PG&E representative visited the customer's home to check on the customer (referred to as the "doorbell ring" process) while hourly notification retries continued. If the customer did not provide confirmation to PG&E following the check-in, the PG&E representative left a door hanger providing additional PSPS notification and information at the home to indicate PG&E had visited. In each case, the additional door hanger notification was considered a positive successful notification.[20]

At times, PG&E also made Live Agent phone calls in parallel to the automated notifications and doorbell rings, as an additional attempt to reach the customer prior to and/or after de-energization.

PG&E shared the lists of the MBL and SIV customers who had not confirmed receipt of their notifications with the appropriate county and tribal emergency managers twice daily via the PSPS Portal. PG&E proactively notified agencies that the data was available on the PSPS Portal and encouraged them to inform these customers of the resources available to them. PG&E is unable to track and report on notifications made by Public Safety Partners, as notification systems and/or platforms used by Public Safety Partners are out of PG&E's purview; PG&E encourages Public Safety Partners to include PSPS messages on all of their platforms. PG&E describes its engagement with Public Safety Partners in Section 6.

[19] Including MBL customers who are master-metered tenants (e.g., renters or tenants in mobile home park).
[20] For MBL and SIV customers, an in-person door ring visit where a door hanger is left, but no contact is made with the customer is considered "successful contact," but not "received." If the PG&E representative makes contact with the customer, then it is considered "received."

Section 5.4 - A copy or scripts of all notifications with a list of all languages that each type of notification was provided in, the timing of notifications, the methods of notifications and who made the notifications (the utility or local public safety partners). *(D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A23, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
For a copy of the notification templates, the timing of the notifications and methods of notifications that PG&E sent during the October 10, 2026, PSPS, see attachment, *"PGE_PSPS Event Notifications_20261010.pdf."* For additional information on the timing of notifications sent during this PSPS, see Table 4 in the attachment, *"PGE_PSPS_Post-Event Report Tables_20261010.xlsx."*

PG&E provides tribal, county, city, CCAs, Public Safety Partner and Transmission-level customer notifications in English only. All other customer notifications are delivered in-language if a customer's language preference is on file. If there is no language preference on file, the notification is delivered in English, with information on how to access and receive PSPS information in translated languages. Non-English languages requested for this PSPS were Spanish, Chinese (Cantonese and Mandarin), Russian, Portuguese.

Section 5.5 - If the utility fails to provide notifications according to the minimum timelines set forth in D.19-05-042 and D.21-06-034, using the following template to report a breakdown of the notification failure and an explanation of what caused the failure. This applies to both de-energization and non de-energization events. For non-de-energization event, the starting time of the first Period of Concern is the anticipated de-energization time to assess notification failure. If a circuit is de-energized multiple times during an event, the utility must include notification failures for the multiple de-energizations. The explanation must be specific. *(D.21-06-014 page 286, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
PG&E makes a substantial effort to provide notifications whenever possible and to the extent it is operationally feasible in accordance with the PSPS Phase 1, Phase 3 and 2019 PSPS OII guidelines within the CPUC's minimum timeline requirements, weather and other factors permitting.[21] The notification guidelines set forth in the Phase 1 Guidelines are not a strict liability standard and state that "the electric investor owned utilities should, whenever possible, adhere to the following minimum notification timeline…" Additionally, pursuant to ESRB-8, the CPUC has stated that it is not practicable to have an absolute requirement that electric IOUs provide advanced notifications to customers prior to a PSPS and that "it is an impossible feat of anticipating every emergency situation resulting in pro-active de-energization."[22]

Due to the two periods of concern associated with this PSPS, notifications are attributed to two groups of outages. For reporting purposes, these outages will be referred to as "Outage A" and "Outage B."

Customers and agencies solely planned for de-energization in Wave 2 have their notification failures reported under "Outage B." For customers and agencies planned for outages which cover both Wave 1 and Wave 2:

- Any notification failures for their planned outage are reported under "Outage A."
- If these customers or agencies were subsequently planned for a second outage after the end of their first outage, notification failures for the second planned outage are reported under "Outage B."

As the Priority and Watch notification windows for the second outage had already elapsed when we determined these customers could be de-energized a second time, many of the reported notification failure counts reflect the unique circumstances of this two-period event rather than missed notifications. The majority of these instances were associated with operational decisions to restore customers whenever real-time conditions allowed and with the objective of minimizing customer outage duration. Further information is provided in the tables below:

[21] D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.
[22] ESRB-8, p. 5, D.19-05-042, pp. 84-86, Finding of Fact 22 at p. 118.

Table 6: Breakdown of Notification Failure

Notifications Sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Account	Explanation of Failure
Public Safety Partners excluding CFI[23]	**Entities who did not receive 48-to 72-hour priority notification**	143	See Table 6A for explanations.
	Entities who did not receive 24-48 hour advance notification	69	See Table 6B for explanations.
	Entities who did not receive 1-4-hour imminent notification	0	No failures.
	Entities who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	0	No failures.
	Entities who were not notified at de-energization initiation	0	No failures.
	Entities who were not notified immediately before re-energization	0	No failures.
	Entities who were not notified when re-energization is complete	7	See Table 6G for explanations.
	Entities who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	58	See Table 6H for explanations.
CFI[24]	**Facilities who did not receive 48-72-hour priority notification**	198	See Table 6A for explanations.
	Facilities who did not receive 24-48 hour advance notification	97	See Table 6B for explanations.
	Facilities who did not receive 1-4-hour imminent notification	1	See Table 6C for explanations.
	Facilities who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	0	No failures.
	Facilities who were not notified at de-energization initiation	4	See Table 6E for explanations.
	Facilities who were not notified immediately before re-energization	1	See Table 6F for explanations.

[23] Only includes tribes, cities, counties, and CCAs.
[24] Includes Public Safety Partners who are CFI customers.

Notifications Sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Account	Explanation of Failure
	Facilities who were not notified when re-energization is complete	1	See Table 6G for explanations.
	Facilities who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	0	No failures.
All other affected customers	**Customers who did not receive 24-48-hour advance notifications**	1,530	See Table 6B for explanations.
	Customers who did not receive 1-4-hour imminent notifications	63	See Table 6C for explanations.
	Customers who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	45**	See Table 6D for explanations.
	Customers who were not notified at de-energization initiation	115	See Table 6E for explanations.
	Customers who were not notified immediately before re-energization	50	See Table 6F for explanations.
	Customers who were not notified when re-energization is complete	61	See Table 6G for explanations.
	Customers who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	3*	See Table 6H for explanations.

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

**This category is duplicative with other notification failure categories in this report, meaning all customers reported in this category are already included in the count of notification failures PG&E reported for the more specific notification categories. As a result, the count from this category should not be included in the sum of total notification failures for this PSPS.

Table 6A: Explanation of Failures for Agency Entities and CFI Who Did Not Receive 48-to 72-Hour Priority Notification

Total Agency Entities	Total CFI	Forecasted or Actual Outage Window	Explanation
1	0	A	This agency entity was in-scope during this compliance window but was not notified until 24-to 48-Hour Watch. PG&E is still investigating the cause of this error and will report our findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report.
73	98	A	These Public Safety Partners were added to PSPS scope based on updated weather forecasts after the applicable Priority Notification window had passed. As a result, it was not possible to issue Priority Notifications to these Public Safety Partners.*
0	3	B	These Public Safety Partners were added to PSPS scope based on updated weather forecasts after the applicable Priority Notification window had passed. As a result, it was not possible to issue Priority Notifications to these Public Safety Partners.*
69	97	B	These agency entities and CFI were initially planned for, notified of, and de-energized for a single PSPS outage spanning two waves of weather. PG&E was able to restore these outages in between the two waves of weather but had to scope and/or de-energize some agencies and customers again when the second wave of weather arrived. In these cases, PG&E sent a new 1-4 Hour Imminent Notification but was already past the compliance window for Priority and Watch Notifications. Although PG&E did not send a second set of Priority and Watch Notifications for these agencies and customers, PG&E does not consider this to be a notification failure: 1) The ability and decision to restore customers between these two waves of weather was made based on real-time weather conditions, which are not within PG&E's control. 2) PG&E's ability to restore these customers temporarily was to the benefit of the customers – PG&E should not be penalized for taking action to reduce the impact of the PSPS event on customers. 3) PG&E's Priority and Watch notifications for the initial planned outage also cover the outage duration of the second outage – thus, customers would have been adequately notified of the overall outage

			duration regardless of whether it was a single long outage or two separate outages.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Table 6B: Explanation of Failures for Agency Entities, CFI, and All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive 24-to 48-Hour Watch Notification

Total Agency Entities	Total CFI	Total Non-CFI Customers	Forecasted or Actual Outage Window	Explanation
0	0	1	B	Due to a data error in PG&E's active customer datasets, PG&E was not aware that this customer had started their responsibility for service until after the last plan used pre-de-energization notifications and thus did not notify this customer prior to de-energization. In reality, their responsibility for service started during the 24-48 Hour Watch notification window and prior to the 1-4 Hour Imminent Notification window.
69	97	1,476	B	These agency entities and customers were planned for a single PSPS outage spanning two waves of weather. PG&E was able to restore these outages in between the two waves of weather but had to scope and/or de-energize some agencies and customers again when the second wave of weather arrived. In these cases, PG&E sent a new 1-4 Hour Imminent notification but was already past the compliance window for Priority and Watch Notifications. PG&E does not consider this a notification failure, as explained in Table 6A.*
0	0	11	A	PG&E was unable to send these customers notifications as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*
0	0	39	B	PG&E was unable to send these customers notifications as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*

0	0	1	B	There was no active customer to notify during this notification window. Responsibility for service began after this notification window but prior to de-energization.*
0	0	2	B	There was no active customer to notify during this notification window. Responsibility for service stopped prior to this notification window, however, they were already included in scope.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Table 6C: Explanation of Failures for CFI and All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive 1-4 Hour Imminent Notification

Total CFI	Total Non-CFI Customers	Forecasted or Actual Outage Window	Explanation
1	1	B	These COL customers received a delayed 1-4 Hour Imminent Notification because their notification file was launched late. As a result, these customers were notified approximately two minutes late. PG&E is still investigating the root cause of this error and will report our findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report.
0	1	A	This COL customer missed the 1-4 Hour Imminent Notification for both of their forecasted or actual outages due to a missing field in their notification file. PG&E is still investigating the root cause of this error and will report our findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report.
0	1	B	This COL customer missed the 1-4 Hour Imminent Notification for both of their forecasted or actual outages due to a missing field in their notification file. PG&E is still investigating the root cause of this error and will report our findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report. Since this customer is already reported as a 1-4 Hour Imminent Notification failure for their first outage, and for the reasons discussed in Tables 6A and 6B, PG&E does not consider this a separate notification failure from the one already reported above.*
0	1	B	This customer's notification was launched late, resulting in this customer being notified approximately six minutes late. PG&E is still investigating the cause of this error and will report our findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report.
0	1	B	Due to a data error in PG&E's active customer datasets, PG&E was not aware that this customer had started their responsibility for service until after the last plan used pre-de-energization notifications and thus did not notify this customer prior to de-energization. In reality, their responsibility for service started during the 24-48 Hour Watch notification window and prior to the 1-4 Hour Imminent Notification window.
0	10	A	PG&E was unable to send these customers notifications as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*
0	45	B	PG&E was unable to send these customers notifications as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*

0	1	B	There was no active customer at this service point during this notification window, and thus there was no one to notify. The customer subsequently started service after this notification window but prior to de-energization.*
0	2	B	There was no active customer to notify during this notification window. Responsibility for service stopped prior to this notification window, however, they were already included in scope.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Table 6D: Explanation of Failures for All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive Any Notifications Before De-Energization

Total Non-CFI Customers	Forecasted or Actual Outage Window	Explanation
1	B	Due to a data error in PG&E's active customer datasets, PG&E was not aware that this customer had started their responsibility for service until after the last plan used pre-de-energization notifications and thus did not notify this customer prior to de-energization. In reality, their responsibility for service started during the 24-48 Hour Watch notification window and prior to the 1-4 Hour Imminent notification window.
9	A	PG&E was unable to send these customers notifications as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*
34	B	PG&E was unable to send these customers notifications as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*
1	B	There was no active customer to notify during any of the pre-outage notification windows. Responsibility for service began after the last pre-outage notification window but prior to de-energization.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Table 6E: Explanation of Failures for CFI and All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive Power Off Notification

Total CFI	Total Non-CFI Customers	Forecasted or Actual Outage Window	Explanation
4	64	B	A manual step needed to deploy these notifications was delayed due to human error. These notifications were sent approximately 2.5 hours after de-energization was initiated.
0	1	B	PG&E is still investigating the cause of this error and will report findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report.
0	10	A	PG&E was unable to send these customers notifications as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*
0	40	B	PG&E was unable to send these customers notifications as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Table 6F: Explanation of Failures for CFI and All Other Affected Customers Not Notified Immediately Before Re-Energization

Total CFI	Total Non-CFI Customers	Forecasted or Actual Outage Window	Explanation
1	0	B	This CFI customer experienced a PSPS outage prior to receiving backup generation provided by PG&E. Therefore, they are considered an impacted customer with a reduced outage duration, which ended upon activation of the backup generator. Although automated notifications were not issued immediately before or after generator activation, PG&E does not consider this a notification failure because the customer was in direct coordination with a PG&E representative regarding the mitigation. PG&E is investigating whether notification was provided through alternative channels and will report its findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report.*
0	10	A	PG&E was unable to send these customers notifications as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*

0	40	B	PG&E was unable to send these customers notifications as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Table 6G: Explanation of Failures for Agency Entities, CFI, and All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive Restore Notification

Total Agency Entities	Total CFI	Total Non-CFI Customers	Forecasted or Actual Outage Window	Explanation
7	0	0	A	Automated Restore notifications were not generated when service was fully restored within these agencies' jurisdictions, resulting in delayed Restore notifications. The notifications were subsequently issued approximately 6.5 hours later when PG&E reset the automated notification system prior to the next anticipated wave of outages. PG&E is investigating the cause of this error and will report its findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report.
0	0	10	B	As some customers were being restored, they were inadvertently transferred to a non-PSPS outage. This led the system to send notification language associated with non-PSPS outage restoration once these customers were restored. Unlike PSPS notifications, customers may choose notification preferences. PG&E is required to honor these preferences, therefore, PG&E was unable to send these customers restoration notifications. After the issue was identified, PG&E sent 6 of these 10 customers a delayed PSPS Restore notification despite their restoration efforts being complete.
0	0	1	B	PG&E is still investigating the cause of this error and will report findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report.
0	1	0	B	This CFI customer experienced a PSPS outage prior to receiving backup generation provided by PG&E. Therefore, they are considered an impacted customer with a reduced outage

				duration, which ended upon activation of the backup generator. Although automated notifications were not issued immediately before or after generator activation, PG&E does not consider this a notification failure because the customer was in direct coordination with a PG&E representative regarding the mitigation. PG&E is investigating whether notification was provided through alternative channels and will report its findings in the 2026 Post-Season Report.*
0	0	10	A	PG&E was unable to send these customers notifications as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*
0	0	40	B	PG&E was unable to send these customers notifications as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Table 6H: Explanation of Failures for Agency Entities and All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive Cancelation Notification

Total Agency Entities	Total Non-CFI Customers	Forecasted or Actual Outage Window	Explanation
58	0	B	These agencies received a delayed cancelation notification for their second outage. Their jurisdictions had been de-energized for a first PSPS outage then notified of a second planned PSPS outage. When this second planned PSPS outage was cancelled for their jurisdictions, these agencies received cancelation notifications for their first outage because the notifications were created using the previous version of scope, which contained outage timing corresponding to their first outage. PG&E does not consider this a false negative communication because the first PSPS outage had already occurred, and thus these agencies would not be negatively impacted by receiving this incorrect cancelation notification. Therefore, this is not separately reported as a false communication in Section 5.7. The correct cancelation notification for their second outage was subsequently sent approximately seven hours after the decision to cancel their second outage.
0	3	B	These customers were removed from scope because they stopped service, therefore, there was no active customer to notify of cancellation.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Section 5.6 - Explain how the utility will correct the notification failures. *(D.21-06-014, page 286.)*

Response:
We have reviewed the notification failures and false communications for this PSPS and have begun to identify the following corrective actions in Table 7.

Table 7: Notification Failure and False Communications Corrective Actions

Issue	Discussion	Resolution	Status
Delayed Power Off Notification	A manual step needed to deploy these notifications was delayed due to human error.	Formalize process for in-outage monitoring and correction to resolve this error before it can cause a significant notification delay.	In Progress

Beyond the corrective actions identified above, PG&E incurred notification failures under circumstances that were event-specific, out of our control and/or not expected to result in similar notification failures going forward and have not identified any necessary corrective actions for these failures at this time,

We are in the process of identifying additional corrective actions for other notification failures and false communications identified in Section 5.5 and Section 5.7 **and will be includ**ing this information in our 2026 PSPS Post-Season Report.

Section 5.7 - Enumerate and explain the cause of any false communications citing the sources of changing data. Describe the situations at-issue, which involve the level of perceived defect in notice, in specific detail. *(D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 4.)*

Response:
For this PSPS, we identified 22 cases of false positive communications and did not identify any cases of false negative communications. See Table 8 for explanations of false positive communications.

Table 8: Explanations of False Positive Communications

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Forecasted or Actual Outage Window	Explanation
0	4	13	A	These customers were not de-energized for PSPS because PG&E provided temporary generation as part of non-PSPS planned work. However, they received PSPS notifications prior to their avoided PSPS de-energization. They did not require cancelation notifications because PG&E did not remove them from PSPS scope for that planned outage and thus are not considered Cancel Notification failures for Section 5.5. However, these customers were aware that they would remain energized based on on-site coordination with a PG&E representative. Thus, our PSPS notifications would not have

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Forecasted or Actual Outage Window	Explanation
				negatively impacted these customers, which is why PG&E does not consider these to be false positive communications.*
0	1	0	A	PG&E fulfilled a request to mitigate this customer by providing temporary generation. PG&E continued to send this customer PSPS notifications, both prior to and during, their avoided PSPS de-energization. PG&E does not believe this is a compliance violation as these customers were aware they would be mitigated and understood they would not be de-energized for this PSPS. Furthermore, they did not require Cancellation Notifications because PG&E did not remove them from scope.*
0	0	1	B	PG&E fulfilled a request to mitigate this customer by providing temporary generation. PG&E continued to send this customer PSPS notifications, both prior to and during, their avoided PSPS de-energization. PG&E does not believe this is a compliance violation as these customers were aware they would be mitigated and understood they would not be de-energized for this PSPS. Furthermore, they did not require Cancellation Notifications because PG&E did not remove them from scope.*
0	0	3	B	These customers did not receive a Cancellation Notification because they stopped service as reported in Table 6H. Their last communication from PG&E was advising of planned PSPS impact but they are not included in our de-energized customer count, making them appear as false positive communications.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be false communications as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Section 6 – Local and State Public Safety Partner Engagement

Section 6.1 – List the organization names of public safety partners including, but not limited to, local governments, tribal representatives, first responders and emergency management, and critical facilities and infrastructure the utility contacted in anticipation to de-energization of Period of Concern, the date and time on which they were contacted, and whether the areas affected by the de-energization are classified as Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 as per the definition in CPUC General Order 95, Rule 21.2-D. *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
For a list of Public Safety Partners including tribal representatives, local governments, first responders and emergency management, and critical facilities notified with the date and time of the initial notification, and whether the areas affected by the de-energization are classified as Zone 1, Tier 2 or Tier 3, see Appendix D in the attachment, *"PGE_PSPS_Post-Event Report Tables_20261010.xlsx."*

As seen in Appendix D, attachment, *"PGE_PSPS_Post-Event Report Tables_20261010.xlsx,"* we use a High Fire Risk Area (HFRA) classification which we utilize in addition to HFTD to determine PSPS scope. PG&E's circuits can run miles long and span across multiple jurisdictions. Some Public Safety Partners outside of HFRA and HFTD were also in the potentially impacted scope in order to de-energize areas within HFRA and HFTD for safety.

Section 6.2 - List the names of all entities invited to the utility's Emergency Operations Center for a PSPS event, the method used to make this invitation, and whether a different form of communication was preferred by any entity invited to the utility's emergency operation center. *(D.21-06-014, page 289.)*

Response:
PG&E invited the CPUC via email to virtually embed in the EOC for the duration of the activation on October 8, 2026, at 06:50 PDT.

Additionally, telecommunications service providers are appointed a dedicated 24/7 PG&E contact in the EOC, the Critical Infrastructure Lead (CIL), who shared up-to-date PSPS information and answered individual questions. We proactively reached out to 10 telecommunications service providers[25] via email or phone as weather changes or new information regarding the PSPS became available.

As part of our PSPS Pre-Season outreach,[26] we provide water infrastructure entities and communication services in PG&E's electrical service area with information on how to request representation at PG&E's EOC, when activated for PSPS. Alternatively, some partners may also request PG&E representation at their jurisdiction's activated Operations Emergency Center

[25] American Tower Corporation, AT&T Corporation, CenturyLink Companies, Charter Communications, Comcast Corporation, Crown Castle International, Frontier Communications Corp, TDS Telecom, T-Mobile - Sprint, Verizon Wireless.
[26] See PG&E's 2026 PSPS Pre-Season Report.

(OEC).[27] None of the entities invited to embed into our EOC indicated a preference for a different form of communication other than the ones already utilized.

Section 6.3 - A statement verifying the availability to public safety partners of accurate and timely geospatial information, and real time updates to the GIS) shapefiles in preparation for an imminent PSPS event and during a PSPS event. In addition, list any accuracy or timeliness issues in making available the GIS shapefiles to public safety partners during the PSPS event from activation to full restoration. *(D.21-06-014, page 289.)*

Response:
In preparation for a potential PSPS, PG&E sent automated notifications with links to the PSPS Data Portal, which provides PDF maps and Geographic Information System (GIS) data to Public Safety Partners at the times outlined in Table 4 in the attachment, *"PGE_PSPS_Post-Event Report Tables_20261010.xlsx."* In addition, when PDF maps and GIS data were updated on the PSPS Data Portal due to scope changes, users were notified via e-mail at the times outlined in Table 9.

PDF maps and GIS data on the PSPS Data Portal were determined to be accurate and updated in a timely manner following changes to geographic scope or customer impacts.

Table 9: PSPS Data Portal Map Sharing (Date and Time)

Date	Time PDF and GIS Maps Shared (PDT)
10/08/2026	10:16
10/08/2026	13:54
10/08/2026	23:54
10/10/2026	14:39
10/11/2026	11:49
10/11/2026	16:55
10/12/2026	09:58

Section 6.4 - A description and evaluation of engagement with local and state public safety partners in providing advanced outreach and notification during the PSPS event. *(D.19-05-042, Appendix, page A23.)*

Response:
Below is a description of the engagement with state CPUC, Cal OES, CAL FIRE, and local (i.e., tribes, counties and cities) Public Safety Partners:

- Submitted the PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES twice a day (07:00 PDT and 15:00 PDT), if there was a significant change to scope and at least once for each of the five PSPS stages: Activating PSPS Protocols/Potential to De-energize (Stage 1), Decision to De-energize (Stage 2), De-energization Initiated (Stage 3), Initiating Re-energization

[27] D.19-05-042.

Patrols (Stage 4) and All PSPS Lines Re-energized (Stage 5). See Table 10 for the date and time of notifications submitted to Cal OES.

Table 10: Notifications Submitted to Cal OES (Date and Time)

Date	Time Submitted (PDT)
10/08/2026	06:39
10/08/2026	13:41
10/08/2026	14:30
10/09/2026	06:21
10/09/2026	13:27
10/09/2026	14:31
10/09/2026	15:37
10/09/2026	17:15
10/10/2026	06:24
10/10/2026	11:06
10/10/2026	14:55
10/11/2026	06:36
10/11/2026	07:45
10/11/2026	12:03
10/11/2026	14:12
10/11/2026	17:05
10/12/2026	06:45
10/12/2026	09:37
10/12/2026	15:03
10/12/2026	20:48

- Sent e-mails to the CPUC at least once for each of the five PSPS stages listed above. See Table 11 for the date and time of notifications submitted to the CPUC.

Table 11: Notifications Submitted to CPUC (Date and Time)

Date	Time Submitted (PDT)
10/08/2026	06:50
10/08/2026	13:05
10/09/2026	13:02
10/09/2026	14:46
10/09/2026	15:38
10/09/2026	17:29
10/09/2026	21:02
10/10/2026	10:24
10/10/2026	14:30
10/10/2026	21:04
10/11/2026	03:41
10/11/2026	05:12
10/11/2026	05:54
10/11/2026	07:07

10/11/2026	07:26
10/11/2026	08:20
10/11/2026	09:07
10/11/2026	12:31
10/11/2026	18:14
10/12/2026	09:24
10/12/2026	11:00
10/12/2026	19:45

- Hosted daily State Executive Briefings with invitees including Cal OES, CPUC, CAL FIRE, the Governor's Office, and other federal and state agencies to provide the latest PSPS information and answer questions. A presentation deck with key PSPS information was provided to participants.
- Hosted a daily Systemwide Cooperators Call, where all Public Safety Partners in the service area were invited to join for situational awareness.
- Hosted tribal Cooperators Calls with potentially impacted tribes to provide the latest PSPS information and answer questions.
- Hosted Operational Areas Cooperators Communication Calls to provide situational awareness updates and answer questions.[28]
- Conducted ongoing coordination with tribal and local county OES contacts through dedicated Agency Representatives. This includes but is not limited to providing the latest PSPS information, coordinating CRC locations, and resolving local issues in real-time.
- Provided links to the PSPS Data Portal that included planning and event-specific maps, situation reports, critical facility lists and MBL customer lists at each notification and when scope changed. The Situation Report was provided twice a day and at scope changes prior to de-energization and hourly once restoration began.
- Sent automated and live call notifications to agency partners before, during and after de-energization.
- Offered state and local agencies to be embedded in PG&E's EOC and offered PG&E Agency Representatives to embed virtually in local EOCs


[28] May vary in cadence and type based on County OES.

We consider our level of engagement with local and state Public Safety Partners during this EOC activation to be successful. This evaluation is based on the number and various types of outreach conducted (see list above), the feedback received from Public Safety Partners through the post-PSPS survey and the success rate of automated agency notifications. The following is a subset of comments PG&E received from in-scope Public Safety Partners regarding PSPS outreach:
"I appreciated the notices I received before and during this outage."

- "Power should not be turned off for days straight, when wind was minimal and only for an hour or two out of the entire 3 days."
- "The automated phone calls are frankly, ridiculous."
- "Thanks for always being there for us!"

Figure 16 shows the post-PSPS survey results when Public Safety Partners were asked to "evaluate PG&E engagement with your agency during the outage." We received 12 responses to the survey. We will report any late submissions to the survey in our 2026 PSPS Post-Season Report. We continue to look for opportunities for improvement and refine agency notifications to ensure accuracy and timely information sharing.

Figure 16: Evaluation of Public Safety Partner Engagement



Section 6.5 - Specific engagement with local communities regarding the notification and support provided to the AFN community. *(D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 8, SED Additional Information)*

Response:
To ensure PG&E provides adequate support to AFN customers, we engage with local communities through paratransit agencies, media partnerships and CBOs to share coordination efforts, notifications plans, CRC information, PSPS-specific information and more. See below for details on this engagement.

Engagement with Paratransit Agencies
In accordance with the Phase 3 Guidelines,[29] PG&E provided proactive notifications and impacted zip code information to paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a CRC during the PSPS. All notifications included a link to PG&E's PSPS emergency website, and an "Additional Resources" link to maps showing potentially affected areas. For more information on Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) compliant CRC locations, see Section 9.

Community Engagement
We engaged with approximately 380 "information-based" CBOs during this PSPS, sharing courtesy notification updates, fact sheets, and other relevant information to share with their constituents to expand our reach of communications, including videos, social media and other relevant PSPS support services, that organizations could use to educate their consumers.

CBO resource partners were invited to the daily cooperator calls provided to Public Safety Partners. These calls are hosted by members from PG&E who provided a situational update about the latest scope of the PSPS and an overview of the services available to customers. We hosted additional daily coordination calls with CBO resource partners supporting the PSPS to provide an open forum to answer questions, offer suggestions regarding how they can best support their consumer supports and facilitate more localized coordination among the partners.

Programs/Support for AFN Customers
We are dedicated to providing a variety of resources and programs to AFN customers before and during a PSPS through several partnerships and contracts maintained by PG&E. For more information about these resources and partnerships, see the 2026 AFN Plan.

See Table 12 for the support provided during the October 10, 2026, PSPS.

[29] D.21-06-034.

Table 12: AFN Customer Programs and Support

Resource/Program	Resources Provided
Disability Disaster Access and Resource Program (DDAR)	Partnered with 10 local ILCs across 17 counties to provide aid to 400 customers who rely on power for medical or independent living needs, including: • 4 hotel accommodations • 2 food vouchers • 18 generator fuel vouchers • 5 batteries • 54 batteries previously distributed impacted counties. Although we partner with DDAR to provide accessible transportation, we did not receive any transportation requests for this PSPS.
PBP	Supported 396 customers in scope by providing batteries through the PBP. Since July 2020, over 30,400 battery units have been delivered through the PBP across our service area.
Food Bank Partnerships	Partnered with 19 local food banks that serve six counties to provide boxes of food for families.
Meals on Wheels Partnerships	Partnered with 11 Meals on Wheels Organizations in seven counties to provide services to customers in scope for the de-energization.
California 211 (CA 211) Providers Network	Partnered with nine CA 211 network centers across 17 counties to assist 553 customers with resources. The direct assistance resources provided during this activation included: • 404 food vouchers • 34 hotel accommodations • 2 water bladders • 61 generator fuel vouchers • 2 accessible transportations
Accessible Transportation Partnerships	Partnered with three organizations across five counties in preparation for the possibility of any transportation needs.[30] However, we did not receive any transportation requests for this PSPS. Any area that was not in scope for our accessible transportation partners is deferred as AFN transportation requests to our DDAR and CA 211 Network Providers, who also provide transportation assistance.
Ad-Hoc AFN Backup Generation Solutions	We granted temporary generation exceptions to one AFN customers experiencing critical circumstances. This included transportation limitations and medical device requirements that CBO resources were unable to resolve during this PSPS. After exploring all viable options, PG&E delivered backup generation to these individuals who rely on power for their health and safety. These specific situations do not meet our typical temporary generation process and procedures standards. However, given the unique circumstances, we went beyond our usual practices to ensure safety for our customers.

[30] PG&E partnered with Fresno Economic Opportunities Commission, Dignity Health Connected Living, and Vivalon during this PSPS.

Communications to Customers with Limited English Proficiency
We provided translated customer support through our customer notifications, website, call center, social media, engagement with CBOs, and multicultural media partnerships. Customers with their language preference set received in-language (translated) notifications. For customers with no language preference set, notifications were provided in English with information on how to receive PSPS information in 15 non-English languages. Customers with limited English proficiency have access to translation phone numbers on our PSPS website, highlighting that translation services are available in over 200 languages.

We will provide the number of requests we received for information in non-English languages supported by our Call Center Translation Services in our 2026 PSPS Post-Season Data Report.

PG&E continued support and engagement with multi-cultural media organizations and in-language CBOs to maximize the reach of in-language communications to the public. Prior to the PSPS, we reached out to 38 multicultural media organizations to provide outreach in translated languages throughout the impacted counties. Additionally, we shared information and updates on PSPS with these media outlets, including news releases and social media infographics in English, translated languages and ASL, for their use and distribution. We also shared our new PSPS Language Resources page (available in 16 languages) with organizations to share with their constituents.

Section 6.6 - Provide the following information on backup power (including mobile backup power) with the name and email address of a utility contact for customers for each of the following topics: (D.21-06-014, page 300.)

Response:
The information requested is included in Sections 6.6a – 6.6f. For questions related to backup power, customers can email TempGenPSPSSupport@pge.com.

Section 6.6a. Description of the backup generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

Response:
Table 13 lists the generators available for CFI customers before and during this PSPS.

Table 13: Generators Available for CFI Customers

Number of Units	Individual Size (MW)	Run Time (Hrs.)[31]	Description
2	0.032	37.6	Two units on reserve in Sacramento.
1	0.036	37.6	One unit on reserve in Sacramento.
1	0.056	50.0	One unit on reserve in Sacramento.
3	0.065	31.0	Three units on reserve in San Leandro.
5	0.100	25.3	Five units on reserve in Sacramento.
1	0.125	25.0	One unit on reserve in San Leandro.
3	0.150	30.3	Three units on reserve in Sacramento.
4	0.200	22.9	Four units on reserve in San Leandro.
1	0.230	22.9	One unit on reserve in San Leandro.
1	0.275	26.0	One unit on reserve in Sacramento.
3	0.500	24.1	Three units on reserve in Sacramento.
7	1.00	35.0	Seven units on reserve in Sacramento.
6	1.140	24.0	Six units on reserve in San Leandro.
7	1.500	10.0	Seven units on reserve in Benicia.
22	2.000	27.7	Twenty-two units on reserve (eight in Sacramento and twelve in San Leandro).

6.6b. The capacity and estimated maximum duration of operation of the backup generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

Response:
Table 13 lists the power capacity and maximum duration of operation of the generators available for CFI customers before and during this PSPS.

6.6c. The total number of backup generators provided to critical facility and infrastructure customer's site immediately before and during the PSPS.

[31] Estimated based on a 75% load. Barring mechanical failure and refueling the temporary generators have the ability to operate continuously throughout a typical PSPS.

Response:
No backup generators were requested by CFI customers for this PSPS due to previously established mitigation plans.

6.6d. How the utility deployed this backup generation to the critical facility and infrastructure customer's site.

Response:
As a general policy, PG&E does not offer backup generation to individual facilities. However, PG&E's policy grants exceptions for critical facilities when a prolonged outage could have a significant adverse impact to public health or safety.

Deployment of temporary generation is contingent upon the following circumstances: the expected duration to perform permanent repairs is significantly longer than the expected duration to install backup generation, the expected customer outage is collectively 50,000 or more customer minutes, and the outage affects a Distribution circuit serving multiple customers without a functional back-tie.[32]

PG&E has pre-arranged commitments with critical facility and infrastructure customers to provide temporary generation in case of a PSPS and evaluated requests received during this PSPS according to the prioritization described in Section 6.6e.

6.6e. An explanation of how the utility prioritized how to distribute available backup generation.

Response:
PG&E prioritizes the deployment of available generation by first meeting existing commitments to individual facilities in the following order:

- High Risk to Public Safety (Examples):
- Facilities that support public safety, such as but not limited to, first/emergency responders at the tribal, local, state, and federal level, water, wastewater assets, and city or county EOC.
- High Risk of Environmental Hazard (Examples):
- Chemical plants which may risk spilling into a local river.
- High Risk to Essential Emergency Response and Supporting Facilities (Examples):
- 911 call center.
- Water pump availability compromises active firefighting by emergency service personnel.
- Critical telecommunications equipment or other support businesses that directly affect emergency services provisions.
- Affected community choice aggregators, publicly owned utilities/electrical cooperatives, the CPUC, the California Governor's OES, city or county EOC, and the CAL FIRE.

[32] 50,000 customer minutes is approximately equivalent to 100 customers for about eight hours.

Deployment of available generation is then followed by customers with special needs in the following order:

- Life support, MBL Program, and temperature sensitivity.
- Large customers, economic damage customers, and danger to health and safety customers.

Deployment of available generation is then followed by other customers based on maximizing relief based on the number of customers times expected duration.

6.6f. Identify the critical facility and infrastructure customers that received backup generation.

Response:
No backup generators were requested by CFI customers for this PSPS due to previously established mitigation plans.

Section 7 – Complaints & Claims

Section 7.1 - The number and nature of complaints received as the result of the de-energization event and claims that are filed against the utility because of de-energization. The utility must completely report all the informal and formal complaints, meaning any expression of grief, pain, or dissatisfaction, from various sources, filed either with CPUC or received by the utility as a result of the PSPS event. *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, D.21-06-014, page 304.)*

Response:
Table 14 provides the number and nature of complaints received from customers and Public Safety Partners, submitted to both the CPUC and PG&E, for the October 10, 2026, PSPS.[33] Any complaints received after October 23, 2026, will be included in the 2026 PSPS Post-Season Report.

Table 14: Number and Nature of Complaints

Nature of Complaints	Number of Complaints
Communications/Notifications Including, but not limited to complaints regarding lack of notice, excessive notices, confusing notice, false alarm notice, problems with getting up-to-date information, inaccurate information provided, not being able to access information in the prevalent languages and/or information accessibility, complaints about website, Public Safety Partner Portal, Representational State Transfer (REST)/Digital Asset Manager (DAM) sites (as applicable).	8
PSPS Frequency/Duration Including, but not limited to complaints regarding the frequency and/or duration of PSPS, including delays in restoring power, scope of PSPS and dynamic of weather conditions.	13
Safety/Health Concern Including, but not limited to complaints regarding difficulties experienced by AFN/MBL populations, traffic accidents due to non-operating traffic lights, inability to get medical help, well water or access to clean water, inability to keep property cool/warm during outage raising health concern.	10
General PSPS Dissatisfaction/Other Including, but not limited to complaints about being without power during PSPS and related hardships such as food loss, income loss, inability to work/attend school, plus any PSPS-related complaints that do not fall into any other category.	74
Outreach/Assistance Including, but not limited to complaints regarding CRCs, community crew vehicles, backup power, hotel vouchers, and other assistance provided by utility to mitigate impact of PSPS.	1

[33] PG&E's PSPS Post-Event Reports are based on the required CPUC-issued template. Additional information regarding complaints and claims will be provided in subsequent PSPS Post-Season Reports.

Claims

As of October 15, 2026, PG&E received eight claims for the October 10, 2026, PSPS.

Table 15: Count and Type of Claims Received

Description of Claims	Number of Claims
Business Interruption / Economic Loss	2
Food Loss Only	4
Property Damage with Business Interruption / Economic Loss	1
Property Damage	1

Section 8 – Power Restoration

Section 8.1 - A detailed explanation of the steps the utility took to restore power *(Resolution ESRB-8 page 5)*

Response:
During this PSPS, PG&E's EOC Command and Meteorology teams monitor real-time and forecasted weather conditions based on weather models, weather station data, and field observations while patrol crews and helicopters are pre-positioned in anticipation of the Weather All-Clear to begin patrols. Weather All-Clears are called based on circuit segments.

This allows us to issue Weather All-Clears more granularly so we can restore power faster in areas less prone to wind gusts or adverse conditions. We monitor the conditions for each impacted circuit segment and as they fall below our mFPC to consider areas for restoration.

As Weather All-Clears are issued, restoration crews patrol electrical facilities to identify and repair or clear any damage or hazard before restoring power. Using the Incident Command System (ICS) as a base response framework, each circuit is assigned a taskforce consisting of supervisors, crews, trouble men and inspectors. This structure allows us to patrol and perform step restoration in alignment with the centralized control centers.

During restoration, we issued three Weather All-Clears between two waves and deployed up to 144 personnel and 17 helicopters to patrol the lines in advance of restoration. Patrols were conducted on approximately 392 miles of Distribution circuits that had been de-energized during the first wave and approximately 1,245 in the second wave. Power was restored to customers as patrol completion verified the safe condition of each line.

Section 8.2 - The timeline for power restoration, broken down by phase if applicable *(D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A24, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
For detailed information on restoration on each circuit, including restoration date, restoration time and total customer count on each circuit, see Appendix B in the attachment, *"PGE_PSPS_Post-Event Report Tables_20261010.xlsx."*

Section 8.3 - For any circuits that require more than 24 hours to restore, the utility shall use the following template to explain why it was unable to restore each circuit within this timeframe, using the format below. *(D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 6.)*

Response:
PG&E was able to restore all impacted customers within 24 hours of the Weather All-Clear.

Table 16: Circuits Requiring More than 24 Hours to Restore

Circuit Name	Reason the Utility was Unable to Restore the Circuit Within 24 Hours
None	None

Section 9 – Community Resource Centers

Section 9.1 - The address (including city and zip code) of each location during a de-energization event, the location (in a building, a trailer, etc.), the assistance available at each location, the days and hours that it was open, and attendance (i.e., number of visitors) *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
During the October 10, 2026, PSPS, eight CRCs were opened. These CRCs served 1,877 visitors, of which 1,753 did not remain on site and were provided "Grab and Go" bags. "Grab and Go" bags include a PSPS information card, water, non-perishable snacks, mobile battery charger and a blanket. For a list of CRC locations, assistance available, operating days and hours, and attendance, see Appendix E in the attachment, *"PGE_PSPS_Post-Event Report Tables_20261010.xlsx."*

Visitors were provided with PSPS information by dedicated staff, ADA-compliant restrooms, tables and chairs, power strips to meet basic charging needs for personal medical devices and other electronics, snacks, bottled water, Wi-Fi and cellular service access. Bags of ice and privacy screens were also available at indoor locations.

Some visitors may request and are provided with information regarding how to obtain hotel vouchers. In these instances, visitors are referred to CA 211 to confirm eligibility and are connected with local resources.

PG&E coordinates with county Offices of Emergency Management to determine the best locations for CRCs for all PSPS events. For this PSPS, in agreement with counties, CRCs were not opened in Alameda, Fresno, Kern, Kings, Lake, Merced, Napa, San Benito, San Joaquin, San Luis Obispo, and Solano due to low customer impact.

For our CRC Plan and more information regarding CRC operations, including coordination with tribal and local governments, CRC types and resources, see PG&E's 2026 PSPS Pre-Season Report, Appendix A, pp. 42 – 55.

Section 9.2 - Any deviations and explanations from the CRC requirement including operation hours, ADA accessibility, and equipment. *(SED Additional Information.)*


Response:
Due to the timing of de-energization and restoration, CRC hours of operation, listed in Appendix E, deviated from the standard operating hours of 08:00 PDT to 22:00 PDT.

Section 9.3 - A map identifying the location of each CRC and the de-energized areas *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
See Figure 17 for a map of CRC locations opened during this PSPS. Based on the CRC survey conducted for this PSPS, most respondents traveled approximately less than ten miles to the nearest CRC location.

Additional CRC location information can be found at PG&E Emergency Site – View Outage Map where customers can find specific information using the 'Address Search' or 'City/County Search' functions.

Figure 17: CRC Locations Map



Section 10 – Mitigations to Reduce Impact

Section 10.1 - A description of how sectionalization, i.e. separating loads within a circuit, was considered and implemented and the extent to which it impacted the size and scope of the de-energization event (D.19-05-042, page A23).

Response:
PG&E utilized measures to avoid de-energizing approximately 27,024 customers during the October 10, 2026, PSPS including distribution sectionalization and backup power support.

Backup Power Support
Backup power support provides temporary generation to select devices (i.e. medical equipment) or limited areas. However, it does not mitigate PSPS impacts completely given its segmented scope. For more information on backup power support, see www.pge.com/backuppower. During this PSPS, temporary generation was considered and utilized to mitigate approximately four stand-alone customers based on the PSPS scope and available resources.

Distribution Sectionalization
We have installed new Distribution sectionalization devices near the borders of the CPUC-designated HFTD Tier 2 and Tier 3 to reduce the number of customers affected by PSPS. During this PSPS, Distribution sectionalization was considered and utilized on 33 circuits to mitigate approximately 27,005 customers based on PSPS scope and available resource.

Community Microgrids
A community microgrid is a group of customers and Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) within clearly defined electrical boundaries with the ability to disconnect from and reconnect to the grid. These microgrids are typically designed to serve the portions of communities that include community resources, like hospitals, police and fire stations, and gas stations and markets. We continue to own and operate the Distribution system within the microgrid. For more information about PG&E's microgrid solutions or how to begin developing a community microgrid, see www.pge.com/cmep.

For this PSPS, we did not deploy community microgrids as there were not any identified opportunities to serve our customers within the de-energization scope.

Distribution Switching
Depending on fire risk patterns, Distribution switch locations and switching plans maintain service to customers on lines that fall outside the high-risk area but are served by lines that pass through the fire risk area. Depending on PSPS scope, we may be able to use back-tie switching to bypass the Distribution circuits that pass through the de-energization area to keep customers energized from a different set of lines.

For this PSPS, we did not deploy Distribution switching as there were not any identified opportunities to serve our customers within the de-energization scope.

Transmission Line Sectionalization
Transmission lines are segmented using switches enabled with Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), when possible, if only a portion of a line is required to be de-energized due to PSPS. Leaving segments of Transmission lines energized allows us to still reduce fire risk where needed and provide service to stations fed off the non-impacted segments during PSPS events. During this PSPS, there was no Transmission within scope, therefore, Transmission line sectionalization was not utilized.

Transmission Islanding
In some cases, we can leverage islanding capabilities to keep some customers islanded apart from the rest of PG&E's Transmission system and energized by generation located within the island. During this PSPS, there was no Transmission within scope, therefore, islanding was not utilized.

Temporary Substation Generation
Temporary substation generation can enable some community resources to continue serving the surrounding population during a PSPS at Distribution substations resulting from Transmission line outages. An interconnection is made at the substation, energizing entire circuits where downstream assets are not at weather risk and generator capacity is sufficient. If there are downstream assets at risk, this mitigation is combined with Distribution sectionalization to energize only safe areas. For reporting purposes, customers mitigated in the latter case will be documented in this category and not in sectionalization to avoid duplication. On average, customers served by temporary substation generation experience de-energization periods of under 30 minutes.

For this PSPS, PG&E did not deploy Temporary substation generation as there were not any identified opportunities to serve our customers within the de-energization scope.

Temporary Microgrids
Temporary microgrids can enable some community resources to continue serving the surrounding population during a PSPS where it is safe to do so, using pre-installed interconnection hubs to safely and rapidly interconnect temporary generation. While temporary microgrids do not often support large numbers of customers, the community resources served by temporary microgrids include fire stations, local water and waste companies, markets, post offices, and medical facilities. On average, when utilized, customers served by temporary microgrids experience de-energization periods of under 30 minutes. Currently, there are 12 temporary microgrid sites that are currently ready for immediate operation in PG&E's service area.

For this PSPS, we did not deploy temporary Distribution microgrids as there were not any identified opportunities to serve our customers within the de-energization scope.

Covered Conductor

The effects of grid-hardening and covered conductors are accounted for in our IPW model, which predicts the probability of utility-caused ignitions. Overhead system hardening is expected to reduce the probability of outages and ignitions in recently hardened sections. The IPW model more heavily weighs ignition and outage rates in recent years which will result in areas with fewer ignitions (e.g., areas that may have been recently hardened, being less likely to be de-energized for PSPS as there is a lower chance of ignition based on historical ignitions and outages).

Section 10.2 - Mitigation actions and impacts (both waterfall graph and map) including: sectionalization devices, temporary generation, microgrids, permanent backup generations, transmission switching, covered conductor, and any other grid hardening that mitigated the impact of the event *(D.21-06-014, page 285, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
Figure 18 depicts the impact each mitigation measure had on the total number of customers. Customer locations where mitigation efforts were utilized are mapped in Figure 19.

Figure 18: Reduction of Impacted Customers Due to Mitigation Efforts





Figure 19: Mitigation Locations Map



Section 11 – Lessons Learned from this Event

Section 11.1 - Threshold analysis and the results of the utility's examination of whether its thresholds are adequate and correctly applied in the de-energized areas. The utility must include specific information pertaining to the event. *(D.21-06-014, page 305-306.)*

Response:
This section addresses our examination of the adequacy of our PSPS protocols, criteria and guidance thresholds. As a preliminary matter, the CPUC recognizes the statutory authority of the IOUs to de-energize electric facilities when necessary for public safety and further acknowledges that such decision-making is complex and dependent on many factors.[34] As prescribed in ESRB-8, the decision to de-energize electric facilities for public safety is based on the best judgment of the IOU and is dependent on many factors, including but not limited to, fuel moisture, aerial and ground firefighting capabilities, active fires that indicate fire conditions, situational awareness provided by agencies and local meteorological conditions of humidity and winds.[35] The CPUC has declined to establish a minimum windspeed threshold below which an IOU would be prohibited from shutting off power and instead left the decision-making to the IOU's discretion on the basis that the IOU has the detailed knowledge of its facilities necessary to make this decision in real time given contemporaneous weather conditions.[36]

Based on our current PSPS modeling, guidance and criteria as applied in this PSPS and explained in Section 2.3, our current PSPS guidance continues to be adequate and was effectively applied for the October 10, 2026, PSPS. For detailed information on our PSPS criteria and thresholds, see Appendix A-1.1 in the attachment, *"PGE_PSPS_Post-Event Report Tables_20261010.xlsx."*

For each PSPS, we begin our threshold evaluation with a robust historical analysis that is described in detail below. This analysis establishes the guidance values to be applied for a PSPS, which has been optimized to capture data from past catastrophic fires to mitigate customer impacts. To do so, our Meteorology Team uses internal and external tools and subject matter expertise to support their recommendations on when and where to de-energize for public safety. For the October 10, 2026, PSPS, our Meteorologists observed conditions including gusty winds, low humidity and live and dead fuels which were receptive to ignition and fire spread. These additional factors were evaluated through advanced weather modeling systems from our network of more than 1,600 weather stations that forecasted and tracked weather conditions in real-time.

Before de-energization, customer risk was also evaluated against wildfire risk on a per circuit basis to further evaluate the adequateness of the PSPS. See Section 2.4 above for more information.

[34] ESRB-8.
[35] See Resolution ESRB-8, p. 8-9.
[36] D.12-04-024.

Establishing Threshold through Historical Analysis

Our PSPS guidance was established by calibrating a granular, historical dataset. We built our verification dataset by creating, or "backcasting," the PSPS guidance through our historical dataset. We extracted values for all recent fires that have occurred in PG&E's service area from 2012 to 2023. We aimed to capture as many historical fires as possible that were caused by PG&E equipment during high wind events (e.g., Camp, Nuns, Kincade, Zogg) while limiting the number of historical PSPS outages to minimize customer impacts. Our analysis included:

- Hourly review of past incidents
- Verification of hypothetical PSPS dates
- PSPS guidance values testing
- A robust guidance sensitivity and calibration analysis

Historical Analysis: CFP_D Quantification

Based on this historical analysis and as described in Section 2.3 above, PG&E uses a CFP_D value of six as the quantitative threshold guidance value to consider for PSPS on PG&E's Distribution system.


To establish the CFP_D threshold, we performed multiple sensitivity studies in "backcast" mode for calibration and validation. This involved running 68 different versions of the combined Distribution PSPS guidance through hourly historical data throughout multiple years to calibrate PSPS guidance. This included simulating and learning from more than 2,500 virtual PSPS events. Through this "lookback" analysis, we evaluated:

- Potential customer impacts
- The potential size, scope, and frequency of PSPS outages
- Whether utility infrastructure would have qualified for de-energization
- Avoided historical catastrophic fires

The CFP_D guidance value of six is shown in Figure 20 with respect to recent large fires since 2012. Fires to the right of the CFP_D 6 line tend to be wind driven fires, while non-wind driven fires tend to exist left of the CFP_D 6 line. Any fires above six that meet mFPC indicate PSPS would have been executed, had these models and guidance been in use during these historic events. The results show that deployment of this model could have prevented such wildfires as the Camp, Nuns, Atlas, and Zogg, if implemented in 2012.[37]

[37] Note that the inclusion of a fire in this analysis does not indicate that PG&E is directly responsible for or caused a fire. Instead, the fires are included for the purpose of analyzing the impact of PG&E's current PSPS Protocols.

Figure 20: CFP_D Guidance



This analysis was a critical step to ensure the most catastrophic wind-driven historical incidents are identified by PSPS guidance while considering the significant impacts to customers from PSPS outages across multiple dimensions (e.g., duration and frequency). This ensures that future PSPS outages will capture conditions similarly during the most catastrophic fires while also balancing impacts to customers. It also illuminates that PSPS would not have eliminated all historical fires as they can occur during low-wind scenarios (e.g., Dixie, Butte). Therefore, other mitigations must also be considered.

Historical Analysis: Execution

To execute the analysis at this scale, we utilized cloud computing resources to run PSPS model guidance for every hour at every 2 x 2 km grid cell across the historical data set to determine the number of times and locations PSPS guidance is exceeded. Each location exceeding guidance is then grouped into events to determine the location and size of each PSPS given the weather and fuels present at that time under the parameters of the study version. This allows us to determine if synoptic-driven events (e.g., Diablo wind events) are being identified, and if historical fires attributable to PG&E equipment may have been mitigated.

Verification of PSPS Protocols

In addition to these sensitivity studies, PG&E performed extensive verification of the PSPS protocols using several internal and external datasets. The goal of these analyses was to first determine if certain weather events are being captured (e.g., Diablo and offshore wind events), and second, to determine if power lines that have been implicated in historic catastrophic fires would have been identified by the guidance.

The following internal datasets were used in the analysis:

- Climatology of Diablo wind events
- Distribution and Transmission outage history
- Exploratory and dynamic dashboards created with internal and external data
- Hourly high-resolution wind maps from the climatology data set
- The weather signal database

The following external datasets were used in the analysis:

- High risk of potential large fires due to wind from the GACC
- Historical fire occurrence data compiled by federal agencies
- The fifth generation of the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts atmospheric reanalysis of the global climate V5 (ERA5)
- RFWs from NWS

The paragraphs below explain how we leveraged external and internal data to verify our PSPS protocols guidance thresholds.

ERA5 Archives
PG&E works with San Jose State University to acquire, process and make available the ERA5 archive data dating back to 1940[38]. Millions of maps that can be utilized to study past events. These maps are also useful to study the past events leading up to a PSPS, such as the extent of precipitation events and heat waves. When the PSPS models are run through the climatology, each PSPS identified is compared against the archive by our Meteorology Team to determine the large-scale atmospheric features present for each event.

Climatology of Diablo Wind Events
PG&E also leverages the latest academic research on Diablo wind events that use surface-based observations to create a climatology of Diablo wind events. We adapted the criteria and processed it hour-by-hour through the 30+ year weather climatology to determine the frequency, magnitude, and timing of Diablo winds. The output of this analysis was a 30+ year calendar of Diablo wind events experienced in the PG&E service area. As it relates to PSPS directly, the strongest Diablo wind events were evaluated to verify if PSPS guidance also selects these days for potential PSPS outages. Using the days identified by PSPS guidance and the Diablo PSPS list, a high-level comparison was completed to evaluate overlap of the events.

Any events that did not meet PSPS guidance were further evaluated using additional data sources described in this section. For example, the ERA5 archive proved useful, as antecedent conditions such as rainfall before a PSPS and the magnitude of the PSPS could be evaluated.

[38] https://www.met.sjsu.edu/weather/wirc-dev/archive/era5-viewer/current-monthly.html

PG&E's Weather Signal Database

PG&E's Meteorology Team built, and continues to maintain, a "weather signal" database that flags each day from January 1, 1995, to present that experienced any weather-related outages on the Distribution system. It also lists the main weather driver (e.g., heat, low-elevation snow, northeast wind, winter storm, etc.) for these outages. If Distribution outage activity is not driven by weather, the day is classified as a "Blue Sky"[39] day. This dataset combines weather and Distribution outage activity that allows rapid filtering of events based on the main weather drivers. To validate PSPS guidance, we used a combination of "Northeast" wind days and "Blue-Sky" days.

The PSPS guidance was validated against all Northeast wind days in the database. This is similar, but complementary to the Diablo PSPS analysis as it also accounts for outage activity observed on those days. Events were also compared against "Blue Sky" days to ensure that PSPS would not be recommended for a high percentage of non-weather-impact days where little to no outage activity was observed.

RFWs from the NWS

PG&E also validates PSPS guidance against RFWs from the NWS. RFWs mean warm temperatures, very low humidity, and stronger winds are expected to combine and produce an increased risk of fire danger. Historical RFWs were collected and used to evaluate the timing and spatial extent of historical RFWs against our PSPS guidance. It should be noted that each NWS office in the PG&E service area has different RFW criteria, making direct and quantifiable comparisons challenging. However, this dataset is used to evaluate whether RFWs were issued when PSPS guidance was met. Based on historical PSPS analysis, RFWs are expected to occur more frequently and cover a broader area than the area covered by PSPS outages.

High Risk of Potential Large Fires due to Wind from GACC

PG&E also validated PSPS guidance against historical "High Risk" days from the GACC. The GACCs issues High Risk Day alerts when fuel and weather conditions are predicted which historically have resulted in a significantly higher than normal chance for a new large fire or for significant growth on existing fires. Examples of critical weather conditions are high winds, low humidity, an unstable atmosphere, and very hot weather. Similar to the RFW analysis, this dataset was used to evaluate if High Risk days were issued when PSPS guidance was high. Blue Sky Day is defined as "The same as a non-weather impact day (no or very limited impacts due to weather)." Similar to RFWs, based on historical PSPS analysis, High Risk Days are expected to occur more frequently and cover a broader area than PSPS.

[39] A "Blue Sky Day" is defined the same as a non-weather impact day (no or very limited impacts due to weather).

Hourly High-Resolution Wind Maps from PG&E Climatology Data Set
PG&E created hourly maps from high-resolution climatology and a web-based application to display any hour across 30 years. For each PSPS that meets PSPS guidance in the climatology, these maps were evaluated by a Meteorologist to better understand the nature of the event, wind speeds, antecedent conditions, and the spatial extent of strong winds. It's important to note forecast wind speeds are available in the same exact format, allowing Operational Meteorologists to put forecast events in perspective with historical events using the same model.

Detailed PSPS Dashboards
To evaluate the PSPS thresholds, our Meteorology Team and data scientists utilized the data sources described above to evaluate historical PSPS hour-by-hour to verify the locations and times that are being flagged as meeting PSPS guidance. These dashboards determine if historical fire events would have been flagged by PSPS guidance. Our Meteorologists evaluated these data sources hourly to verify model performance of the IPW model and suitability for operations. The PSPS guidance can be evaluated spatially using the dashboard map integration, while the size and timing of the PSPS can be evaluated using the time series integration.

The analysis described above includes evaluating locations that were just below verbatim PSPS protocols as determined and reported by our high-resolution forecast model and data set included in this PSPS Post-Event Report. For example, this may include evaluating areas where the wind speed is -two mph below guidance if all other mFPC or RFW are met. It is well documented that high resolution weather model forecasts of wind speed from Weather Research and Forecasting model (WRF) tend to underpredict at high wind speeds.[40] Thus it is within reason to anticipate that the actual wind speed could be one mph higher than model forecast. If these areas are not scoped for PSPS and the winds materialize stronger than forecast, it could lead to PSPS execution with very little to no advanced notifications to customers and Public Safety Partners. Therefore, as explained in detail above, not one single factor or threshold is determinative of our final PSPS scoping. Based on multiple factors, data and analysis, the final PSPS scope is ultimately based on the judgement of our OIC.

[40] https://doi.org/10.1016/j.atmosres.2021.105673; https://doi.org/10.3390/atmos15050533; https://doi.org/10.3390/atmos15101244; https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoinf.2024.102898.

Section 11.2 - Use the below format to report any lessons learned that will lead to future improvement for the utility *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
PG&E collects lessons learned input from staff during and after every PSPS EOC activation to identify best practices and opportunities for improvement. As reflected in Table 17, PG&E did not identify any lessons learned for the October 10, 2026, PSPS.

Table 17: Lessons Learned

Issue	Discussion	Resolution
None	None	None


Section 12 – Other Relevant Information

Response:
Table 18 and Figure 21 show the maximum wind gust speeds recorded by weather stations in each county within PSPS scope.

Table 18: Maximum Wind Gusts Recorded Between October 10 – 12, 2026

County	Maximum Wind Gust (mph)	Station Name
Alameda	48	North Midway
Colusa	38	Noel Evan Rd
Fresno	64	Upper Providence
Glenn	43	Road 65
Kern	64	China Lake, Naval Air Facility
Kings	41	Lemoore Naval Air Station - Reeves Field
Merced	40	SR-99 - Le Grand Road
San Benito	33	San Juan Grade
San Joaquin	44	I-205 - MacArthur Drive
San Luis Obispo	45	Fellows VOR
Shasta	48	Beegum Gorge
Tehama	47	Eagle Peak
Yolo	45	Winters

Figure 21: Maximum Wind Gusts Recorded Map Between October 10 – 12, 2026



APPENDIX

APPENDIX A
SECTION 2 – DECISION MAKING PROCESS

See Appendix A-1.1 in the attachment,*" PGE_PSPS_Post-Event Report Tables_20261010."*

See Appendix F for the description of each column header, as well as the unit and value provided.

APPENDIX B
SECTION 3 – DE-ENERGIZED TIME, PLACE, DURATION AND CUSTOMERS

See Appendix B in the attachment, *"*PGE_PSPS_Post-Event Report Tables_20261010.xlsx.*"*

APPENDIX B: DE-ENERGIZED TIME, PLACE, DURATION AND CUSTOMERS

Circuits De-Energized During the October 10, 2026, PSPS

Circuits labeled as "non-HFTD" are located outside of the CPUC High Fire-Threat District (HFTD). We use a High Fire Risk Area (HFRA) classification which PG&E utilizes in addition to HFTD to determine PSPS scope – these circuits intersected PG&E's HFRA despite not entering HFTD Tier 2 or Tier 3.

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Counties	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	ANTELOPE 1101*	10/9/2026 13:06	10/10/2026 8:28	10/10/2026 13:52	Kern	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	6	1	5	0	1	0
Distribution	ANTLER 1101*	10/11/2026 3:51	10/12/2026 10:49	10/12/2026 14:11	Shasta	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	890	759	116	55	172	15
Distribution	AVENAL 2101*	10/9/2026 13:08	10/10/2026 8:28	10/10/2026 13:49	Kings	Outside HFTD	3	0	3	0	0	0
Distribution	CANTUA 1103*	10/9/2026 13:30	10/10/2026 8:28	10/10/2026 12:59	Fresno	Outside HFTD	14	2	5	0	0	7
Distribution	CARNERAS 1103*	10/9/2026 14:56	10/10/2026 8:28	10/10/2026 19:21	Kern	Outside HFTD	14	1	13	0	1	0
Distribution	CEDAR CREEK 1101	10/11/2026 6:01	10/12/2026 10:11	10/12/2026 16:12	Shasta	Tier 2, Tier 3	694	628	61	67	208	5
Distribution	CHOLAME 2102*	10/9/2026 14:10	10/10/2026 8:28	10/10/2026 11:36	Kern, San Luis Obispo	Outside HFTD	80	42	30	0	3	8
Distribution	COALINGA NO 1 1108*	10/9/2026 13:56	10/10/2026 8:28	10/10/2026 14:15	Fresno	Outside HFTD	2	0	2	0	0	0
Distribution	COALINGA NO 2 1105*	10/9/2026 13:22	10/10/2026 8:28	10/10/2026 16:28	San Benito, Fresno	Outside HFTD	94	62	21	1	18	11
Distribution	CORNING 1101	10/11/2026 5:25	10/12/2026 10:11	10/12/2026 14:12	Tehama	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	801	741	58	86	410	2
Distribution	CORNING 1102*	10/11/2026 5:32	10/12/2026 10:11	10/12/2026 15:34	Tehama	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	217	175	36	9	63	6

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Counties	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	CORTINA 1101*	10/11/2026 9:04	10/12/2026 10:11	10/12/2026 11:25	Colusa	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	18	7	10	0	2	1
Distribution	DESCHUTES 1101*	10/11/2026 5:55	10/12/2026 10:11	10/12/2026 12:55	Shasta	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	331	301	22	30	83	8
Distribution	DEVILS DEN 1101*	10/9/2026 13:25	10/10/2026 8:28	10/10/2026 13:37	Kings	Outside HFTD	6	1	5	0	0	0
Distribution	ELK CREEK 1101*	10/11/2026 6:55	10/12/2026 10:49	10/12/2026 14:52	Colusa, Glenn	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	821	679	116	53	178	26
Distribution	FELLOWS 2104*	10/9/2026 15:20	10/10/2026 8:28	10/10/2026 20:23	Kern, San Luis Obispo	Outside HFTD	22	2	18	0	0	2
Distribution	FRENCH GULCH 1102*	10/9/2026 21:05	10/10/2026 8:28	10/10/2026 11:52	Shasta	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	37	10	25	1	2	2
Distribution	FRENCH GULCH 1102*	10/11/2026 7:31	10/12/2026 10:11	10/12/2026 14:46	Shasta	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	37	10	25	1	2	2
Distribution	GIRVAN 1101	10/11/2026 5:58	10/12/2026 10:11	10/12/2026 16:22	Shasta	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	1221	1131	83	119	180	7
Distribution	GLENN 1101*	10/11/2026 5:58	10/12/2026 10:49	10/12/2026 13:46	Tehama, Glenn	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	145	82	39	3	17	24
Distribution	GUSTINE 1102*	10/9/2026 15:37	10/10/2026 8:28	10/10/2026 10:10	Merced	Outside HFTD	23	10	10	0	2	3
Distribution	HERDLYN 1102*	10/9/2026 15:29	10/10/2026 8:28	10/10/2026 12:17	Alameda, San Joaquin	Outside HFTD	98	63	26	3	12	9
Distribution	JESSUP 1101*	10/11/2026 6:04	10/12/2026 10:11	10/12/2026 16:12	Shasta	Tier 2	136	132	3	11	44	1
Distribution	KESWICK 1101	10/9/2026 21:03	10/10/2026 8:28	10/10/2026 13:24	Shasta	Tier 3	513	441	70	32	142	2
Distribution	KESWICK 1101	10/11/2026 7:36	10/12/2026 10:11	10/12/2026 16:33	Shasta	Tier 3	513	441	70	32	142	2

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Counties	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	LOGAN CREEK 2102*	10/11/2026 5:33	10/12/2026 10:49	10/12/2026 15:26	Colusa, Glenn	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	155	64	49	1	9	42
Distribution	MADISON 2101*	10/11/2026 7:02	10/12/2026 10:11	10/12/2026 11:13	Yolo	Tier 2	9	0	9	0	0	0
Distribution	MARICOPA 1102*	10/9/2026 15:07	10/10/2026 8:28	10/10/2026 20:35	Kern	Outside HFTD	172	154	16	13	76	2
Distribution	MAXWELL 1105*	10/11/2026 9:00	10/12/2026 10:11	10/12/2026 11:33	Colusa	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	37	21	13	0	3	3
Distribution	MCKITTRICK 1101*	10/9/2026 14:45	10/10/2026 8:28	10/10/2026 19:44	Kern	Outside HFTD	33	6	19	0	0	8
Distribution	OREGON TRAIL 1102*	10/11/2026 3:51	10/12/2026 10:49	10/12/2026 14:41	Shasta	Tier 2	237	212	25	29	66	0
Distribution	OREGON TRAIL 1103*	10/11/2026 8:00	10/12/2026 10:11	10/12/2026 13:59	Shasta	Tier 2	238	226	10	20	46	2
Distribution	ROUND MOUNTAIN 1101	10/11/2026 5:59	10/12/2026 10:11	10/12/2026 16:27	Shasta	Tier 2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Distribution	SANTA NELLA 1103	10/9/2026 15:43	10/10/2026 8:28	10/10/2026 16:32	Merced	Outside HFTD	107	62	40	4	21	5
Distribution	SANTA NELLA 1104*	10/9/2026 15:40	10/10/2026 8:28	10/10/2026 10:03	Merced	Outside HFTD	3	0	1	0	0	2
Distribution	STILLWATER 1101	10/11/2026 3:51	10/12/2026 10:49	10/12/2026 15:24	Shasta	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	661	578	77	80	205	6
Distribution	STILLWATER 1102	10/11/2026 3:52	10/12/2026 10:49	10/12/2026 15:31	Shasta	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	1368	1332	36	136	376	0
Distribution	TEMBLOR 1104*	10/9/2026 14:28	10/10/2026 8:28	10/10/2026 18:49	Kern, San Luis Obispo	Outside HFTD	22	3	17	0	0	2

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Counties	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	TYLER 1104*	10/11/2026 6:55	10/12/2026 10:11	10/12/2026 13:19	Tehama	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	232	175	29	23	46	28
Distribution	VASCO 1102*	10/9/2026 15:30	10/10/2026 8:28	10/10/2026 16:19	Alameda	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	264	194	58	13	13	12
Distribution	VASCO 1103*	10/9/2026 15:25	10/10/2026 8:28	10/10/2026 11:45	Alameda	Outside HFTD	29	16	12	0	1	1
Distribution	VOLTA 1101*	10/11/2026 7:32	10/12/2026 10:49	10/12/2026 19:28	Tehama, Shasta	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Tier 3	1206	1034	142	86	210	30
Distribution	WHITMORE 1101	10/11/2026 6:14	10/12/2026 10:11	10/12/2026 13:51	Shasta	Tier 2, Tier 3	498	450	40	46	125	8
Distribution	WILDWOOD 1101*	10/9/2026 17:01	10/10/2026 8:28	10/10/2026 13:22	Tehama, Shasta	Tier 2	36	26	9	2	9	1
Total							**12,043**	**10,274**	**1,474**	**956**	**2,888**	**295**

APPENDIX C
SECTION 4 – DAMAGE AND HAZARDS TO OVERHEAD FACILITIES

See Appendix C in the attachment, *"PGE_PSPS_Post-Event Report Tables_20261010.xlsx."*

APPENDIX D
SECTION 6 – PUBLIC SAFETY PARTNERS CONTACTED

See Appendix D in the attachment, *"PGE_PSPS_Post-Event Report Tables_20261010.xlsx."*

APPENDIX E
SECTION 9 – COMMUNITY RESOURCE CENTER LOCATIONS

See Appendix E in the attachment "PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20261010."

APPENDIX F: DEFINITIONS

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
Access and Functional Needs (AFN) Populations	None	Includes individuals who have developmental or intellectual disabilities, physical disabilities, chronic conditions, injuries, limited English proficiency or who are non-English speaking, older adults, children, people living in institutionalized settings, or those who are low income, homeless, or transportation disadvantaged, including, but not limited to, those who are dependent on public transit or those who are pregnant.
AFN Characteristics	None	Includes blind/low vision, deaf/hard of hearing, senior, non-English speaking, durable medical equipment, assistive technology, low income, or life support. In accordance with D.21-06-034, PG&E includes customers who have voluntarily indicated they are "dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology" in an effort to identify customers "above and beyond those in the medical baseline population" or self-identified vulnerable population to include persons reliant on electricity to maintain necessary life functions including for durable medical equipment and assistive technology. This includes Assistive Technology, Blind, Disabled, Durable Medical Equipment, Hearing Disability–Deaf or Hard of Hearing, Senior or Vision Disability-Low Vision.
Benefit to Risk Ratio	Fraction – Max (Threshold, Forecast Factor)	Adverse impact to customers due to a catastrophic fire prevented by PSPS de-energization divided by adverse impact to customers due to PSPS de-energization. No observed value is available for this factor.
California Alternate Rates for Energy (CARE)	None	A state mandated program. As determined by PU Code Section 739.1(a), annual household must be no greater than 200% of the federal poverty guideline levels.
Catastrophic Fire Probability Distribution (CFP_D)	Scaled Probability – Max (Threshold, Forecast, Observed Factor)	The probability of fire ignitions due to weather impacting the Distribution electric system combined with the probability that a fire will be catastrophic if it starts. In Appendix A-1.1, this is the product of catastrophic fire (Prob Cat) and Ignition Probability Weather (IPW) minus probability of ignition (Prob Ignition). Scaled by 1000 to convert to an integer value.
Catastrophic Fire Probability Transmission (CFP_T)	Scaled Probability – Max (Threshold, Forecast and Observed Factor)	In Appendix A-2.1, this is the product of probability of catastrophic fire (Prob Cat) and Operability Assessment Probability of Failure. This product is called the (CFP_T) Catastrophic Fire Probability Transmission model. Scaled by 1000 to convert to an integer value.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
Critical Facilities and Infrastructure (CFI)	None	"Critical Facilities" and "Critical Infrastructure" refer to facilities and infrastructure that are essential to public safety and require additional assistance and advance planning to ensure resiliency during de-energization. The CPUC adopted the following interim list of CFI, as aligned with Department of Homeland Security's Critical Infrastructure Sectors: • **Emergency Services Sector**: Police Stations, Fire Stations, Emergency Operations Centers • **Government Facilities Sector**: Schools, Jails and Prisons • **Healthcare and Public Health Sector**: Public Health Departments, Medical facilities, including hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, nursing homes, blood banks, health care facilities, dialysis centers and hospice facilities • **Energy Sector**: Public and private utility facilities vital to maintaining or restoring normal service, including, but not limited to, interconnected publicly owned utilities and electric cooperatives • **Water and Wastewater Systems Sector**: Facilities associated with the provision of drinking water or processing of wastewater including facilities used to pump, divert, transport, store, treat and deliver water or wastewater • **Communications Sector**: Communication carrier infrastructure including selective routers, central offices, head ends, cellular switches, remote terminals and cellular sites • **Chemical Sector**: Facilities associated with the provision of manufacturing, maintaining, or distributing hazardous materials and chemicals • Note: Some customers meet the criteria of being both a Public Safety Partner & Critical Facility, which include Emergency services sector, water and wastewater providers, communication service providers and emergency hospitals.
Customer or Customer Accounts	None	Active service points or meter.
Dead Fuel Moisture Content (DFM) 10hr	Fuel Moisture Fraction – Min (Threshold, Forecast, Observed Factor)	The amount of moisture in dead vegetation (i.e., fallen leaves, tree branches, and logs). In Appendix A-1.1, "DFM 10hr" is Dead Fuel Moisture provided in 10-hour fuel moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
Dead Fuel Moisture Content (DFM) 100hr	Fuel Moisture Fraction – Min (Threshold, Forecast Factor)	The amount of moisture in dead vegetation (i.e., fallen leaves, tree branches, and logs). In Appendix A-1.1, "DFM 100hr" is Dead Fuel Moisture provided in 100-hour moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100. No observed value is available for this factor.
Emergency Operations Center (EOC)	None	A central command and control facility responsible for carrying out the principles of emergency preparedness and emergency management, or disaster management functions at a strategic level during an emergency and ensuring the continuity of operation of a company.
EV charging station levels	None	• **Level 1 Charging:** 120-Volt; Connectors Used: J1772, NACS/J3400; Charging Speed: 3 to 5 Miles Per Hour • **Level 2 Charging:** 208-Volt to 240-Volt; Connectors Used: J1772, NACS/J3400; Charging Speed: 12 to 80 Miles Per Hour • **Level 3 Charging:** 400-Volt to 900-Volt (DC Fast Charge & Supercharging); Connectors Used: Combined Charging System (Combo), CHAdeMO & NACS/J3400; Charging Speed: 3 to 20 Miles Per Minute
Family Electric Rate Assistance Program (FERA)	None	CPUC established program for households of any size with incomes between 200% and 250% of federal poverty guidelines. (PU Code Section 739.12)
Fire Index Area (FIA)	None	Boundaries originally designated by the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection and United States Forest Service for the purpose of establishing a fire-danger rating for that area based on local conditions. There are 109 rating areas in PG&E's service area.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
Fire Index Rating	None	A rating used by fire agencies to determine the risk of fire and its likely behavior. Its calculation considers fuel moisture, humidity, wind speed, air temperature, and historical fire occurrence. These ratings are as follows: • **R1:** Very little or no fire danger • **R2:** Moderate fire danger • **R3:** When fire danger is so high that care must be taken using fire-starting equipment. Local conditions may limit the use of machinery and equipment to certain hours of the day • **R4:** Fire danger is critical. The use of equipment and open flames are limited to specific areas and times • **R5:** Fire danger is so critical that the use of equipment and open flames are not allowed at any time • **R5-Plus:** Fire danger is at R5 "plus" high risk weather trigger of strong wind
First/Emergency Responders	None	Individuals who, in the early stages of an incident, are responsible for the protection and preservation of life, property, evidence, and the environment, including emergency response providers. The term "emergency response providers" includes federal, state, and local governmental and nongovernmental public safety, fire, law enforcement, emergency response, emergency medical services providers (including hospital emergency facilities), and related personnel, agencies and authorities.
Flame Length ft 8hr	Feet – Max (Threshold, Forecast Factor)	Flame length in feet on fire front for first eight hours of fire spread simulation from Technosylva. No observed value is available for this factor.
Full-Scale Exercise (FSE)	None	A complex, resource-intensive operations-based exercise often involving multiple agencies, jurisdictions/organizations, and real-time movement of resources.
Functional Exercise (FE)	None	An operations-based exercise designed to test and evaluate capabilities and functions in a realistic, real-time environment. Movement of resources is usually simulated.
Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC)	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	High fire risk issued by the Federal North or South Operations Predictive Services.
Hazard Awareness and Center (HAWC)	None	The operations center that monitors for wildfires. HAWC leadership communicates and informs other PG&E Business Units and Executive Leadership about threats from wildfires in the service area.
High Fire Risk Area (HFRA)	None	Area where risk factors for the potential of catastrophic fire from utility infrastructure ignition during offshore wind events is higher than others. HFRA boundaries were developed based on the CPUC's HFTD boundaries.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
High Fire Threat Districts (HFTDs)	None	Per D.17-01-009, areas of the State designated by the CPUC and California Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) to have elevated wildfire risk, indicating where utilities must take additional action (per GO 95, GO 165, and GO 166) to mitigate wildfire risk. The districts have three levels: • **Zone 1:** High Hazard Zones on the U.S. Forest Service-California Department of Forestry and CAL FIRE joint map of Tree Mortality High Hazard Zones • **Tier 2:** Elevated risk for utility-associated wildfires • **Tier 3:** Extreme risk for utility-associated wildfires
High Impact Critical Customers	None	Non-residential customers that may present a significant community impact in the event they experience a sustained outage but do not meet the CPUC criteria for a Critical Facility Customer.
High Priority Vegetation Tag	None	**"**Priority 1" and "Priority 2" vegetation tags are created when trained vegetation inspectors identify trees or limbs that currently present elevated risk and must be worked on an expedited basis. Inspectors use Priority 1 tags for vegetation (i) in contact or showing signs of previous contact with a primary conductor; (ii) actively failing or at immediate risk of failing and which could strike PG&E's facilities; or (iii) presenting an immediate risk to PG&E's facilities. Inspectors use Priority 2 tags for vegetation that does not rise to the level of Priority 1 but has encroached within the PG&E minimum clearance requirements or has an identifiable potential safety issue requiring expedited work.
High Wind Advisory	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	Advisory of high winds issued by the Federal National Weather Service.
High Wind Warning (HWW)	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	Warning of high winds issued by the Federal National Weather Service.
Life Support	None	Customers that require critical life support equipment in their home.
Medical Baseline (MBL) Program	None	This program assists residential customers who rely on power for certain medical needs, as certified by a licensed medical practitioner. Eligible customers receive an extra monthly allotment of energy or discount, depending on their current rate plan. The program also includes additional notifications in advance of a PSPS.
Monitoring Stage	None	The seven days ahead of a weather event when weather patterns are being monitored. Utility provides seven-day proactive de-energization potential rolling forecast or implements an escalating notification system similar to the National Weather Service's "weather watch" and "weather warning" system on its public website.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	Fire weather forecast issued by NOAA (SPC).
Officer-in-Charge (OIC)	None	A position specific to PSPS to engage higher-level management accountability in the decision to de-energize and restore power while also enabling rapid decision-making during real-time. The OIC approves all PSPS Decision Records and associated documentation following a PSPS.
Open PSPS Tags	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	PSPS-Qualified Tags include P1 (tree represents an immediate risk) and P2 (tree is damaged or diseased and could fall into nearby power lines) tree tags and Electric Corrective tags (Priority A - emergency, B - urgent, and E/F - risk-based).
Page View	None	The number of times a web page was viewed by individual users.
Patrol Inspection	None	In accordance with GO 165, a visual inspection of applicable utility equipment and structures that is designed to identify obvious structural problems and hazards. Patrol inspections may be carried out during other company business.
Prob Cat	Probability Outputs – Max (Threshold, Forecast, Observed Factor)	Fire Potential Index (FPI) Model Output minus Probability of a catastrophic fire if an ignition were to occur. FPI component of the CFPD model.
PSPS Mitigation	None	The efforts taken to avoid de-energization including backup generation, backup storage, distribution microgrid, islanding, patrols, sectionalization, switching, temporary substation microgrid, Transmission switching and vegetation management (expedite priority trees that prevent circuit from being removed from scope).
Public Safety Partner	None	First/emergency response providers at the federal, state and local levels including, water, wastewater and communication service providers, affected community choice aggregators, publicly owned utilities/electrical cooperatives, the CPUC, the California Governor's Office of Emergency Services (OES) and the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. The term "emergency response providers" includes federal, state, and local governmental and nongovernmental public safety, fire, law enforcement, emergency response, emergency medical services providers (including hospital emergency facilities), and related personnel, agencies and authorities.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
Rate of Spread Chhr 8hr	Chains/Hour – Max (Threshold, Forecast Factor)	Rate of fire spread in chains per hour for first eight hours of fire spread simulation from Technosylva. No observed value is available for this factor.
Red Flag Warning (RFW)	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	Red Flag Warning from the Federal National Weather Service.
Relative Humidity (RH)	Percentage – Min (Threshold, Forecast, Observed Factor)	Relative Humidity in percent at two meters above ground level. For observed values, this is the minimum relative humidity recorded by all weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated All-Clear time.
Self-Identified Vulnerable (SIV)	None	Customers who have indicated they are "dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology" as well as customers that are not enrolled or qualify for the MBL Program and "certify that they have a serious illness or condition that could become life threatening if service is disconnected." In accordance with D.21-06-034, PG&E includes customers who have indicated they are "dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology" in an effort to identify customers "above and beyond those in the medical baseline population" to include persons reliant on electricity to maintain necessary life functions including for durable medical equipment and assistive technology. This designation remains on their account for one year, at which a customer can recertify their SIV Status.
Site Visit	None	A continuous session that begins when a user arrives on a site and ends after either 30 minutes of inactivity or 12 hours of continuous activity.
SIV Program	None	A PG&E program inclusive of customers who have indicated they are "dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology" as well as customers that are not enrolled or qualify for the MBL Program and "certify that they have a serious illness or condition that could become life threatening if service is disconnected." In accordance with D.21-06-034, PG&E includes customers who have indicated they are "dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology" in an effort to identify customers "above and beyond those in the medical baseline population" to include persons reliant on electricity to maintain necessary life functions including for durable medical equipment and assistive technology. This designation remains on their account for one year, at which a customer can recertify their SIV Status.
Sustained Wind	None	The average observed wind speed value over a two-minute period.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
Tabletop Exercise (TTX)	None	A discussion-based exercise in response to a scenario, intended to generate a dialogue of various issues to facilitate a conceptual understanding, identify strengths and areas for improvement, and/or achieve changes in perceptions about plans, policies, or procedures.
Time Place (TP)	None	A portion of the PG&E grid that is electrically and geographically coherent and is forecast to experience consistent timing for severe fire weather. TPs are identified for each PSPS and receive consistent treatment for notifications and de-energization. Once actual weather conditions occur, Weather "All-Clear" and service restoration times may vary due to actual weather conditions across various TPs as well as within a TP.
Transmission (Tx) Impacts	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	Distribution lines that would have been de-energized due to de-energization of upstream Transmission lines, regardless of whether those Distribution lines would have also been de-energized due to direct Distribution PSPS.
Vulnerable Populations	None	Individuals who have physical, developmental, intellectual disabilities; chronic conditions or injuries, are limited English proficient or non-English speaking; older adults, children, people living in institutionalized settings, low-income, homeless and/or transportation-disadvantaged (i.e., dependent on public transit) and pregnant women. This term is also used interchangeable with AFN.
Weather "All-Clear"	None	When severe weather has passed, the OIC gives approval to start patrols and restoration for all impacted areas at once or for specific areas.
Wind Gust	None	A rapid fluctuation of wind speed with variations of ten knots or more between peaks and lulls, typically, determined by averaging observed values over a three-second period.
WS MPH	MPH – Max (Threshold, Forecast, Observed Factor)	Sustained windspeed in miles per hour at 10 meters above ground level. The observed values show the maximum sustained wind speed recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated All-Clear time.

VERIFICATION


I, undersigned, say:

I am an officer of PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, a corporation, and am authorized to make this verification for that reason.

I have read the foregoing "PG&E Public Safety Power Shutoff Report to the CPUC" for the October 10, 2026, PSPS and I am informed and believe the matters stated therein to be true.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed at Oakland, California this 13th day of November 2026.



ANDREW ABRANCHES
VICE PRESIDENT
WILDFIRE MITIGATION