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September 28, 2026

VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL

Leslie Palmer
Deputy Executive Director, Safety and Enforcement
California Public Utilities Commission
505 Van Ness Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94102

Dear Mr. Palmer:

As required by Resolution ESRB-8 and in accordance with Ordering Paragraph 1 of California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Decision (D.) 19-05-042, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) respectfully submits this report for the September 12, 2026, PSPS. This report has been verified by a PG&E officer in accordance with Rule 1.11 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure.

Members of the public may submit both formal and informal comments on this report to the CPUC by following instructions on the CPUC's website (www.cpuc.ca.gov). The CPUC's Public Advisor's Office has established procedures for providing such comments, including via online form. Comments may also be submitted directly to the Director of the Safety and Enforcement Division (SED) of the CPUC using the contact information below.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads 'Susan C. Martinez'. The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Susan C. Martinez
Director of Liaison, Regulatory Operations and Engagement

Enclosures

cc: Anthony Noll, SED
ESRB_ComplianceFilings@cpuc.ca.gov
EnergyDivisionCentralFiles@cpuc.ca.gov

**Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E)
Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) Report to the
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)
September 12, 2026, De-energization**

Table of Contents

Section 1 – Executive Summary	3
Section 2 – Decision Making Process	8
Section 3 – De-energized Time, Place, Duration and Customers	26
Section 4 – Damages and Hazards to Overhead Facilities	28
Section 5 – Notifications	30
Section 6 – Local and State Public Safety Partner Engagement	59
Section 7 – Complaints & Claims	69
Section 8 – Power Restoration	71
Section 9 – Community Resource Centers	73
Section 10 – Mitigations to Reduce Impact	75
Section 11 – Lessons Learned from this Event	79
Section 12 – Other Relevant Information	85
APPENDIX	86
VERIFICATION	104

**PG&E PSPS Report to the CPUC
September 12, 2026, De-energization**

Section 1 – Executive Summary

Section 1.1 - Brief description of the PSPS event starting from the time when the utility's Emergency Operation Center is activated until service to all customers has been restored.
(D.21-06-014, page 286, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

High winds can cause tree branches and debris to contact energized electric lines and potentially lead to a wind-driven wildfire. As a result, we may need to turn off power during severe weather to help prevent wildfires. This is called a Public Safety Power Shutoff, or PSPS. We recognize that it is disruptive for our customers to be without power. Therefore, we initiate a PSPS when the weather forecast is so severe that public safety, lives, homes and businesses may be in danger of wildfires. It is not a decision we take lightly. For the safety of customers and communities, PSPS continues to be a necessary tool as a last resort.

This report follows the updated California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) template effective on May 1, 2026. PG&E reached out to the CPUC's Safety Enforcement Division (SED) on June 30, 2026, for clarification on the template updates. While some feedback has been provided, we plan to continue working with SED where additional clarification is beneficial. Accordingly, responses in this report are based on our current understanding of the recently updated prompts.

Timeline

On Tuesday, September 8, our Meteorology Team identified weather in forecast models that could indicate potential for wildfire conditions. Emergency response leadership was informed at this time.

On Wednesday, September 9, we entered readiness posture and activated our Emergency Operations Center (EOC) for a potential PSPS between September 12 – 14. Our teams began notifying Public Safety Partners in the areas anticipated to be impacted, readied the grid, and planned for Community Resource Centers (CRCs) and other customer support resources. During initial scoping, we identified 15 Time Places (TPs).

On Thursday, September 10, PG&E further refined the PSPS scope based on changing weather and updated meteorological forecasts, adding an additional TP near the Feather River Canyon. PG&E also began notifying customers in the areas anticipated to be impacted. PG&E closely monitored weather conditions across 16 TPs, as shown in Figure 1.

On September 12, at 09:06 PDT, planned de-energization windows for each TP were reviewed based on updated weather forecasts and real-time observations. As weather conditions evolved, we continuously evaluated updated meteorology information, real-time weather observations, and operational considerations to determine the appropriate timing and scope of de-energization activities. We determined the PSPS was necessary and began de-energization. This was done for public safety and due to increased fire potential conditions, resulting from gusty westerly winds,

low relative humidity, output from fire spread models, and real-time Hazard Awareness and Warning Center (HAWC) reports. At this time, PG&E authorized de-energization to mitigate catastrophic wildfire risk across portions of the Sacramento Valley and high elevation circuits in the Sierra Nevada. Based on the totality of information available at the time, including operational considerations, observed and forecasted wildfire risk, and assessment of public safety risks, TPs 13 – 15 were de-energized earlier than forecasted for public safety. As a result, the de-energization windows for these TPs were adjusted to September 12. We ultimately de-energized 12,068 customers across 10 counties and 12 TPs between September 12 and 14.

On September 13, we restored impacted customers in TPs 13, 14, and 15 to provide customers access to power while weather conditions allowed. We continuously monitored weather conditions for returning adverse weather, as reflected in early forecasts. For TPs 13 and 15, adverse weather conditions did return, and those TPs were subsequently de-energized a second time during this PSPS. For TP 14, weather conditions remained safe enough to allow customers to remain restored for the remainder of the PSPS.

On September 14, at 11:24 PDT, the Weather All Clear was declared for TP 15 and select circuits within TP 12 and 13 which were declared fully All-Clear at 11:58 PDT. The last Weather All-Clear was declared on September 14, at 12:48 PDT, for TP 17.

Through various mitigation efforts, we avoided the de-energization of approximately 14,209 customers in the final scope for de-energization. For more information regarding our mitigation efforts for this PSPS, see [Section 10](#).


Inspections

During patrol and inspections, we identified one damage caused by weather. For more information regarding the Technosylva fire spread simulation, see [Section 2.2](#). For more information regarding damages and hazards, see [Section 4](#).

Following patrol and inspections, customers were restored safely and as quickly as possible. Within 24 hours of the Weather All-Clear, service to 100% of customers had been restored. The average restoration time was approximately 4.3 hours.

PSPP Outage Area:

Time Place 1	Time Place 10
Time Place 2	Time Place 11
Time Place 3	Time Place 12
Time Place 4	Time Place 13
Time Place 5	Time Place 14
Time Place 6	Time Place 15
Time Place 7	Time Place 16
Time Place 9	Time Place 17



Section 1.2 - A table including the maximum numbers of customers notified and actually de-energized; number of counties de-energized; number of tribes de-energized; number of Medical Baseline customers de-energized; number of transmission and distribution circuits de-energized; damage/hazard count; number of critical facilities and infrastructure de-energized. Hazards are conditions discovered during restoration patrolling or operations that might have caused damages or posed an electrical arcing or ignition risk had PSPS not been executed. Table 1 must contain unique data counts from event. (D.21-06-034, Appendix A, page A15, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

Table 1 identifies the maximum number of unique customers notified, de-energized and canceled; number of Medical Baseline (MBL) customers de-energized; number of counties de-energized; number of tribes de-energized; number of Critical Facilities and Infrastructure (CFI) de-energized; number of Transmission lines and Distribution circuits de-energized; and damage/hazard count.

Table 1: PSPS Event Summary¹

Total Customers Notified	Total Customers De-energized	Total Customers Canceled	MBL Customers De-energized	Counties De-energized	Tribes De-energized	CFI De-energized	Transmission De-energized	Unique Distribution Circuits in Scope	Distribution Circuits De-energized	Damage/Hazard Count
14,905 ²	12,068 ³	2,062 ³	598	10	3	319	2	33	28	1 damage

¹ The information, times, and figures referenced in this report are based on the best available information available at the time of this report's submission. The information, times and figures herein are subject to revision based on further analysis and validation.

² Of the customers who received pre-outage notification of planned de-energization, seven customers are not considered de-energized customers and also did not receive cancellation notifications: two were mitigated from all de-energization windows by backup generation, four stopped service prior to de-energization but were not descope, and one stopped service prior to de-energization but did not receive a cancellation notification. See [Section 5.7](#) for more information. Note: the unique customer counts reported here differ from the per-window counts reported in [Section 5.7](#).

³ Of the customers de-energized, 42 did not receive any notifications regarding planned de-energization: 39 had no valid contact information for the main customer of record, two weren't included in scope due to use of outdated data in event scoping, and one wasn't included in scope due to errors in transformer assignment data. See [Section 5.5](#) for more information. Note: the unique customer counts reported here differ from the per-window counts reported in [Section 5.5](#).


⁴ This is the count of customers who received cancellation notifications without de-energization. Customers who receive a cancellation notification and are de-energized are only reported in the Total Customers De-energized.

Section 1.3 - A PDF map depicting the de-energized area(s) (*SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

During the September 12, 2026, PSPS, we de-energized 12,068 customers in 12 TPs across 10 counties. The final de-energization footprint is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: PSPS De-Energization Footprint Map



Section 2 – Decision Making Process

Section 2.1 - A table showing all factors considered in the decision to shut off power for each circuit de-energized, including but not limited to, sustained and gust wind speeds, temperature, humidity, and moisture in the vicinity of the de-energized circuits (*Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, Appendix A-1.1 and A-2.1 in the attachment, “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report_20260912 Tables.xlsx*” provides a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope for the September 12, 2026, PSPS.

Section 2.2 - Use the following format to provide decision-making criteria detailing circuit level analysis and comparison between threshold, forecast, and actual readings utilized during the scoping process and de-energization process. Also include a PSPS decision-making diagram(s)/flowchart(s) or equivalent along with narrative description (*D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A22, D.21-06-014, page 284, SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

As the CPUC noted in ESRB-8, the decision to de-energize electric facilities for public safety is complex and dependent on many factors, including but not limited to, fuel moisture, aerial and ground firefighting capabilities, active fires that indicate fire conditions, situational awareness provided by fire agencies, the National Weather Service (NWS) and the United States Forest Service, and local meteorological conditions of humidity and winds.⁴


Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, this section provides an overview of our decision-making criteria and threshold evaluation process that were used in the decision to de-energize customers during the September 12, 2026, PSPS. For event-specific thresholds and a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope for the September 12, 2026, PSPS, see Appendix A-1.1 and A-2.1 in the attachment, “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report_20260912 Tables.xlsx*.”

PSPS Preparation and Scoping Process

At a high level, Figure 3 shows the process used to prepare for a PSPS. We utilized and referenced the following protocols and tools during the September 12, 2026, PSPS to determine the latest forecasted weather parameters versus actual weather. Appendix A-1.1 and A-2.1 in the attachment, “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report_20260912 Tables.xlsx*” includes anticipated parameters based on the latest forecast used to develop the planned de-energization scope versus actual weather parameters for each circuit.

⁴ ESRB-8, pp. 8 – 9.

Figure 3: PG&E's High-Level PSPS Process Steps



We consider executing a PSPS when strong winds, critically low humidity levels, and low fuel moisture levels pose an unacceptable risk of causing fast-spreading, catastrophic wildfires. Assessments begin several days before the weather event is forecasted to take place.

We identified weather conditions that could create high fire potential by using a combination of high outage and ignition potential, high-resolution internal and external weather forecasting models and data from federal agencies that include the following:

- *Ignition Probability Weather (IPW)*: Determines the potential of an outage due to weather conditions, and then for that outage to lead to an ignition.
- *Fire Potential Index (FPI)*: Assists with fire model development and calibration.
- *Technosylva*: Provides fire spread modeling via data inputs.

Through partnerships with external experts, we developed our machine learning models using historic datasets and advanced forecast models that provide a better understanding of historical weather events and improve our weather forecasting. These models use the following:

- Data storage and processing via the PG&E-Amazon Web Services Cloud.
- Hourly weather data such as temperature, relative humidity, wind speed, precipitation, pressure, and dead and live fuel moisture.
- Over 100 trillion data points of historical weather and fuel.
- Precise location data points across our service area to conduct hourly weather analyses using high-resolution, historical data.

Our thresholds and guidance for identifying critical fire risk and outage/ignition potential are determined by analyzing and rigorously testing our current PSPS protocols and criteria against decades of historical weather data in and around California.

External forecast information from the NWS (e.g., Red Flag Warnings [RFWs]) and other forecast agencies are examined carefully. We also coordinate with these agencies during high-risk periods via daily conference calls to decide whether to de-energize portions of the grid for public safety.

Tools and Technology


We partner with Technosylva, an external expert in the wildfire modeling field to test and deploy cloud-based wildfire spread model capabilities. This helps us to better understand where we might need to turn off power.

Each day, we deliver our wildfire condition datasets to Technosylva, who then perform over 100 million fire spread simulations to provide fire spread scenarios that help to identify circuits that

may be at risk during dry, windy weather. These are done every three hours, for the five days ahead.

Figure 4 shows the Technosylva fire spread simulation demonstrating what a wildfire might have looked like, and the potential damages or impacts caused, if the September 12, 2026, PSPS had not been initiated. For more information regarding damages and hazards, see [Section 4](#).

Figure 4: Fire Spread Simulation Damage in Plumas County (Broken Conductor)
Rate of Spread (ch/h)



Impact Analysis


Size (ac)	676.34
Initial Attack Assessment	1 - Low
No. of Buildings	20
Total Population	14
No. of Places	0

Decision Criteria and Thresholds for Distribution PSPS Protocols

We begin determining whether to turn off power for safety by first evaluating the Distribution system. These powerlines are closer to communities and are generally more susceptible to dry, windy weather threats. Our process is outlined in Figure 5. The values presented in Figure 5 were developed using 30+ years of PG&E’s high-resolution climate data to help understand wildfire risk and the potential customer impacts of PSPS. We evaluate PSPS criteria within small geographic

areas (0.7 square kilometers) and if the criteria presented below are forecasted to be met, we scope circuit segments within that region for de-energization. There is no single criterion or threshold that will require turning off power to a Distribution circuit. For event-specific thresholds and a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope, see Appendix A-1.1 and A-2.1 in the attachment, “PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report_20260912 Tables.xlsx.”

Figure 5: PSPS Protocols for Distribution



Step 1: Evaluating Minimum Fire Potential Conditions

The first step to determine the scope of a PSPS is evaluating the minimum fire potential conditions (mFPC). This ensures that PSPS is only executed during wind events when atmospheric conditions and fuels are dry. A PSPS is evaluated if the mFPC noted in Step 1 of Figure 5 above is met or have a reasonable chance of being met should future forecasts strengthen.

These values were established from a combination of analyses including:

- Historical fire occurrence in our service area.
- PSPS sensitivity studies that show how PSPS criteria impacted the frequency of PSPS events and total customer impact.
- Information published by federal agencies regarding fire behavior and criteria used to issue warnings to the public.

Step 2: In-Depth Review of Fire Risk


If all minimum fire conditions are met, we conduct an in-depth review of fire risk using multiple separate measures. If the criteria for any of these measures are met, we may need to turn off power for safety. We evaluate all the factors below together, rather than isolating any specific factor to assess fire risk against the potential harms of de-energization. For event-specific thresholds and a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the distribution circuits in scope for the September 12, 2026, PSPS, see Appendix A-1.1 in the attachment, “PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report_20260912 Tables.xlsx.”

- Catastrophic Fire Probability (CFPD):** This model combines the probability of fire ignitions due to weather impacting the electric system with the probability that a fire will

be catastrophic if it starts. It is the combination of the IPW and the FPI. The CFP_D model accounts for changes to the grid over time based on actual performance data. Thus, the model will address positive and negative trends in grid performance and reliability year-over-year, incorporating grid improvements such as system hardening, and enhanced vegetation management based on their performance at mitigating outages over time.

- IPW Model: A system comprised of two machine learning models. These models are used to evaluate the probability of outages across several outage classes (Outage Probability Weather [OPW] model) and the probability of that outage becoming an ignition (Ignition Given Outage Probability Weather Model [IOPW]). These models are combined for each location at each hour to ascertain the ignition probability. These machine learning models use 17 years of weather data to correlate approximately 650,000 outages occurring on our Distribution grid. The model analyzes the potential for several types of power outages in each weather event, as well as the potential for that outage to be the source of an ignition. IPW learns from and accounts for changes on the grid from year-to-year.
- FPI Model: This model outputs the probability that a fire will become large or catastrophic and is used as a daily and hourly tool to drive operational decisions to reduce the risk of utility caused fires. It was enhanced in 2024 with additional data and improved analytic capabilities.
- *Tree Strike Considerations*: Our PSPS protocols utilize a machine learning model to integrate the potential for trees to strike the lines into our OPW Model and IPW Model. This helps our Meteorology Team more accurately analyze risk posed by trees and how that translates to increased ignition probability. For more information regarding OPW modeling, see Figure 6. Scenarios with a high risk of an IPW and a high FPI value will always warrant a PSPS. However, power may be turned off in other scenarios to avoid catastrophic wildfires.

Figure 6: Incorporation of Tree Strike Potential into PSPS Modeling



- *Catastrophic Fire Behavior (CFB)*: We also evaluate areas that are meeting mFPC (windy and dry conditions) but are not meeting our CFP guidance values by utilizing dynamic wildfire spread simulations from Technosylva. This allows us to consider potential ignition events that are rarer and more difficult to forecast such as animal and third-party contacts, or external debris impacting electrical lines. These locations are only considered once the mFPC are met, ensuring that conditions are sufficiently windy and dry.
- *Fireline Intensity*: The U.S. Forest Service Rocky Mountain Research Station performed a study of fire line intensity which is determined by the size and components of flames. It is measured as the rate of heat energy released (Btu) per unit length of the fire line (ft) per unit(s). It is also calculated by estimating the flame length, the distance measured from the average flame tip to the middle of the fire's base. Internal studies that evaluated historical fire simulation outputs to actual fire events, damages, and fatalities showed that outputs of flame length and rate of spread were best correlated to historical fire outcomes. As mentioned above, studies have shown that more intense fires with higher flame lengths and higher rates of spread are more difficult to control. Thus, we evaluate fire simulation data that indicates where fast-spreading and intense fires could manifest and incorporate that into our PSPS decision making process.
- *Vegetation and Electric Asset Criteria Considerations*: We review locations from recent inspections where high-priority trees or electric compliance issues may increase the risk of ignition. If an area is forecasted to experience minimum fire conditions and there are known issues with equipment or vegetation that have not yet been addressed, we may need to turn off power.

PSPS Protocols for Transmission

In addition to analyzing Distribution circuits that may need to be de-energized for safety, we also review the Transmission lines and structures in areas experiencing dry and windy weather conditions. Transmission lines are like the freeways of the electric system, carrying high voltage energy across long distances. For event-specific thresholds and a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the transmission circuits in scope for the September 12, 2026, PSPS, see Appendix A-2.1 in the attachment, "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report_20260912 Tables.xlsx*."

Step 1: Evaluating Minimum Fire Potential Conditions

When determining whether to turn off power for safety on Transmission lines, we review the same mFPC as with Distribution circuits. If these conditions are met, we will review the criteria below to determine whether a Transmission line must be turned off.

Step 2: In-Depth Review of Fire Risk


Once we identify the initial scope, we work with the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) to ensure the initial scope is appropriate. This includes analyzing whether it will compromise the power supply to other jurisdictions, utilities or facilities connected to our system. This important step can last several hours, which is why the potential scope of a PSPS may change as we get closer to the forecasted weather event.

- *Catastrophic Fire Probability – Asset (CFPT – Asset)*: We use computer models to assess the likelihood of equipment failure during a given weather event, and the subsequent risk of catastrophic wildfires if a failure occurs. This model uses a combination of the Operability

Assessment (OA) and FPI Models, both in time and space, at every Transmission structure to form the Transmission CFPT model for asset failures. The OA Model combines historical wind speeds for each structure, historical outage activity, Bayesian updating, and the condition of assets based on inspection programs to help understand the wind-related failure probability of each structure. The OA Model can be driven with forecast wind speeds to output the probability of failure at the structure level.

- *Catastrophic Fire Probability – Vegetation (CFPT – Veg)*: The Transmission-specific vegetation risk model is a calibrated probability of vegetation risk built internally using data collected and managed by our Vegetation Management and external contractors, such as NV5 and Formation Environmental. This model leverages aerial LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) data to map the location and attributes of trees near Transmission lines. The Transmission vegetation risk model is based on several factors such as overstrike, the amount of unobstructed fall paths to a wire, the slope between a tree and a conductor, and tree exposure. The Transmission vegetation risk model is combined with the FPI Model in space and time to form CFPT – Veg.
- *CFB*: We may de-energize customers where the consequence of a potential wildfire ignition would be extreme, even if the probability of a power line or equipment failure is low.
- *Vegetation and Electric Asset Criteria Considerations*: We review locations from recent inspections where high-priority trees or electric compliance issues are present that may increase the risk of ignition. Figure 7 provides a quantitative summary of our PSPS Protocols for Transmission.

Figure 7: PSPS Protocols for Transmission



Step 3: Determining the Outage Area

Transmission lines meeting the criteria above pass to the next stage of review. We conduct a Power Flow Analysis on the in-scope Transmission lines (if applicable) to analyze any potential downstream impacts of load shedding.

Reviewing Impact and Forecasted Weather

After determining the outage area both for Distribution and Transmission, we review the forecasted customer impacts of each circuit against the forecasted wildfire risk of each circuit. If there is reasonable risk for ignition on the Distribution or Transmission circuits during the forecasted weather event, it is included in the PSPS scope. During key decision-making points, we internally share this analysis to inform PSPS decision-making and further risk modeling.

Starting 12 hours before the forecasted PSPS de-energization time, we transition from evaluating forecast data to observing the weather in real-time. Based on real-time observations and analysis, we continually evaluate all the outage areas identified in the previous steps and use external tools and analysis to determine whether to initiate PSPS de-energization.

Decision-Making and Analysis to Validate if PSPS is Necessary

During high-risk periods, our Meteorologists participate in daily interagency conference calls that commonly include multiple NWS local offices, the NWS western region headquarters, and representatives from the Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC) also known as Predictive Services. This call is hosted by the Northern California and/or Southern California GACC offices.

During these calls, the external agencies present their expert assessment on the upcoming periods and locations of risk, wind speeds and fuel moisture levels, and any other relevant factors to consider.

During a PSPS, our Lead Meteorologist, called the Meteorologist-in-Charge (MIC), summarizes these forecasts and discussions for the Officer-in-Charge (OIC), who ultimately makes the decision to execute a PSPS.

The following sources and tools are considered before initiating a PSPS:

- Daily interagency conference call with agencies during high-risk periods;
- External weather model data;
- Field observer information;
- Fire Weather Watches and RFW (NWS – Federal);
- Live weather data from weather stations;
- Location of existing fires;
- Significant fire potential for wind (GACC – Federal) and;
- Storm Prediction Center (SPC) (part of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) – Federal);
- Vegetation and Electric Asset criteria considerations.

Based on the analyses above, we can determine how many customers may be subject to de-energization, and further investigate mitigation options, such as advanced switching solutions, sectionalization, islanding, alternative grid solutions and temporary generation, to support

customers who could lose upstream power sources but are in areas that may be safe to keep energized.

We monitor and forecast weather over a multi-day horizon, so we can anticipate when a PSPS may be needed and activate our EOC as far in advance as possible. Our internal weather model and external modeling are updated multiple times per day. Our Meteorology Team constantly evaluates both internal and external weather models for changes in weather timing, strength, and potential locations impacted. We then incorporate these changes into a new weather scope generally once per day.

Weather shifts may force changes to PSPS scope and impacts at any point in time during PSPS planning and execution; this may allow us to avoid de-energization in some areas if fire-critical conditions lessen but can also cause some areas and customers to move into de-energization scope early or late in the process if forecasted fire-critical weather footprints change or increase. Possible changes in PSPS scope and impact are driven by the inherent uncertainty in weather forecast models.

Section 2.3 - A thorough and detailed description of the quantitative and qualitative factors it considered in calling, sustaining, or curtailing each de-energization event including any fire risk or PSPS risk modeling results and information regarding why the de-energization event was a last resort, and a specification of the factors that led to the conclusion of the de-energization event. (D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 9, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

The quantitative factors that were used to determine de-energizing customers for safety are provided in Appendix A-1.1 and A-2.1 in the attachment, “PGE_PSPS_Post-Event Report_20260912 Tables.xlsx.” Below, we outline a detailed description of the qualitative factors provided by our Meteorology Team when we were determining whether to de-energize customers.

As forecast weather models do not provide absolute certainty of the future, our Meteorologists evaluate several external forecasts, external models and machine learning wind speed modeling at a station-by-station basis to determine PSPS scope. Other factors include forecasts by the NWS, such as RFWs.

PG&E Meteorology Team Review

On September 8, 2026, weather models indicated potential for two distinct wind events developing between September 12 – 14. On September 8, our Meteorology Team, Emergency Planning and Response Team, and EOC Commander met to discuss the potential need for a PSPS.

Based on the emerging risk of weather conditions, we entered readiness posture at 11:00 PDT on September 9 and activated the EOC at 18:00 PDT on September 9.

On September 9, federal forecast agencies began to highlight the upcoming weather conditions. All federal agencies kept this posture throughout the period of concern. See “External PSPS Decision Inputs” below for external agency forecasts.

On September 12, PG&E began reviewing TPs in scope during the start of the weather event for potential adverse fire weather conditions. Using the process described in [Section 2.2](#), it was determined mFPC was met or being approached for TPs 13 – 15. Additionally, real-time weather observations of wind speeds were trending greater than forecasted in portions of those TPs. For TP 13, the Lucas Fire and associated response activities were considered as part of the broader situational awareness and public safety assessment. Open vegetation and asset tags were also considered as part of the overall risk assessment for TP 13.

Based on all information available, we determined out of an abundance of caution that earlier de-energization of TPs 13, 14, and 15 was warranted to reduce wildfire risk and protect public safety. These TPs were continuously monitored and identified for a second de-energization window. When weather conditions allowed us to do so safely, we re-energized these customers temporarily between real-time weather conditions. For de-energization and restoration times for these TPs, please see Figure 1 or Appendix A-1.1 in the attachment, “*PGE_PSPS_Post-Event Report_20260912 Tables.xlsx*.”

Following this event, we reviewed the factors that informed the September 12, 2026, PSPS decision-making process. This review reaffirmed the importance of considering forecast information, real-time weather observations, and additional risk indicators when evaluating evolving wildfire conditions. We continue to evaluate opportunities to improve situational awareness and decision support capabilities while maintaining our focus on public safety. Additional information regarding lessons learned from this event is provided in [Section 11.1](#).

High Resolution PSPS Models Guidance

The tools and models outlined in [Section 2.2](#) are part of the decision criteria that our Meteorologists consider when determining PSPS scope. Longer range weather forecast model data are used to determine the location and timing of a PSPS. Typically, these weather forecasts are less certain the farther they are from the observed date. This is akin to the well-known hurricane “cone of uncertainty” in which the potential track of a hurricane is represented by an area that expands farther out in time, which resembles an expanding cone. Therefore, there is an inherent tradeoff between the further out the forecasts are for a PSPS and the uncertainty in the PSPS scope and waiting until forecasts become more certain. Forecast uncertainty leads to changes in PSPS scope as weather forecast models are updated, and the scope is refined closer to the period of concern.

As the PSPS unfolds in real-time, our Meteorologists transition to real-time observations of weather stations, satellite data, pressure gradients, and live feeds from Alert Wildfire Cameras. These observations help to evaluate if the weather is behaving as expected. In many instances, models trend stronger or weaker with each model iteration leading up to a PSPS.

External PSPS Decision Inputs

Meteorological analyses establish that high winds in California create significant fire threat and exacerbate fire spread. The NWS issues a RFW to indicate critical fire weather conditions under which any fire that develops will likely spread rapidly. California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) states, “the types of weather patterns that cause a watch or warning include low relative humidity, strong winds, dry fuels, the possibility of dry lightning strikes, or any combination of the above.” As noted previously, our decision to initiate a PSPS consistently occurs

during periods and in areas where federal, state, and local authorities have identified as having extreme fire risk including the presence of strong winds.

As discussed above and in [Section 2.2](#), we compare our fire risk forecasts against those of external agencies to validate that there is shared recognition of high fire risk across the California meteorology community. Between September 9 – 14, our analysis of fire risk justifying a PSPS were validated by several sources and warnings:

- North Ops Predictive Services issued their 7-Day Significant Fire Potential Outlook showing high risk wind triggers for the Far Eastside (NC08) and Sac Valley/Foothills (NC05) Predictive Service Areas.
- RFWs from the NWS were issued from three local NWS offices (Figure 8).
 - The Sacramento NWS office issued a Fire Weather Watch for the Sacramento Valley beginning at 11:00 PDT on September 12 and lasting through 11:00 PDT on September 14. On September 11, NWS Sacramento upgraded Fire Weather Watch to a RFW.
 - The Eureka NWS office issued a RFW for most of Lake County beginning at 10:00 PDT on September 12 and lasting through 14:00 PDT on September 13.
 - The Reno NWS office issued a RFW for the Northern Sierra Front beginning at 11:00 PDT on September 12 and lasting through 14:00 PDT on September 13.
- The NOAA's SPC's Day 2 Fire Weather Outlook indicated elevated risk conditions across northern Nevada (Figure 9).
- Predictive Services Geographic Coordination Center High Risk Summary (Figure 10).

Figure 8: NWS RFW Coverage from the NWS Eureka, Sacramento & Reno Weather Offices




Figure 9: NOAA – SPC Forecasts of Elevated Fire Weather Conditions





Figure 10: Predictive Services Geographic Coordination Center High Risk Summary



We also review forecasted wind speeds in the potentially impacted counties to evaluate the need for a PSPS. Figure 11 shows the Utility FPI Ratings for Fire Index Areas (FIAs) in our service area between September 12 – 14. We determine the scope for a PSPS within those FIAs with fire risk rating R5-Plus from our FPI model. Additionally, Figure 12 compares the PSPS scope with other agencies to vet the fire weather risk.

Figure 11: PG&E's Utility Fire Potential Index Ratings





Figure 12: Comparison of Federal Agency Fire Weather Warning and Final PSPS Scope



Section 2.4 - An explanation of how the utility determined that the benefit of de-energization outweighed potential public safety risks, and analysis of the risks of de-energization against not de-energizing for each circuit or segment. The utility must identify and quantify customer, resident, and the general public risks and harms from de-energization and clearly explain risk models, risk assessment processes, and provide further documentation on how the power disruptions to customers, residents, and the general public is weighed against the benefits of a proactive de-energization (D.19-05- 042, Appendix A, page A24, D.21-06-014, page 284, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

For the September 12, 2026, PSPS, we used our PSPS Risk Model with the latest scope prior to making the decision to de-energization. For a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope, including risk factors, see Appendix A-1.1 and A-2.1 in the attachment, “PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report_20260912 Tables.xlsx.”

Our PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool addresses the CPUC’s requirements presented in the 2019 PSPS OIL.⁵ This decision states California investor-owned utilities (IOUs) are required to quantify the risk/benefits associated with initiating or not initiating a PSPS for our customers.

We incorporated this risk-benefit analysis into our PSPS execution process to help inform our PSPS decision-making process. Our Risk-Benefit Tool aligns with the California IOUs Cost Benefit Approach (CBA) framework, as defined through the Safety Modeling Assessment Proceeding (SMAP), CPUC’s Risk Based Decision-Making Framework (R.20-07-013), which specifies how various consequences are factored into a risk calculation. Utilizing this framework, we incorporate PSPS forecast information into the tool, which is further described in the “Risk Assessment” section below.

The output of the tool is a ratio that compares the calculated PSPS potential benefit from initiating de-energization (i.e., mitigation of catastrophic wildfire consequence) to the risks associated with PSPS (i.e., impact to customers resulting from a PSPS). Key inputs in the risk-benefit analysis include results from Technosylva wildfire simulations specific to the Distribution circuit and Transmission lines in scope for a potential de-energization, the number of customers forecasted to be de-energized, and the forecasted number of customer minutes across each identified circuit in scope for a potential de-energization.

After the potential de-energization scope is determined, including the potentially impacted circuits identified for the potential PSPS, this scope and the Technosylva wildfire simulation outputs are used as inputs into the Risk-Benefit Tool, which quantifies the potential public safety risk and wildfire risk resulting from the forecasted impacts of the pending PSPS. Note that the Wildfire Risk Score is based on an eight-hour simulation from Technosylva and while useful, in some cases this can significantly understate the risk. As a result, we may still recommend de-energizing circuits where the Risk-Benefit Tool shows higher PSPS risk than wildfire risk.

⁵ D. 21-06-014.

Risk Assessment

As referenced above, our PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool follows California IOU agreed approach to utilize the CBA framework that captures the safety, reliability, and financial impact of identified potential risk events, as outlined in our Enterprise Risk Register.⁶ The tool's calculations use a non-linear scaling of consequences reflecting our focus on low-frequency/high-consequence risk events without neglecting high-probability/low-consequence risk events. Developed by the PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool, CBA scores are used to compare the potential de-energization risk from a forecasted PSPS to the potential risk of catastrophic wildfires from keeping the circuits energized, specific to the potentially impacted circuits being considered for a PSPS.

The following inputs are used in calculations to build CBA risk scores for a PSPS and wildfires, which are ultimately weighed against one another:

- *Customer Category and Critical Customer Adjustment Factor*: The type of customer (e.g., MBL Program) using a “critical customer adjustment factor.” This is applied to the customer outage duration to reflect a higher risk score for customers who are at a greater adverse risk of a potential PSPS.
- *Customers Impacted*: Forecasted number of customers anticipated to be impacted by the potential PSPS.
- *Customer Minutes*: Forecasted outage duration the customers will experience during the potential PSPS.
- *Forecasted Circuits*: The final list of the Distribution circuits and Transmission lines identified to be in scope for a potential PSPS.
- *Technosylva Wildfire Simulation Data*: Fire simulation forecasts on the consequence of a potential wildfire's impact on customers, wildlife, and infrastructures on each circuit for every three hours. These values are based on Technosylva's wildfire modeling, using real-time weather, state-of-the-art fuel, and eight-hour fire spread modeling.

Once the data above is made available and incorporated into the tool, the modeling considerations described in Table 2 are used to estimate the consequence of the potential wildfire risk and PSPS risk at the per-circuit level. Within the tool, a variety of modeling considerations are made to facilitate calculations, included in Table 2 and summarized in Figure 13.

⁶ Full details of the CBA methodology are provided through the 2024 Risk Assessment and Mitigation Phase (RAMP) and 2027 General Rate Case (GRC) filings.

Table 2: 2026 PG&E's PSPS Risk-Benefit Consequence Modeling Considerations

Consequence Type	Wildfire Consequence Considerations	PSPS Consequence Considerations
Safety	Calculated based on maximum population impacts derived from Technosylva wildfire simulation models and a fatality ratio based on National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) data.	Calculated from an estimate of Equivalent Fatalities (EF) per Million Customer Minutes Interrupted (MMCI). The EF/MMCI ratio is estimated from previous PG&E PSPS outages and other large external outages. ⁷
Reliability	None.	Calculated directly from the potential number of customers impacted and outage duration based on customer minutes interrupted.
Financial	Calculated based on maximum building impacts derived from Technosylva wildfire simulation models and a cost per structure burned previously evaluated in 2024 RAMP Report. ⁸	Calculated based on two financial estimates, 1) distribution of a lump sum cost of execution across all relevant circuits and 2) an estimated proxy cost per customer in scope per PSPS. ⁹

Potential Wildfire Risk

Wildfire consequence impacts are calculated based on the outputs of the Technosylva simulations. Variables include 1) population impacted by wildfire and 2) structures impacted by wildfire used to calculate natural unit values for two consequence components:

- *Wildfire Safety Consequence:* EF
- *Wildfire Financial Consequence:* Financial Cost of Wildfire (in dollars)

Potential PSPS Risk

PSPS consequence impacts are based on the following values: duration of de-energization by circuit, and number of customers impacted by de-energization on each circuit. These input values are used to calculate natural unit values for three consequence components:

- *PSPS Safety Consequence:* EF as an output of Customer Minutes interrupted
- *PSPS Electric Reliability Consequence:* Customer Minutes Interrupted × Critical Customer Adjustment Factor
- *PSPS Financial Consequence:* Financial Cost of PSPS (in dollars) × Critical Customer Adjustment Factor

Once the consequence values (safety, reliability, financial) are estimated they are converted into CBA risk scores. Once the Risk-Benefit Tool calculates the impacts between the PSPS and a

⁷ Includes 2019-2021 PSPS outages, the 2003 Northeast Blackout in New York City, 2011 Southwest Blackout in San Diego, 2012 Derecho Windstorms, 2012 Superstorm Sandy, 2017 Hurricane Irma and 2021 Blackout event.

⁸ A.24-05-008.

⁹ The assumptions used in these calculations, including the proxy cost per customer per PSPS, are subject to be updated and are not intended to prejudge or create precedent with regard to the development of more precise values of resiliency or cost of PSPS metrics being considered in other ongoing proceedings at the CPUC, such as the Risk-Based Decision-Making Rulemaking [R.20.07.013] and the Microgrid and Resiliency Strategies.

wildfire, it is summarized in Figure 13 and 14 by indicating if the adverse impact from a PSPS outweighs the risk of a wildfire.

Figure 13: Representation of PG&E’s PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool



Figure 14: PSPS Potential Benefit Versus PSPS Potential Risk Consequence¹⁰

PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	140	} Aggregated to event-level
PSPS Potential Benefit (Wildfire Mitigation)	13,904	
Potential Benefit : Potential Risk	100	
Recommended Approach	Indicates potential PSPS benefit outweighs risk	
Risk Ratio Per Circuit (>1, PSPS Benefit Outweighs Risk)	Dx Circuits: 33 (of 33) Tx Circuits: 2 (of 2)	
As defined in PLAN_D-02		

$\frac{\text{PSPS Potential Benefit (wildfire risk)}}{\text{PSPS Potential Risk}} > 1$ Indicates potential PSPS benefit outweighs risk

$\frac{\text{PSPS Potential Benefit (wildfire risk)}}{\text{PSPS Potential Risk}} < 1$ Indicates potential risk may outweigh potential benefit

Key Factors

- **PSPS Consequence**
 - Safety consequence factors in planned and unplanned widespread outage events across the US.
 - Reliability consequence based on customer minutes interrupted
 - Financial consequence based on execution and fixed customer cost per event
 - Assumes maximum duration for each customer per circuit
- **PSPS Benefit (Wildfire Mitigation)**
 - Safety consequence based on population impacted from fire spread simulation
 - Reliability consequence not considered
 - Financial consequence based on buildings impacted from fire spread simulation
 - Assumes an ignition on each circuit based on the maximum consequence modeled by TechnoSylva

Our PSPS Risk Model supported initiating a PSPS based on the September 12, 2026, PSPS scope and forecasted impact information. The model indicated that each of the 33 Distribution circuits and two Transmission lines in the latest scope surpassed the analysis threshold of “one” to support a PSPS.

¹⁰ The risk values in Figure 14 represents associated costs.

Section 2.5 - Explanation of alternatives considered and evaluation of each alternative. (D.19-05-042 Appendix A, page A22.)

Response:

After reviewing the meteorological information that indicated potential for catastrophic wildfire and the impacts on customers through de-energization, we considered whether alternatives to de-energizing, such as additional vegetation management and disabling automatic reclosers, could adequately reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire thus lowering the need for de-energization. We determined these measures alone did not reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire in areas within the PSPS scope sufficiently to protect public safety.

Section 3 – De-energized Time, Place, Duration and Customers

Section 3.1 - The summary of time, place and duration of the event, broken down by phase if applicable (*Resolution ESRB-8 page 3, SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

The PSPS occurred on September 12, 2026, in 12 TPs across 10 counties.

Section 3.2 - A consolidated zipped geodatabase (.gdb) file that includes all PSPS event data requested in Section 3.2 and Section 4.3. Use WGS 1984 Web Mercator Auxiliary Sphere projected coordinate system (WKID: Esri 3857) for the geodatabase. The geodatabase must include PSPS polygon feature classes of de-energized areas with items that are required in Section 3.3. In addition, the geodatabase must contain one consolidated event single polygon feature class with the following exact fields (dates will be formatted XX/XX/XX): (*SED Additional Information.*)

- **Event Name:** PG&E PSPS Event 09/12/2026
- **First Date of POC:** [first date of initial period of concern]
- **IOU:** [PGE, SCE, SDGE, Liberty, PacifiCorp, or BVES]
- **De-energization Start Date:** [XX/XX/XX]
- **Full Restoration Date:** [XX/XX/XX]
- **Customers De-energized:** [unique count matching Table 1]
- **De-energization:** [Yes or No]

Response:

Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, attachment, “*PGE_PSPS_Polygons_of_De-energized_Areas_and_Damage_Hazard_Points_20260912.gdb.zip*” provides a consolidated zipped geodatabase file that includes PSPS polygons of final de-energized areas combined with PSPS data as well as damages and hazards.

Section 3.3 - A list of circuits de-energized, with the following information for each circuit. If a circuit is de-energized multiple times during an event, the following information must be provided for each de-energization. This information should be provided in both a PDF and excel spreadsheet (*Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.*)

- **County**
- **De-energization date/time**
- **Restoration date/time**
- **“All Clear” declaration date/time**
- **General Order (GO) 95, Rule 21.2-D Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 classification or non-High Fire Threat District**
- **Total customers de-energized**
- **Residential customers de-energized**
- **Commercial/Industrial Customers de-energized**
- **Medical Baseline (MBL) customers de-energized**
- **AFN other than MBL customers de-energized**
- **Other Customers**
- **Distribution or transmission classification**

Response:

Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, Appendix B in the attachment, “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report_20260912 Tables.xlsx*.” provides a list of de-energized circuits and the relevant information relating to each circuit. This table includes two Transmission lines which were de-energized impacting three Transmission-level¹¹ customers.

¹¹ PG&E defines a transmission-level customer as a non-residential customer that receives service directly from PG&E's transmission system at 50 kV or higher.

Section 4 – Damages and Hazards to Overhead Facilities

Section 4.1 – Description of all found wind-related damages or hazards to the utility’s overhead facilities in the areas where power was shut off. (*Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

During this PSPS, weather stations near the areas in the de-energized scope recorded wind gusts as high as 51 mph. Recorded wind gusts are shown in Table 18 and Figure 22 in [Section 12](#).

During patrols of the de-energized circuits prior to restoring power, we found one incident of wind-related damage. Damages are conditions that occurred during the PSPS, likely wind-related, necessitating repair or replacement of our asset, such as a wire down or a fallen pole. Hazards are conditions that might have caused damages or posed an electrical arcing or ignition risk had PSPS not been executed, such as a tree limb found suspended in electrical wires. The damage and hazard locations are illustrated in Figure 15 and mapped in Figure 16.

Figure 15: Damage in Plumas County – Broken Conductor



Section 4.2 - A table showing circuit name and structure identifier (if applicable) for each damage or hazard, County that each damage or hazard is located in, whether the damage or hazard is in a High Fire-Threat District (HFTD) or non-HFTD, Type of damage/hazard of damage. (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

For a list of the damage within the de-energized areas, see Appendix C in the attachment, “PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report_20260912 Tables.xlsx.”

Section 4.3 - The consolidated zipped geodatabase file from Section 3.2 must include the PSPS event damage and hazard points, if applicable. The file should include items that are required in Section 4.2. (SED Additional Information.)


Response:

For a zipped geodatabase file that includes the PSPS damage point, see the attachment, “PGE_PSPS_Polygons_of_De-energized_Areas_and_Damage_Hazard_Points_20260912.gdb.zip.”

Section 4.4 - A PDF map identifying the location of each damage or hazard. (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

See Figure 16 for a map identifying the location of the damage.



Section 5 – Notifications

Section 5.1 - A description of the notice to California Independent System Operator (as needed), public safety partners, local/tribal governments, paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a community resource center, multi-family building account holders/building managers in the AFN community, and all customers, including the means by which utilities provide notice to customers of the locations/hours/services available for CRCs, and where to access electricity during the hours the CRC is closed. (Resolution ESRB-8, page 3 D19-05-042, page A26, D21-06-034, Appendix A, page A2, A9-A10, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

Throughout the PSPS, we followed the Notification Plan included in our [2026 PSPS Pre-Season Report](#), Appendix C, pp. 57 – 67, and made significant efforts to notify tribal and local governments, Public Safety Partners, Community Based Organizations (CBOs) (including paratransit agencies) and impacted customers in accordance with the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines.¹² See Table 3 for a description of the notifications we sent to stakeholders in accordance with the minimum timelines set forth by the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines.¹³

In accordance with D.21-06-034, we provide CRC information to customers in PSPS notifications via hyperlink to the [PSPS updates page](#). This webpage includes up-to-date CRC locations, services available and hours of operation as well as how customers can find local CRCs and where to access electricity during the hours CRCs are closed. Due to text message character constraints and the dynamic nature of CRCs information, providing a link to the [PSPS updates page](#) ensures that all impacted customers and local agencies have access to the latest CRC information at all times. For more information on CRCs, see [Section 9](#).

Multi-family building account holders/building managers in the Access and Functional Needs (AFN) community are considered part of our All Customers (including MBL customers and Self-Identified Vulnerable (SIV) customers) recipient group. For information on our outreach and community engagement with master-metered owners, property managers, and building account holders, see [PG&E's AFN Quarterly Progress Reports](#) for activities between April 1, 2026, and June 30, 2026.

In addition to providing direct notifications to stakeholders, we alerted the public in advance of de-energization via the media and PG&E's website.

¹² D.19-05-042.

¹³ D.19-05-042.

Media Engagement

From the time we publicly announced the PSPS until power was restored, we engaged with the public through the media by:

- Responding to approximately five media inquiries, either from media outlets that contacted PG&E's 24-hour media line, or direct calls/emails to field media.
- Participating in 18 media interviews (i.e. live, recorded or unrecorded phone interviews) to provide situational updates and preparedness messages.
- Proactively issuing 10 local news releases and updates directly to news outlets.

As of September 18, 2026, we identified 158 unique prints, online and broadcast stories.

PG&E Website

We placed an Informational Alert on the www.pge.com home page that directed the public to our PSPS site. From the start of the PSPS to full restoration, the [PSPS emergency website](#) received a total of 601,615 page views and 129,042 site visits.

Among other resources noted throughout this report, our [PSPS emergency website](#) includes information regarding Electric Vehicle (EV), American Sign Language (ASL), Independent Living Centers (ILCs), Backup Power, AFN customer resources, MBL Program information and more. Additionally, the address look-up tool and [address-level alerts](#), are available on our website, in 16 languages, that allow non-PG&E-account holders to receive notifications for any address where they do not receive a bill (e.g., workplace, child's school, renters, mobile home parks, etc.).

At 17:25 PDT on September 12, we identified that the address look-up tool on the PSPS emergency website was returning an error for all users. At 17:59 PDT, we redirected all traffic going to the PSPS emergency website to our backup PSPS site. The backup PSPS site has key PSPS information including the 7-day PSPS forecast, address look-up tool, maps of current outages, maps of forecasted PSPS areas, downloadable maps, and CRC locations/hours/services. We identified that the address look-up tool on the backup PSPS site had outdated information and updated the data by 19:16 PDT. We determined that the issue with the address look-up tool on PG&E's primary PSPS emergency website was due to an expired security certificate. At 22:10 PDT, we updated the security certificate and redirected traffic back to the primary PSPS emergency website by 22:24 PDT.

We remain committed to the continuous improvement of our websites to better meet the needs of customers. As we launch new features to www.pge.com and to www.pgealerts.alerts.pge.com, we test to ensure compliance with WCAG 2.1AA standards and improve customer experience. Where possible, we remediate accessibility issues that customers or stakeholders have brought to our attention.

Table 3: Notification Descriptions

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
PRIORITY NOTIFICATION: 48-72 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization	Public Safety Partners, CBOs ¹⁴ , and Transmission-level customers	On September 8, our Meteorology Team noted a potential PSPS and updated the weather forecast on pge.com/weather to “elevated” in certain parts of the service area. At this time, agency representatives called each County Office of Emergency Services (OES) in PG&E’s electrical service area and select tribes and cities to inform them that PG&E was monitoring an increased potential for a PSPS. Following the EOC activation, we completed the following: • Notified CAISO of the potential PSPS on September 9, 2026, at 13:20 PDT and shared additional information via email at 16:18 PDT. • Submitted a PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E’s EOC has been activated and that PG&E is monitoring for a potential PSPS. • Agency representatives called potentially impacted County OES and select tribes and cities to inform them that PG&E is monitoring a potential PSPS. • Sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners,¹⁵ via call, text and e-mail, which included information such as: ○ Estimated window of the de-energization time. ○ When weather is anticipated to pass. ○ Estimated Time of Restoration (ETOR). ○ For agency partners and distribution-level critical customers: Links to the PSPS Data Portal where PSPS-specific maps and information are available. ○ For Transmission-level customers only: Transmission Substation Name and Line name serving substation.
WATCH NOTIFICATION: 24-48 hours in advance of	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL	During this time, we completed the following: • Submitted a PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E’s EOC has been activated and that PG&E is monitoring for a potential PSPS.

¹⁴ D.21-06-034, Appendix A, page A9, Section G. MBL Program and AFN Communities, No. 4, Each electric investor-owned utility must provide proactive notification and impacted zip code information to paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a CRC during a PSPS.

¹⁵ Other Public Safety Partners refer to first/emergency responders at the local, state, and federal level, water, wastewater, and communication service providers, affected CCAs, publicly owned utilities/electrical cooperatives, the CPUC, the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, and the CAL FIRE.

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
anticipated de-energization	and SIV customers) and Transmission-level customers	• Sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners,¹⁶ Transmission-level customers and customers via call, text and e-mail, which included information such as: ○ Estimated window of the de-energization time. ○ When weather is anticipated to pass. ○ Estimated Time of Restoration (ETOR). ○ For Public Safety Partners Only: Links to the PSPS Data Portal where PSPS-specific maps and information are available. ○ For customers only: Potentially impacted addresses, links to PSPS emergency website with CRC information, and resources for AFN customers, including but not limited to information on the MBL Program, language support, and the Portable Battery Program (PBP). ○ For Transmission-level customers only: Transmission Substation Name and Line name serving substation. • Sent notifications to MBL customers, including tenants of master metered accounts, and SIV customers. For more information regarding MBL Program notifications, see Section 5.3. • Sent Cancellation Notifications to Public Safety Partners and customers within two hours of being removed from scope, to inform them that their power would not be shut off. Customer notifications are provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications are provided in English.
WARNING NOTIFICATION: 1-4 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization, if possible	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL and SIV customers)	During this time, we completed the following: • Submitted a PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E has made the decision to de-energize. • Sent notifications to Public Safety Partners, Transmission-level customers and customers, which included the same key information and resources as Watch Notifications.

¹⁶ Other Public Safety Partners refers to first/emergency responders at the local, state, and federal level, water, wastewater, and communication service providers, affected CCAs, publicly owned utilities/electrical cooperatives, the CPUC, the California Governor's OES and the CAL FIRE.

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
	Transmission-level customers	• Sent notifications to MBL customers, including tenants of master metered accounts, and SIV customers. For more information regarding MBL Program notifications, see Section 5.3. • Sent Cancellation Notifications to Public Safety Partners and customers within two hours of being removed from scope to inform them that their power would not be shut off. • Provided an additional call to Transmission-level customers within 20 minutes of de-energization when possible in order to allow Transmission-level customers sufficient time to properly ramp down any processes and shut down equipment. Customer notifications are provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications are provided in English.
POWER OFF NOTIFICATION: When de-energization is initiated	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL and SIV customers), Transmission-level customers ¹⁷	When de-energization was initiated, we completed the following: • Submitted a PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC to notify them that de-energization has been initiated. • Conducted live agent calls to impacted Transmission-level customers. • Sent notifications to Public Safety Partners. Transmission-level customers and customers via call, text messages and e-mail, which included: ○ De-energization time. ○ When weather is anticipated to pass. ○ For customers only: Impacted addresses. ○ For customers only: Links to the PSPS emergency website with CRC information, and resources for AFN customers, including but not limited to information on the MBL Program, Meals on Wheels, language support, and the PBP. • Sent notifications to MBL customers, including tenants of master metered accounts, and SIV customers. For more information regarding MBL Program notifications, see Section 5.3.

¹⁷ Transmission-level customers receive a GCC live call before de-energization and prior to restoration.

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
		Customer notifications are provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications are provided in English.
WEATHER “ALL-CLEAR”/ETOR UPDATE NOTIFICATION: Immediately before re-energization begins	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL and SIV customers) Transmission-level customers	After weather conditions had passed and areas were deemed safe to begin patrols and restoration, we completed the following: • Submitted a PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E is initiating re-energization patrols. • Sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners Transmission-level customers and customers, via call, text message and e-mail, which included the ETOR. • Sent “update” notifications to customers if their ETOR changed. Two ways that an ETOR may change include: ○ New field or meteorology conditions. ○ Damage found during patrols and repair was needed. Customer notifications are provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications are provided in English. Conducted live agent calls immediately prior to re-energization to coordinate restoration with impacted Transmission-level customers.
RESTORATION NOTIFICATION: When re-energization is complete	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL and SIV customers) Transmission-level customers	Once all customers were restored within a jurisdiction, we sent a notification to agency partners via call, text and e-mail. Once all customers were restored, we completed the following: • Submitted the final PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES. • Sent an e-mail to the CPUC confirming restoration of PSPS outages and reclassification of customers if applicable.

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
		Once customers, including MBL and SIV customers, were restored, they received automated notifications via call, text, and e-mail. Conducted live agent calls to notify impacted Transmission-level customers of restoration. Customer notifications are provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications are provided in English.

Section 5.2 – Notification timeline including prior to de-energization or Period of Concern (if no de-energization), initiation, restoration, and cancellation, if applicable, for each circuit or circuit segment. The timeline should include the required minimum timeline and approximate time notifications were sent for each de-energization if a circuit was de-energized multiple times. (D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A8-A9, D.21-06-034, page A11)

Response:

Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, Table 4 in the attachment, “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report_20260912 Tables.xlsx*” provides the time required notifications were sent in accordance with the minimum timelines set forth by the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines,¹⁸ to Tribal/Local Governments, other Public Safety Partners, and all other customers prior to de-energization initiation, after cancellation, and before and after restoration. The advanced notification guidelines set forth in the Phase 1 Guidelines are not based on a strict liability standard and state that “recognizing that there may be times when advanced notice is not possible due to emergency conditions beyond the electric investor-owned utilities’ control, the electric investor-owned utilities should, whenever possible, provide advance notification to all populations potentially affected by a de-energization event.”¹⁹

Our response was provided based on the format used for the May 17 – 18, 2026, June 10 – 11, 2026, and July 15, 2026, PSPS Post-Event Reports. We are still clarifying the format for this table following our most recent discussion with SED on June 30, 2026, and can submit a new version of this table in the 2026 PSPS Post-Season Report based on the finalized format.

Table 4: Notification Timeline Summary

See Table 4 in the attachment, “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report_20260912 Tables.xlsx*.”

¹⁸ D.19-05-042.

¹⁹ D.19-05-042, Appendix A.

Section 5.3 - For those customers where positive or affirmative notification was attempted, use the following template to report the accounting of the customers (which tariff and/or access and functional needs population designation), the number of notification attempts made, the timing of attempts, who made the notification attempt (utility or public safety partner) and the number of customers for whom positive notification was achieved. (D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A23, SED Additional Information.)

“Notification attempts made” and “Successful positive notification” must include the unique number of customer counts. When the actual notification attempts made is less than the number of customers in scope, the utility must explain the reason. In addition, the utility must explain the reason of any unsuccessful positive notifications. Utilities may not mark N/A and must answer 5.3 regardless if the utility did not de-energize customers. (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, Table 5 includes metrics associated with notifications we provided to customers where positive or affirmative notification was attempted. We interpret the number of customers that need positive or affirmative notification as customers the company seeks confirmation from, namely MBL and SIV customers. We track positive confirmation from MBL/SIV customers via text, phone call, email, doorbell rings, live agent phone calls or door hanger at all stages of notifications. If a notification is acknowledged at any stage and/or a door hanger is left, that is considered a successful positive notification. For more information, see PG&E’s [AFN Quarterly Progress Reports](#).

Table 5: Positive Notifications

Designation	Total Number of Customers	Number of Notification Attempts Made ²⁰	Timing of Attempts	Who Made the Notification Attempt	Successful Positive Notification
MBL in scope ²¹	685	685	Daily	PG&E	684
SIV	389	386	Daily	PG&E	384

As informed by our ongoing discussions with SED to clarify reporting requirements, the counts reported in Table 5 and its supplemental tables include both 1) MBL or SIV customers scoped for this event and 2) MBL or SIV customers who were de-energized but not included in planned scope. Please see Table 5A for a breakdown of MBL and SIV customer counts by de-energization window, and Table 5B for explanations of why MBL or SIV customers did not receive attempted or successful positive notification.

²⁰ Count of “Notification Attempts Made” includes doorbell rings and Live Agent phone calls.

²¹ Residential tenants of master-metered customers can also qualify for MBL quantities. The MBL category for the purposes of Table 5 includes MBL customers who are master meter tenants.

Some MBL or SIV customers were scoped or de-energized for more than one outage during this PSPS event. Table 5 shows unique customer counts, where a single MBL or SIV customer de-energized for two outages would only be counted once. A unique MBL or SIV customer would be included in “Number of Notification Attempts Made” if a notification was attempted prior to at least one of their scoped or actual outages and included in the “Successful Positive Notification” count if at successful positive notification was achieved for at least one of their scoped or actual outages.

Some service points changed their MBL or SIV status while they were scoped or de-energized: customers are included in this count if they were MBL or SIV at any point while in-scope or while de-energized. Some service points changed status between MBL and SIV during this event: those customers are included in both the MBL and SIV counts. Thus, the unique count of MBL and SIV customers will be smaller than the sum of the separate MBL and SIV counts.

Table 5A: Positive Notifications by De-energization Window

Designation	Scoped or Actual Outage Window	Total Number of Customers	Number of Notification Attempts Made ²²	Timing of Attempts	Who Made the Notification Attempt	Successful Positive Notification
MBL in scope ²³	1	565	509	Daily	PG&E	508
	2	176	176	Daily	PG&E	176
SIV	1	336	304	Daily	PG&E	302
	2	82	82	Daily	PG&E	82

²² Count of “Notification Attempts Made” includes doorbell rings and Live Agent phone calls.

²³ Residential tenants of master-metered customers can also qualify for MBL quantities. The MBL category for the purposes of Table 5 includes MBL customers who are master meter tenants.

Table 5B: Explanation of MBL and SIV Customers Without Successful Positive Notifications

Notification Outcome	De-energized or Descoped in Window?	Scoped or Actual Outage Window	Count of MBL	Count of SIV	Explanation
Notification not attempted	De-Energized	1	56	29	As explained in Section 5.5, no pre-outage notifications were attempted for this outage because this de-energization was not forecasted, and PG&E does not consider this a notification failure. Although separate pre-de-energization notifications were not sent for their September 12 de-energization: prior to that outage, PG&E attempted and achieved successful positive notification of all of these 56 MBL and 29 SIV customers using notifications for their September 14 de-energization. Thus, although these customers were not separately notified of the September 12 de-energization, all of them were aware that they were in-scope for the PSPS overall before that first outage.
Pre-outage notification not attempted	Descoped	1	0	1	PG&E did not attempt automated phone, email, and text notifications for this customer because no valid contact info was provided for the main customer of record. This customer was descoped prior to de-energization, and before PG&E could attempt an in-person doorbell ring. PG&E does not consider this a notification failure as this customer was not de-energized.

Notification Outcome	De-energized or Descoped in Window?	Scoped or Actual Outage Window	Count of MBL	Count of SIV	Explanation
Pre-outage notification not attempted	De-energized	1	0	2	PG&E did not attempt automated phone, email, and text notifications for these customers because no valid contact info was provided for the main customer of record. No in-person doorbell rings were attempted prior to de-energization for these customers due to a process error: the file used for designating doorbell ring recipients did not include all required customers. We will update our process to fix this error for future PSPS events.
Pre-outage notification attempted but did not achieve successful positive contact	Descoped	1	1	2	PG&E attempted automated phone, email, and text notifications for these customers but was unable to achieve successful positive contact. These customers were then descoped prior to de-energization, and before PG&E could attempt in-person doorbell rings. PG&E sent timely cancellation notifications to these customers within two hours of their removal from scope. PG&E does not consider this a notification failure as these customers were not de-energized.

For this PSPS, MBL and SIV customers received automated calls, texts, and emails at the same intervals as the general customer notifications. We provided unique PSPS Watch and PSPS Warning Notifications to MBL customers²⁴ and SIV customers.

These customer groups also received additional calls and texts at hourly intervals until the customer confirmed receipt of the automated notifications by either answering the phone, responding to the text, or opening the email. If confirmation was not received, a PG&E representative visited the customer's home to check on the customer (referred to as the "doorbell ring" process) while hourly notification retries continued. If the customer did not provide confirmation to us following the check-in, the PG&E representative left a door hanger providing additional PSPS notification and information at the home to indicate we had visited. In each case, the additional door hanger notification was considered a positive successful notification.²⁵

²⁴ Including MBL customers who are master-metered tenants (e.g., renters or tenants in mobile home park).

²⁵ For MBL and SIV customers, an in-person door ring visit where a door hanger is left, but no contact is made with the customer is considered "successful contact," but not "received." If the PG&E representative makes contact with the customer, then it is considered "received."

At times, we also made Live Agent phone calls in parallel to the automated notifications and doorbell rings, as an additional attempt to reach the customer prior to and/or after de-energization.

We shared the lists of the MBL and SIV customers who had not confirmed receipt of their notifications with the appropriate county and tribal emergency managers twice daily via the PSPS Portal. We proactively notified agencies that the data was available on the PSPS Portal and encouraged them to inform these customers of the resources available to them. We are unable to track and report on notifications made by Public Safety Partners, as notification systems and/or platforms used by Public Safety Partners are out of PG&E's purview; we encourage Public Safety Partners to include PSPS messages on all of their platforms. We describe its engagement with Public Safety Partners in [Section 6](#).

Section 5.4 - A copy or scripts of all notifications with a list of all languages that each type of notification was provided in, the timing of notifications, the methods of notifications and who made the notifications (the utility or local public safety partners). (D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A23, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

For a copy of the notification templates, the timing of the notifications and methods of notifications that we sent during the September 12, 2026, PSPS, see attachment, "[PGE_PSPS_Notifications_20260912.pdf](#)." For additional information on the timing of notifications sent during this PSPS, see Table 4 in the attachment, "[PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report_20260912 Tables.xlsx](#)."

PG&E provides tribal, county, city, CCAs, Public Safety Partner and Transmission-level customer notifications in English only. All other customer notifications are delivered in-language if a customer's language preference is on file. If there is no language preference on file, the notification is delivered in English, with information on how to access and receive PSPS information in translated languages. Non-English languages requested for this PSPS were Spanish and Chinese (Mandarin).

Section 5.5 - If the utility fails to provide notifications according to the minimum timelines set forth in D.19-05-042 and D.21-06-034, using the following template to report a breakdown of the notification failure and an explanation of what caused the failure. This applies to both de-energization and non de-energization events. For non-de-energization event, the starting time of the first Period of Concern is the anticipated de-energization time to assess notification failure. If a circuit is de-energized multiple times during an event, the utility must include notification failures for the multiple de-energizations. The explanation must be specific. (D.21-06-014 page 286, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

PG&E recognizes that the updated CPUC template effective May 1, 2026, requires separate notification failure reporting per de-energization. During this event, weather conditions in some TPs suggested earlier de-energization times were necessary for public safety.

PG&E interprets the updated template to require notification sequences be completed and reported for each de-energization. Based on CPUC Phase 1, pre-outage notifications were conducted based on the anticipated outage times available at the time of deployment. PG&E was able to complete

notification requirements milestones associated with the forecasted de-energization on September 14, including TPs 13-15. However, separate pre-de-energization notifications associated with first de-energization were not sent for TPs 13-15.

PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures for the following reasons:

- PG&E successfully executed Priority and Watch notifications for the forecasted September 14 planned outage prior to the September 12 outage.
- The decision to issue the first de-energization to TPs 13-15 was informed by real-time operational and qualitative considerations, such as the Lucas Fire and associated response activities, which could not be captured in the standard PSPS guidance and weather forecasts used for pre-outage scoping. During the monitoring phase, PG&E also observed real-time weather stronger than forecast for portions of these TPs.
- PG&E operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities (see D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034).

Additional rationale can be found below in Table 6A, 6B and 6C.

To best support customers during this PSPS, PG&E restored customers when conditions allowed, providing temporary access to power to customers could recharge devices, power medical equipment, preserve food and medications, and address any other essential needs prior to adverse weather returning. Customers were only re-de-energized customers when subsequent weather and operational conditions warranted action for public safety.

PG&E makes a substantial effort to provide notifications whenever possible and to the extent it is operationally feasible in accordance with the PSPS Phase 1, Phase 3 and 2019 PSPS OII guidelines within the CPUC's minimum timeline requirements, weather and other factors permitting.²⁶ The notification guidelines set forth in the Phase 1 Guidelines are not a strict liability standard and state that "the electric investor owned utilities should, whenever possible, adhere to the following minimum notification timeline..." Additionally, pursuant to ESRB-8, the CPUC has stated that it is not practicable to have an absolute requirement that electric IOUs provide advanced notifications to customers prior to a PSPS and that "it is an impossible feat of anticipating every emergency situation resulting in pro-active de-energization."²⁷

²⁶ D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.

²⁷ ESRB-8, p. 5, D.19-05-042, pp. 84-86, Finding of Fact 22 at p. 118.

Table 6: Breakdown of Notification Failure

Notifications Sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Account	Explanation of Failure
Public Safety Partners excluding CFI²⁸	Entities who did not receive 48-to 72-hour priority notification	22*	See Table 6A for explanations.
	Entities who did not receive 24-48 hour advance notification	22*	See Table 6B for explanations.
	Entities who did not receive 1-4-hour imminent notification	18*	See Table 6C for explanations.
	Entities who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	18* **	See Table 6D for explanations.
	Entities who were not notified at de-energization initiation	0	No failures.
	Entities who were not notified immediately before re-energization	0	No failures.
	Entities who were not notified when re-energization is complete	0	No failures.
	Entities who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	0	No failures.
CFI²⁹	Facilities who did not receive 48-72-hour priority notification	65*	See Table 6A for explanations.
	Facilities who did not receive 24-48 hour advance notification	74	See Table 6B for explanations.
	Facilities who did not receive 1-4-hour imminent notification	62	See Table 6C for explanations.
	Facilities who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	61**	See Table 6D for explanations.
	Facilities who were not notified at de-energization initiation	4	See Table 6E for explanations.

²⁸ Only includes tribes, cities, counties, and CCAs.

²⁹ Includes Public Safety Partners who are CFI customers.

Notifications Sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Account	Explanation of Failure
	Facilities who were not notified immediately before re-energization	2	See Table 6F for explanations.
	Facilities who were not notified when re-energization is complete	0	No failures.
	Facilities who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	0	No failures.
All other affected customers	Customers who did not receive 24-48-hour advance notifications	1247	See Table 6B for explanations.
	Customers who did not receive 1-4-hour imminent notifications	1204	See Table 6C for explanations.
	Customers who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	1183**	See Table 6D for explanations.
	Customers who were not notified at de-energization initiation	111	See Table 6E for explanations.
	Customers who were not notified immediately before re-energization	53	See Table 6F for explanations.
	Customers who were not notified when re-energization is complete	60	See Table 6G for explanations.
	Customers who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	2*	See Table 6H for explanations.

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

**This category is duplicative with other notification failure categories in this report, meaning all customers reported in this category are already included in the count of notification failures PG&E reported for the more specific notification categories. As a result, the count from this category should not be included in the sum of total notification failures for this PPS.

Table 6A: Explanation of Failures for Agency Entities and CFI Who Did Not Receive 48-to 72-Hour Priority Notification

Total Agency Entities	Total CFI	Forecasted or Actual Outage Window	Explanation
18	61	1	These agencies and critical facilities did not receive any pre-outage notifications for their first de-energization because this de-energization was not forecasted. PG&E successfully sent all required pre-outage notifications for these agencies and critical facilities, but those were sent for the forecasted de-energization which was ultimately delayed to September 14. However, this required notification was not separately sent for the additional earlier outage which started on September 12. As explained in the Section 5.5 narrative above, PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures because de-energization windows were advanced out of an abundance of caution and the interest of public safety. * Furthermore, these agencies and critical facilities all received 48-72 Hour Priority and 24-48 Hour Advance notifications targeted for the September 14 forecasted de-energization prior to this first un-forecasted de-energization, so these agencies and critical facilities were all at least notified of the planned PSPS event even though those notifications were not specific to this outage.
4	0	2	These agencies had customers in their county planned for both outage windows. Each scoped customer in this county was planned for only a single window but the overall jurisdiction would experience a single continuous outage spanning from the start of first window to the end of the second window. Based on that planned scope, PG&E successfully sent all required pre-outage notifications for these agencies within compliance windows set by the forecasted start time of the single long outage, with a message that accurately communicated the forecasted outage start and end times described above. Due to changes in the forecasted weather arrival for the second window, this jurisdiction ultimately experienced two shorter outages instead of a single long outage. PG&E did not send a separate Priority notification for the second window because this change occurred after the compliance window.

			However, we do not consider this a notification failure because the split into individual outages occurred due to changing weather conditions could not be forecasted during this compliance window, and the Priority notification for the first window communicated an outage duration corresponding to both windows and thus these agencies would have been prepared for both outages. *
0	4	1	Due to changes in forecasted weather, three transmission-level facilities and one distribution-fed critical facility entered into PSPS scope after this notification window had passed. Therefore, it was not possible for these facilities to receive Priority Notifications. *

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Table 6B: Explanation of Failures for Agency Entities, CFI, and All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive 24-to 48-Hour Watch Notification.

Total Agency Entities	Total CFI	Total Non-CFI Customers	Forecasted or Actual Outage Window	Explanation
18	61	1136	1	These agencies and customers did not receive any pre-outage notifications for their first de-energization because this de-energization was not forecasted. PG&E successfully sent all required pre-outage notifications for these agencies and customers, but those were sent for the forecasted de-energization which was ultimately delayed to September 14. However, this required notification was not separately sent for the additional earlier outage which started on September 12. As explained in the Section 5.5 narrative above, PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures because de-energization windows were advanced out of an abundance of caution and the interest of public safety. * Furthermore, these agencies and customers all received 48-72 Hour Priority (if applicable) and 24-48 Hour Advance notifications targeted for the September 14 forecasted de-energization

				prior to this first un-forecasted de-energization, so these agencies and critical facilities were all at least notified of the planned PSPS event even though those notifications were not specific to this outage.
4	0	0	2	These agencies had customers in their county planned for both outage windows. Each scoped customer in this county was planned for only a single window but the overall jurisdiction would experience a single continuous outage spanning from the start of first window to the end of the second window. Based on that planned scope, PG&E successfully sent all required pre-outage notifications for these agencies within compliance windows set by the forecasted start time of the single long outage, with a message that accurately communicated the forecasted outage start and end times described above. Due to changes in the forecasted weather arrival for the second window, this jurisdiction ultimately experienced two shorter outages instead of a single long outage. PG&E did not send a separate 24-48 Hour Advance notification for the second window because this change occurred after the compliance window. However, we do not consider this a notification failure because the split into individual outages occurred due to changing weather conditions could not be forecasted during this compliance window, and the 24-48 Hour Advance notification for the first window communicated an outage duration corresponding to both windows and thus these agencies would have been prepared for both outages. *
0	1	0	1	This transmission-level facility was not notified during this notification window due to a data issue which caused them to be excluded from all transmission customer notification files for this event. Starting shortly before de-energization, this transmission-level facility received live calls for its remaining required notifications.
0	12	47	1	Due to a system logic error in PG&E's system for pre-outage notifications, these customers

				incorrectly received Microgrid Watch notifications which stated they will be mitigated from PSPS outage while potentially experiencing a potential shorter-duration switching outage. Thus, these customers did not receive 24 to 48 hour notice of their planned long-duration PSPS outage. Of these customers, four CFI and 27 non-critical customers solely received Microgrid Watch notifications during this compliance window while the remaining eight CFI and 20 non-critical customers received Microgrid Watch notifications and standard Watch notifications simultaneously. We do not believe that the eight CFI and 20 non-critical customers who received parallel microgrid and non-microgrid notifications are notification failures because they did receive the PSPS required notification.
0	0	1	1	This customer was not notified before de-energization due to use of outdated data in event scoping: this customer was inactive during prior scoping and had started service within the 24-48 Hour Watch window but was not targeted for notifications because the scope incorrectly assumed they were still inactive.
0	0	1	2	This customer was not notified before de-energization due to use of outdated data in event scoping: this customer was inactive during prior scoping and had started service within the 24-48 Hour Watch window but was not targeted for notifications because the scope incorrectly assumed they were still inactive.
0	0	1	1	This customer was not notified before de-energization due to data issues which caused conflicting transformer assignments for this customer. As a result, this customer was incorrectly excluded from scope and thus not targeted for pre-outage notifications. PG&E has since corrected this data issue in our systems.
0	0	54	1	These customers did not receive notifications during this PSPS as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*

0	0	7	2	These customers did not receive notifications during this PSPS as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*
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*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Table 6C: Explanation of Failures for Agency Entities, CFI, and All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive 1-4 Hour Imminent Notifications.

Total Agency Entities	Total CFI	Total Non-CFI Customers	Forecasted or Actual Outage Window	Explanation
18	61	1136	1	These agencies and customers did not receive any pre-outage notifications for their first de-energization because this de-energization was not forecasted. PG&E successfully sent all required pre-outage notifications for these agencies and customers, but those were sent for the forecasted de-energization which was ultimately delayed to September 14. However, this required notification was not separately sent for the additional earlier outage which started on September 12. As explained in the Section 5.5 narrative above, PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures because de-energization windows were advanced out of an abundance of caution and the interest of public safety. * Furthermore, these agencies and customers all received 48-72 Hour Priority (if applicable) and 24-48 Hour Advance notifications targeted for the September 14 forecasted de-energization prior to this first un-forecasted de-energization, so these agencies and critical facilities were all at least notified of the planned PSPS event even though those notifications were not specific to this outage.
0	1	0	1	This transmission-level facility was not notified during this notification window due to a data issue which caused them to be excluded from all transmission customer notification files for this

				event. Starting shortly before de-energization, this transmission-level facility received live calls for its remaining required notifications.
0	0	1	1	This customer did not receive 1-4 Hour Imminent notifications due to a gap in our active customer data. This service point switched owners during this event: rather than reflecting an immediate change in ownership, this customer was incorrectly categorized as an inactive customer during this period and thus was not targeted for 1-4 Hour Imminent notifications.
0	0	1	1	This customer was not notified before de-energization due to use of outdated data in event scoping: this customer was inactive during prior scoping and had started service within the 24-48 Hour Watch window but was not targeted for notifications because the scope incorrectly assumed they were still inactive.
0	0	1	2	This customer was not notified before de-energization due to use of outdated data in event scoping: this customer was inactive during prior scoping and had started service within the 24-48 Hour Watch window but was not targeted for notifications because the scope incorrectly assumed they were still inactive.
0	0	1	1	This customer was not notified before de-energization due to data issues which caused conflicting transformer assignments for this customer. As a result, this customer was incorrectly excluded from scope and thus not targeted for pre-outage notifications. PG&E has since corrected this data issue in our systems.
0	0	4	2	These customers had stopped service by the time of this notification and thus could not be notified.*
0	0	53	1	These customers did not receive notifications during this PSPS as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*
0	0	7	2	These customers did not receive notifications during this PSPS as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Table 6D: Explanation of Failures for Agency Entities, CFI, and All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive Any Notifications Before De-Energization.

Total Agency Entities	Total CFI	Total Non-CFI Customers	Forecasted or Actual Outage Window	Explanation
18	61	1136	1	These agencies and customers did not receive any pre-outage notifications for their first de-energization because this de-energization was not forecasted. PG&E successfully sent all required pre-outage notifications for these agencies and customers, but those were sent for the forecasted de-energization which was ultimately delayed to September 14. However, this required notification was not separately sent for the additional earlier outage which started on September 12. As explained in the Section 5.5 narrative above, PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures because de-energization windows were advanced out of an abundance of caution and the interest of public safety. * Furthermore, these agencies and customers all received 48-72 Hour Priority (if applicable) and 24-48 Hour Advance notifications targeted for the September 14 forecasted de-energization prior to this first un-forecasted de-energization, so these agencies and critical facilities were all at least notified of the planned PSPS event even though those notifications were not specific to this outage.
0	0	1	1	This customer was not notified before de-energization due to use of outdated data in event scoping: this customer was inactive during prior scoping and had started service within the 24-48 Hour Watch window but was not targeted for notifications because the scope incorrectly assumed they were still inactive.
0	0	1	2	This customer was not notified before de-energization due to use of outdated data in event scoping: this customer was inactive during prior scoping and had started service within the 24-48 Hour Watch window but was not targeted for

				notifications because the scope incorrectly assumed they were still inactive.
0	0	1	1	This customer was not notified before de-energization due to data issues which caused conflicting transformer assignments for this customer. As a result, this customer was incorrectly excluded from scope and thus not targeted for pre-outage notifications. PG&E has since corrected this data issue in our systems.
0	0	38	1	These customers did not receive notifications during this PSPS as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*
0	0	6	2	These customers did not receive notifications during this PSPS as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Table 6E: Explanation of Failures for CFI and All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive Power Off Notification.

Total CFI	Total Non-CFI Customers	Forecasted or Actual Outage Window	Explanation
4	64	2	These customers received a delayed notification at de-energization initiation due to human error – the manual step to trigger these notifications was delayed. These notifications were ultimately sent approximately 2.5 hours after de-energization initiation.
0	3	1	These customers received a delayed notification at de-energization initiation due to incorrect information in our data systems: the system did not recognize these customers as de-energized for PSPS because their transformer was incorrectly marked as already de-energized for a non-PSPS extended outage, so it did not generate automated PSPS notifications for their first de-energization. PG&E detected this issue during their first PSPS de-energization and sent a delayed manual Power Off notification to these customers approximately 4.8 hours after de-energization initiation. Timely manual notifications were sent for the remaining required notifications of their first outage. PG&E performed an

			in-person inspection of their transformer and removed the outdated extended outage tag prior to their second de-energization, allowing these customers to receive timely automated notifications for that second de-energization and for any future PSPS.
0	38	1	These customers did not receive notifications during this PSPS as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*
0	6	2	These customers did not receive notifications during this PSPS as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Table 6F: Explanation of Failures for CFI and All Other Affected Customers Not Notified Immediately Before Re-energization.

Total CFI	Total Non-CFI Customers	Forecasted or Actual Outage Window	Explanation
2	9	1	These customers were not notified immediately before re-energization due to human error – the manual step to trigger these notifications was not performed for these outages.
0	38	1	These customers did not receive notifications during this PSPS as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*
0	6	2	These customers did not receive notifications during this PSPS as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Table 6G: Explanation of Failures for All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive Restore Notification.

Total Non-CFI Customers	Forecasted or Actual Outage Window	Explanation
15	1	These customers received a delayed Restore notification due to a system error which prevented this batch of notifications from being picked up by our notifications vendor. PG&E manually relaunched these notifications as soon as this issue was detected, but the detection delay caused these customers to receive this notification approximately 6 hours after the end of their outage.

		PG&E has implemented automated retry logic and enhanced alerting to prevent this type of delay for future PSPS events.
1	1	This non-critical customer was partially mitigated from PSPS de-energization using backup generation provided by PG&E. However, as this customer had already experienced a significant outage as part of the PSPS prior to their mitigation, we consider this as an impacted customer with a shortened outage duration. Their PSPS outage was considered to be over when their generator started running. This customer did not receive an automated notification immediately after the generator started running, though they received an automated Restore notification after the rest of their outage was restored: this notification was sent approximately 2.6 hours after the generator started running. However, PG&E does not believe this is a notification failure because the recipient of backup generation was in coordination with PG&E crews who implemented the mitigation. *
38	1	These customers did not receive notifications during this PSPS as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*
6	2	These customers did not receive notifications during this PSPS as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Table 6H: Explanation of Failures for All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive Cancellation Notification

Total Non-CFI Customers	Forecasted or Actual Outage Window	Explanation
2	1	These customers were removed from scope because they stopped service, therefore, there was no active customer to notify of cancellation. * One of these two customers then resumed service prior to de-energization and is included in our count of de-energized customers. The other customer did not resume service prior to the end of the outage and is thus reported in Section 5.7 as an apparent false positive.

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Section 5.6 - Explain how the utility will correct the notification failures. (D.21-06-014, page 286.)

Response:

We have reviewed the notification failures and false communications for this PSPS and have begun to identify the following corrective actions noted in Table 7.

Table 7: Notification Failures Corrective Actions

Issue	Discussion	Resolution	Status
Mitigation Notifications	Some multiple-premise customers with at least one premise planned for mitigation received either 1) two sets of notifications: one informing them they would be mitigated and one that they should prepare for PSPS outages or 2) received only Microgrid Watch Notifications.	Update system logic to ensure multi-premise customers receive the correct notification type per facility to avoid confusion about which are mitigated.	Planned
Delayed notification at de-energization initiation due to human error	Some customers received a delayed notification at de-energization initiation due to human error – the manual step to trigger these notifications was delayed.	Enhance process for in-event monitoring to detect and correct errors in PG&E's outage management platform in a timely manner to prevent notification misses and delays.	Planned
Missed notification immediately before re-energization due to human error	Some customers were not notified immediately before re-energization due to human error – the manual step to trigger these notifications was not completed before outage restoration.	Enhance process for in-event monitoring to detect and correct errors in PG&E's outage management platform in a timely manner to prevent notification misses and delays.	Planned
Delayed notification of restoration due to system error	Some customers received a delayed notification of re-energization because an automated notification batch was not picked up by our notifications vendor.	Implemented automated retry logic and enhanced alerting to prevent this type of delay for future PSPS events.	Completed

False positive notification to unimpacted tribal agency contacts	Agency contacts for an unimpacted tribe were incorrectly notified of active PSPS de-energization due to a system logic error.	Fix system logic error in PG&E's in-outage and post-outage automated notification system.	Planned
Outdated customer data used for PSPS scoping	The procedures used for scoping this PSPS event used outdated customer data and therefore misidentified active vs. inactive customers. This is not an issue overall with PG&E's PSPS scoping.	Update procedures to ensure customer data is refreshed with each scope version.	Planned
Incorrect process used for designating doorbell ring recipients	No in-person doorbell rings were attempted prior to de-energization for some customers due to a process error; the file used for designating doorbell ring recipients did not include all required customers.	Update our process for designating doorbell ring recipients to ensure the correct recipients are identified.	Planned

Beyond the corrective actions identified above, we are in the process of identifying additional corrective actions for other notification failures and false communications identified in [Section 5.5](#) and [Section 5.7](#) and will be included this information in our 2026 PSPS Post-Season Report.

As explained in [Section 5.5](#), we were able to mitigate some misalignments in field conditions prior to submission of this report. We plan to mitigate the other identified misalignment in field conditions going forward.

Section 5.7 - Enumerate and explain the cause of any false communications citing the sources of changing data. Describe the situations at-issue, which involve the level of perceived defect in notice, in specific detail. (D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 4.)

Response:

For this PSPS, we identified 11 cases of false positive communications and seven cases of false negative communications. See Table 8 and 9 for explanations of false positive and negative communications.

Table 8: Explanations of False Positive Communications

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Forecasted or Actual Outage Window	Explanation
1	0	0	1	This agency was incorrectly notified of active PSPS de-energization for their jurisdiction due to a system logic error in PG&E's system for in-outage and post-outage notifications: when a different tribe was de-energized for PSPS, these notifications were sent to all tribal contacts for that county. This error was not detected during the PSPS event so corrective messaging was not sent.
0	1	2	2	These customers were mitigated from PSPS de-energization using PG&E-provided backup generation. However, they received PSPS notifications both prior to and during their avoided PSPS de-energization. PG&E does not believe this is a compliance violation as the recipients of backup generation would be aware of their mitigation from PSPS and thus would not be negatively impacted by the PSPS pre-outage and in outage notifications. Furthermore, they did not require Cancellation Notifications because PG&E did not remove them from scope. *
0	0	4	2	These customers stopped service prior to de-energization but were not descoped due to use of outdated data in event scoping. As a result, these customers were notified of PSPS impact while they were still active but are not counted as de-energized customers. Furthermore, they did not require cancellation Notifications because PG&E did not remove them from scope. *
0	0	2	1	These customers were planning to start service after the end of the PSPS event but were

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Forecasted or Actual Outage Window	Explanation
				prematurely marked as active customers in our data systems. When their locations were de-energized for PSPS, this resulted in false positive notifications of active de-energization for customers who would not experience the PSPS outage. PG&E does not believe this is a compliance violation as these customers would have been aware that they hadn't started service yet and thus would not be negatively impacted by the PSPS in-outage notifications. *
0	0	1	1	This customer did not receive a Cancellation Notification as reported in Table 6H and did not resume service prior to de-energization. This customer's last communication from PG&E was advising of planned PSPS impact but this customer is not included in our de-energized customer count, making it appear as a false positive communication. *

*PG&E does not consider these to be false communications as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Table 9: Explanations of False Negative Communications

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Forecasted or Actual Outage Window	Explanation
0	0	7	1	These customers were prematurely notified of outage restoration due to human error: minutes after their de-energization for PSPS, their outage was incorrectly marked as restored from PSPS in PG&E's internal outage management platform which triggered Restore notifications for these customers.

Section 6 – Local and State Public Safety Partner Engagement

Section 6.1 – List the organization names of public safety partners including, but not limited to, local governments, tribal representatives, first responders and emergency management, and critical facilities and infrastructure the utility contacted in anticipation to de-energization of Period of Concern, the date and time on which they were contacted, and whether the areas affected by the de-energization are classified as Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 as per the definition in CPUC General Order 95, Rule 21.2-D. (Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

For a list of Public Safety Partners including tribal representatives, local governments, first responders and emergency management, and critical facilities notified with the date and time of the initial notification, and whether the areas affected by the de-energization are classified as Zone 1, Tier 2 or Tier 3, see Appendix D in the attachment, “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report_20260912 Tables.xlsx*.”

We use a High Fire Risk Area (HFRA) classification which we utilize in addition to HFTD to determine PSPS scope. In Appendix D in the attachment, “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report_20260912 Tables.xlsx*” we begin by identifying HFTD area assigned to Public Safety Partners. Any area outside of HFTD is re-classified as HFRA. Our circuits can run miles long and span across multiple jurisdictions. Some Public Safety Partners outside of HFRA and HFTD were also in the potentially impacted scope in order to de-energize areas within HFRA and HFTD for safety.

Section 6.2 - List the names of all entities invited to the utility’s Emergency Operations Center for a PSPS event, the method used to make this invitation, and whether a different form of communication was preferred by any entity invited to the utility’s emergency operation center. (D.21-06-014, page 289.)

Response:

We invited the CPUC via email to virtually embed in the EOC for the duration of the activation on September 9, 2026, at 19:10 PDT.

Additionally, telecommunications service providers are appointed a dedicated 24/7 PG&E contact in the EOC, the Critical Infrastructure Lead (CIL), who shared up-to-date PSPS information and answered individual questions. We proactively reached out to five telecommunications service providers³⁰ via email or phone as weather changes or new information regarding the PSPS became available.

As part of our PSPS Pre-Season outreach,³¹ we provide water infrastructure entities and communication services in our electrical service area with information on how to request representation at our EOC, when activated for PSPS. Alternatively, some partners may also request PG&E representation at their jurisdiction’s activated Operations Emergency Center (OEC).³² None

³⁰ American Tower Corp., AT&T Corp., Frontier Communications Corp., T-Mobile-Sprint, Verizon Wireless.

³¹ See PG&E’s [2025 PSPS Pre-Season Report](#), pp. 59 – 60.

³² D.19-05-042.

of the entities invited to embed into our EOC indicated a preference for a different form of communication other than the ones already utilized.

Section 6.3 - A statement verifying the availability to public safety partners of accurate and timely geospatial information, and real time updates to the GIS shapefiles in preparation for an imminent PSPS event and during a PSPS event. In addition, list any accuracy or timeliness issues in making available the GIS shapefiles to public safety partners during the PSPS event from activation to full restoration. (D.21-06-014, page 289.)

Response:

In preparation for a potential PSPS, we sent automated notifications with links to the PSPS Data Portal, which provides Portable Document Format (PDF) maps and Geographic Information System (GIS) data to Public Safety Partners at the times outlined in Table 4 in the attachment, “PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report_20260912 Tables.xlsx.” In addition, when PDF maps and GIS data were updated on the PSPS Data Portal due to scope changes, users were notified via e-mail at the times outlined in Table 10.

PDF maps and GIS data on the PSPS Data Portal were determined to be accurate and updated in a timely manner following changes to geographic scope or customer impacts.

Table 10: PSPS Data Portal Map Sharing (Date and Time)

Date	Time PDF and GIS Maps Shared (PDT)
09/09/2026	00:45
09/10/2026	15:08
09/11/2026	03:56
09/12/2026	10:57
09/13/2026	08:40
09/13/2026	17:28
09/14/2026	10:51

Section 6.4 - A description and evaluation of engagement with local and state public safety partners in providing advanced outreach and notification during the PSPS event. (D.19-05-042, Appendix, page A23.)

Response:

Below is a description of the engagement with state CPUC, Cal OES, CAL FIRE, and local (i.e., tribes, counties and cities) Public Safety Partners:

- Submitted the PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES twice a day (07:00 PDT and 15:00 PDT), if there was a significant change to scope and at least once for each of the five PSPS stages: Activating PSPS Protocols/Potential to De-energize (Stage 1), Decision to De-energize (Stage 2), De-energization Initiated (Stage 3), Initiating Re-energization Patrols (Stage 4) and All PSPS Lines Re-energized (Stage 5). See Table 11 for the date and time of notifications submitted to Cal OES.

Table 11: Notifications Submitted to Cal OES (Date and Time)

Date	Time Submitted (PDT)
09/09/2026	19:00
09/10/2026	07:02
09/10/2026	14:36
09/11/2026	03:38
09/11/2026	06:53
09/11/2026	14:42
09/12/2026	06:50
09/12/2026	09:26
09/12/2026	10:09
09/12/2026	13:03
09/12/2026	13:23
09/12/2026	14:46
09/12/2026	15:13
09/12/2026	16:31
09/12/2026	20:20
09/13/2026	07:01
09/13/2026	08:39
09/13/2026	15:53
09/13/2026	17:26
09/14/2026	01:38
09/14/2026	02:23
09/14/2026	07:17
09/14/2026	14:46
09/14/2026	18:10

- Sent e-mails to the CPUC at least once for each of the five PSPS stages listed above. See Table 12 for the date and time of notifications submitted to the CPUC.

Table 12: Notifications Submitted to CPUC (Date and Time)

Date	Time Submitted (PDT)
09/09/2026	19:10
09/11/2026	03:10
09/12/2026	01:38
09/12/2026	09:14
09/12/2026	13:21
09/12/2026	15:02
09/12/2026	18:49
09/12/2026	19:31
09/13/2026	09:15
09/13/2026	09:16
09/13/2026	16:41
09/14/2026	00:50
09/14/2026	02:07
09/14/2026	18:26

- Hosted daily State Executive Briefings with invitees including Cal OES, CPUC, CAL FIRE, the Governor’s Office, and other federal and state agencies to provide the latest PSPS information and answer questions. A presentation deck with key PSPS information was provided to participants.
- Hosted a daily Systemwide Cooperators Call, where all Public Safety Partners in the service area were invited to join for situational awareness.
- Hosted Tribal Cooperators Calls with potentially impacted tribes to provide the latest PSPS information and answer questions
- Hosted Operational Areas Cooperators Communication Calls to provide situational awareness updates and answer questions.³³
- Conducted ongoing coordination with tribal and local county OES contacts through dedicated Agency Representatives. This includes but is not limited to providing the latest PSPS information, coordinating CRC locations, and resolving local issues in real-time.
- Provided links to the PSPS Data Portal that included planning and event-specific maps, situation reports, critical facility lists and MBL customer lists at each notification and when scope changed. The Situation Report was provided twice a day and at scope changes prior to de-energization and hourly once restoration began.
- Sent automated and live call notifications to agency partners before, during and after de-energization.
- Offered state and local agencies to be embedded in PG&E’s EOC and offered PG&E Agency Representatives to embed virtually in local EOCs.


³³ May vary in cadence and type based on County OES.

We consider our level of engagement with local and state Public Safety Partners during this EOC activation to be successful. This evaluation is based on the number and various types of outreach conducted (listed above), the feedback received from Public Safety Partners through the post-PSPS survey and the success rate of automated agency notifications. The following is a subset of comments we received from in-scope Public Safety Partners regarding PSPS outreach:

- “PG&E should be kind to its customers and wait till 7AM before texting them about future PSPS outages instead of texting at 4AM.”
- “PG&E Tribal rep is “doing an exceptional job keeping Tribes informed on these events.”

Figure 17 shows the post-PSPS survey results when Public Safety Partners were asked to “evaluate PG&E engagement with your agency during the outage.” We received 14 responses to the survey. We will report any late submissions to the survey in our 2026 PSPS Post-Season Report. We continue to look for opportunities for improvement and refine agency notifications to ensure accuracy and timely information sharing.

Figure 17: Evaluation of Public Safety Partner Engagement



Section 6.5 - Specific engagement with local communities regarding the notification and support provided to the AFN community. (D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 8, SED Additional Information)

Response:

To ensure we provide adequate support to AFN customers, we engage with local communities through paratransit agencies, media partnerships and CBOs to share coordination efforts, notifications plans, CRC information, PSPS-specific information and more. See below for details on this engagement.

Engagement with Paratransit Agencies

In accordance with the Phase 3 Guidelines,³⁴ PG&E provided proactive notifications and impacted zip code information to paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a CRC during the PSPS. All notifications included a link to our [PSPS emergency website](#), and an “Additional Resources” link to maps showing potentially affected areas. For more information on Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) compliant CRC locations, see [Section 9](#).

Community Engagement

We engaged with approximately 380 “information-based” CBOs during this PSPS, sharing courtesy notification updates, fact sheets, and other relevant information to share with their constituents to expand our reach of communications, including videos, social media and other relevant PSPS support services, that organizations could use to educate their consumers.

CBO resource partners were invited to the daily cooperator calls provided to Public Safety Partners. These calls are hosted by members from PG&E who provided a situational update about the latest scope of the PSPS and an overview of the services available to customers. We hosted additional daily coordination calls with CBO resource partners supporting the PSPS to provide an open forum to answer questions, offer suggestions regarding how they can best support their consumer supports and facilitate more localized coordination among the partners.

Programs/Support for AFN Customers

We are dedicated to providing a variety of resources and programs to AFN customers before and during a PSPS through several partnerships and contracts maintained by PG&E. For more information about these resources and partnerships, see the 2026 AFN Plan.

See Table 13 for the support provided during the September 12, 2026, PSPS.

³⁴ D.21-06-034.

Table 13: AFN Customer Programs and Support

Resource/Program	Resources Provided
Disability Disaster Access and Resource Program (DDAR)	Partnered with two local ILCs across 12 counties to provide aid to 249 customers who rely on power for medical or independent living needs, including: • Five generator fuel vouchers • Two batteries • 11 batteries previously distributed in impacted counties Although PG&E partners with DDAR to provide hotels accommodations, food vouchers and accessible transportation, we did not receive any requests for these services during this PSPS.
PBP	Supported 76 customers in scope by providing batteries through the PBP. Since July 2020, over 29,600 battery units have been delivered through the PBP across our service area.
Food Bank Partnerships	Partnered with six local food banks that serve all impacted counties to provide boxes of food for families.
Meals on Wheels Partnerships	Partnered with four Meals on Wheels Organizations in four counties to provide services to customers in scope for the de-energization.
California 211 (CA 211) Providers Network	Partnered with five CA 211 network centers across 11 counties to assist 716 customers with resources. The direct assistance resources provided during this activation included: • 45 food vouchers • 10 hotel accommodations • One water bladder • Six generator fuel voucher(s) Although PG&E partners with CA 211 to provide accessible transportation, we did not receive any requests for these services during this PSPS.
Accessible Transportation Partnerships	Partnered with El Dorado Transit and Dignity Health Connected Living across three counties in preparation for the possibility of any transportation needs.
Ad-Hoc AFN Backup Generation Solutions	We granted temporary generation exceptions to two AFN customers experiencing critical circumstances. This included transportation limitations and medical device requirements that CBO resources were unable to resolve during this PSPS. After exploring all viable options, PG&E delivered backup generation to these individuals who rely on power for their health and safety. These specific situations do not meet our typical temporary generation process and procedures standards. However, given the unique circumstances, we went beyond our usual practices to ensure safety for our customers.

Communications to Customers with Limited English Proficiency

We provided translated customer support through our customer notifications, website, call center, social media, engagement with CBOs, and multicultural media partnerships. Customers with their language preference set received in-language (translated) notifications. For customers with no language preference set, notifications were provided in English with information on how to receive PSPS information in 15 non-English languages. Customers with limited English proficiency have access to translation phone numbers on our PSPS website, highlighting that translation services are available in over 200 languages.

We will provide the number of requests we received for information in non-English languages supported by our Call Center Translation Services in our 2026 PSPS Post-Season Data Report.

We continued support and engagement with multi-cultural media organizations and in-language CBOs to maximize the reach of in-language communications to the public. Prior to the PSPS, we reached out to 32 multicultural media organizations to provide outreach in translated languages throughout the impacted counties. Additionally, we shared information and updates on PSPS with these media outlets, including news releases and social media infographics in English, translated languages and ASL, for their use and distribution. We also shared our new [PSPS Language Resources page](#) (available in 16 languages) with organizations to share with their constituents.

Section 6.6 - Provide the following information on backup power (including mobile backup power) with the name and email address of a utility contact for customers for each of the following topics: (D.21-06-014, page 300.)

Response:

The information requested is included in Sections 6.6a – 6.6f. For questions related to backup power, customers can email TempGenPSPSSupport@pge.com.

Section 6.6a. Description of the backup generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

Response:

Table 14 lists the generators available for CFI customers before and during this PSPS.

Table 14: Generators Available for CFI Customers

Number of Units	Individual Size (MW)	Run Time (Hrs.) ³⁵	Description
2	0.032	37.6	Two units on reserve in Sacramento.
1	0.036	37.6	One unit on reserve in Sacramento.
3	0.065	31.0	Three units on reserve in San Leandro.

³⁵ Estimated based on a 75% load. Barring mechanical failure and refueling the temporary generators have the ability to operate continuously throughout a typical PSPS.

Number of Units	Individual Size (MW)	Run Time (Hrs.) ³⁵	Description
6	0.100	25.3	Six units on reserve in Sacramento
1	0.125	25.0	One unit on reserve in San Leandro
3	0.150	30.3	Three units on reserve in Sacramento
4	0.200	22.9	Four units on reserve in San Leandro
1	0.230	22.9	One unit on reserve in San Leandro
1	0.275	26.0	One unit on reserve in Sacramento
3	0.500	24.1	Three units on reserve in Sacramento
7	1.000	35.0	Seven units on reserve in Sacramento
9	1.140	24.0	Nine units on reserve in San Leandro
7	1.500	10.0	Seven units on reserve in Benicia
19	2.000	27.7	Fourteen units on reserve in San Leandro and five units on reserve in Sacramento

6.6b. The capacity and estimated maximum duration of operation of the backup generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

Response:

Table 13 lists the power capacity and maximum duration of operation of the generators available for CFI customers before and during this PSPS.

6.6c. The total number of backup generators provided to critical facility and infrastructure customer's site immediately before and during the PSPS.

Response:

No backup generators were requested by CFI customers for this PSPS due to previously established mitigation plans.

6.6d. How the utility deployed this backup generation to the critical facility and infrastructure customer's site.

Response:

As a general policy, we do not offer backup generation to individual facilities. However, PG&E's policy grants exceptions for critical facilities when a prolonged outage could have a significant adverse impact to public health or safety.

Deployment of temporary generation is contingent upon the following circumstances: the expected duration to perform permanent repairs is significantly longer than the expected duration to install backup generation, the expected customer outage is collectively 50,000 or more customer minutes, and the outage affects a Distribution circuit serving multiple customers without a functional back-tie.³⁶

We have pre-arranged commitments with critical facility and infrastructure customers to provide temporary generation in case of a PSPS and evaluated requests received during this PSPS according to the prioritization described in [Section 6.6e](#).

6.6e. An explanation of how the utility prioritized how to distribute available backup generation.

Response:

We prioritize the deployment of available generation by first meeting existing commitments to individual facilities in the following order:

- High Risk to Public Safety
 - Examples: Facilities that support public safety, such as but not limited to, first/emergency responders at the tribal, local, state, and federal level, water, wastewater assets, and city or county EOC.
- High Risk of Environmental Hazard
 - Example: Chemical plant which may risk spilling into a local river.
- High Risk to Essential Emergency Response and Supporting Facilities (Examples).
 - Examples: 911 call center, water pump availability compromises active firefighting by emergency service personnel, critical telecommunications equipment or other support businesses that directly affect emergency services provisions, affected community choice aggregators, publicly owned utilities/electrical cooperatives, the CPUC, the California Governor's OES, city or county EOC, and the CAL FIRE.

Deployment of available generation is then followed by customers with special needs in the following order:

- Life support, MBL Program, and temperature sensitivity.
- Large customers, economic damage customers, and danger to health and safety customers.

Deployment of available generation is then followed by other customers based on maximizing relief based on the number of customers times expected duration.

6.6f. Identify the critical facility and infrastructure customers that received backup generation.

Response:

No backup generators were requested by CFI customers for this PSPS due to previously established mitigation plans.

³⁶ 50,000 customer minutes is approximately equivalent to 100 customers for about eight hours.

Section 7 – Complaints & Claims

Section 7.1 - The number and nature of complaints received as the result of the de-energization event and claims that are filed against the utility because of de-energization. The utility must completely report all the informal and formal complaints, meaning any expression of grief, pain, or dissatisfaction, from various sources, filed either with CPUC or received by the utility as a result of the PSPS event. (Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, D.21-06- 014, page 304.)

Response:

Table 15 provides the number and nature of complaints received from customers and Public Safety Partners, submitted to both the CPUC and PG&E, for the September 12, 2026, PSPS.³⁷ Any complaints received after September 22, 2026, will be included in the 2026 PSPS Post-Season Report.

Table 15: Number and Nature of Complaints

Nature of Complaints	Number of Complaints
Communications/Notifications Including, but not limited to complaints regarding lack of notice, excessive notices, confusing notice, false alarm notice, problems with getting up-to-date information, inaccurate information provided, not being able to access information in the prevalent languages and/or information accessibility, complaints about website, Public Safety Partner Portal, Representational State Transfer (REST)/Digital Asset Manager (DAM) sites (as applicable).	31
PSPS Frequency/Duration Including, but not limited to complaints regarding the frequency and/or duration of PSPS, including delays in restoring power, scope of PSPS and dynamic of weather conditions.	15
Safety/Health Concern Including, but not limited to complaints regarding difficulties experienced by AFN/MBL populations, traffic accidents due to non-operating traffic lights, inability to get medical help, well water or access to clean water, inability to keep property cool/warm during outage raising health concern.	4
General PSPS Dissatisfaction/Other Including, but not limited to complaints about being without power during PSPS and related hardships such as food loss, income loss, inability to work/attend school, plus any PSPS-related complaints that do not fall into any other category.	32
Outreach/Assistance Including, but not limited to complaints regarding CRCs, community crew vehicles, backup power, hotel vouchers, and other assistance provided by utility to mitigate impact of PSPS.	2

³⁷ PG&E's PSPS Post-Event Reports are based on the required CPUC-issued template. Additional information regarding complaints and claims will be provided in subsequent PSPS Post-Season Reports.

Claims

As of September 18, 2026, PG&E received two claims for the September 12, 2026, PSPS.

Table 16: Count and Type of Claim(s) Received

Description of Claims	Number of Claims
Business Interruption / Economic Loss	1
Food Loss Only	1
Property Damage	0

Section 8 – Power Restoration

Section 8.1 - A detailed explanation of the steps the utility took to restore power (*Resolution ESRB-8 page 5*)

Response:

During this PSPS, PG&E's EOC Command and Meteorology teams monitor real-time and forecasted weather conditions based on weather models, weather station data, and field observations while patrol crews and helicopters are pre-positioned in anticipation of the Weather All-Clear to begin patrols. Weather All-Clears are called based on circuit segments.

This allows us to issue Weather All-Clears more granularly so we can restore power faster in areas less prone to wind gusts or adverse conditions. We monitor the conditions for each impacted circuit segment and as they fall below our mFPC to consider areas for restoration.

As Weather All-Clears are issued, restoration crews patrol electrical facilities to identify and repair or clear any damage or hazard before restoring power. Using the Incident Command System (ICS) as a base response framework, each circuit is assigned a taskforce consisting of supervisors, crews, trouble men and inspectors. This structure allows us to patrol and perform step restoration in alignment with the centralized control centers.

During restoration, we issued four Weather All-Clears between September 12 and September 14 and deployed up to 90 personnel and 17 helicopters to patrol the lines in advance of restoration. Patrols were conducted on approximately 821 miles of distribution circuits and 430 miles of transmission lines that had been de-energized during the first de-energization window and approximately 442 miles of distribution miles in the second de-energization window. Power was restored to customers as patrol completion verified the safe condition of each line.

Section 8.2 - The timeline for power restoration, broken down by phase if applicable (*D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A24, SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

For detailed information on restoration on each circuit, including restoration date, restoration time and total customer count on each circuit, see Appendix B in the attachment, "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report_20260912 Tables.xlsx.*"

Section 8.3 - For any circuits that require more than 24 hours to restore, the utility shall use the following template to explain why it was unable to restore each circuit within this timeframe, using the format below. (D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 6.)

Response:

PG&E was able to restore all impacted customers within 24 hours of the Weather All-Clear.

Table 17: Circuits Requiring More than 24 Hours to Restore

Circuit Name	Reason the Utility was Unable to Restore the Circuit Within 24 Hours
None	None

Section 9 – Community Resource Centers

Section 9.1 - The address (including city and zip code) of each location during a de-energization event, the location (in a building, a trailer, etc.), the assistance available at each location, the days and hours that it was open, and attendance (i.e., number of visitors) *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:

During the September 12, 2026, PSPS, seven CRCs were opened. These CRCs served 466 visitors, of which 411 did not remain on site and were provided “Grab and Go” bags. “Grab and Go” bags include a PSPS information card, water, non-perishable snacks, mobile battery charger, and a blanket. For a list of CRC locations, assistance available, operating days and hours, and attendance, see Appendix E in the attachment, “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report_20260912 Tables.xlsx*.”

Visitors were provided with PSPS information by dedicated staff, ADA-compliant restrooms, tables and chairs, power strips to meet basic charging needs for personal medical devices and other electronics, snacks, bottled water, Wi-Fi and cellular service access. Bags of ice and privacy screens were also available at indoor locations.

Some visitors may request, and are provided with, information regarding how to obtain hotel vouchers. In these instances, visitors are referred to CA 211 to confirm eligibility and are connected with local resources.

PG&E coordinates with county Offices of Emergency Management to determine the best locations for CRCs for all PSPS events. For this PSPS, in agreement with counties, CRCs were not opened in Butte, El Dorado, Nevada, Placer, Sierra, Shasta, and Tehama counties due to low customer impact.

For our CRC Plan and more information regarding CRC operations, including coordination with tribal and local governments, CRC types and resources, see PG&E’s 2026 PSPS Pre-Season Report, [Appendix A, pp. 42– 55](#).

Section 9.2 - Any deviations and explanations from the CRC requirement including operation hours, ADA accessibility, and equipment. *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:

Due to the timing of de-energization and restoration, CRC hours of operation, listed in Appendix E in the attachment, “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report_20260912 Tables.xlsx*,” deviated from the standard operating hours of 8:00 to 22:00 PST.


Section 9.3 - A map identifying the location of each CRC and the de-energized areas (*SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

See Figure 18 for a map of CRC locations opened during this PSPS. Based on the CRC survey conducted for this PSPS, most respondents traveled approximately less than five miles to the nearest CRC location.

Additional CRC location information can be found at [PG&E Emergency Site – View Outage Map](#) where customers can find specific information using the “Address Search” or “City/County Search” functions.

Figure 18: CRC Locations Map



Section 10 – Mitigations to Reduce Impact

Section 10.1 - A description of how sectionalization, i.e. separating loads within a circuit, was considered and implemented and the extent to which it impacted the size and scope of the de-energization event (D.19-05-042, page A23).

Response:

PG&E utilized measures to avoid de-energizing approximately 14,209 customers during the September 12, 2026, PSPS including Backup Power Support, Distribution Sectionalization, Distribution Switching, and Transmission Line Segmentation.

Backup Power Support

Backup power support provides temporary generation to select devices (i.e. medical equipment) or limited areas. However, it does not mitigate PSPS impacts completely given its segmented scope. For more information on backup power support, see www.pge.com/backuppower.

During this PSPS, temporary generation was considered and utilized to mitigate approximately three stand-alone customers based on the PSPS scope and available resources. It should be noted that one of these customers experienced an outage during the first de-energization window, prior to receiving backup power support in the second de-energization window. Accordingly, we classify this customer as impacted in the event-level metrics, resulting in a total of two customers being counted as mitigated through backup power support.

Distribution Sectionalization

We have installed new Distribution sectionalization devices near the borders of the CPUC-designated HFTD Tier 2 and Tier 3 to reduce the number of customers affected by PSPS. During this PSPS, Distribution sectionalization was considered and utilized on 19 circuits to mitigate approximately 14,114 customers based on PSPS scope and available resources.

We considered but did not utilize the following mitigation measures below as there were no identified opportunities to avoid de-energizing customers using these efforts during this PSPS.

Community Microgrids

A community microgrid is a group of customers and Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) within clearly defined electrical boundaries with the ability to disconnect from and reconnect to the grid. These microgrids are typically designed to serve the portions of communities that include community resources, like hospitals, police and fire stations, and gas stations and markets. We continue to own and operate the Distribution system within the microgrid. For more information about PG&E's microgrid solutions or how to begin developing a community microgrid, see www.pge.com/cmep.

For this PSPS, we did not deploy community microgrids as there were not any identified opportunities to serve our customers within the de-energization scope.

Distribution Switching

Depending on fire risk patterns, Distribution switch locations and switching plans maintain service to customers on lines that fall outside the high-risk area but are served by lines that pass through

the fire risk area. Depending on PSPS scope, we may be able to use back-tie switching to bypass the Distribution circuits that pass through the de-energization area to keep customers energized from a different set of lines. During this PSPS, Distribution switching was used to mitigate approximately 92 customers.

Transmission Line Sectionalization

Transmission lines are segmented using switches enabled with Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), when possible, if only a portion of a line is required to be de-energized due to PSPS. Leaving segments of Transmission lines energized allows us to still reduce fire risk where needed and provide service to stations fed off the non-impacted segments during PSPS events.

During this PSPS, Transmission line sectionalization reduced impacts by one Transmission customer.

Transmission Islanding

In some cases, we can leverage islanding capabilities to keep some customers islanded apart from the rest of PG&E's Transmission system and energized by generation located within the island.

For this PSPS, we did not deploy Transmission islanding as there were not any identified opportunities to serve our customers within the de-energization scope.

Temporary Substation Generation

Temporary substation generation can enable some community resources to continue serving the surrounding population during a PSPS at Distribution substations resulting from Transmission line outages. An interconnection is made at the substation, energizing entire circuits where downstream assets are not at weather risk and generator capacity is sufficient. If there are downstream assets at risk, this mitigation is combined with Distribution sectionalization to energize only safe areas. For reporting purposes, customers mitigated in the latter case will be documented in this category and not in sectionalization to avoid duplication. On average, customers served by temporary substation generation experience de-energization periods of under 30 minutes.

For this PSPS, PG&E did not deploy Temporary substation generation as there were not any identified opportunities to serve our customers within the de-energization scope.

Temporary Microgrids

Temporary microgrids can enable some community resources to continue serving the surrounding population during a PSPS where it is safe to do so, using pre-installed interconnection hubs to safely and rapidly interconnect temporary generation. While temporary microgrids do not often support large numbers of customers, the community resources served by temporary microgrids include fire stations, local water and waste companies, markets, post offices, and medical facilities. On average, when utilized, customers served by temporary microgrids experience de-energization periods of under 30 minutes. Currently, there are 12 temporary microgrid sites that are currently ready for immediate operation in PG&E's service area.

For this PSPS, we did not deploy temporary Distribution microgrids as there were not any identified opportunities to serve our customers within the de-energization scope.

Covered Conductor

The effects of grid-hardening and covered conductors are accounted for in our IPW model, which predicts the probability of utility-caused ignitions. Overhead system hardening is expected to reduce the probability of outages and ignitions in recently hardened sections. The IPW model more heavily weighs ignition and outage rates in recent years which will result in areas with fewer ignitions (e.g., areas that may have been recently hardened, being less likely to be de-energized for PSPS as there is a lower chance of ignition based on historical ignitions and outages).

Section 10.2 - Mitigation actions and impacts (both waterfall graph and map) including: sectionalization devices, temporary generation, microgrids, permanent backup generations, transmission switching, covered conductor, and any other grid hardening that mitigated the impact of the event (D.21-06-014, page 285, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

Figure 19 depicts the impact each mitigation measure had on the total number of customers. Customer locations where mitigation efforts were utilized are mapped in Figure 20.

Figure 19: Reduction of Impacted Customers Due to Mitigation Efforts





Figure 20: Mitigation Locations Map



Section 11 – Lessons Learned from this Event

Section 11.1 - Threshold analysis and the results of the utility’s examination of whether its thresholds are adequate and correctly applied in the de-energized areas. The utility must include specific information pertaining to the event. (D.21-06-014, page 305-306.)

Response:

This section addresses our examination of the adequacy of our PSPS protocols, criteria and guidance thresholds. As a preliminary matter, the CPUC recognizes the statutory authority of the IOUs to de-energize electric facilities when necessary for public safety and further acknowledges that such decision-making is complex and dependent on many factors.³⁸ As prescribed in ESRB-8, the decision to de-energize electric facilities for public safety is based on the best judgment of the IOU and is dependent on many factors, including but not limited to, fuel moisture, aerial and ground firefighting capabilities, active fires that indicate fire conditions, situational awareness provided by agencies and local meteorological conditions of humidity and winds.³⁹ The CPUC has declined to establish a minimum windspeed threshold below which an IOU would be prohibited from shutting off power and instead left the decision-making to the IOU’s discretion on the basis that the IOU has the detailed knowledge of its facilities necessary to make this decision in real time given contemporaneous weather conditions.⁴⁰

Based on our current PSPS modeling, guidance and criteria as applied in this PSPS and explained in [Section 2.3](#), our current PSPS guidance continues to be adequate and was effectively applied for the September 12, 2026, PSPS. For detailed information on our PSPS criteria and thresholds, see Appendix A-1.1 and A-2.1 in the attachment, “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report_20260912 Tables.xlsx*.”

For each PSPS, we begin our threshold evaluation with a robust historical analysis that is described in detail below. This analysis establishes the guidance values to be applied for a PSPS, which has been optimized to capture data from past catastrophic fires to mitigate customer impacts. To do so, our Meteorology Team uses internal and external tools and subject matter expertise to support their recommendations on when and where to de-energize for public safety. For the September 12, 2026, PSPS, our Meteorologists observed conditions including gusty north winds, low humidity and grassland fuels which were receptive to ignition and fire spread. These additional factors were evaluated through advanced weather modeling systems from our network of more than 1,500 weather stations that forecasted and tracked weather conditions in real-time.

Before de-energization, customer risk was also evaluated against wildfire risk on a per circuit basis to further evaluate the adequateness of the PSPS. See [Section 2.4](#) above for more information.

Establishing Threshold through Historical Analysis

Our PSPS guidance was established by calibrating a granular, historical dataset. We built our verification dataset by creating, or “backcasting,” the PSPS guidance through our historical dataset. We extracted values for all recent fires that have occurred in PG&E’s service area from 2012 to 2023. We aimed to capture as many historical fires as possible that were caused by

³⁸ ESRB-8.

³⁹ See Resolution ESRB-8, p. 8-9.

⁴⁰ D.12-04-024.

PG&E equipment during high wind events (e.g., Camp, Nuns, Kincade, Zogg) while limiting the number of historical PSPS outages to minimize customer impacts. Our analysis included:

- Hourly review of past incidents
- Verification of hypothetical PSPS dates
- PSPS guidance values testing
- A robust guidance sensitivity and calibration analysis

Historical Analysis: CFP_D Quantification

Based on this historical analysis and as described in [Section 2.3](#) above, we use a CFP_D value of seven as the quantitative threshold guidance value to consider for PSPS on our Distribution system.

To establish the CFP_D threshold of seven, we performed multiple sensitivity studies in “backcast” mode for calibration and validation. This involved running 68 different versions of the combined Distribution PSPS guidance through hourly historical data throughout multiple years to calibrate PSPS guidance. This included simulating and learning from more than 2,500 virtual PSPS outages. Through this “lookback” analysis, we evaluated:


- Potential customer impacts
- The potential size, scope, and frequency of PSPS outages
- The days PSPS outages would have occurred
- Whether utility infrastructure would have qualified for de-energization

The mFPC and CFP_D guidance that is determined from Technosylva was also evaluated using this process.

The CFP_D guidance value of six is shown in [Figure 21](#) with respect to recent large fires since 2012. Fires to the right of the CFP_D6 line tend to be wind driven fires, while non-wind driven fires tend to exist left of the CFP_D6 line. Any fires above six that meet mFPC indicate PSPS would have been executed, had these models and guidance been in use during these historic events. The results show that deployment of this model could have prevented such wildfires as the Camp, Nuns, Atlas, and Zogg, if implemented in 2012.⁴¹

⁴¹ Note that the inclusion of a fire in this analysis does not indicate that PG&E is directly responsible for or caused a fire. Instead, the fires are included for the purpose of analyzing the impact of PG&E’s current PSPS Protocols.

Figure 21: CFP_D Guidance



This analysis was a critical step to ensure the most catastrophic historical incidents are identified by PSPS guidance while considering the significant impacts to customers from PSPS outages across multiple dimensions (e.g., duration and frequency). This ensures that future PSPS outages will capture conditions similarly during the most catastrophic fires while also balancing impacts to our customers.

Historical Analysis: Execution

To execute the analysis at this scale, we utilized cloud computing resources to run PSPS model guidance for every hour at every 2 x 2 km grid cell across the historical data set to determine the number of times and locations PSPS guidance is exceeded. Each location exceeding guidance is then grouped into events to determine the location and size of each PSPS given the weather and fuels present at that time under the parameters of the study version. This allows us to determine if synoptic-driven events (e.g., Diablo wind events) are being identified, and if historical fires attributable to our equipment may have been mitigated.

Verification of PSPS Protocols

In addition to these sensitivity studies, we performed extensive verification of the PSPS protocols using several internal and external datasets. The goal of these analyses was to first determine if certain weather events are being captured (e.g., Diablo and offshore wind events), and second, to determine if power lines that have been implicated in historic catastrophic fires would have been identified by the guidance.

The following internal datasets were used in the analysis:

- Climatology of Diablo wind events
- Distribution and Transmission outage history
- Exploratory and dynamic dashboards created with internal and external data
- Hourly high-resolution wind maps from the climatology data set
- The weather signal database

The following external datasets were used in the analysis:

- High risk of potential large fires due to wind from the GACC
- Historical fire occurrence data compiled by federal agencies
- National Center for Environmental Prediction (NCEP) North American Regional Reanalysis Archive (NARR) synoptic weather maps
- RFWs from NWS

The paragraphs below explain how we leveraged external and internal data to verify our PSPS protocols guidance thresholds.

NARR Archive

We acquired the NARR archive data dating back to 1995 and produced over two million maps that can be utilized to study past events. These maps are also useful to study the past events leading up to a PSPS, such as the extent of precipitation events and heat waves. When the PSPS models are run through the climatology, each PSPS identified is compared against the NARR archive by our Meteorology Team to determine the large-scale atmospheric features present for each event.

Climatology of Diablo Wind Events

We also leverage the latest academic research on Diablo wind events that use surface-based observations to create a climatology of Diablo wind events. We adapted the criteria and processed it hour-by-hour through the 31-year weather climatology to determine the frequency, magnitude, and timing of Diablo winds. The output of this analysis was a 31-year calendar of Diablo wind events experienced in our service area. As it relates to PSPS directly, the strongest Diablo wind events were evaluated to verify if PSPS guidance also selects these days for potential PSPS outages. Using the days identified by PSPS guidance and the Diablo PSPS list, a high-level comparison was completed to evaluate overlap of the events.

Any events that did not meet PSPS guidance were further evaluated using additional data sources described in this section. For example, the NARR archive proved useful, as antecedent conditions such as rainfall before a PSPS and the magnitude of the PSPS could be evaluated.

PG&E's Weather Signal Database

Our Meteorology Team built, and continues to maintain, a “weather signal” database that flags each day from January 1, 1995, to present that experienced any weather-related outages on the Distribution system. It also lists the main weather driver (e.g., heat, low-elevation snow, northeast wind, winter storm, etc.) for these outages. If Distribution outage activity is not driven by weather, the day is classified as a “Blue Sky”⁴² day. This dataset combines weather and Distribution outage

⁴² A “Blue Sky Day” is defined the same as a non-weather impact day (no or very limited impacts due to weather).

activity that allows rapid filtering of events based on the main weather drivers. To validate PSPS guidance, we used a combination of “Northeast” wind days and “Blue-Sky” days.

The PSPS guidance was validated against all Northeast wind days in the database. This is similar, but complementary to the Diablo PSPS analysis as it also accounts for outage activity observed on those days. Events were also compared against “Blue Sky” days to ensure that PSPS would not be recommended for a high percentage of non-weather-impact days where little to no outage activity was observed.

RFWs from the NWS

We also validated PSPS guidance against RFWs from the NWS. RFWs mean warm temperatures, very low humidity, and stronger winds are expected to combine and produce an increased risk of fire danger. These RFWs were collected between 2015 – 2020 in shapefile format and used to evaluate the timing and spatial extent of historical RFWs against our PSPS guidance. It should be noted that each NWS office in our service area has different RFW criteria, making direct and quantifiable comparisons challenging. However, this dataset is used to evaluate whether RFWs were issued when PSPS guidance was met. Based on historical PSPS analysis, RFWs are expected to occur more frequently and cover a broader area than the area covered by PSPS outages.

High Risk of Potential Large Fires due to Wind from GACC

We also validated PSPS guidance against historical “High Risk” days from the GACC. The GACCs issues High Risk Day alerts when fuel and weather conditions are predicted which historically have resulted in a significantly higher than normal chance for a new large fire or for significant growth on existing fires. Examples of critical weather conditions are high winds, low humidity, an unstable atmosphere, and very hot weather. Similar to the RFW analysis, this dataset was used to evaluate if High Risk days were issued when PSPS guidance was high. Blue Sky Day is defined as “The same as a non-weather impact day (no or very limited impacts due to weather).” Similar to RFWs, based on historical PSPS analysis, High Risk Days are expected to occur more frequently and cover a broader area than PSPS.

Hourly High-Resolution Wind Maps from PG&E Climatology Data Set

We created hourly maps from high-resolution climatology and a web-based application to display any hour across 30 years. For each PSPS that meets PSPS guidance in the climatology, these maps were evaluated by a Meteorologist to better understand the nature of the event, wind speeds, antecedent conditions, and the spatial extent of strong winds. It’s important to note forecast wind speeds are available in the same exact format, allowing Operational Meteorologists to put forecast events in perspective with historical events using the same model.

Detailed PSPS Dashboards

To evaluate the PSPS thresholds, our Meteorology Team and data scientists utilized the data sources described above to evaluate historical PSPS hour-by-hour to verify the locations and times that are being flagged as meeting PSPS guidance. These dashboards determine if historical fire events would have been flagged by PSPS guidance. Our Meteorologists evaluated these data sources hourly to verify model performance of the IPW model and suitability for operations. The PSPS guidance can be evaluated spatially using the dashboard map integration, while the size and timing of the PSPS can be evaluated using the time series integration.

The analysis described above includes evaluating locations that were just below verbatim PSPS protocols as determined and reported by our high-resolution forecast model and data set included in this PSPS Post-Event Report. For example, this may include evaluating areas where the wind speed is -two mph below guidance if all other mFPC or RFW are met. It is well documented that high resolution weather model forecasts of wind speed from Weather Research and Forecasting model (WRF) tend to underpredict at high wind speeds.⁴³ Thus it is within reason to anticipate that the actual wind speed could be one mph higher than model forecast. If these areas are not scoped for PSPS and the winds materialize stronger than forecast, it could lead to PSPS execution with very little to no advanced notifications to customers and Public Safety Partners. Therefore, as explained in detail above, not one single factor or threshold is determinative of our final PSPS scoping. Based on multiple factors, data and analysis, the final PSPS scope is ultimately based on the judgement of our OIC.

Section 11.2 - Use the below format to report any lessons learned that will lead to future improvement for the utility (*SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

We collect lessons learned input from staff during and after every PSPS EOC activation to identify best practices and opportunities for improvement. See Table 18 for lessons learned from the September 12, 2026, PSPS.

Table 18: Lessons Learned

Issue	Discussion	Resolution
Mitigation Notifications	Some multiple-premise customers with at least one premise planned for mitigation received either 1) two sets of notifications: one informing they would be mitigated and one that they should prepare for PSPS outages or 2) received only Microgrid Watch notifications	Update system logic to ensure multi-premise customers receive the correct notification type per facility to avoid confusion about which are mitigated.

⁴³ <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.atmosres.2021.105673>; <https://doi.org/10.3390/atmos15050533>; <https://doi.org/10.3390/atmos15101244>; <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoinf.2024.102898>.

Section 12 – Other Relevant Information


Response:

Table 19 and Figure 22 show the maximum wind gust speeds recorded by weather stations in each county within the PSPS de-energized scope.

Table 19: Maximum Wind Gusts Recorded During September 12 – 14, 2026

County	Maximum Wind Gust (MPH)	Station Name
Butte	44	Jarbo Gap RAWS
Colusa	42	Colusa Hills PG697
Glenn	34	Sanhedrin Road 197PG
Lassen	50	Ladder Butte RAWS
Nevada	46	Tahoe Donner RAWS
Placer	43	Homewood
Plumas	45	Stampfii Lane PG310
Shasta	51	West Prospect Lookout 532PG
Tehama	46	Thomes Creek RAWS
Yolo	39	Bald Mountain Tower PG490

Figure 22: Maximum Wind Gusts Recorded Map Between September 12 – 14, 2026



APPENDIX

APPENDIX A
SECTION 2 – DECISION MAKING PROCESS

See Appendix A-1.1 and Appendix A-2.1 in the attachment,
“PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report_20260912 Tables.xlsx.”

See [Appendix F](#) for the description of each column header, as well as the unit and value provided.

APPENDIX B
SECTION 3 – DE-ENERGIZED TIME, PLACE, DURATION AND CUSTOMERS

APPENDIX B: DE-ENERGIZED TIME, PLACE, DURATION AND CUSTOMERS

Circuits De-Energized During the September 12, 2026, PSPS

Circuits labeled as “non-HFTD” are located outside of the CPUC High Fire-Threat District (HFTD). We use a High Fire Risk Area (HFRA) classification which PG&E utilizes in addition to HFTD to determine PSPS scope – these circuits intersected PG&E's HFRA despite not entering HFTD Tier 2 or Tier 3.

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Counties	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	BIG BEND 1101	9/14/2026 0:57	9/14/2026 12:48	9/14/2026 18:04	Butte	Tier 2, Tier 3	279	254	23	26	98	2
Distribution	BIG MEADOWS 2101	9/12/2026 13:19	9/13/2026 7:28	9/13/2026 14:28	Plumas	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Zone 1	2924	2658	235	142	365	31
Distribution	BOGARD 1101	9/12/2026 13:50	9/13/2026 7:28	9/13/2026 11:43	Lassen	Tier 2	9	0	7	0	0	2
Distribution	CORNING 1101	9/14/2026 1:02	9/14/2026 11:24	9/14/2026 14:37	Tehama	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	803	744	57	84	415	2
Distribution	CORNING 1102	9/14/2026 1:02	9/14/2026 11:58	9/14/2026 15:26	Tehama	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	216	175	35	9	64	6
Distribution	CORTINA 1101	9/12/2026 15:09	9/13/2026 7:28	9/13/2026 10:17	Colusa	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	18	7	10	0	2	1
Distribution	CRESTA 1101	9/14/2026 0:57	9/14/2026 12:48	9/14/2026 16:10	Butte	Tier 2, Tier 3	6	1	3	0	0	2
Distribution	ELK CREEK 1101	9/12/2026 19:37	9/13/2026 7:28	9/13/2026 12:22	Colusa, Glenn	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	822	680	116	52	182	26
Distribution	ELK CREEK 1101	9/14/2026 0:59	9/14/2026 11:58	9/14/2026 15:54	Colusa, Glenn	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	821	679	116	51	182	26
Distribution	FRENCH GULCH 1102	9/12/2026 18:42	9/13/2026 7:28	9/13/2026 11:32	Shasta	Tier 2	7	0	7	0	0	0
Distribution	GIRVAN 1101	9/12/2026 18:42	9/13/2026 7:28	9/13/2026 11:22	Shasta	Tier 2	127	113	11	9	23	3
Distribution	GIRVAN 1102	9/12/2026 18:43	9/13/2026 7:28	9/13/2026 10:56	Shasta	Tier 3	252	244	7	19	33	1

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Counties	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	GLENN 1101	9/12/2026 19:36	9/13/2026 7:28	9/13/2026 10:14	Tehama, Glenn	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	146	82	40	3	17	24
Distribution	GLENN 1101	9/14/2026 1:09	9/14/2026 11:58	9/14/2026 16:43	Tehama, Glenn	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	146	82	40	3	17	24
Distribution	HAMILTON BRANCH 1101	9/12/2026 13:20	9/13/2026 7:28	9/13/2026 11:15	Lassen, Plumas	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Zone 1	2033	1870	161	74	145	2
Distribution	KESWICK 1101	9/12/2026 18:42	9/13/2026 7:28	9/13/2026 15:51	Shasta	Tier 2, Tier 3	529	442	85	32	139	2
Distribution	LOGAN CREEK 2102	9/12/2026 19:41	9/13/2026 7:28	9/13/2026 10:46	Colusa, Glenn	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	146	64	47	1	9	35
Distribution	LOGAN CREEK 2102	9/14/2026 1:20	9/14/2026 11:58	9/14/2026 15:33	Colusa, Glenn	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	146	64	47	1	9	35
Distribution	MADISON 2101	9/12/2026 16:42	9/13/2026 7:28	9/13/2026 9:36	Yolo	Tier 2	9	0	9	0	0	0
Distribution	MADISON 2101	9/14/2026 2:11	9/14/2026 11:24	9/14/2026 13:40	Yolo	Tier 2	9	0	9	0	0	0
Distribution	MAXWELL 1102	9/12/2026 15:51	9/13/2026 7:28	9/13/2026 10:35	Colusa	Outside HFTD	11	5	2	0	0	4
Distribution	MAXWELL 1105	9/12/2026 15:03	9/13/2026 7:28	9/13/2026 9:48	Colusa	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	36	20	13	0	3	3
Distribution	MC ARTHUR 1101	9/12/2026 12:20	9/13/2026 7:28	9/13/2026 17:00	Lassen, Shasta	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Zone 1	920	723	136	56	232	61
Distribution	MC ARTHUR 1102	9/12/2026 13:29	9/13/2026 7:28	9/13/2026 12:28	Shasta	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	8	5	2	0	5	1
Distribution	PIT NO 1 1101	9/12/2026 12:21	9/13/2026 7:28	9/13/2026 11:20	Shasta	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Zone 1	734	571	124	48	169	39
Distribution	SPAULDING 1101	9/12/2026 13:21	9/13/2026 7:28	9/13/2026 10:46	Placer, Nevada	Partially Outside HFTD, Zone 1	27	11	14	0	0	2

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Counties	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	SUMMIT 1101	9/12/2026 9:25	9/13/2026 7:28	9/13/2026 11:09	Placer, Nevada	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Zone 1	1080	994	80	23	39	6
Distribution	SUMMIT 1102	9/12/2026 9:22	9/13/2026 7:28	9/13/2026 11:43	Placer, Nevada	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	287	224	63	3	8	0
Distribution	TAMARACK 1101	9/12/2026 13:22	9/13/2026 7:28	9/13/2026 10:43	Placer, Nevada	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Zone 1	453	418	29	12	40	6
Distribution	TAMARACK 1102	9/12/2026 13:23	9/13/2026 7:28	9/13/2026 9:56	Placer	Partially Outside HFTD, Zone 1	132	105	21	3	2	6
Distribution	WILDWOOD 1101	9/12/2026 16:42	9/13/2026 7:28	9/13/2026 11:15	Tehama, Shasta	Tier 2	36	26	9	2	10	1
Distribution	WILLIAMS 1102	9/12/2026 16:27	9/13/2026 7:28	9/13/2026 9:32	Colusa	Outside HFTD	15	7	5	0	2	3
Transmission	HAT CREEK #1- WESTWOOD	9/12/2026 13:50	9/13/2026 7:28	9/13/2026 11:42	Shasta, Lassen	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Zone 1	3	0	0	0	0	3
Transmission	SPAULDING-SUMMIT	9/12/2026 9:57	9/13/2026 7:28	9/13/2026 10:24	Placer	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2, Zone 1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total							13,190	11,268	1,563	653	2,210	359

APPENDIX C
SECTION 4 – DAMAGE AND HAZARDS TO OVERHEAD FACILITIES
See Appendix C in the attachment, “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report_20260912 Tables.xlsx*”

APPENDIX D
SECTION 6 – PUBLIC SAFETY PARTNERS CONTACTED

See Appendix D in the attachment, “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report_20260912 Tables.xlsx.*”

APPENDIX E
SECTION 9 – COMMUNITY RESOURCE CENTER LOCATIONS

See Appendix E in the attachment, “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report_20260912 Tables.xlsx.*”

Appendix F: DEFINITIONS

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
Access and Functional Needs (AFN) Populations	None	Includes individuals who have developmental or intellectual disabilities, physical disabilities, chronic conditions, injuries, limited English proficiency or who are non-English speaking, older adults, children, people living in institutionalized settings, or those who are low income, homeless, or transportation disadvantaged, including, but not limited to, those who are dependent on public transit or those who are pregnant.
AFN Characteristics	None	Includes blind/low vision, deaf/hard of hearing, senior, non-English speaking, durable medical equipment, assistive technology, low income, or life support. In accordance with D.21-06-034, PG&E includes customers who have voluntarily indicated they are “dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology” in an effort to identify customers “above and beyond those in the medical baseline population” or self-identified vulnerable population to include persons reliant on electricity to maintain necessary life functions including for durable medical equipment and assistive technology. This includes Assistive Technology, Blind, Disabled, Durable Medical Equipment, Hearing Disability–Deaf or Hard of Hearing, Senior or Vision Disability–Low Vision.
Benefit to Risk Ratio	Fraction – Max (Threshold, Forecast Factor)	Adverse impact to customers due to a catastrophic fire prevented by PSPS de-energization divided by adverse impact to customers due to PSPS de-energization. No observed value is available for this factor.
California Alternate Rates for Energy (CARE)	None	A state mandated program. As determined by PU Code Section 739.1(a), annual household must be no greater than 200% of the federal poverty guideline levels.
Catastrophic Fire Probability Distribution (CFPD)	Scaled Probability – Max (Threshold, Forecast, Observed Factor)	The probability of fire ignitions due to weather impacting the Distribution electric system combined with the probability that a fire will be catastrophic if it starts. In Appendix A-1.1, this is the product of catastrophic fire (Prob Cat) and Ignition Probability Weather (IPW) minus probability of ignition (Prob Ignition). Scaled by 1000 to convert to an integer value.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
Catastrophic Fire Probability Transmission (CFPT)	Scaled Probability – Max (Threshold, Forecast and Observed Factor)	In Appendix A-2.1, this is the product of probability of catastrophic fire (Prob Cat) and Operability Assessment Probability of Failure. This product is called the (CFPT) Catastrophic Fire Probability Transmission model. Scaled by 1000 to convert to an integer value.
Critical Facilities and Infrastructure (CFI)	None	“Critical Facilities” and “Critical Infrastructure” refer to facilities and infrastructure that are essential to public safety and require additional assistance and advance planning to ensure resiliency during de-energization. The CPUC adopted the following interim list of CFI, as aligned with Department of Homeland Security’s Critical Infrastructure Sectors: • Emergency Services Sector: Police Stations, Fire Stations, Emergency Operations Centers • Government Facilities Sector: Schools, Jails and Prisons • Healthcare and Public Health Sector: Public Health Departments, Medical facilities, including hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, nursing homes, blood banks, health care facilities, dialysis centers and hospice facilities • Energy Sector: Public and private utility facilities vital to maintaining or restoring normal service, including, but not limited to, interconnected publicly owned utilities and electric cooperatives • Water and Wastewater Systems Sector: Facilities associated with the provision of drinking water or processing of wastewater including facilities used to pump, divert, transport, store, treat and deliver water or wastewater • Communications Sector: Communication carrier infrastructure including selective routers, central offices, head ends, cellular switches, remote terminals and cellular sites • Chemical Sector: Facilities associated with the provision of manufacturing, maintaining, or distributing hazardous materials and chemicals • Note: Some customers meet the criteria of being both a Public Safety Partner & Critical Facility, which include Emergency services sector, water and wastewater providers, communication service providers and emergency hospitals.
Customer or Customer Accounts	None	Active service points or meters.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
Dead Fuel Moisture Content (DFM) 10hr	Fuel Moisture Fraction – Min (Threshold, Forecast, Observed Factor)	The amount of moisture in dead vegetation (i.e. fallen leaves, tree branches, and logs). In Appendix A-1.1, “DFM 10hr” is Dead Fuel Moisture provided in 10-hour fuel moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100.
Dead Fuel Moisture Content (DFM) 100hr	Fuel Moisture Fraction – Min (Threshold, Forecast Factor)	The amount of moisture in dead vegetation (i.e. fallen leaves, tree branches, and logs). In Appendix A-1.1, “DFM 100hr” is Dead Fuel Moisture provided in 100-hour moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100. No observed value is available for this factor.
Emergency Operations Center (EOC)	None	A central command and control facility responsible for carrying out the principles of emergency preparedness and emergency management, or disaster management functions at a strategic level during an emergency and ensuring the continuity of operation of a company.
EV charging station levels	None	• Level 1 Charging: 120-Volt; Connectors Used: J1772, NACS/J3400; Charging Speed: 3 to 5 Miles Per Hour • Level 2 Charging: 208-Volt to 240-Volt; Connectors Used: J1772, NACS/J3400; Charging Speed: 12 to 80 Miles Per Hour • Level 3 Charging: 400-Volt to 900-Volt (DC Fast Charge & Supercharging); Connectors Used: Combined Charging System (Combo), CHAdeMO & NACS/J3400; Charging Speed: 3 to 20 Miles Per Minute
Family Electric Rate Assistance Program (FERA)	None	CPUC established program for households of any size with incomes between 200% and 250% of federal poverty guidelines. (PU Code Section 739.12)
Fire Index Area (FIA)	None	Boundaries originally designated by the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection and United States Forest Service for the purpose of establishing a fire-danger rating for that area based on local conditions. There are 109 rating areas in PG&E’s service area.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
Fire Index Rating	None	A rating used by fire agencies to determine the risk of fire and its likely behavior. Its calculation considers fuel moisture, humidity, wind speed, air temperature, and historical fire occurrence. These ratings are as follows: • R1: Very little or no fire danger • R2: Moderate fire danger • R3: When fire danger is so high that care must be taken using fire-starting equipment. Local conditions may limit the use of machinery and equipment to certain hours of the day • R4: Fire danger is critical. The use of equipment and open flames are limited to specific areas and times • R5: Fire danger is so critical that the use of equipment and open flames are not allowed at any time • R5-Plus: Fire danger is at R5 "plus" high risk weather trigger of strong wind
First/Emergency Responders	None	Individuals who, in the early stages of an incident, are responsible for the protection and preservation of life, property, evidence, and the environment, including emergency response providers. The term “emergency response providers” includes federal, state, and local governmental and nongovernmental public safety, fire, law enforcement, emergency response, emergency medical services providers (including hospital emergency facilities), and related personnel, agencies and authorities.
Flame Length ft 8hr	Feet – Max (Threshold, Forecast Factor)	Flame length in feet on fire front for first eight hours of fire spread simulation from Technosylva. No observed value is available for this factor.
Full-Scale Exercise (FSE)	None	A complex, resource-intensive operations-based exercise often involving multiple agencies, jurisdictions/organizations, and real-time movement of resources.
Functional Exercise (FE)	None	An operations-based exercise designed to test and evaluate capabilities and functions in a realistic, real-time environment. Movement of resources is usually simulated.
Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC)	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	High fire risk issued by the Federal North or South Operations Predictive Services.
Hazard Awareness and Center (HAWC)	None	The operations center that monitors for wildfires. HAWC leadership communicates and informs other PG&E Business Units and Executive Leadership about threats from wildfires in the service area.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
High Fire Risk Area (HFRA)	None	Area where risk factors for the potential of catastrophic fire from utility infrastructure ignition during offshore wind events is higher than others. HFRA boundaries were developed based on the CPUC's HFTD boundaries.
High Fire Threat Districts (HFTDs)	None	Per D.17-01-009, areas of the State designated by the CPUC and California Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) to have elevated wildfire risk, indicating where utilities must take additional action (per GO 95, GO 165, and GO 166) to mitigate wildfire risk. The districts have three levels: • Zone 1: High Hazard Zones on the U.S. Forest Service-California Department of Forestry and CAL FIRE joint map of Tree Mortality High Hazard Zones • Tier 2: Elevated risk for utility-associated wildfires • Tier 3: Extreme risk for utility-associated wildfires
High Impact Critical Customers	None	Non-residential customers that may present a significant community impact in the event they experience a sustained outage but do not meet the CPUC criteria for a Critical Facility Customer.
High Priority Vegetation Tag	None	"Priority 1" and "Priority 2" vegetation tags are created when trained vegetation inspectors identify trees or limbs that currently present elevated risk and must be worked on an expedited basis. Inspectors use Priority 1 tags for vegetation (i) in contact or showing signs of previous contact with a primary conductor; (ii) actively failing or at immediate risk of failing and which could strike PG&E's facilities; or (iii) presenting an immediate risk to PG&E's facilities. Inspectors use Priority 2 tags for vegetation that does not rise to the level of Priority 1 but has encroached within the PG&E minimum clearance requirements or has an identifiable potential safety issue requiring expedited work.
High Wind Advisory	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	Advisory of high winds issued by the Federal National Weather Service.
High Wind Warning (HWW)	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	Warning of high winds issued by the Federal National Weather Service.
Life Support	None	Customers that require critical life support equipment in their home.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
Medical Baseline (MBL) Program	None	This program assists residential customers who rely on power for certain medical needs, as certified by a licensed medical practitioner. Eligible customers receive an extra monthly allotment of energy or discount, depending on their current rate plan. The program also includes additional notifications in advance of a PSPS.
Monitoring Stage	None	The seven days ahead of a weather event when weather patterns are being monitored. Utility provides seven-day proactive de-energization potential rolling forecast or implements an escalating notification system similar to the National Weather Service's "weather watch" and "weather warning" system on its public website.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	Fire weather forecast issued by NOAA (SPC).
Officer-in-Charge (OIC)	None	A position specific to PSPS to engage higher-level management accountability in the decision to de-energize and restore power while also enabling rapid decision-making during real-time. The OIC approves all PSPS Decision Records and associated documentation following a PSPS.
Open PSPS Tags	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	PSPS-Qualified Tags include P1 (tree represents an immediate risk) and P2 (tree is damaged or diseased and could fall into nearby power lines) tree tags and Electric Corrective tags (Priority A - emergency, B - urgent, and E/F - risk-based).
Page View	None	The number of times a web page was viewed by individual users.
Patrol Inspection	None	In accordance with GO 165, a visual inspection of applicable utility equipment and structures that is designed to identify obvious structural problems and hazards. Patrol inspections may be carried out during other company business.
Prob Cat	Probability Outputs – Max (Threshold, Forecast, Observed Factor)	Fire Potential Index (FPI) Model Output minus Probability of a catastrophic fire if an ignition were to occur. FPI component of the CFPD model.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
PSPS Mitigation	None	The efforts taken to avoid de-energization including backup generation, backup storage, distribution microgrid, islanding, patrols, sectionalization, switching, temporary substation microgrid, Transmission switching and vegetation management (expedite priority trees that prevent circuit from being removed from scope).
Public Safety Partner	None	First/emergency response providers at the federal, state and local levels including, water, wastewater and communication service providers, affected community choice aggregators, publicly owned utilities/electrical cooperatives, the CPUC, the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (OES) and the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. The term “emergency response providers” includes federal, state, and local governmental and nongovernmental public safety, fire, law enforcement, emergency response, emergency medical services providers (including hospital emergency facilities), and related personnel, agencies and authorities.
Rate of Spread Chhr 8hr	Chains/Hour – Max (Threshold, Forecast Factor)	Rate of fire spread in chains per hour for first eight hours of fire spread simulation from Technosylva. No observed value is available for this factor.
Red Flag Warning (RFW)	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	Red Flag Warning from the Federal National Weather Service.
Relative Humidity (RH)	Percentage – Min (Threshold, Forecast, Observed Factor)	Relative Humidity in percent at two meters above ground level. For observed values, this is the minimum relative humidity recorded by all weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated All-Clear time.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
Self-Identified Vulnerable (SIV)	None	Customers who have indicated they are “dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology” as well as customers that are not enrolled or qualify for the MBL Program and “certify that they have a serious illness or condition that could become life threatening if service is disconnected.” In accordance with D.21-06-034, PG&E includes customers who have indicated they are “dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology” in an effort to identify customers “above and beyond those in the medical baseline population” to include persons reliant on electricity to maintain necessary life functions including for durable medical equipment and assistive technology. This designation remains on their account for one year, at which a customer can recertify their SIV Status.
Site Visit	None	A continuous session that begins when a user arrives on a site and ends after either 30 minutes of inactivity or 12 hours of continuous activity.
SIV Program	None	A PG&E program inclusive of customers who have indicated they are “dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology” as well as customers that are not enrolled or qualify for the MBL Program and “certify that they have a serious illness or condition that could become life threatening if service is disconnected.” In accordance with D.21-06-034, PG&E includes customers who have indicated they are “dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology” in an effort to identify customers “above and beyond those in the medical baseline population” to include persons reliant on electricity to maintain necessary life functions including for durable medical equipment and assistive technology. This designation remains on their account for one year, at which a customer can recertify their SIV Status.
Sustained Wind	None	The average observed wind speed value over a two-minute period.
Tabletop Exercise (TTX)	None	A discussion-based exercise in response to a scenario, intended to generate a dialogue of various issues to facilitate a conceptual understanding, identify strengths and areas for improvement, and/or achieve changes in perceptions about plans, policies, or procedures.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
Time Place (TP)	None	A portion of the PG&E grid that is electrically and geographically coherent and is forecast to experience consistent timing for severe fire weather. TPs are identified for each PSPS and receive consistent treatment for notifications and de-energization. Once actual weather conditions occur, Weather “All-Clear” and service restoration times may vary due to actual weather conditions across various TPs as well as within a TP.
Transmission (Tx) Impacts	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	Distribution lines that would have been de-energized due to de-energization of upstream Transmission lines, regardless of whether those Distribution lines would have also been de-energized due to direct Distribution PSPS.
Vulnerable Populations	None	Individuals who have physical, developmental, intellectual disabilities; chronic conditions or injuries, are limited English proficient or non-English speaking; older adults, children, people living in institutionalized settings, low-income, homeless and/or transportation-disadvantaged (i.e., dependent on public transit) and pregnant women. This term is also used interchangeable with AFN.
Weather “All-Clear”	None	When severe weather has passed, the OIC gives approval to start patrols and restoration for all impacted areas at once or for specific areas.
Wind Gust	None	A rapid fluctuation of wind speed with variations of ten knots or more between peaks and lulls, typically, determined by averaging observed values over a three-second period.
WS MPH	MPH – Max (Threshold, Forecast, Observed Factor)	Sustained windspeed in miles per hour at 10 meters above ground level. The observed values show the maximum sustained wind speed recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated All-Clear time.

VERIFICATION

I, undersigned, say:

I am an officer of PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, a corporation, and am authorized to make this verification for that reason.

I have read the foregoing “PG&E Public Safety Power Shutoff Report to the CPUC” for the September 12, 2026, PSPS and I am informed and believe the matters stated therein to be true.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed at Oakland, California this 28th day of September 2026.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Abranches", is written over a horizontal line.

ANDREW ABRANCHES
VICE PRESIDENT
WILDFIRE MITIGATION