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July 30, 2026

VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL

Leslie Palmer
Deputy Executive Director, Safety and Enforcement
California Public Utilities Commission
505 Van Ness Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94102

Dear Mr. Palmer:

As required by Resolution ESRB-8 and in accordance with Ordering Paragraph 1 of California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Decision (D.) 19-05-042, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) respectfully submits this report for the July 15, 2026 PSPS. This report has been verified by a PG&E officer in accordance with Rule 1.11 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure.

Members of the public may submit both formal and informal comments on this report to the CPUC by following instructions on the CPUC's website (www.cpuc.ca.gov). The CPUC's Public Advisor's Office has established procedures for providing such comments, including via online form. Comments may also be submitted directly to the Director of the Safety and Enforcement Division (SED) of the CPUC using the contact information below.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads 'Susan C. Martinez'. The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Susan C. Martinez
Director of Liaison, Regulatory Operations and Engagement

Enclosures

cc: Anthony Noll, SED
ESRB_ComplianceFilings@cpuc.ca.gov
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**Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E)
Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) Report to the
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)
July 15, 2026 De-energization**

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**PG&E PSPS Report to the CPUC
July 15, 2026 De-energization**

Section 1 – Executive Summary

Section 1.1 - Brief description of the PSPS event starting from the time when the utility's Emergency Operation Center is activated until service to all customers has been restored.
(D.21-06-014, page 286, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

High winds can cause tree branches and debris to contact energized electric lines and potentially lead to a wind-driven wildfire. As a result, we may need to turn off power during severe weather to help prevent wildfires. This is called a Public Safety Power Shutoff, or PSPS. We recognize that it is disruptive for our customers to be without power, therefore, we initiate a PSPS when the weather forecast is so severe that public safety, lives, homes and businesses may be in danger of wildfires. It is not a decision we take lightly. For the safety of our customers and communities, PSPS continues to be a necessary tool as a last resort.

This report follows the updated CPUC template effective on May 1, 2026. We reached out to the CPUC's Safety Enforcement Division (SED) on June 30, 2026, for clarification on the template updates. We have since received some feedback, and we plan to continue working with SED on further clarifications needed. Therefore, our responses are based on our current understanding of the recently updated prompts.

Timeline

The weather conditions that led to the July 15, 2026 PSPS were unlike other PSPS events that involved offshore winds. On July 13, our weather models observed onshore flow, which typically does not lead to conditions warranting a PSPS, this weather pattern was forecasted to intensify on July 15. However, an unusual weather pattern of high-pressure over the interior U.S. significantly suppressed the marine layer. These conditions do not typically occur during onshore winds, which introduced further complexity to this weather pattern. Simultaneously, low pressure off the coast strengthened onshore pressure gradients that caused an unusual combination of northwest winds and dry, relative humidity.

During this time, PG&E was in contact with federal agencies who also observed this unusual weather pattern and began to escalate their forecasts. In particular, the North Ops Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC) escalated their forecast to a high risk with wind trigger for northern portions of our eventual scope, and the Oxnard office issuing a Fire Weather Watch for the southernmost portions of our eventual scope. Prior to this late escalation, there were no watches/warnings or high risk forecasts issued by federal agencies.

Prior to July 13, our main concern regarding these conditions was the impact of monsoon moisture moving into the interior of our service area and the potential for dry thunderstorms. Typically, onshore wind events do not meet PG&E's Minimum Fire Potential Conditions (mFPC). However, intensifying weather model data caused the original forecasted conditions to quickly change and meet minimum PSPS thresholds close to the time of necessary de-energization.

Once our Meteorology Team identified that this unusual weather pattern could indicate potential for wildfire conditions on July 13, we entered readiness posture and emergency response

leadership was informed. Our teams began conducting courtesy calls to Public Safety Partners in the areas anticipated to be impacted, readied the grid, and prepared Community Resource Centers (CRCs) and other customer support resources.

Due to the rapidly shifting weather, the initial PSPS scope was established for de-energization after the (48 – 72hr) Priority Notification window had passed. As a result of the rapidly changing weather, Priority Notifications were not sent to Public Safety Partners within 48 – 72 hours prior to anticipated de-energization, in accordance with Phase 1 Guidelines. For more information regarding the weather conditions that led to the delayed initial PSPS scope, see [Section 2.3](#).

On Tuesday, July 14, we began notifying Public Safety Partners and customers in the areas anticipated to be impacted.

We closely monitored weather conditions across 12 Time Places (TPs), as shown in Figure 1, and on July 15 at 12:30 PDT, we made the decision to de-energize customers for safety, due to increased fire potential conditions resulting from gusty northwest winds, low humidity, output from fire spread models, and real-time Hazard Awareness and Warning Center (HAWC) reports. At this time, we approved de-energization to our assets and customers to mitigate catastrophic wildfire risk across the Bay Area, Salinas Valley, and Santa Ynez range. We ultimately de-energized 5,186 customers across eight counties and seven TPs on July 15.

Once winds subsided on July 16 at 06:47 PDT, the first Weather All-Clear was issued for all circuit segments in TPs 1, 2, 7, 8, 10 and 11. The last Weather All-Clear was declared on July 16 at 08:38 PDT for TP 3.

Through various mitigation efforts, we avoided the de-energization of approximately 22,784 customers in the final scope for de-energization. For more information regarding our mitigation efforts for this PSPS, see [Section 10](#).

Inspections

During patrol and inspections, we did not identify any damages or hazards caused by weather. For more information regarding damages and hazards, see [Section 4](#).


Following patrol and inspections, customers were restored safely and as quickly as possible. Within 24 hours of the Weather All-Clear service to 100% of customers had been restored. The average restoration time was approximately 3.6 hours.

Customer Feedback

The City of Mill Valley, which has not experienced a PSPS since 2019, provided positive feedback on PG&E's PSPS outreach and planning efforts, highlighting timely notifications and effective preparedness support. City representatives also reported no negative community feedback was received and expressed strong support for the PSPS, recognizing its importance in protecting public safety.

PG&E also received positive feedback from a customer whose impact was mitigated through Temporary Generation efforts in the community of Lockwood. The customer expressed their appreciation for being able to remain in their home with large animals while in a wheelchair, as relocating during the PSPS was not feasible.

Figure 1: PSPS Timeline



Section 1.2 - A table including the maximum numbers of customers notified and actually de-energized; number of counties de-energized; number of tribes de-energized; number of Medical Baseline customers de-energized; number of transmission and distribution circuits de-energized; damage/hazard count; number of critical facilities and infrastructure de-energized. Hazards are conditions discovered during restoration patrolling or operations that might have caused damages or posed an electrical arcing or ignition risk had PSPS not been executed. Table 1 must contain unique data counts from event. (D.21-06-034, Appendix A, page A15, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

Table 1 identifies the maximum number of customers notified, de-energized and canceled; number of Medical Baseline (MBL) customers de-energized; number of counties de-energized; number of tribes de-energized; number of Critical Facilities and Infrastructure (CFI) de-energized; number of Transmission lines and Distribution circuits de-energized; and damage/hazard count.

Table 1: PSPS Event Summary¹

Total Customers Notified	Total Customers De-energized	Total Customers Canceled	MBL Customers De-energized	Counties De-energized	Tribes De-energized	CFI De-energized	Transmission De-energized	Unique Distribution Circuits in Scope	Distribution Circuits De-energized	Damage/Hazard Count
7,790 ²	5,186 ³	2,618	151	8	0	129	2	24	16	0 damages 0 hazards

¹ The information, times, and figures referenced in this report are based on the best available information available at the time of this report's submission. The information, times and figures herein are subject to revision based on further analysis and validation.

² Of the customers who received notifications that their power may be de-energized, two customers stopped service prior to de-energization. See [Section 5.7](#) for more information.

³ Of the customers de-energized, 16 customers did not receive any notifications regarding planned de-energization. See [Section 5.5](#) for more information.

Section 1.3 - A PDF map depicting the de-energized area(s) (*SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

During the July 15, 2026 PSPS, we de-energized 5,186 customers in seven TPs across eight counties. The final de-energization footprint is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: PSPS De-Energization Footprint Map



Section 2 – Decision Making Process

Section 2.1 - A table showing all factors considered in the decision to shut off power for each circuit de-energized, including but not limited to, sustained and gust wind speeds, temperature, humidity, and moisture in the vicinity of the de-energized circuits (*Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, Appendix A-1.1 and A-2.1 in the attachment “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260715*” provides a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope for the July 15, 2026 PSPS.

Section 2.2 - Use the following format to provide decision-making criteria detailing circuit level analysis and comparison between threshold, forecast, and actual readings utilized during the scoping process and de-energization process. Also include a PSPS decision-making diagram(s)/flowchart(s) or equivalent along with narrative description (*D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A22, D.21-06-014, page 284, SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

As the CPUC noted in ESRB-8, the decision to de-energize electric facilities for public safety is complex and dependent on many factors including but not limited to fuel moisture, aerial and ground firefighting capabilities, active fires that indicate fire conditions, situational awareness provided by fire agencies, the National Weather Service (NWS) and the United States Forest Service, and local meteorological conditions of humidity and winds.⁴


Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, this section provides an overview of our decision-making criteria and threshold evaluation process that were used in the decision to de-energize customers during the July 15, 2026 PSPS. For event-specific thresholds and a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope for the July 15, 2026 PSPS, see Appendix A-1.1 and A-2.1 in the attachment “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260715*.”

PSPS Preparation and Scoping Process

At a high level, Figure 3 shows the process used to prepare for a PSPS. PG&E utilized and referenced the following protocols and tools during the July 15, 2026 PSPS to determine the latest forecasted weather parameters versus actual weather. Appendix A-1.1 and A-2.1 in the attachment “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260715*” includes anticipated parameters based on the latest forecast used to develop the planned de-energization scope versus actual weather parameters for each circuit.

⁴ ESRB-8, pp. 8 – 9.

Figure 3: PG&E's High-Level PSPS Process Steps



We consider executing a PSPS when strong gusty winds, critically low humidity levels, and low fuel moisture levels pose an unacceptable risk of causing fast-spreading, catastrophic wildfires. Assessments begin several days before the weather event is forecasted to take place.

We identify weather conditions that could create high fire potential by using a combination of high outage and ignition potential, high-resolution internal and external weather forecasting models and data from federal agencies that include the following:

- *Ignition Probability Weather (IPW)*: Determines the potential of an outage due to weather conditions, and then for that outage to lead to an ignition.
- *Fire Potential Index (FPI)*: Assists with fire model development and calibration.
- *Technosylva*: Provides fire spread modeling via data inputs.

Through partnerships with external experts, we developed our machine learning models using historic datasets and advanced forecast models that provide a better understanding of historical weather events and improve our weather forecasting. These models use the following:

- Data storage and processing via the PG&E-Amazon Web Services Cloud.
- Hourly weather data such as temperature, relative humidity, wind speed, precipitation, pressure, and dead and live fuel moisture.
- Over 100 trillion data points of historical weather and fuel.
- Precise location data points across our service area to conduct hourly weather analyses using high-resolution, historical data.

Our thresholds and guidance for identifying critical fire risk and outage/ignition potential are determined by analyzing and rigorously testing our current PSPS protocols and criteria against decades of historical weather data in and around California.

External forecast information from the NWS (e.g., Red Flag Warnings [RFWs]) and other forecast agencies are examined carefully. Furthermore, we coordinate with these agencies during high-risk periods via daily conference calls to ultimately decide whether to de-energize portions of the grid for public safety.

Tools and Technology


PG&E partners with Technosylva, an external expert in the wildfire modeling field to test and deploy cloud-based wildfire spread model capabilities. This helps us to better understand where we might need to turn off power.

Each day, PG&E delivers our wildfire condition datasets to Technosylva, who then perform over 100 million fire spread simulations to provide fire spread scenarios that help to identify circuits that may be at risk during dry, windy weather. These are done every three hours, for the five days ahead.

Decision Criteria and Thresholds for Distribution PSPS Protocols

We begin determining whether to turn off power for safety by first evaluating the Distribution system. These powerlines are closer to communities and are generally more susceptible to dry, windy weather threats. Our process is outlined in Figure 4. The values presented in Figure 4 were developed using 31 years of PG&E's high-resolution climate data to help understand wildfire risk and the potential customer impacts of PSPS. We evaluate within a small geographic area (0.7 square kilometers) and if any of the measures are forecasted to be met, we scope the circuit segments within that region for de-energization. There is no single criterion or threshold that will require turning off power to a Distribution circuit. For event-specific thresholds and a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope, see Appendix A-1.1 in the attachment "PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260715."

Figure 4: PSPS Protocols for Distribution



Step 1: mFPC

The first step to determine the scope of a PSPS is evaluating the mFPC. This ensures that PSPS is only executed during wind events when atmospheric conditions and fuels are dry. A PSPS is evaluated if the mFPC noted in Step 1 of Figure 4 above is met.

These values were established from a combination of analyses including:


- Historical fire occurrence in our service area.
- PSPS sensitivity studies how PSPS criteria impacted the frequency of PSPS events and total customer impact.
- Information published by federal agencies regarding fire behavior and criteria used to issue warnings to the public.

Step 2: In-Depth Review of Fire Risk

If all minimum fire conditions are met, we conduct an in-depth review of fire risk using multiple separate measures. If the criteria for any of these measures are met, we may need to turn off power for safety. We evaluate all the factors below together, rather than isolating any specific factor to assess fire risk against the potential harms of de-energization. For event-specific thresholds and a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope for the July 15, 2026 PSPS, see Appendix A-1.1 in the attachment “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260715*.”

- *Catastrophic Fire Probability (CFP_D)*: This model combines the probability of fire ignitions due to weather impacting the electric system with the probability that a fire will be catastrophic if it starts. It is the combination of the IPW and the FPI. The CFP_D model accounts for changes over time based on actual performance data. Thus, the model will address positive and negative trends in grid performance and reliability year-over-year, incorporating grid improvements such as system hardening, and enhanced vegetation management based on their performance at mitigating outages over time.
 - IPW Model: A system comprised of two machine learning models. These models are used to evaluate the probability of outages across several outage classes (Outage Probability Weather [OPW] model) and the probability of that outage becoming an ignition (Ignition Given Outage Probability Weather Model [IOPW]). These models are combined for each location at each hour to ascertain the ignition probability. These machine learning models use 17 years of weather data to correlate approximately 650,000 outages occurring on PG&E’s Distribution grid. The model analyzes the potential for several types of power outages in each weather event, as well as the potential for that outage to be the source of an ignition. IPW learns from and accounts for changes on the grid from year-to-year.
 - FPI Model: This model outputs the probability that a fire will become large or catastrophic and is used as a daily and hourly tool to drive operational decisions to reduce the risk of utility caused fires. It was enhanced in 2024 with additional data and improved analytic capabilities.
- *Tree Strike Considerations*: Our PSPS protocols utilize a machine learning model to integrate the potential for trees to strike the lines into our OPW Model and IPW Model. This helps our Meteorology Team more accurately analyze risk posed by trees and how that translates to increased ignition probability. For more information regarding OPW modeling, see Figure 5. Scenarios with a high risk of an IPW and a high FPI value will always warrant a PSPS. However, power may be turned off in other scenarios to avoid catastrophic wildfires.

Figure 5: Incorporation of Tree Strike Potential into PSPS Modeling



- *Catastrophic Fire Behavior (CFB)*: We also evaluate areas that are meeting mFPC (windy and dry conditions) but are not meeting our CFP guidance values by utilizing dynamic wildfire spread simulations from Technosylva. This allows us to consider potential ignition events that are rarer and more difficult to forecast such as animal and third-party contacts, or external debris impacting electrical lines. These locations are only considered once the mFPC are met, ensuring that conditions are sufficiently windy and dry.
- *Fireline Intensity*: The U.S. Forest Service Rocky Mountain Research Station did a study of fire line intensity which is determined by the size and components of flames. It is measured as the rate of heat energy released (Btu) per unit length of the fire line (ft) per unit(s). It is also calculated by estimating the flame length, the distance measured from the average flame tip to the middle of the fire's base. Internal studies that evaluated historical fire simulation outputs to actual fire events, damages, and fatalities showed that outputs of flame length and rate of spread were best correlated to historical fire outcomes. Studies, as mentioned above, have shown that more intense fires with higher flame lengths and higher rates of spread are more difficult to control. Thus, we evaluate fire simulation data that indicates where fast-spreading and intense fires could manifest and incorporate that into our PSPS decision making process.
- *Vegetation and Electric Asset Criteria Considerations*: We review locations from recent inspections where high-priority trees or electric compliance issues may increase the risk of ignition. If an area is forecasted to experience minimum fire conditions and there are known issues with equipment or vegetation that have not yet been addressed, we may need to turn off power.

PSPS Protocols for Transmission

In addition to analyzing Distribution circuits that may need to be de-energized for safety, we also review the Transmission lines and structures in areas experiencing dry and windy weather conditions. Transmission lines are like the freeways of the electric system, carrying high voltage energy across long distances. Similar to our Distribution protocols, there is no single factor or threshold that will require turning off power to a Transmission line.

Step 1: mFPC


When determining whether to turn off power for safety on Transmission lines, we review the same mFPC as with Distribution circuits. If these conditions are met, we will review the criteria below to determine whether a Transmission line must be turned off.

Step 2: In-Depth Review of Fire Risk

Once we identify the initial scope, we work with the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) to ensure the initial scope is appropriate. This includes analyzing whether it will compromise the power supply to other jurisdictions, utilities or facilities connected to our system. This important step can last several hours, which is why the potential scope of a PSPS may change as we get closer to the forecasted weather event.

- *Catastrophic Fire Probability – Asset (CFPT – Asset)*: We use computer models to assess the likelihood of equipment failure during a given weather event, and the subsequent risk of catastrophic wildfires if a failure occurs. This model uses a combination of the Operability Assessment (OA) and FPI Models, both in time and space, at every Transmission structure to form the Transmission CFPT model for asset failures. The OA Model combines historical wind speeds for each structure, historical outage activity, Bayesian updating, and the condition of assets based on inspection programs to help understand the wind-related failure probability of each structure. The OA Model can be driven with forecast wind speeds to output the probability of failure at the structure level.
- *Catastrophic Fire Probability – Vegetation (CFPT – Veg)*: The Transmission-specific vegetation risk model is a calibrated probability of vegetation risk built internally using data collected and managed by PG&E vegetation management and external contractors such as NV5 and Formation Environmental. This model leverages aerial LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) data to map the location and attributes of trees near Transmission lines. The Transmission vegetation risk model is based on several factors such as overstrike, the amount of unobstructed fall paths to a wire, the slope between a tree and a conductor, and tree exposure. The Transmission vegetation risk model is combined with the FPI Model in space and time to form CFPT – Veg.
- *CFB*: We may de-energize customers where the consequence of a potential wildfire ignition would be extreme, even if the probability of a power line or equipment failure is low.
- *Vegetation and Electric Asset Criteria Considerations*: We review locations from recent inspections where high-priority trees or electric compliance issues are present that may increase the risk of ignition. Figure 6 provides a quantitative summary of our PSPS Protocols for Transmission.

Figure 6: PSPS Protocols for Transmission



Step 3: Determining the Outage Area

Transmission lines meeting the criteria above pass to the next stage of review. We conduct a Power Flow Analysis on the in-scope Transmission lines (if applicable) to analyze any potential downstream impacts of load shedding.

Reviewing Impact and Forecasted Weather

After determining the outage area both for Distribution and Transmission, PG&E reviews the forecasted customer impacts of each circuit against the forecasted wildfire risk of each circuit. If there is reasonable risk for ignition on the Distribution circuits or Transmission lines during the forecasted weather event, it is included in the PSPS scope. During key decision-making points, we internally share this analysis to inform PSPS decision-making and further risk modeling.

Starting 12 hours before the forecasted PSPS de-energization time, we transition from evaluating forecast data to observing the weather in real-time. Based on real-time observations and analysis, we continually evaluate all the outage areas identified in the previous steps and use external tools and analysis to determine whether to initiate PSPS de-energization.

Decision-Making and Analysis to Validate if PSPS is Necessary

During high-risk periods, our Meteorologists participate in daily interagency conference calls that commonly include multiple NWS local offices, the NWS western region headquarters, and representatives from the GACC, also known as Predictive Services. This call is hosted by the Northern California and/or Southern California GACC offices.

During these calls, the external agencies present their expert assessment on the upcoming periods and locations of risk, wind speeds and fuel moisture levels, and any other relevant factors to consider.

During a PSPS, our Lead Meteorologist, called the Meteorologist-in-Charge (MIC), summarizes these forecasts and discussions for the Officer-in-Charge (OIC), who ultimately makes the decision to execute a PSPS.

The following sources and tools are considered before initiating a PSPS by the MIC:

- Daily interagency conference call with agencies during high-risk periods;
- External weather model data;
- Field observer information;
- Fire Weather Watches and RFW (NWS – Federal);
- Live weather data from weather stations;
- Location of existing fires;
- Significant fire potential for wind (GACC – Federal) and;
- Storm Prediction Center (SPC) (part of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) – Federal).

Based on the analyses above, we can determine how many customers may be subject to de-energization, and further investigate mitigation options, such as advanced switching solutions, sectionalization, the use of islanding, alternative grid solutions and temporary generation, to support customers who could lose upstream power sources but are in areas that may be safe to keep energized.

We monitor and forecast weather over a multi-day horizon, so we can anticipate when a PSPS may be needed and activate our EOC as far in advance as possible. Our internal weather model and external modeling are updated multiple times per day. Our Meteorology Team constantly evaluates both internal and external weather models for changes in weather timing, strength, and potential locations impacted. We then incorporate these changes into a new weather scope generally once per day.

Weather shifts may force changes to PSPS scope and impacts at any point in time during PSPS planning and execution; this may allow us to avoid de-energization in some areas if fire-critical conditions lessen but can also cause some areas and customers to move into de-energization scope late in the process if forecasted fire-critical weather footprints change or increase. Possible changes in PSPS scope and impact are driven by the inherent uncertainty in weather forecast models.

Section 2.3 - A thorough and detailed description of the quantitative and qualitative factors it considered in calling, sustaining, or curtailing each de-energization event including any fire risk or PSPS risk modeling results and information regarding why the de-energization event was a last resort, and a specification of the factors that led to the conclusion of the de-energization event. (D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 9, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

The quantitative factors that were used to determine de-energizing customers for safety are provided in Appendix A-1.1 and A-2.1 in the attachment “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260715*.” Below, we outline a detailed description of the qualitative factors provided by our Meteorology Team when we were determining whether to de-energize customers.

As forecast weather models do not provide absolute certainty of the future, our Meteorologists evaluate several external forecasts, external models and machine learning wind speed modeling at a station-by-station basis to determine PSPS scope. Other factors include forecasts by the NWS such as RFWs.

PG&E Meteorology Team Review

On Monday, July 13, 2026, weather models indicated potential for gusty northwest winds developing between July 15 – 16. On July 13, our Meteorology Team, Emergency Planning and Response Team, and EOC Commander met to discuss the potential need for a PSPS. As discussed in [Section 1.1](#), the weather conditions that led to this PSPS were unlike other PSPS events. Several unusual weather patterns occurred simultaneously, which on their own do not typically meet PSPS thresholds.

On July 13 and July 14, federal forecast agencies began to highlight the upcoming weather conditions. All federal agencies kept this posture throughout the period of concern. See “External PSPS Decision Inputs” below for external agency forecasts.

Intensifying weather model data caused the original forecasted conditions to quickly change and meet minimum PSPS thresholds close to the time of necessary de-energization. Based on the emerging risk of weather conditions, we entered readiness posture at 18:30 PDT on July 13 and activated the EOC at 06:00 PDT on July 14.

As a result of the quickly shifting weather conditions, the initial PSPS scope was developed on July 13, reflecting the unusual risk of Northwest winds creating critical fire weather conditions in portions of the Bay Area, Salinas Valley, and Santa Ynez range.

Once winds subsided on July 16 at 06:47 PDT, the first Weather All-Clear was issued for all circuits segments in TPs 1, 2, 7, 8, 10 and 11. The last Weather All-Clear was declared on July 16 at 08:38 PDT for TP 3.

High Resolution PSPS Models Guidance

The tools and models outlined in [Section 2.2](#) are part of the decision criteria that our Meteorologists consider when determining PSPS scope. Longer range weather forecast model data are used to determine the location and timing of a PSPS. Typically, these weather forecasts are less certain the farther they are from the observed date. This is akin to the well-known hurricane “cone of uncertainty” in which the potential track of a hurricane is represented by an area that expands farther out in time, which resembles an expanding cone. Therefore, there is an inherent tradeoff between the further out the forecasts are for a PSPS and the uncertainty in the PSPS scope and waiting until

forecasts become more certain. Forecast uncertainty leads to changes in PSPS scope as weather forecast models are updated, and the scope is refined closer to the period of concern.

As the PSPS unfolds in real-time, our Meteorologists transition to real-time observations of weather stations, satellite data, pressure gradients, and live feeds from Alert Wildfire Cameras. These observations help to evaluate if the weather is behaving as expected. In many instances, models trend stronger or weaker with each model iteration leading up to a PSPS.

External PSPS Decision Inputs

Meteorological analyses establish that high winds in California create significant fire threat and exacerbate fire spread. The NWS issues a RFW to indicate critical fire weather conditions under which any fire that develops will likely spread rapidly. California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) states, “the types of weather patterns that cause a watch or warning include low relative humidity, strong winds, dry fuels, the possibility of dry lightning strikes, or any combination of the above.” As noted previously, our decision to initiate a PSPS consistently occurs during periods and in areas where federal, state, and local authorities have identified as having extreme fire risk including the presence of strong winds.

As discussed above and in [Section 2.2](#), we compare our fire risk forecasts against those of external agencies to validate that there is shared recognition of high fire risk across the California meteorology community. Between July 13 – 15, our analysis of fire risk justifying a PSPS were validated by several sources and warnings:

- North Ops Predictive Services issued their seven-day Significant Fire Potential Outlook showing High Risk for two Predictive Service Areas (NC02 and NC03B) which covered Marin County and the interior East Bay.
- Predictive Services Northern California GACC issued high risk for Significant Fire Development due to wind on July 15 in the Mid Coast and Diablo regions.
- The Los Angeles/Oxnard NWS office issued a Fire Weather Watch for the Santa Barbara County interior mountains beginning at 12:00 PDT Wednesday on July 15 and lasting through 09:00 PDT Thursday on July 16 due to strong northwest to north winds along with low humidity and hot temperatures. On July 14, NWS Los Angeles/Oxnard upgraded Fire Weather Watch to an RFW (Figure 7).
- The NOAA’s SPC’s Fire Weather Outlooks indicating elevated fire-weather conditions across California (Figure 8).
- North Ops Predictive Services included in their forecast High Risk due to wind for The North Bay (NC02) and interior East Bay (NC03B) for July 15 (Figure 9).
- The Hanford and Monterey NWS offices began mentioning elevated fire conditions during the period of concern in their area forecast discussions, however, decided not to issue Fire Weather Watches or RFWs.

Figure 7: NWS RFW Coverage from the NWS Los Angeles/Oxnard Weather Office




Figure 8: NOAA – SPC Forecasts of Elevated and Critical Fire Weather Condition




Figure 9: Predictive Services Geographic Coordination Center High Risk Summary



We also review forecasted wind speeds in the potentially impacted counties to evaluate the need for a PSPS. Figure 10 shows the Utility FPI Ratings for Fire Index Areas (FIAs) in our service area between July 15 – 16. We determine the scope for a PSPS within those FIAs with fire risk rating R5-Plus from PG&E's FPI model. Additionally, Figure 11 compares the PSPS scope with other agencies to vet the fire weather risk.

Figure 10: PG&E's Utility FPI Ratings





Figure 11: Comparison of Federal Agency Fire Weather Warning and Final PSPS Scope

GACC High Risk Wind

NWS RFW

NOAA Fire Weather Outlook



Section 2.4 - An explanation of how the utility determined that the benefit of de-energization outweighed potential public safety risks, and analysis of the risks of de-energization against not de-energizing for each circuit or segment. The utility must identify and quantify customer, resident, and the general public risks and harms from de-energization and clearly explain risk models, risk assessment processes, and provide further documentation on how the power disruptions to customers, residents, and the general public is weighed against the benefits of a proactive de-energization (D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A24, D.21-06-014, page 284, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

For the July 15, 2026 PSPS, we used our PSPS Risk Model with the latest scope prior to making the decision to de-energization. See Appendix A-1.1 and A-2.1 in the attachment “*PGE PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260715*” for a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope, including risk factors.

Our PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool addresses the CPUC’s requirements presented in the 2019 PSPS OIL.⁵ This decision states California investor-owned utilities (IOUs) are required to quantify the risk/benefits associated with initiating or not initiating a PSPS for our customers.

PG&E incorporated this risk-benefit analysis into our PSPS execution process to help inform our PSPS decision-making process. Our Risk-Benefit Tool aligns with the California IOUs Cost Benefit Approach (CBA) framework, as defined through the Safety Modeling Assessment Proceeding (SMAP), CPUC’s Risk Based Decision-Making Framework (R.20-07-013), which specifies how various consequences are factored into a risk calculation. Utilizing this framework, we incorporate PSPS forecast information into the tool, which is further described in the “Risk Assessment” section below.

The output of the tool is a ratio that compares the calculated PSPS potential benefit from initiating de-energization (i.e., mitigation of catastrophic wildfire consequence) to the risks associated with PSPS (i.e., impact to customers resulting from a PSPS). Key inputs in the risk-benefit analysis include results from Technosylva wildfire simulations specific to the Distribution circuit and Transmission lines in scope for a potential de-energization, the number of customers forecasted to be de-energized, and the forecasted number of customer minutes across each identified circuit in scope for a potential de-energization.

After the potential de-energization scope is determined, including the potentially impacted circuits identified for the potential PSPS, this scope and the Technosylva wildfire simulation outputs are used as inputs into the Risk-Benefit Tool, which quantifies the potential public safety risk and wildfire risk resulting from the forecasted impacts of the pending PSPS. Note that the Wildfire Risk Score is based on an eight-hour simulation from Technosylva and while useful, in some cases this can significantly understate the risk. As a result, the MIC may still recommend to de-energize circuits where the Risk-Benefit Tool shows higher PSPS risk than wildfire risk.

⁵ D. 21-06-014

Risk Assessment

As referenced above, PG&E's PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool follows California IOU agreed approach to utilize the CBA framework that captures the safety, reliability, and financial impact of identified potential risk events, as outlined in our Enterprise Risk Register.⁶ The tool's calculations use a non-linear scaling of consequences reflecting our focus on low-frequency/high-consequence risk events without neglecting high-probability/low-consequence risk events. Developed by the PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool, CBA scores are used to compare the potential de-energization risk from a forecasted PSPS to the potential risk of catastrophic wildfires from keeping the circuits energized, specific to the potentially impacted circuits being considered for a PSPS.

The following inputs are used in calculations to build CBA risk scores for a PSPS and wildfires, which are ultimately weighed against one another:

- *Customer Category and Critical Customer Adjustment Factor*: The type of customer (e.g., MBL Program) using a "critical customer adjustment factor." This is applied to the customer outage duration to reflect a higher risk score for customers who are at a greater adverse risk of a potential PSPS.
- *Customers Impacted*: Forecasted number of customers anticipated to be impacted by the potential PSPS.
- *Customer Minutes*: Forecasted outage duration the customers will experience during the potential PSPS.
- *Forecasted Circuits*: The final list of the Distribution circuits and Transmission lines identified to be in scope for a potential PSPS.
- *Technosylva Wildfire Simulation Data*: Fire simulation forecasts on the consequence of a potential wildfire's impact on customers, wildlife, and infrastructures on each circuit for every three hours. These values are based on Technosylva's wildfire modeling, using real-time weather, state-of-the-art fuel, and eight-hour fire spread modeling.

Once the data above is made available and incorporated into the tool, the modeling considerations described in Table 2 are used to estimate the consequence of the potential wildfire risk and PSPS risk at the per-circuit level. Within the tool, a variety of modeling considerations are made to facilitate calculations, included in Table 2 and summarized in Figure 12.

⁶ Full details of the CBA methodology are provided through the 2024 Risk Assessment and Mitigation Phase (RAMP) and 2027 General Rate Case (GRC) filings.

Table 2: 2026 PG&E's PSPS Risk-Benefit Consequence Modeling Considerations

Consequence Type	Wildfire Consequence Considerations	PSPS Consequence Considerations
Safety	Calculated based on maximum population impacts derived from Technosylva wildfire simulation models and a fatality ratio based on National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) data.	Calculated from an estimate of Equivalent Fatalities (EF) per Million Customer Minutes Interrupted (MMCI). The EF/MMCI ratio is estimated from previous PG&E PSPS outages and other large external outages. ⁷
Reliability	None.	Calculated directly from the potential number of customers impacted and outage duration based on customer minutes interrupted.
Financial	Calculated based on maximum building impacts derived from Technosylva wildfire simulation models and a cost per structure burned previously evaluated in 2024 RAMP Report. ⁸	Calculated based on two financial estimates, 1) distribution of a lump sum cost of execution across all relevant circuits and 2) an estimated proxy cost per customer in scope per PSPS. ⁹

Potential Wildfire Risk

Wildfire consequence impacts are calculated based on the outputs of the Technosylva simulations. Variables include 1) population impacted by wildfire and 2) structures impacted by wildfire used to calculate natural unit values for two consequence components:

- *Wildfire Safety Consequence*: EF
- *Wildfire Financial Consequence*: Financial Cost of Wildfire (in dollars)

Potential PSPS Risk

PSPS consequence impacts are based on the following values: duration of de-energization by circuit, and number of customers impacted by de-energization on each circuit. These input values are used to calculate natural unit values for three consequence components:

- *PSPS Safety Consequence*: EF as an output of Customer Minutes interrupted
- *PSPS Electric Reliability Consequence*: Customer Minutes Interrupted × Critical Customer Adjustment Factor
- *PSPS Financial Consequence*: Financial Cost of PSPS (in dollars) × Critical Customer Adjustment Factor

⁷ Includes 2019-2021 PSPS outages, the 2003 Northeast Blackout in New York City, 2011 Southwest Blackout in San Diego, 2012 Derecho Windstorms, 2012 Superstorm Sandy, 2017 Hurricane Irma and 2021 Blackout event.

⁸ A.24-05-008.

⁹ The assumptions used in these calculations, including the proxy cost per customer per PSPS, are subject to be updated and are not intended to prejudge or create precedent with regard to the development of more precise values of resiliency or cost of PSPS metrics being considered in other ongoing proceedings at the CPUC, such as the Risk-Based Decision-Making Rulemaking [R.20.07.013] and the Microgrid and Resiliency Strategies.

Once the consequence values (safety, reliability, financial) are estimated they are converted into CBA risk scores. Once the Risk-Benefit Tool calculates the impacts between the PSPS and a wildfire, it is summarized in Figure 12 and 13 by indicating if the adverse impact from a PSPS outweighs the risk of a wildfire.

Figure 12: Representation of PG&E's PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool




Figure 13: PSPS Potential Benefit Versus PSPS Potential Risk Consequence¹⁰

PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	49.2
PSPS Potential Benefit (Wildfire Mitigation)	30,598.8
Potential Benefit : Potential Risk	622.2
Recommended Approach	Indicates potential PSPS benefit outweighs risk
Risk Ratio Per Circuit (>1, PSPS Benefit Outweighs Risk)	Dx Circuits: 24 (of 24) Tx Circuits: 1 (of 2 ¹)

As defined in PLAN_D-02-REV1

¹ Tx line is a D+ and will be de-energized due to Coburn oil fields #2.

$\frac{\text{PSPS Potential Benefit (wildfire risk)}}{\text{PSPS Potential Risk}} > 1$ Indicates potential PSPS benefit outweighs risk

$\frac{\text{PSPS Potential Benefit (wildfire risk)}}{\text{PSPS Potential Risk}} < 1$ Indicates potential risk may outweigh potential benefit

Key Factors

- **PSPS Consequence**
 - Safety consequence factors in planned and unplanned widespread outage events across the US.
 - Reliability consequence based on customer minutes interrupted
 - Financial consequence based on execution and fixed customer cost per event
 - Assumes maximum duration for each customer per circuit
- **PSPS Benefit (Wildfire Mitigation)**
 - Safety consequence based on population impacted from fire spread simulation
 - Reliability consequence not considered
 - Financial consequence based on buildings impacted from fire spread simulation
 - Assumes an ignition on each circuit based on the maximum consequence modeled by TechnoSylva

¹⁰ The risk values in Figure 13 represents associated costs.

Our PSPS Risk Model supported initiating a PSPS based on the July 15, 2026 PSPS scope and forecasted impact information. The model indicated that each of the 24 Distribution circuits and one of the two Transmission lines in the latest scope surpassed the analysis threshold of “one” to support a PSPS. San Ardo TAP was a Direct Impact Plus (D+) Transmission line which would have been de-energized due to Direct Impact line, Coburn Oil Fields #2, being potentially impacted. San Ardo TAP line had no customer impact, is outside of the High Fire Risk Area (HFRA) boundary and has no wildfire consequence data, therefore the risk ratio did not meet the threshold of “one.” The model’s calculations are based on forecasted conditions.

Section 2.5 - Explanation of alternatives considered and evaluation of each alternative. (D.19-05-042 Appendix A, page A22.)

Response:

After reviewing the meteorological information that indicated potential for catastrophic wildfire and the impacts on customers through de-energization, we considered whether alternatives to de-energizing, such as additional vegetation management and disabling automatic reclosers, could adequately reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire thus lowering the need for de-energization. We determined these measures alone did not reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire in areas within the PSPS scope sufficiently to protect public safety.

Section 3 – De-energized Time, Place, Duration and Customers

Section 3.1 - The summary of time, place and duration of the event, broken down by phase if applicable (*Resolution ESRB-8 page 3, SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

The PSPS occurred on July 15, 2026, in seven TPs across eight counties.

Section 3.2 - A consolidated zipped geodatabase (.gdb) file that includes all PSPS event data requested in Section 3.2 and Section 4.3. Use WGS 1984 Web Mercator Auxiliary Sphere projected coordinate system (WKID: Esri 3857) for the geodatabase. The geodatabase must include PSPS polygon feature classes of de-energized areas with items that are required in in Section 3.3. In addition, the geodatabase must contain one consolidated event single polygon feature class with the following exact fields (dates will be formatted XX/XX/XX): (*SED Additional Information.*)

- **Event Name:** [same PSPS Event Name used during the event and shared with public safety partners]
- **First Date of POC:** [first date of initial period of concern]
- **IOU:** [PGE, SCE, SDGE, Liberty, PacifiCorp, or BVES]
- **De-energization Start Date:** [XX/XX/XX]
- **Full Restoration Date:** [XX/XX/XX]
- **Customers De-energized:** [unique count matching Table 1]
- **De-energization:** [Yes or No]

Response:

Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, attachment “*PGE_PSPS_Polygons_of_De-energized_Areas_20260715.gdb.zip*” provides a consolidated zipped geodatabase file that includes PSPS polygons of final de-energized areas combined with PSPS data.

Section 3.3 - A list of circuits de-energized, with the following information for each circuit. If a circuit is de-energized multiple times during an event, the following information must be provided for each de-energization. This information should be provided in both a PDF and excel spreadsheet (*Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.*)

- **County**
- **De-energization date/time**
- **Restoration date/time**
- **“All Clear” declaration date/time**
- **General Order (GO) 95, Rule 21.2-D Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 classification or non-High Fire Threat District**
- **Total customers de-energized**
- **Residential customers de-energized**
- **Commercial/Industrial Customers de-energized**
- **Medical Baseline (MBL) customers de-energized**
- **AFN other than MBL customers de-energized**
- **Other Customers**
- **Distribution or transmission classification**

Response:

Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, [Appendix B](#) provides a list of de-energized circuits and the relevant information relating to each circuit.

Two transmission lines were de-energized during this PSPS; however, no Transmission-level customers were impacted. PG&E defines a Transmission-level customer as an entity that receives service directly from PG&E's Transmission system at 50 kV or higher. De-energizing a Transmission line may not result in Transmission-level customer impacts, depending on event-specific factors, such as system configuration and mitigation efforts.

Section 4 – Damages and Hazards to Overhead Facilities

Section 4.1 – Description of all found wind-related damages or hazards to the utility’s overhead facilities in the areas where power was shut off. (Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

During this PSPS, weather stations near the areas in the de-energized scope recorded wind gusts as high as 55 mph. Recorded wind gusts are shown in Table 18 and Figure 19 in [Section 12](#).

During patrols of the de-energized circuits prior to restoring power, PG&E did not find any incidents of wind-related damages or hazards. Damages are conditions that occurred during the PSPS, likely wind-related, necessitating repair or replacement of PG&E’s asset, such as a wire down or a fallen pole. Hazards are conditions that might have caused damages or posed an electrical arcing or ignition risk had PSPS not been executed, such as a tree limb found suspended in electrical wires.

Section 4.2 - A table showing circuit name and structure identifier (if applicable) for each damage or hazard, County that each damage or hazard is located in, whether the damage or hazard is in a High Fire-Threat District (HFTD) or non-HFTD, Type of damage/hazard of damage. (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

PG&E did not locate any incidents of wind-related damages or hazards, therefore, Section 4.2 is not applicable.

Section 4.3 - The consolidated zipped geodatabase file from Section 3.2 must include the PSPS event damage and hazard points, if applicable. The file should include items that are required in Section 4.2. (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

PG&E did not locate any incidents of wind-related damages or hazards, therefore, Section 4.3 is not applicable.

Section 4.4 - A PDF map identifying the location of each damage or hazard. (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

PG&E did not locate any incidents of wind-related damages or hazards, therefore, Section 4.4 is not applicable.

Section 5 – Notifications

Section 5.1 - A description of the notice to California Independent System Operator (as needed), public safety partners, local/tribal governments, paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a community resource center, multi-family building account holders/building managers in the AFN community, and all customers, including the means by which utilities provide notice to customers of the locations/hours/services available for CRCs, and where to access electricity during the hours the CRC is closed. (Resolution ESRB-8, page 3 D19-05-042, page A26, D21-06-034, Appendix A, page A2, A9-A10, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

Throughout the PSPS, we followed the Notification Plan included in our [2026 PSPS Pre-Season Report](#), Appendix C, pp. 62 – 73 and made significant efforts to notify Local Governments, Public Safety Partners, Community Based Organizations (CBOs) (including paratransit agencies) and impacted customers in accordance with the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines.¹¹ Tribes were not in scope for the July 15, 2026 PSPS, therefore, tribal communications were not provided. See Table 3 for a description of the notifications we sent to stakeholders in accordance with the minimum timelines set forth by the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines.¹²

In accordance with D.21-06-034, we provide CRC information to customers in PSPS notifications via hyperlink to the [PSPS updates page](#). This webpage includes up-to-date CRC locations, services available and hours of operation as well as how customers can find local CRCs and where to access electricity during the hours CRCs are closed. Due to text message character constraints and the dynamic nature of CRCs information, providing a link to the [PSPS updates page](#) ensures that all impacted customers and local agencies have access to the latest CRC information at all times. For more information on CRCs, see [Section 9](#).

Multi-family building account holders/building managers in the Access and Functional Needs (AFN) community are included in our All Customers (including MBL customers and Self-Identified Vulnerable (SIV) customers) recipient group. For information on our outreach and community engagement with master-metered owners, property managers, and building account holders, see [PG&E's AFN Quarterly Progress Reports](#) for activities between January 1, 2026, and March 31, 2026.

In addition to providing direct notifications to stakeholders, PG&E alerted the public in advance of de-energization via the media and PG&E's website.

¹¹ D.19-05-042.

¹² D.19-05-042.

Media Engagement

From the time we publicly announced the PSPS until power was restored, we engaged with the public through the media by:

- Responding to approximately 59 media inquiries, either from media outlets that contacted PG&E's 24-hour media line, or direct calls/emails to field media.
- Participating in 29 media interviews (i.e. live, recorded or unrecorded phone interviews) to provide situational updates and preparedness messages.
- Proactively issuing 12 local news releases and updates directly to news outlets.

As of July 21, 2026, we identified 66 unique print, online and broadcast stories.

PG&E Website

We placed an Informational Alert on the www.pge.com home page that directed the public to PG&E's PSPS site. From the start of the PSPS to full restoration, the [PSPS emergency website](#) received a total of 842,978 page views and 194,278 site visits.

Among other resources noted throughout this report, PG&E's [PSPS emergency website](#) includes information regarding Electric Vehicle (EV), American Sign Language (ASL), Independent Living Centers (ILCs), Backup Power, AFN customer resources, MBL Program information and more. Additionally, the address look-up tool and [address-level alerts](#), are available on our website, in 16 languages, that allow non-PG&E-account holders to receive notifications for any address where they do not receive a bill (e.g., workplace, child's school, renters, mobile home parks, etc.).

We remain committed to the continuous improvement of our websites to better meet the needs of customers. As we launch new features to www.pge.com and to www.pgealerts.alerts.pge.com, we test to ensure compliance with WCAG 2.1AA standards and improve customer experience. Where possible, we remediate accessibility issues that customers or stakeholders have brought to our attention.

Table 3: Notification Descriptions

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
PRIORITY NOTIFICATION: 48-72 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization	Public Safety Partners and CBOs ¹³	On July 13, our Meteorology Team noted a potential PSPS and updated the weather forecast on www.pge.com/weather to “elevated” in certain parts of the service area. In the evening of July 13, agency representatives called each County Office of Emergency Services (OES) in PG&E’s electrical service area and select tribes and cities to inform them that PG&E was monitoring an increased potential for a PSPS. As mentioned in Section 1.1, due to the rapidly shifting weather, the initial PSPS scope was established for de-energization after the (48-72hr) Priority Notification window had passed. As a result, Priority Notifications were not sent to Public Safety Partners within 48 – 72 hours prior to anticipated de-energization, in accordance with Phase 1 Guidelines.
WATCH NOTIFICATION: 24-48 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL and SIV customers)	Following the EOC activation, we completed the following: • Notified CAISO of the potential PSPS (on July 14 at 06:19 PDT) and shared additional information via email (at 10:14 PDT). • Submitted a PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E’s EOC has been activated and that PG&E is monitoring for a potential PSPS. • Agency representatives called potentially impacted County OES and cities to inform them that PG&E is monitoring a potential PSPS. • Sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners,¹⁴ via call, text and e-mail, which included: ○ Estimated window of the de-energization time. ○ When weather is anticipated to pass. ○ Estimated Time of Restoration (ETOR). ○ For Public Safety Partners Only: Links to the PSPS Data Portal where PSPS-specific maps and information are available. ○ For customers only: Potentially impacted addresses, links to PSPS emergency website with CRC information, and resources for AFN customers, including but not limited to

¹³ D.21-06-034, Appendix A, page A9, Section G. MBL Program and AFN Communities, No. 4, Each electric investor-owned utility must provide proactive notification and impacted zip code information to paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a CRC during a PSPS.

¹⁴ Other Public Safety Partners refers to first/emergency responders at the local, state, and federal level, water, wastewater, and communication service providers, affected CCAs, publicly owned utilities/electrical cooperatives, the CPUC, the California Governor’s OES and the CAL FIRE.

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
		information on the MBL Program, language support, and the Portable Battery Program (PBP). • Sent notifications to MBL customers, including tenants of master metered accounts, and SIV customers. For more information regarding MBL Program notifications, see Section 5.3. • Sent Cancellation Notifications to Public Safety Partners and customers after being removed from scope to inform them that their power would not be shut off. Customer notifications are provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications are provided in English.
WARNING NOTIFICATION: 1-4 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization, if possible	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL and SIV customers)	During this time, we completed the following: • Submitted a PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E has made the decision to de-energize. • Sent notifications to Public Safety Partners and customers which included the same key information and resources as Watch Notifications. • Sent notifications to MBL customers, including tenants of master metered accounts, and SIV customers. For more information regarding MBL Program notifications, see Section 5.3. • Sent Cancellation Notifications to Public Safety Partners and customers after being removed from scope to inform them that their power would not be shut off. Customer notifications are provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications are provided in English.
POWER OFF NOTIFICATION: When de-energization is initiated	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL and SIV customers)	When de-energization was initiated, we completed the following: • Submitted a PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC to notify them that de-energization has been initiated. • Sent notifications to Public Safety Partners and customers via call, text messages and e-mail, which included: ○ De-energization time. ○ When weather is anticipated to pass.

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
		○ For customers only: Impacted addresses. ○ For customers only: Links to the PSPS emergency website with CRC information, and resources for AFN customers, including but not limited to information on the MBL Program, Meals on Wheels, language support, and the PBP. ● Sent notifications to MBL customers, including tenants of master metered accounts, and SIV customers. For more information regarding MBL Program notifications, see Section 5.3. Customer notifications are provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications are provided in English.
WEATHER “ALL-CLEAR”/ETOR UPDATE NOTIFICATION: Immediately before re-energization begins	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL and SIV customers)	After weather conditions had passed and areas were deemed safe to begin patrols and restoration, we completed the following: ● Submitted a PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E is initiating re-energization patrols. ● Sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners and customers, via call, text message and e-mail, which included the ETOR. ● Sent “update” notifications to customers if their ETOR changed. Two ways that an ETOR may change include: ○ New field or meteorology conditions. ○ Damage found during patrols and repair was needed. Customer notifications are provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications are provided in English.
RESTORATION NOTIFICATION: When re-energization is complete	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL and SIV customers)	Once all customers were restored, we completed the following: ● Sent a notification to Public Safety Partners via call, text and e-mail. ● Submitted the final PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES. ● Sent an e-mail to the CPUC confirming restoration of PSPS outages and reclassification of customers if applicable.

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
		Once customers, including MBL and SIV customers, were restored, they received automated notifications via call, text, and e-mail. Customer notifications are provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications are provided in English.

Section 5.2 – Notification timeline including prior to de-energization or Period of Concern (if no de-energization), initiation, restoration, and cancellation, if applicable, for each circuit or circuit segment. The timeline should include the required minimum timeline and approximate time notifications were sent for each de-energization if a circuit was de-energized multiple times. (D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A8-A9, D.21-06-034, page A11)

Response:

Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, Table 4 in the attachment “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260715*” provides the time notifications were sent in accordance with the minimum timelines set forth by the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines,¹⁵ to Local Governments, Public Safety Partners, and all customers prior to de-energization, initiation, cancellation, and restoration. The advanced notification guidelines set forth in the Phase 1 Guidelines are not based on a strict liability standard and state that “recognizing that there may be times when advanced notice is not possible due to emergency conditions beyond the electric IOUs’ control, the electric IOUs should, whenever possible, provide advance notification to all populations potentially affected by a de-energization event.”¹⁶

As mentioned in [Section 1.1](#), due to the rapidly shifting weather, the initial PSPS scope was established for de-energization after the (48 – 72hr) Priority Notification window had passed. As a result of the rapidly changing weather, Priority Notifications were not sent to Public Safety Partners within 48 – 72 hours prior to anticipated de-energization, in accordance with Phase 1 Guidelines.

Our response was provided based on the format used for the May 17 – 18, 2026 and June 10 – 11, 2026 PSPS Post-Event Reports. PG&E is still clarifying the format for this table following our most recent discussion with SED on June 30, 2026, and can submit a new version of this table in the 2026 PSPS Post-Season Report based on the finalized format.

Table 4: Notification Timeline Summary

See Table 4 in the attachment “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260715*.”

¹⁵ D.19-05-042.

¹⁶ D.19-05-042, Appendix A

Section 5.3 - For those customers where positive or affirmative notification was attempted, use the following template to report the accounting of the customers (which tariff and/or access and functional needs population designation), the number of notification attempts made, the timing of attempts, who made the notification attempt (utility or public safety partner) and the number of customers for whom positive notification was achieved. (D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A23, SED Additional Information.)

“Notification attempts made” and “Successful positive notification” must include the unique number of customer counts. When the actual notification attempts made is less than the number of customers in scope, the utility must explain the reason. In addition, the utility must explain the reason of any unsuccessful positive notifications. Utilities may not mark N/A and must answer 5.3 regardless if the utility did not de-energize customers. (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, Table 5 includes metrics associated with notifications PG&E provided to customers where positive or affirmative notification was attempted. PG&E interprets the number of customers that need positive or affirmative notification as customers the company seeks confirmation from, namely MBL and SIV customers. PG&E tracks positive confirmation from MBL/SIV customers via text, phone call, email, doorbell rings, live agent phone calls or door hanger at all stages of notifications. If a notification is acknowledged at any stage and/or a door hanger is left, that is considered a successful positive notification. For more information, see PG&E’s and [AFN Quarterly Progress Reports](#).

Table 5: Positive Notification

Designation	Total Number of Customers	Number of Notification Attempts Made ¹⁷	Timing of Attempts	Who Made the Notification Attempt	Successful Positive Notification
MBL in scope ¹⁸	288	288	Daily	PG&E	288
SIV	129	129	Daily	PG&E	129

For this PSPS, MBL and SIV customers received automated calls, texts, and emails at the same intervals as the general customer notifications. PG&E provided unique PSPS Watch and PSPS Warning Notifications to MBL customers¹⁹ and SIV customers.

These customer groups also received additional calls and texts at hourly intervals until the customer confirmed receipt of the automated notifications by either answering the phone, responding to the text, or opening the email. If confirmation was not received, a PG&E representative visited the customer’s home to check on the customer (referred to as the “doorbell

¹⁷ Count of “Notification Attempts Made” includes doorbell rings and Live Agent phone calls.

¹⁸ Residential tenants of master-metered customers can also qualify for MBL quantities. The MBL category for the purposes of Table 5 includes MBL customers who are master meter tenants.

¹⁹ Including MBL customers who are master-metered tenants (e.g., renters or tenants in mobile home park).

ring” process) while hourly notification retries continued. If the customer did not provide confirmation to PG&E following the check-in, the PG&E representative left a door hanger providing additional PSPS notification and information at the home to indicate PG&E had visited. In each case, the additional door hanger notification was considered a positive successful notification.²⁰

At times, PG&E also made Live Agent phone calls in parallel to the automated notifications and doorbell rings, as an additional attempt to reach the customer prior to and/or after de-energization.

PG&E shared the lists of the MBL and SIV customers who had not confirmed receipt of their notifications with the appropriate county emergency managers twice daily via the PSPS Data Portal. PG&E proactively notified agencies that the data was available on the PSPS Data Portal and encouraged them to inform these customers of the resources available to them. PG&E is unable to track and report on notifications made by Public Safety Partners, as notification systems and/or platforms used by Public Safety Partners are out of PG&E’s purview; PG&E encourages Public Safety Partners to include PSPS messages on all of their platforms. PG&E describes its engagement with Public Safety Partners in [Section 6](#).

²⁰ For MBL and SIV customers, an in-person door ring visit where a door hanger is left, but no contact is made with the customer is considered “successful contact,” but not “received.” If the PG&E representative makes contact with the customer, then it is considered “received.”

Section 5.4 - A copy or scripts of all notifications with a list of all languages that each type of notification was provided in, the timing of notifications, the methods of notifications and who made the notifications (the utility or local public safety partners). (D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A23, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

For a copy of the notification templates, the timing of the notifications and methods of notifications that PG&E sent during the July 15, 2026 PSPS, see attachment “*PGE_PSPS_Notifications_20260715.pdf*.” For additional information on the timing of notifications sent during this PSPS, see Table 4 in the attachment “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260715*.”

PG&E provides tribal, county, city, CCAs, Public Safety Partner and Transmission-level customer notifications in English only. All other customer notifications are delivered in-language if a customer’s language preference is on file. If there is no language preference on file, the notification is delivered in English, with information on how to access and receive PSPS information in translated languages. Non-English languages requested for this PSPS were Spanish and Japanese.

Section 5.5 - If the utility fails to provide notifications according to the minimum timelines set forth in D.19-05-042 and D.21-06-034, using the following template to report a breakdown of the notification failure and an explanation of what caused the failure. This applies to both de-energization and non de-energization events. For non-de-energization event, the starting time of the first Period of Concern is the anticipated de-energization time to assess notification failure. If a circuit is de-energized multiple times during an event, the utility must include notification failures for the multiple de-energizations. The explanation must be specific. (D.21-06-014 page 286, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

PG&E makes a substantial effort to provide notifications whenever possible and to the extent it is operationally feasible in accordance with the PSPS Phase 1, Phase 3 and 2019 PSPS OII guidelines within the CPUC’s minimum timeline requirements, weather and other factors permitting.²¹ The notification guidelines set forth in the Phase 1 Guidelines are not a strict liability standard and state that “the electric investor owned utilities should, whenever possible, adhere to the following minimum notification timeline...” Additionally, pursuant to ESRB-8, the CPUC has stated that it is not practicable to have an absolute requirement that electric IOUs provide advanced notifications to customers prior to a PSPS and that “it is an impossible feat of anticipating every emergency situation resulting in pro-active de-energization.”²²

As mentioned in [Section 1.1](#), due to the rapidly shifting weather, the initial PSPS scope was established for de-energization after the (48 – 72hr) Priority Notification window had passed. As a result of the rapidly changing weather, Priority Notifications were not sent to Public Safety Partners within 48 – 72 hours prior to anticipated de-energization, in accordance with Phase 1 Guidelines.

²¹ D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.

²² ESRB-8, p. 5, D.19-05-042, pp. 84-86, Finding of Fact 22 at p. 118.

Table 6: Breakdown of Notification Failure

Notifications Sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Account	Explanation of Failure
Public Safety Partners Excluding CFI²³	Entities who did not receive 48-to 72-hour priority notification	89*	See Table 6A for explanation.
	Entities who did not receive 24-48 hour advance notification	4	See Table 6B for explanations.
	Entities who did not receive 1-4-hour imminent notification	4	See Table 6C for explanations.
	Entities who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	3	See Table 6D for explanations.
	Entities who were not notified at de-energization initiation	0	No failures.
	Entities who were not notified immediately before re-energization	3	See Table 6F for explanations.
	Entities who were not notified when re-energization is complete	4	See Table 6G for explanations.
	Entities who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	0	No failures.
CFI²⁴	Facilities who did not receive 48-72-hour priority notification	180*	See Table 6A for explanations.
	Facilities who did not receive 24-48 hour advance notification	0	No failures.
	Facilities who did not receive 1-4-hour imminent notification	0	No failures.
	Facilities who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	0	No failures.
	Facilities who were not notified at de-energization initiation	0	No failures.
	Facilities who were not notified immediately before re-energization	0	No failures.

²³ Only includes cities, counties and CCAs.

²⁴ Includes Public Safety Partners who are CFI customers.

Notifications Sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Account	Explanation of Failure
	Facilities who were not notified when re-energization is complete	0	No failures.
	Facilities who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	1	See Table 6H for explanations.
All other Affected Customers	Customers who did not receive 24-48-hour advance notifications	31	See Table 6B for explanations.
	Customers who did not receive 1-4-hour imminent notifications	27	See Table 6C for explanations.
	Customers who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	16**	See Table 6D for explanations.
	Customers who were not notified at de-energization initiation	17	See Table 6E for explanations.
	Customers who were not notified immediately before re-energization	18	See Table 6F for explanations.
	Customers who were not notified when re-energization is complete	18	See Table 6G for explanations.
	Customers who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	62	See Table 6H for explanations.

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

**This category is duplicative with other notification failure categories in this report, meaning all customers reported in this category are already included in the count of notification failures PG&E reported for the more specific notification categories. As a result, the count from this category should not be included in the sum of total notification failures for this PSPS.

Table 6A: Explanation of Failures for Agency Entities and CFI Who Did Not Receive 48-to 72-Hour Priority Notification

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Explanation
89	180	As explained in Section 1.1 , due to the rapidly shifting weather, the initial PSPS scope was established for de-energization after the (48 – 72hr) Priority Notification window had passed. As a result, these agency entities and critical facilities were not sent Priority Notifications.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC’s PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06 034.)

Table 6B: Explanation of Failures for Agency Entities and All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive 24-to 48-Hour Watch Notification

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (Non-CFI Customers)	Explanation
4	0	Due to a system logic error in PG&E’s system for pre-outage notifications, these agency entities were incorrectly notified of PSPS impact to areas not in-scope for PSPS. In addition to missing this type of notification, this error also caused false positive communications as discussed in Section 5.7 .
0	31	These customers did not receive notifications during this PSPS as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC’s PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06 034.)

Table 6C: Explanation of Failures for Agency Entities and All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive 1-4 Hour Imminent Notifications

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (Non-CFI Customers)	Explanation
4	0	Due to a system logic error in PG&E’s system for pre-outage notifications, these agency entities were incorrectly notified of PSPS impact to areas not in-scope for PSPS. In addition to missing this type of notification, this error also caused false positive communications as discussed in Section 5.7 .
0	1	This customer was included in PG&E notification files for 1 – 4 Hour Imminent Notifications provided to our notifications vendor. However, this customer was not notified by our notifications vendor. The root cause is still under investigation, and we will report our findings in the 2026 PSPS Post-Season Report.
0	26	These customers did not receive notifications during this PSPS as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC’s PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06 034.)

Table 6D: Explanation of Failures for Agency Entities and All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive Any Notifications Before De-Energization

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (Non-CFI Customers)	Explanation
3	0	Due to a system logic error in PG&E's system for pre-outage notifications, these agency entities were incorrectly notified of PSPS impact to areas not in-scope for PSPS. In addition to missing this type of notification, this error also caused false positive communications as discussed in Section 5.7 .
0	16	These customers did not receive notifications during this PSPS as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06 034.)

Table 6E: Explanation of Failures for All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive Power Off Notification

Total	Explanation
17	These customers did not receive notifications during this PSPS as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06 034.)

Table 6F: Explanation of Failures for Agency Entities and All Other Affected Customers Not Notified Immediately Before Re-energization

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (Non-CFI Customers)	Explanation
3	0	Due to a delay within our in-outage notification systems, caused by attempts to fix false positive communications described in Section 5.7 , these agency entities were not notified until after restoration was complete.
0	17	These customers did not receive notifications during this PSPS as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*
0	1	This non-critical customer was partially mitigated from PSPS de-energization using backup generation provided by PG&E. However, as this customer had already experienced a short outage as part of the PSPS prior to their mitigation, we consider this as an impacted customer with a shortened outage duration. Their PSPS outage was considered to be over when their generator started running. This customer did not receive an automated notification immediately prior to or after the generator started running. However, PG&E does not believe this is a notification failure because the recipient of backup generation was in coordination with PG&E crews who implemented the mitigation.

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06 034.)

Table 6G: Explanation of Failures for Agency Entities and All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive Restore Notification

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (Non-CFI Customers)	Explanation
4	0	PG&E's automated notification systems will notify agencies of restoration after all impacted customers within their jurisdiction have been restored from PSPS. Concurrent to this PSPS, Southern California Edison (SCE) was also activated for a PSPS which impacted some PG&E customers. Our automated notification systems did not differentiate between PG&E customers impacted by SCE and PG&E's separate PSPS events. This delayed the Restoration Notifications from being sent until after both SCE and PG&E's PSPS were fully restored. PG&E does not consider this a notification failure because we notified the county agencies when all PSPS impacts were restored from their county. We are explaining this in the table due to the otherwise perceived delay between when customers were restored

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (Non-CFI Customers)	Explanation
		from PG&E's PSPS in this county vs. when the county agencies received this notification.
0	17	These customers did not receive notifications during this PSPS as no valid contact information for the main customer of record was provided to PG&E.*
0	1	This non-critical customer was partially mitigated from PSPS de-energization using backup generation provided by PG&E. However, as this customer had already experienced a short outage as part of the PSPS prior to their mitigation, we consider this as an impacted customer with a shortened outage duration. Their PSPS outage was considered to be over when their generator started running. This customer did not receive an automated notification immediately prior to or after the generator started running. However, PG&E does not believe this is a notification failure because the recipient of backup generation was in coordination with PG&E crews who implemented the mitigation.

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06 034.)

Table 6H: Explanation of Failures for CFI and All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive Cancellation Notification

Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Explanation
1	62	Due to process and procedure issues, these customers were incorrectly excluded from the Cancel Notification files. Once we became aware of this issue, we sent these customers a delayed Cancel Notification.

Section 5.6 - Explain how the utility will correct the notification failures. (D.21-06-014, page 286.)

Response:

We have reviewed the notification failures and false communications for this PSPS and have begun to identify the following corrective actions:

- Investigate technical and training enhancements to improve data quality and control to ensure all applicable customers are included in their appropriate cancellation notification deployment and agency notifications clearly identify affected jurisdictions.
- Request our notification vendor determines the cause of discrepancy between contacts submitted for notification and corresponding completion records.
- Benchmark with IOU partners to confirm alignment regarding agency notification when shared customers are de-energized.
- Coordinate internally with responsible teams to reinforce training and update procedures and job aids regarding:
 - Power Off Notification and All-Clear Notification triggers.
 - Managing customer tagging in databases when there are overlapping outage types during a PSPS.
 - Alignment of notification processes for customers mitigated following de-energization.

Beyond the corrective actions identified above, we are in the process of identifying additional corrective actions for other notification failures and false communications identified in [Section 5.5](#) and [Section 5.7](#). This information will be included in our 2026 PSPS Post-Season Report.

Section 5.7 - Enumerate and explain the cause of any false communications citing the sources of changing data. Describe the situations at-issue, which involve the level of perceived defect in notice, in specific detail. (D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 4.)

Response:

For this PSPS, we identified 23 cases of false positive communications and 8 cases of false negative communications. See Table 7 and 8 for explanations of false positive and negative communications.

Table 7: Explanations of False Positive Communications

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Explanation
11	0	0	A data issue caused de-energized transformers to be incorrectly assigned to these agencies' jurisdictions. As a result, these agencies were incorrectly notified of active PSPS de-energization for their jurisdictions. This issue impacted agencies but did not result in any false communications to customers. Two instances occurred during this PSPS. Once this issue was identified, PG&E began outreach to clarify the situation within one hour in the first instance, and within approximately two hours for the second instance.

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Explanation
10	0	0	Due to a system logic error in PG&E's system for pre-outage notifications, these agency entities were incorrectly notified of PSPS impact to areas not de-energized for PSPS. No Cancellation Notifications were sent for these areas because this error was not discovered until after the end of the PSPS. This error also caused notification failures as discussed in Section 5.5 .
0	0	2	These customers stopped their PG&E service after the planned PSPS scope was finalized but before PSPS de-energization occurred. As a result, these customers were correctly notified of PSPS impact while they were still active but are not counted as de-energized customers. Furthermore, they did not require Cancellation Notifications because PG&E did not remove them from scope.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be false communications as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Table 8: Explanations of False Negative Communications

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Explanation
8	0	0	Due to human error, these agency entities received a premature PSPS Restore Notification. Once this issue was identified, PG&E began outreach to clarify the situation within 30 minutes of the false communications.

Section 6 – Local and State Public Safety Partner Engagement

Section 6.1 – List the organization names of public safety partners including, but not limited to, local governments, tribal representatives, first responders and emergency management, and critical facilities and infrastructure the utility contacted in anticipation to de-energization of Period of Concern, the date and time on which they were contacted, and whether the areas affected by the de-energization are classified as Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 as per the definition in CPUC General Order 95, Rule 21.2-D. (Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

For a list of Public Safety Partners including tribal representatives, local governments, first responders and emergency management, and critical facilities notified with the date and time of the initial notification, and whether the areas affected by the de-energization are classified as Zone 1, Tier 2 or Tier 3, see Appendix C in the attachment “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260715*.”

We use a HFRA classification which we utilize in addition to HFTD to determine PSPS scope. In Appendix C in the attachment “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260715*,” we begin by identifying HFTD area assigned to Public Safety Partners. Any area outside of HFTD is re-classified as HFRA. PG&E’s circuits can run miles long and span across multiple jurisdictions. Some Public Safety Partners outside of HFRA and HFTD were also in the potentially impacted scope in order to de-energize areas within HFRA and HFTD for safety.

Section 6.2 - List the names of all entities invited to the utility’s Emergency Operations Center for a PSPS event, the method used to make this invitation, and whether a different form of communication was preferred by any entity invited to the utility’s emergency operation center. (D.21-06-014, page 289.)

Response:

PG&E invited the CPUC via email on July 14, 2026, at 06:38 PDT to virtually embed in the EOC for the duration of the activation.

Additionally, telecommunications service providers are appointed a dedicated 24/7 PG&E contact in the EOC, the Critical Infrastructure Lead (CIL), who shared up-to-date PSPS information and answered individual questions. We proactively reached out to 11 telecommunications service providers²⁵ via email or phone as weather changes or new information regarding the PSPS became available.

As part of our PSPS Pre-Season outreach,²⁶ we provide water infrastructure entities and communication services in PG&E’s electrical service area with information on how to request representation at PG&E’s EOC, when activated for PSPS. Alternatively, some partners may also request PG&E representation at their jurisdiction’s activated Operations Emergency Center (OEC).²⁷ None of the entities invited to embed into our EOC indicated a preference for a different form of communication other than the ones already utilized.

²⁵ American Tower Corporation, AT&T Corporation, CenturyLink Companies, Charter Communications, Comcast Corporation, Crown Castle International, Frontier Communications Corp, SBA Towers, T-Mobile – Sprint, Verizon Wireless and Western State Teleport.

²⁶ See PG&E’s [2026 PSPS Pre-Season Report](#), pp. 64 – 65.

²⁷ D.19-05-042.

Section 6.3 - A statement verifying the availability to public safety partners of accurate and timely geospatial information, and real time updates to the GIS shapefiles in preparation for an imminent PSPS event and during a PSPS event. In addition, list any accuracy or timeliness issues in making available the GIS shapefiles to public safety partners during the PSPS event from activation to full restoration. (D.21-06-014, page 289.)

Response:

In preparation for a potential PSPS, PG&E sent automated notifications with links to the PSPS Data Portal, which provides PDF maps and Geographic Information System (GIS) data to Public Safety Partners at the times outlined in Table 4 in the attachment “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260715*.” In addition, when PDF maps and GIS data were updated on the PSPS Data Portal due to scope changes, users were notified via e-mail at the times outlined in Table 9.

PDF maps and GIS data on the PSPS Data Portal were determined to be accurate and updated in a timely manner following changes to geographic scope or customer impacts.

Table 9: PSPS Data Portal Map Sharing (Date and Time)

Date	Time PDF and GIS Maps Shared (PDT)
7/14/2026	11:15
7/14/2026	23:00

Section 6.4 - A description and evaluation of engagement with local and state public safety partners in providing advanced outreach and notification during the PSPS event. (D.19-05-042, Appendix, page A23.)

Response:

Below is a description of the engagement with state CPUC, Cal OES, CAL FIRE, and local (i.e., counties and cities) Public Safety Partners:

- Submitted the PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES twice a day (07:00 PDT and 15:00 PDT), if there was a significant change to scope and at least once for each of the five PSPS stages: Activating PSPS Protocols/Potential to De-energize (Stage 1), Decision to De-energize (Stage 2), De-energization Initiated (Stage 3), Initiating Re-energization Patrols (Stage 4) and All PSPS Lines Re-energized (Stage 5). See Table 10 for the date and time of notifications submitted to Cal OES.

Table 10: Notifications Submitted to Cal OES (Date and Time)

Date	Time Submitted (PDT)
7/14/2026	07:19
7/14/2026	14:28
7/15/2026	06:15
7/15/2026	13:05
7/15/2026	14:56
7/16/2026	06:42
7/16/2026	08:50
7/16/2026	14:59
7/16/2026	16:33

- Sent e-mails to the CPUC at least once for each of the five PSPS stages listed above. See Table 11 for the date and time of notifications submitted to the CPUC.

Table 11: Notifications Submitted to CPUC (Date and Time)

Date	Time Submitted (PDT)
7/14/2026	06:38
7/14/2026	23:12
7/15/2026	07:55
7/15/2026	13:00
7/15/2026	14:55
7/15/2026	15:53
7/15/2026	19:17
7/16/2026	07:35
7/16/2026	07:48
7/16/2026	16:23

- Hosted daily State Executive Briefings with invitees including Cal OES, CPUC, CAL FIRE, the Governor’s Office, and other federal and state agencies to provide the latest PSPS information and answer questions. A presentation deck with key PSPS information was provided to participants.
- Hosted a daily Systemwide Cooperators Call, where all Public Safety Partners in the service area were invited to join for situational awareness.
- Hosted Operational Areas Cooperators Communication Calls to provide situational awareness updates and answer questions.²⁸
- Conducted ongoing coordination with local county OES contacts through dedicated Agency Representatives. This includes but is not limited to providing the latest PSPS information, coordinating CRC locations, and resolving local issues in real-time.
- Provided links to the PSPS Data Portal that included planning and event-specific maps, situation reports, critical facility lists and MBL customer lists at each notification and when scope changed. The Situation Report was provided twice a day and at scope changes prior to de-energization and hourly once restoration began.
- Sent automated and live call notifications to agency partners before, during and after de-energization.
- Offered state and local agencies to be embedded in PG&E’s EOC and offered PG&E Agency Representatives to embed virtually in local EOCs.


²⁸ May vary in cadence and type based on County OES.

We consider our level of engagement with state and local Public Safety Partners during this EOC activation to be successful. This evaluation is based on the number and various types of outreach conducted (see list above), the feedback received from Public Safety Partners through the post-PSPS survey and the success rate of automated agency notifications. The following is a subset of comments PG&E received from in-scope Public Safety Partners regarding PSPS outreach:

- “I appreciate the partnership with PGE as a local hospital's ED (Sutter Delta) had been affected by the power outage and their back up generator was inoperable. I spoke with a supervisor at PGE and she made sure to send a tech out right away.”
- “I received way too many notifications: many emails, calls and texts with no new information.”

Figure 14 shows the post-PSPS survey results received from Public Safety Partners when they were asked to “evaluate PG&E engagement with your agency during the outage.” We received seven responses to the survey. We will report any late submissions to the survey in our 2026 PSPS Post-Season Report. We continue to look for opportunities for improvement and refine agency notifications to ensure accuracy and timely information sharing.

Figure 14: Evaluation of Public Safety Partner Engagement



Section 6.5 - Specific engagement with local communities regarding the notification and support provided to the AFN community. (D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 8, SED Additional Information)

Response:

To ensure PG&E provides adequate support to AFN customers, we engage with local communities through paratransit agencies, media partnerships and CBOs to share coordination efforts, notifications plans, CRC information, PSPS-specific information and more. See below for details on this engagement.

Engagement with Paratransit Agencies

In accordance with the Phase 3 Guidelines,²⁹ PG&E provided proactive notifications and impacted zip code information to paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a CRC during the PSPS. All notifications included a link to PG&E's [PSPS emergency website](#), and an "Additional Resources" link to maps showing potentially affected areas. For more information on Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) compliant CRC locations, see [Section 9](#).

Community Engagement

We engaged with approximately 390 "information-based" CBOs during this PSPS, sharing courtesy notification updates, fact sheets, and other relevant information to share with their constituents to expand our reach of communications, including videos, social media and other relevant PSPS support services, that organizations could use to educate their consumers. CBO resource partners were invited to the daily cooperator calls provided to Public Safety Partners. These calls are hosted by members from PG&E who provided a situational update about the latest scope of the PSPS and an overview of the services available to customers. We hosted additional daily coordination calls with CBO resource partners supporting the PSPS to provide an open forum to answer questions, offer suggestions regarding how they can best support their consumer supports and facilitate more localized coordination among the partners.

Programs/Support for AFN Customers

We are dedicated to providing a variety of resources and programs to AFN customers before and during a PSPS through several partnerships and contracts maintained by PG&E. For more information about these resources and partnerships, see the [2026 AFN Plan](#).

See Table 12 for the support provided during the July 15, 2026 PSPS.

²⁹ D.21-06-034.

Table 12: AFN Customer Programs and Support

Resource/Program	Resources Provided
Disability Disaster Access and Resource Program (DDAR)	Partnered with eight local ILCs across 10 counties to provide aid to 113 customers who rely on power for medical or independent living needs, including: • Six batteries • Four batteries previously distributed in impacted counties Although we partner with DDAR to provide hotel accommodations, food vouchers, generator fuel vouchers and accessible transportation, we did not receive any requests for these services during this PSPS.
PBP	Supported 49 customers in scope by providing batteries through the PBP. Since July 2020, over 28,500 battery units have been delivered through the PBP across our service area.
Food Bank Partnerships	Partnered with seven local food banks that serve all impacted counties to provide boxes of food for families.
Meals on Wheels Partnerships	Partnered with Meals on Wheels Organizations in four counties to provide services to customers in scope for the de-energization.
CA 211 Providers Network	Partnered with eight CA 211 network centers across 10 counties to assist 37 customers with resources. The direct assistance resources provided during this activation included: • 40 food vouchers • Five hotel accommodations • Three water bladders • Three generator fuel vouchers Although we partner with CA 211 to provide accessible transportation, we did not receive any transportation requests for this PSPS.
Accessible Transportation Partnerships	Partnered with Vivalon and Fresno Economic Opportunities Commission across three counties in preparation for the possibility of any transportation needs.
Ad-Hoc AFN Backup Generation Solutions	We granted temporary generation exceptions to one AFN customer in need of critical support. This included transportation limitations and medical device requirements that CBO resources were unable to resolve during this PSPS. After exploring all viable options, PG&E delivered backup generation to this individual who relies on power for their health and safety. This specific situation does not meet our typical temporary generation process and procedures standards. However, given the unique circumstances, we went beyond our usual practices to ensure safety for our customers.

Communications to Customers with Limited English Proficiency

We provided translated customer support through our customer notifications, website, call center, social media, engagement with CBOs, and multicultural media partnerships. Customers with their language preference set received in-language (translated) notifications. For customers with no language preference set, notifications were provided in English with information on how to receive PSPS information in 15 non-English languages. Customers with limited English proficiency have access to translation phone numbers on our PSPS website, highlighting that translation services are available in over 200 languages.

We will provide the number of requests we received for information in non-English languages supported by our Call Center Translation Services in our 2026 PSPS Post-Season Data Report.

PG&E continued support and engagement with multi-cultural media organizations and in-language CBOs to maximize the reach of in-language communications to the public. Prior to the PSPS, we reached out to 38 multicultural media organizations to provide outreach in translated languages throughout the impacted counties. Additionally, we shared information and updates on PSPS with these media outlets, including news releases and social media infographics in English, translated languages and ASL, for their use and distribution. We also shared our new [PSPS Language Resources page](#) (available in 16 languages) with organizations to share with their constituents.

Section 6.6 - Provide the following information on backup power (including mobile backup power) with the name and email address of a utility contact for customers for each of the following topics: (D.21-06-014, page 300.)

Response:

The information requested is included in Sections 6.6a – 6.6f. For questions related to backup power, customers can email TempGenPSPSSupport@pge.com.

Section 6.6a. Description of the backup generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

Response:

Table 13 lists the generators available for CFI customers before and during this PSPS.

Table 13: Generators Available for CFI Customers

Number of Units	Individual Size (MW)	Run Time (Hrs.) ³⁰	Description
3	0.032	37.6	Three units on reserve in Sacramento.
1	0.036	37.6	One unit on reserve in Sacramento.
4	0.065	31.0	Four units on reserve in San Leandro.
6	0.100	25.3	Six units on reserve in Sacramento.

³⁰ Estimated based on a 75% load. Barring mechanical failure and refueling the temporary generators have the ability to operate continuously throughout a typical PSPS.

Number of Units	Individual Size (MW)	Run Time (Hrs.) ³⁰	Description
2	0.125	25.0	One unit on reserve in Sacramento and one unit on reserve in San Leandro.
2	0.150	30.3	Two units on reserve in Sacramento.
5	0.200	22.9	Five units on reserve in San Leandro.
3	0.230	22.9	Three units on reserve in San Leandro.
3	0.275	26.0	Three units on reserve in Sacramento.
3	0.500	24.1	Three units on reserve in Sacramento.
3	0.570	24.1	Three units on reserve in San Leandro.
3	1.00	35.0	Three units on reserve in Sacramento.
14	1.140	24.0	14 units on reserve in San Leandro.
7	1.500	10.0	Seven units on reserve in Benecia.
17	2.00	27.7	Eight units on reservation in Sacramento and nine units on reserve in San Leandro.

6.6b. The capacity and estimated maximum duration of operation of the backup generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

Response:

Table 13 lists the power capacity and maximum duration of operation of the generators available for CFI customers before and during this PSPS.

6.6c. The total number of backup generators provided to critical facility and infrastructure customer's site immediately before and during the PSPS.

Response:

No backup generators were requested by CFI customers for this PSPS due to previously established mitigation plans.

6.6d. How the utility deployed this backup generation to the critical facility and infrastructure customer's site.

Response:

As a general policy, PG&E does not offer backup generation to individual facilities. However, PG&E's policy grants exceptions for critical facilities when a prolonged outage could have a significant adverse impact to public health or safety.

Deployment of temporary generation is contingent upon the following circumstances: the expected duration to perform permanent repairs is significantly longer than the expected duration to install backup generation, the expected customer outage is collectively 50,000 or more customer minutes, and the outage affects a Distribution circuit serving multiple customers without a functional back-tie.³¹

PG&E has pre-arranged commitments with critical facility and infrastructure customers to provide temporary generation in case of a PSPS and evaluated requests received during this PSPS according to the prioritization described in [Section 6.6e](#).

6.6e. An explanation of how the utility prioritized how to distribute available backup generation.

Response:

PG&E prioritizes the deployment of available generation by first meeting existing commitments to individual facilities in the following order:

- High Risk to Public Safety (Examples):
 - Facilities that support public safety, such as but not limited to, first/emergency responders at the tribal, local, state, and federal level, water, wastewater assets, and city or county EOC.
- High Risk of Environmental Hazard (Examples):
 - Chemical plant which may risk spilling into a local river.
- High Risk to Essential Emergency Response and Supporting Facilities (Examples).
 - 911 call center.
 - Water pump availability compromises active firefighting by emergency service personnel.
 - Critical telecommunications equipment or other support businesses that directly affect emergency services provisions.
 - Affected community choice aggregators, publicly owned utilities/electrical cooperatives, the CPUC, the California Governor's OES, city or county EOC, and the CAL FIRE.

Deployment of available generation is then followed by customers with special needs in the following order:

- Life support, MBL Program, and temperature sensitivity.
- Large customers, economic damage customers, and danger to health and safety customers.

Deployment of available generation is then followed by other customers based on maximizing relief based on the number of customers times expected duration.

³¹ 50,000 customer minutes is approximately equivalent to 100 customers for about eight hours.

6.6f. Identify the critical facility and infrastructure customers that received backup generation.

Response:

No backup generators were requested by CFI customers for this PSPS due to previously established mitigation plans.

Section 7 – Complaints & Claims

Section 7.1 - The number and nature of complaints received as the result of the de-energization event and claims that are filed against the utility because of de-energization. The utility must completely report all the informal and formal complaints, meaning any expression of grief, pain, or dissatisfaction, from various sources, filed either with CPUC or received by the utility as a result of the PSPS event. (Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, D.21-06- 014, page 304.)

Response:

Table 14 provides the number and nature of complaints received from customers and Public Safety Partners, submitted to both the CPUC and PG&E, for the July 15, 2026 PSPS.³² Any complaints received after July 22, 2026, will be included in the 2026 PSPS Post-Season Report.

Table 14: Number and Nature of Complaints

Nature of Complaints	Number of Complaints
Communications/Notifications Including, but not limited to complaints regarding lack of notice, excessive notices, confusing notice, false alarm notice, problems with getting up-to-date information, inaccurate information provided, not being able to access information in the prevalent languages and/or information accessibility, complaints about website, Public Safety Partner Portal, Representational State Transfer (REST)/Digital Asset Manager (DAM) sites (as applicable).	19
PSPS Frequency/Duration Including, but not limited to complaints regarding the frequency and/or duration of PSPS, including delays in restoring power, scope of PSPS and dynamic of weather conditions.	13
Safety/Health Concern Including, but not limited to complaints regarding difficulties experienced by AFN/MBL populations, traffic accidents due to non-operating traffic lights, inability to get medical help, well water or access to clean water, inability to keep property cool/warm during outage raising health concern.	14
General PSPS Dissatisfaction/Other Including, but not limited to complaints about being without power during PSPS and related hardships such as food loss, income loss, inability to work/attend school, plus any PSPS-related complaints that do not fall into any other category.	43
Outreach/Assistance Including, but not limited to complaints regarding CRCs, community crew vehicles, backup power, hotel vouchers, and other assistance provided by utility to mitigate impact of PSPS.	1

³² PG&E's PSPS Post-Event Reports are based on the required CPUC-issued template. Additional information regarding complaints and claims will be provided in subsequent PSPS Post-Season Reports.

Claims

As of July 22, 2026, PG&E received two claims for the July 15, 2026 PSPS.

Table 15: Count and Type of Claims Received

Description of Claims	Number of Claims
Business Interruption / Economic Loss	0
Food Loss Only	1
Property Damage	1

Section 8 – Power Restoration

Section 8.1 - A detailed explanation of the steps the utility took to restore power (*Resolution ESRB-8 page 5*)

Response:

During this PSPS, PG&E's EOC Command and Meteorology teams monitor real-time and forecasted weather conditions based on weather models, weather station data, and field observations while patrol crews and helicopters are pre-positioned in anticipation of the Weather All-Clear to begin patrols. Weather All-Clears are called based on circuit segments.

This allows us to issue Weather All-Clears more granularly so we can restore power faster in areas less prone to wind gusts or adverse conditions. We monitor the conditions for each impacted circuit segment and as they fall below our mFPC to consider areas for restoration.

As Weather All-Clears are issued, restoration crews patrol electrical facilities to identify and repair or clear any damage or hazard before restoring power. Using the Incident Command System (ICS) as a base response framework, each circuit is assigned a taskforce consisting of supervisors, crews, trouble men and inspectors. This structure allows us to patrol and perform step restoration in alignment with the centralized control centers.

During restoration, we issued two Weather All-Clears and deployed approximately 84 personnel and 11 helicopters to patrol the lines in advance of restoration. Patrols were conducted on approximately 588 miles of Distribution circuits and 31 miles of Transmission lines that had been de-energized. Power was restored to customers as patrol completion verified the safe condition of each line.

Section 8.2 - The timeline for power restoration, broken down by phase if applicable (*D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A24, SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

For detailed information on restoration on each circuit, including restoration date, restoration time and total customer count on each circuit, see [Appendix B](#).

Section 8.3 - For any circuits that require more than 24 hours to restore, the utility shall use the following template to explain why it was unable to restore each circuit within this timeframe, using the format below. (*D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 6.*)

Response:

PG&E was able to restore all impacted customers within 24 hours of the Weather All-Clear.

Table 16: Circuits Requiring More than 24 Hours to Restore

Circuit Name	Reason the Utility was Unable to Restore the Circuit Within 24 Hours
None	None

Section 9 – Community Resource Centers

Section 9.1 - The address (including city and zip code) of each location during a de-energization event, the location (in a building, a trailer, etc.), the assistance available at each location, the days and hours that it was open, and attendance (i.e., number of visitors) *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:

During the July 15, 2026 PSPS, five CRCs were opened. These CRCs served 2,494 visitors, of which 2,438 did not remain on site and were provided “Grab and Go” bags. “Grab and Go” bags include a PSPS information card, water, non-perishable snacks, mobile battery charger and a blanket. For a list of CRC locations, assistance available, operating days and hours, and attendance, see Appendix D in the attachment “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260715*.”

Visitors were provided with PSPS information by dedicated staff, ADA-compliant restrooms, tables and chairs, power strips to meet basic charging needs for personal medical devices and other electronics, snacks, bottled water, Wi-Fi, and cellular service access. Bags of ice and privacy screens were also available at indoor locations.

Some visitors may request and are provided with information regarding how to obtain hotel vouchers. In these instances, visitors are referred to 211 California to confirm eligibility and are connected with local resources.

PG&E coordinates with county Offices of Emergency Management to determine the best locations for CRCs for all PSPS events. For this PSPS, in agreement with counties, CRCs were not opened in Alameda, Contra Costa, Fresno, Merced, San Benito, San Joaquin and Santa Barbara due to low customer impact.

For our CRC Plan and more information regarding CRC operations, including coordination with tribal and local governments, CRC types and resources, see PG&E’s [2026 PSPS Pre-Season Report](#), Appendix A, pp. 42 – 55.

Section 9.2 - Any deviations and explanations from the CRC requirement including operation hours, ADA accessibility, and equipment. *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:

There were no deviations from required CRC operating hours, accessibility or equipment during this PSPS.


Section 9.3 - A map identifying the location of each CRC and the de-energized areas (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

See Figure 15 for a map of CRC locations opened during this PSPS. Based on the CRC survey conducted for this PSPS, most respondents traveled approximately less than five miles to the nearest CRC location.

Additional CRC location information can be found at [PG&E Emergency Site – View Outage Map](#) where customers can find specific information using the “Address Search” or “City/County Search” functions.

Figure 15: CRC Locations Map



Section 10 – Mitigations to Reduce Impact

Section 10.1 - A description of how sectionalization, i.e. separating loads within a circuit, was considered and implemented and the extent to which it impacted the size and scope of the de-energization event (D.19-05-042, page A23).

Response:

PG&E utilized measures to avoid de-energizing approximately 22,784 customers during the July 15, 2026 PSPS including Distribution sectionalization and Distribution switching.

Distribution Sectionalization

We have installed new Distribution sectionalization devices near the borders of the CPUC-designated HFTD Tier 2 and Tier 3 to reduce the number of customers affected by PSPS. During this PSPS, Distribution sectionalization was considered and utilized on 13 circuits to mitigate approximately 21,994 customers based on PSPS scope and available resources.

Distribution Switching

Depending on fire risk patterns, Distribution switch locations and switching plans maintain service to customers on lines that fall outside the high-risk area but are served by lines that pass through the fire risk area. Depending on PSPS scope, we may be able to use back-tie switching to bypass the Distribution circuits that pass through the de-energization area to keep customers energized from a different set of lines. During this PSPS, Distribution switching was used to mitigate approximately 790 customers.

Backup Power Support

Backup power support provides temporary generation to select devices (i.e. medical equipment) or limited areas. However, it does not mitigate PSPS impacts completely given its segmented scope. For more information on backup power support, see www.pge.com/backuppower.

Although backup power support was provided to one customer, this customer had already experienced a short outage as part of this PSPS before the backup generators began operations and thus is not included in the total count of mitigated customers.

PG&E considered but did not utilize the following mitigation measures below as there were no identified opportunities to avoid de-energizing customers using these efforts during this PSPS.

Community Microgrids

A community microgrid is a group of customers and Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) within clearly defined electrical boundaries with the ability to disconnect from and reconnect to the grid. These microgrids are typically designed to serve the portions of communities that include community resources, like hospitals, police and fire stations, and gas stations and markets. We continue to own and operate the Distribution system within the microgrid. For more information about PG&E's microgrid solutions or how to begin developing a community microgrid, see www.pge.com/cmep.

Transmission Line Sectionalization

Transmission lines are segmented using switches enabled with Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), when possible, if only a portion of a line is required to be de-energized due to PSPS. Leaving segments of Transmission lines energized allows us to still reduce fire risk where needed and provide service to stations fed off the non-impacted segments during this PSPS.

Transmission Islanding

In some cases, we can leverage islanding capabilities to keep some customers islanded apart from the rest of PG&E's Transmission system and energized by generation located within the island.

Temporary Substation Generation

Temporary substation generation can enable some community resources to continue serving the surrounding population during a PSPS at Distribution substations resulting from Transmission line outages. An interconnection is made at the substation, energizing entire circuits where downstream assets are not at weather risk and generator capacity is sufficient. If there are downstream assets at risk, this mitigation is combined with Distribution sectionalization to energize only safe areas. For reporting purposes, customers mitigated in the latter case will be documented in this category and not in sectionalization to avoid duplication. On average, customers served by temporary substation generation experience de-energization periods of under 30 minutes.

Temporary Microgrids

Temporary microgrids can enable some community resources to continue serving the surrounding population during a PSPS where it is safe to do so, using pre-installed interconnection hubs to safely and rapidly interconnect temporary generation. While temporary microgrids do not often support large numbers of customers, the community resources served by temporary microgrids include fire stations, local water and waste companies, markets, post offices, and medical facilities. On average, when utilized, customers served by temporary microgrids experience de-energization periods of under 30 minutes. Currently, there are 12 temporary microgrid sites that are currently ready for immediate operation in PG&E's service area.

Covered Conductor

The effects of grid-hardening and covered conductors are accounted for in our IPW model, which predicts the probability of utility-caused ignitions. Overhead system hardening is expected to reduce the probability of outages and ignitions in recently hardened sections. The IPW model more heavily weighs ignition and outage rates in recent years which will result in areas with fewer ignitions (e.g., areas that may have been recently hardened, being less likely to be de-energized for PSPS as there is a lower chance of ignition based on historical ignitions and outages).

Section 10.2 - Mitigation actions and impacts (both waterfall graph and map) including: sectionalization devices, temporary generation, microgrids, permanent backup generations, transmission switching, covered conductor, and any other grid hardening that mitigated the impact of the event (D.21-06-014, page 285, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

Figure 16 depicts the impact each mitigation measure had on the total number of customers. Customer locations where mitigation efforts were utilized are mapped in Figure 17.

Figure 16: Reduction of Impacted Customers Due to Mitigation Efforts





Figure 17: Mitigation Utilization Map



Section 11 – Lessons Learned from this Event

Section 11.1 - Threshold analysis and the results of the utility’s examination of whether its thresholds are adequate and correctly applied in the de-energized areas. The utility must include specific information pertaining to the event. (D.21-06-014, page 305-306.)

Response:

This section addresses our examination of the adequacy of our PSPS protocols, criteria and guidance thresholds. As a preliminary matter, the CPUC recognizes the statutory authority of the IOUs to de-energize electric facilities when necessary for public safety and further acknowledges that such decision-making is complex and dependent on many factors.³³ As prescribed in ESRB-8, the decision to de-energize electric facilities for public safety is based on the best judgment of the IOU and is dependent on many factors, including but not limited to, fuel moisture, aerial and ground firefighting capabilities, active fires that indicate fire conditions, situational awareness provided by agencies and local meteorological conditions of humidity and winds.³⁴ The CPUC has declined to establish a minimum windspeed threshold below which an IOU would be prohibited from shutting off power and instead left the decision-making to the IOU’s discretion on the basis that the IOU has the detailed knowledge of its facilities necessary to make this decision in real time given contemporaneous weather conditions.³⁵

Based on our current PSPS modeling, guidance and criteria as applied in this PSPS and explained in [Section 2.3](#), our current PSPS guidance continues to be adequate and was effectively applied for the July 15, 2026 PSPS. For detailed information on our PSPS criteria and thresholds, see Appendix A-1.1 and A-2.1 in the attachment “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260715*.”

For each PSPS, we begin our threshold evaluation with a robust historical analysis that is described in detail below. This analysis establishes the guidance values to be applied for a PSPS, which has been optimized to capture data from past catastrophic fires to mitigate customer impacts. To do so, our Meteorology Team uses internal and external tools and subject matter expertise to support their recommendations on when and where to de-energize for public safety. For the July 15, 2026 PSPS, our Meteorologists observed conditions including gusty north winds, low humidity and grassland fuels which were receptive to ignition and fire spread. These additional factors were evaluated through advanced weather modeling systems from our network of more than 1,500 weather stations that forecasted and tracked weather conditions in real-time.

Before de-energization, customer risk was also evaluated against wildfire risk on a per circuit basis to further evaluate the adequateness of the PSPS. See [Section 2.4](#) above for more information.

Establishing Threshold through Historical Analysis

Our PSPS guidance was established by calibrating a granular, historical dataset. We built our verification dataset by creating, or “backcasting,” the PSPS guidance through our historical dataset. We extracted values for all recent fires that have occurred in PG&E’s service area from 2012 to 2023. We aimed to capture as many historical fires as possible that were caused by PG&E equipment during high wind events (e.g., Camp, Nuns, Kincade, Zogg) while limiting the number of historical PSPS outages to minimize customer impacts. Our analysis included:

- Hourly review of past incidents

³³ ESRB-8

³⁴ See Resolution ESRB-8, p. 8-9.

³⁵ D.12-04-024

- Verification of hypothetical PSPS dates
- PSPS guidance values testing
- A robust guidance sensitivity and calibration analysis

Historical Analysis: CFP_D Quantification

Based on this historical analysis and as described in [Section 2.3](#) above, PG&E uses a CFP_D value of seven as the quantitative threshold guidance value to consider for PSPS on PG&E's Distribution system.

To establish the CFP_D threshold of seven, we performed multiple sensitivity studies in “backcast” mode for calibration and validation. This involved running 68 different versions of the combined Distribution PSPS guidance through hourly historical data throughout multiple years to calibrate PSPS guidance. This included simulating and learning from more than 2,500 virtual PSPS outages. Through this “lookback” analysis, we evaluated:


- Potential customer impacts
- The potential size, scope, and frequency of PSPS outages
- The days PSPS outages would have occurred
- Whether utility infrastructure would have qualified for de-energization

The mFPC and CFP_D guidance that is determined from Technosylva was also evaluated using this process.

The CFP_D guidance value of six is shown in Figure 18 with respect to recent large fires since 2012. Fires to the right of the CFP_D6 line tend to be wind driven fires, while non-wind driven fires tend to exist left of the CFP_D6 line. Any fires above six that meet mFPC indicate PSPS would have been executed, had these models and guidance been in use during these historic events. The results show that deployment of this model could have prevented such wildfires as the Camp, Nuns, Atlas, and Zogg, if implemented in 2012.³⁶

³⁶ Note that the inclusion of a fire in this analysis does not indicate that PG&E is directly responsible for or caused a fire. Instead, the fires are included for the purpose of analyzing the impact of PG&E's current PSPS Protocols.

Figure 18: CFP_D Guidance



This analysis was a critical step to ensure the most catastrophic historical incidents are identified by PSPS guidance while considering the significant impacts to customers from PSPS outages across multiple dimensions (e.g., duration and frequency). This ensures that future PSPS outages will capture conditions similarly during the most catastrophic fires while also balancing impacts to customers.

Historical Analysis: Execution

To execute the analysis at this scale, we utilized cloud computing resources to run PSPS model guidance for every hour at every 2 x 2 km grid cell across the historical data set to determine the number of times and locations PSPS guidance is exceeded. Each location exceeding guidance is then grouped into events to determine the location and size of each PSPS given the weather and fuels present at that time under the parameters of the study version. This allows us to determine if synoptic-driven events (e.g., Diablo wind events) are being identified, and if historical fires attributable to PG&E equipment may have been mitigated.

Verification of PSPS Protocols

In addition to these sensitivity studies, PG&E performed extensive verification of the PSPS protocols using several internal and external datasets. The goal of these analyses was to first determine if certain weather events are being captured (e.g., Diablo and offshore wind events), and second, to determine if power lines that have been implicated in historic catastrophic fires would have been identified by the guidance.

The following internal datasets were used in the analysis:

- Climatology of Diablo wind events
- Distribution and Transmission outage history
- Exploratory and dynamic dashboards created with internal and external data
- Hourly high-resolution wind maps from the climatology data set
- The weather signal database

The following external datasets were used in the analysis:

- High risk of potential large fires due to wind from the GACC
- Historical fire occurrence data compiled by federal agencies
- National Center for Environmental Prediction (NCEP) North American Regional Reanalysis Archive (NARR) synoptic weather maps
- RFWs from NWS

The paragraphs below explain how we leveraged external and internal data to verify our PSPS protocols guidance thresholds.

NARR Archive

PG&E has acquired the NARR archive data dating back to 1995 and produced over two million maps that can be utilized to study past events. These maps are also useful to study the past events leading up to a PSPS, such as the extent of precipitation events and heat waves. When the PSPS models are run through the climatology, each PSPS identified is compared against the NARR archive by our Meteorology Team to determine the large-scale atmospheric features present for each event.

Climatology of Diablo Wind Events

PG&E also leverages the latest academic research on Diablo wind events that use surface-based observations to create a climatology of Diablo wind events. We adapted the criteria and processed it hour-by-hour through the 31-year weather climatology to determine the frequency, magnitude, and timing of Diablo winds. The output of this analysis was a 31-year calendar of Diablo wind events experienced in the PG&E service area. As it relates to PSPS directly, the strongest Diablo wind events were evaluated to verify if PSPS guidance also selects these days for potential PSPS outages. Using the days identified by PSPS guidance and the Diablo PSPS list, a high-level comparison was completed to evaluate overlap of the events.

Any events that did not meet PSPS guidance were further evaluated using additional data sources described in this section. For example, the NARR archive proved useful, as antecedent conditions such as rainfall before a PSPS and the magnitude of the PSPS could be evaluated.

PG&E's Weather Signal Database

PG&E's Meteorology Team built, and continues to maintain, a "weather signal" database that flags each day from January 1, 1995, to present that experienced any weather-related outages on the Distribution system. It also lists the main weather driver (e.g., heat, low-elevation snow, northeast wind, winter storm, etc.) for these outages. If Distribution outage activity is not driven by weather, the day is classified as a "Blue Sky"³⁷ day. This dataset combines weather and Distribution outage activity that allows rapid filtering of events based on the main weather drivers. To validate PSPS guidance, we used a combination of "Northeast" wind days and "Blue-Sky" days.

The PSPS guidance was validated against all Northeast wind days in the database. This is similar, but complementary to the Diablo PSPS analysis as it also accounts for outage activity observed on those days. Events were also compared against "Blue Sky" days to ensure that PSPS would not be recommended for a high percentage of non-weather-impact days where little to no outage activity was observed.

RFWs from the NWS

PG&E also validated PSPS guidance against RFWs from the NWS. RFWs mean warm temperatures, very low humidity, and stronger winds are expected to combine and produce an increased risk of fire danger. These RFWs were collected between 2015 – 2020 in shapefile format and used to evaluate the timing and spatial extent of historical RFWs against our PSPS guidance. It should be noted that each NWS office in the PG&E service area has different RFW criteria, making direct and quantifiable comparisons challenging. However, this dataset is used to evaluate whether RFWs were issued when PSPS guidance was met. Based on historical PSPS analysis, RFWs are expected to occur more frequently and cover a broader area than the area covered by PSPS outages.

High Risk of Potential Large Fires due to Wind from GACC

PG&E also validated PSPS guidance against historical "High Risk" days from the GACC. The GACCs issues High Risk Day alerts when fuel and weather conditions are predicted which historically have resulted in a significantly higher than normal chance for a new large fire or for significant growth on existing fires. Examples of critical weather conditions are high winds, low humidity, an unstable atmosphere, and very hot weather. Similar to the RFW analysis, this dataset was used to evaluate if High Risk days were issued when PSPS guidance was high. Blue Sky Day is defined as "The same as a non-weather impact day (no or very limited impacts due to weather)." Similar to RFWs, based on historical PSPS analysis, High Risk Days are expected to occur more frequently and cover a broader area than PSPS.

Hourly High-Resolution Wind Maps from PG&E Climatology Data Set

PG&E created hourly maps from high-resolution climatology and a web-based application to display any hour across 30 years. For each PSPS that meets PSPS guidance in the climatology, these maps were evaluated by a Meteorologist to better understand the nature of the event, wind speeds, antecedent conditions, and the spatial extent of strong winds. It's important to note forecast wind speeds are available in the same exact format, allowing Operational Meteorologists to put forecast events in perspective with historical events using the same model.

Detailed PSPS Dashboards

To evaluate the PSPS thresholds, our Meteorology Team and data scientists utilized the data sources described above to evaluate historical PSPS hour-by-hour to verify the locations and times

³⁷ A "Blue Sky Day" is defined the same as a non-weather impact day (no or very limited impacts due to weather).

that are being flagged as meeting PSPS guidance. These dashboards determine if historical fire events would have been flagged by PSPS guidance. Our Meteorologists evaluated these data sources hourly to verify model performance of the IPW model and suitability for operations. The PSPS guidance can be evaluated spatially using the dashboard map integration, while the size and timing of the PSPS can be evaluated using the time series integration.

The analysis described above includes evaluating locations that were just below verbatim PSPS protocols as determined and reported by our high-resolution forecast model and data set included in this PSPS Post-Event Report. For example, this may include evaluating areas where the wind speed is -two mph below guidance if all other mFPC or RFW are met. It is well documented that high resolution weather model forecasts of wind speed from Weather Research and Forecasting model (WRF) tend to underpredict at high wind speeds.³⁸ Thus it is within reason to anticipate that the actual wind speed could be one mph higher than model forecast. If these areas are not scoped for PSPS and the winds materialize stronger than forecast, it could lead to PSPS execution with very little to no advanced notifications to customers and Public Safety Partners. Therefore, as explained in detail above, not one single factor or threshold is determinative of our final PSPS scoping. Based on multiple factors, data and analysis, the final PSPS scope is ultimately based on the judgement of our OIC.

³⁸ <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.atmosres.2021.105673>; <https://doi.org/10.3390/atmos15050533>; <https://doi.org/10.3390/atmos15101244>; <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoinf.2024.102898>

Section 11.2 - Use the below format to report any lessons learned that will lead to future improvement for the utility (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

PG&E collects lessons learned input from staff during and after every PSPS EOC activation to identify best practices and opportunities for improvement. See Table 17 for lessons learned from the July 15, 2026 PSPS.

Table 17: Lessons Learned

Issue	Discussion	Resolution
Agency Outreach	Jurisdictions that have not been included in PSPS scope for several years may be relying on outdated messaging templates. An in-scope police department that had not experienced a PSPS in recent years included an incorrect link in one of its advisory messages.	We will work with jurisdictions to ensure they have the latest information to share in their own advisory messages and press releases.
Technology	During the PSPS, a system issue resulted in 64 customers not receiving cancellation notifications within the required notification window.	The root cause of these notification failures is still under investigation; corrective actions will be identified upon completion of the investigation and reported in the 2026 Post Season Report. All corrective actions will focus on preventing similar communication discrepancies in future PSPS events.

Section 12 – Other Relevant Information


Response:

Table 18 and Figure 19 show the maximum wind gust speeds recorded by weather stations in each county within the PSPS de-energized scope.

Table 18: Maximum Wind Gusts Recorded During July 15 – 16, 2026

County	Maximum Wind Gust (mph)	Station Name
Alameda	45	Altamont RAWS
Contra Costa	55	Black Diamond Mine East
Marin	43	Big Rock
Monterey	43	Las Aquilas
Santa Barbara	55	SCE Coastal View
San Benito	28	San Juan Grade
San Joaquin	43	I-205 MacArthur Drive
San Luis Obispo	44	Davis Peak

Figure 19: Maximum Wind Gusts Recorded Map Between July 15 – 16, 2026



APPENDIX

APPENDIX A
SECTION 2 – DECISION MAKING PROCESS

See Appendix A-1.1 and Appendix A-2.1 in the attachment
“PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260715.”

See [Appendix E](#) for the description of each column header, as well as the unit and value provided.

APPENDIX B
SECTION 3 – DE-ENERGIZED TIME, PLACE, DURATION AND CUSTOMERS

Appendix B: DE-ENERGIZED TIME, PLACE, DURATION AND CUSTOMERS

Circuits De-Energized During the July 15, 2026 PSPS

Circuits labeled as “non-HFTD” are located outside of the CPUC HFTD. We use a HFRA classification which PG&E utilizes in addition to HFTD to determine PSPS scope – these circuits intersected PG&E's HFRA despite not entering HFTD Tier 2 or Tier 3.

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Counties	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	ALTO 1124	7/15/2026 18:07	7/16/2026 6:47	7/16/2026 9:41	Marin	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3	1637	1567	70	47	66	0
Distribution	ALTO 1125	7/15/2026 18:05	7/16/2026 6:47	7/16/2026 9:36	Marin	Tier 3	384	363	21	9	23	0
Distribution	CABRILLO 1104	7/15/2026 15:30	7/16/2026 6:47	7/16/2026 9:17	Santa Barbara	Tier 2	1	0	1	0	0	0
Distribution	CARBONA 1101	7/15/2026 15:25	7/16/2026 8:38	7/16/2026 11:50	Alameda, San Joaquin	Outside HFTD	56	22	14	2	3	20
Distribution	HERDLYN 1102	7/15/2026 15:49	7/16/2026 8:38	7/16/2026 11:24	Alameda	Outside HFTD	4	2	2	0	0	0
Distribution	KING CITY 1102	7/15/2026 12:49	7/16/2026 6:47	7/16/2026 9:52	San Benito, Monterey	Outside HFTD	58	14	17	0	4	27
Distribution	KING CITY 1106	7/15/2026 12:53	7/16/2026 6:47	7/16/2026 10:37	San Benito, Monterey	Outside HFTD	88	42	25	0	8	21
Distribution	LAS POSITAS 2110	7/15/2026 15:31	7/16/2026 8:38	7/16/2026 11:09	Contra Costa, Alameda	Outside HFTD	50	22	26	0	0	2
Distribution	LOS OSITOS 2101	7/15/2026 12:46	7/16/2026 6:47	7/16/2026 14:12	San Benito, Monterey	Outside HFTD	167	92	47	4	10	28
Distribution	LOS OSITOS 2102	7/15/2026 12:42	7/16/2026 6:47	7/16/2026 16:17	Monterey	Outside HFTD	89	26	37	1	5	26
Distribution	OILFIELDS 1102	7/15/2026 13:00	7/16/2026 6:47	7/16/2026 15:43	Monterey	Outside HFTD	100	33	38	1	6	29

Distribution	OILFIELDS 1103	7/15/2026 12:57	7/16/2026 6:47	7/16/2026 11:43	Monterey, San Luis Obispo	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	1711	1459	210	70	148	42
Distribution	SAN ARDO 1101	7/15/2026 13:22	7/16/2026 6:47	7/16/2026 10:08	Monterey	Outside HFTD	14	7	3	0	0	4
Distribution	SAN ARDO 1102	7/15/2026 13:07	7/16/2026 6:47	7/16/2026 11:33	San Benito, Monterey	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	598	352	159	12	134	87
Distribution	SOLEDAD 2101	7/15/2026 12:49	7/16/2026 6:47	7/16/2026 10:29	Monterey	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	162	99	32	2	36	31
Distribution	TIDEWATER 2106	7/15/2026 15:22	7/16/2026 6:47	7/16/2026 8:43	Contra Costa	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	67	51	15	3	7	1
Transmission	COBURN-OIL FIELDS #2	7/15/2026 13:13	7/16/2026 6:47	7/16/2026 9:52	Monterey	Outside HFTD	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	SAN ARDO TAP	7/15/2026 13:13	7/16/2026 6:47	7/16/2026 9:52	Monterey	Outside HFTD	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total							5,186	4,151	717	151	450	318

APPENDIX C
SECTION 6 – PUBLIC SAFETY PARTNERS CONTACTED

See Appendix C in the attachment “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260715*”.

APPENDIX D
SECTION 9 – COMMUNITY RESOURCE CENTER LOCATIONS

See Appendix D in the attachment “*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260715.*”

Appendix E: DEFINITIONS

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
Access and Functional Needs (AFN) Populations	None	Includes individuals who have developmental or intellectual disabilities, physical disabilities, chronic conditions, injuries, limited English proficiency or who are non-English speaking, older adults, children, people living in institutionalized settings, or those who are low income, homeless, or transportation disadvantaged, including, but not limited to, those who are dependent on public transit or those who are pregnant.
AFN Characteristics	None	Includes blind/low vision, deaf/hard of hearing, senior, non-English speaking, durable medical equipment, assistive technology, low income, or life support. In accordance with D.21-06-034, PG&E includes customers who have voluntarily indicated they are “dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology” in an effort to identify customers “above and beyond those in the medical baseline population” or self-identified vulnerable population to include persons reliant on electricity to maintain necessary life functions including for durable medical equipment and assistive technology. This includes Assistive Technology, Blind, Disabled, Durable Medical Equipment, Hearing Disability–Deaf or Hard of Hearing, Senior or Vision Disability–Low Vision.
Benefit to Risk Ratio	Fraction – Max (Threshold, Forecast Factor)	Adverse impact to customers due to a catastrophic fire prevented by PSPS de-energization divided by adverse impact to customers due to PSPS de-energization. No observed value is available for this factor.
California Alternate Rates for Energy (CARE)	None	A state mandated program. As determined by PU Code Section 739.1(a), annual household must be no greater than 200% of the federal poverty guideline levels.
Catastrophic Fire Probability Distribution (CFP_D)	Scaled Probability – Max (Threshold, Forecast, Observed Factor)	The probability of fire ignitions due to weather impacting the Distribution electric system combined with the probability that a fire will be catastrophic if it starts. In Appendix A-1.1, this is the product of catastrophic fire (Prob Cat) and Ignition Probability Weather (IPW) minus probability of ignition (Prob Ignition). Scaled by 1000 to convert to an integer value.
Catastrophic Fire Probability Transmission (CFP_T)	Scaled Probability – Max (Threshold, Forecast and Observed Factor)	In Appendix A-2.1, this is the product of probability of catastrophic fire (Prob Cat) and Operability Assessment Probability of Failure. This product is called the (CFP _T) Catastrophic Fire Probability Transmission model. Scaled by 1000 to convert to an integer value.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
Critical Facilities and Infrastructure (CFI)	None	“Critical Facilities” and “Critical Infrastructure” refer to facilities and infrastructure that are essential to public safety and require additional assistance and advance planning to ensure resiliency during de-energization. The CPUC adopted the following interim list of CFI, as aligned with Department of Homeland Security’s Critical Infrastructure Sectors: • Emergency Services Sector: Police Stations, Fire Stations, Emergency Operations Centers • Government Facilities Sector: Schools, Jails and Prisons • Healthcare and Public Health Sector: Public Health Departments, Medical facilities, including hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, nursing homes, blood banks, health care facilities, dialysis centers and hospice facilities • Energy Sector: Public and private utility facilities vital to maintaining or restoring normal service, including, but not limited to, interconnected publicly owned utilities and electric cooperatives • Water and Wastewater Systems Sector: Facilities associated with the provision of drinking water or processing of wastewater including facilities used to pump, divert, transport, store, treat and deliver water or wastewater • Communications Sector: Communication carrier infrastructure including selective routers, central offices, head ends, cellular switches, remote terminals and cellular sites • Chemical Sector: Facilities associated with the provision of manufacturing, maintaining, or distributing hazardous materials and chemicals • Note: Some customers meet the criteria of being both a Public Safety Partner & Critical Facility, which include Emergency services sector, water and wastewater providers, communication service providers and emergency hospitals.
Customer or Customer Accounts	None	Active service points or meter.
Dead Fuel Moisture Content (DFM) 10hr	Fuel Moisture Fraction – Min (Threshold, Forecast, Observed Factor)	The amount of moisture in dead vegetation (i.e. fallen leaves, tree branches, and logs). In Appendix A-1.1, “DFM 10hr” is Dead Fuel Moisture provided in 10-hour fuel moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
Dead Fuel Moisture Content (DFM) 100hr	Fuel Moisture Fraction – Min (Threshold, Forecast Factor)	The amount of moisture in dead vegetation (i.e. fallen leaves, tree branches, and logs). In Appendix A-1.1, “DFM 100hr” is Dead Fuel Moisture provided in 100-hour moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100. No observed value is available for this factor.
Emergency Operations Center (EOC)	None	A central command and control facility responsible for carrying out the principles of emergency preparedness and emergency management, or disaster management functions at a strategic level during an emergency and ensuring the continuity of operation of a company.
EV charging station levels	None	• Level 1 Charging: 120-Volt; Connectors Used: J1772, NACS/J3400; Charging Speed: 3 to 5 Miles Per Hour • Level 2 Charging: 208-Volt to 240-Volt; Connectors Used: J1772, NACS/J3400; Charging Speed: 12 to 80 Miles Per Hour • Level 3 Charging: 400-Volt to 900-Volt (DC Fast Charge & Supercharging); Connectors Used: Combined Charging System (Combo), CHAdeMO & NACS/J3400; Charging Speed: 3 to 20 Miles Per Minute
Family Electric Rate Assistance Program (FERA)	None	CPUC established program for households of any size with incomes between 200% and 250% of federal poverty guidelines. (PU Code Section 739.12)
Fire Index Area (FIA)	None	Boundaries originally designated by the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection and United States Forest Service for the purpose of establishing a fire-danger rating for that area based on local conditions. There are 109 rating areas in PG&E’s service area.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
Fire Index Rating	None	A rating used by fire agencies to determine the risk of fire and its likely behavior. Its calculation considers fuel moisture, humidity, wind speed, air temperature, and historical fire occurrence. These ratings are as follows: • R1: Very little or no fire danger • R2: Moderate fire danger • R3: When fire danger is so high that care must be taken using fire-starting equipment. Local conditions may limit the use of machinery and equipment to certain hours of the day • R4: Fire danger is critical. The use of equipment and open flames are limited to specific areas and times • R5: Fire danger is so critical that the use of equipment and open flames are not allowed at any time • R5-Plus: Fire danger is at R5 "plus" high risk weather trigger of strong wind
First/Emergency Responders	None	Individuals who, in the early stages of an incident, are responsible for the protection and preservation of life, property, evidence, and the environment, including emergency response providers. The term “emergency response providers” includes federal, state, and local governmental and nongovernmental public safety, fire, law enforcement, emergency response, emergency medical services providers (including hospital emergency facilities), and related personnel, agencies and authorities.
Flame Length ft 8hr	Feet – Max (Threshold, Forecast Factor)	Flame length in feet on fire front for first eight hours of fire spread simulation from Technosylva. No observed value is available for this factor.
Full-Scale Exercise (FSE)	None	A complex, resource-intensive operations-based exercise often involving multiple agencies, jurisdictions/organizations, and real-time movement of resources.
Functional Exercise (FE)	None	An operations-based exercise designed to test and evaluate capabilities and functions in a realistic, real-time environment. Movement of resources is usually simulated.
Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC)	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	High fire risk issued by the Federal North or South Operations Predictive Services.
Hazard Awareness and Center (HAWC)	None	The operations center that monitors for wildfires. HAWC leadership communicates and informs other PG&E Business Units and Executive Leadership about threats from wildfires in the service area.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
High Fire Risk Area (HFRA)	None	Area where risk factors for the potential of catastrophic fire from utility infrastructure ignition during offshore wind events is higher than others. HFRA boundaries were developed based on the CPUC's HFTD boundaries.
High Fire Threat Districts (HFTDs)	None	Per D.17-01-009, areas of the State designated by the CPUC and California Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) to have elevated wildfire risk, indicating where utilities must take additional action (per GO 95, GO 165, and GO 166) to mitigate wildfire risk. The districts have three levels: • Zone 1: High Hazard Zones on the U.S. Forest Service-California Department of Forestry and CAL FIRE joint map of Tree Mortality High Hazard Zones • Tier 2: Elevated risk for utility-associated wildfires • Tier 3: Extreme risk for utility-associated wildfires
High Impact Critical Customers	None	Non-residential customers that may present a significant community impact in the event they experience a sustained outage but do not meet the CPUC criteria for a Critical Facility Customer.
High Priority Vegetation Tag	None	“Priority 1” and “Priority 2” vegetation tags are created when trained vegetation inspectors identify trees or limbs that currently present elevated risk and must be worked on an expedited basis. Inspectors use Priority 1 tags for vegetation (i) in contact or showing signs of previous contact with a primary conductor; (ii) actively failing or at immediate risk of failing and which could strike PG&E's facilities; or (iii) presenting an immediate risk to PG&E's facilities. Inspectors use Priority 2 tags for vegetation that does not rise to the level of Priority 1 but has encroached within the PG&E minimum clearance requirements or has an identifiable potential safety issue requiring expedited work.
High Wind Advisory	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	Advisory of high winds issued by the Federal National Weather Service.
High Wind Warning (HWW)	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	Warning of high winds issued by the Federal National Weather Service.
Life Support	None	Customers that require critical life support equipment in their home.
Medical Baseline (MBL) Program	None	This program assists residential customers who rely on power for certain medical needs, as certified by a licensed medical practitioner. Eligible customers receive an extra monthly allotment of energy or discount, depending on their current rate plan. The program also includes additional notifications in advance of a PSPS.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
Monitoring Stage	None	The seven days ahead of a weather event when weather patterns are being monitored. Utility provides seven-day proactive de-energization potential rolling forecast or implements an escalating notification system similar to the National Weather Service’s “weather watch” and “weather warning” system on its public website.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	Fire weather forecast issued by NOAA (SPC).
Officer-in-Charge (OIC)	None	A position specific to PSPS to engage higher-level management accountability in the decision to de-energize and restore power while also enabling rapid decision-making during real-time. The OIC approves all PSPS Decision Records and associated documentation following a PSPS.
Open PSPS Tags	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	PSPS-Qualified Tags include P1 (tree represents an immediate risk) and P2 (tree is damaged or diseased and could fall into nearby power lines) tree tags and Electric Corrective tags (Priority A - emergency, B - urgent, and E/F - risk-based).
Page View	None	The number of times a web page was viewed by individual users.
Patrol Inspection	None	In accordance with GO 165, a visual inspection of applicable utility equipment and structures that is designed to identify obvious structural problems and hazards. Patrol inspections may be carried out during other company business.
Prob Cat	Probability Outputs – Max (Threshold, Forecast, Observed Factor)	Fire Potential Index (FPI) Model Output minus Probability of a catastrophic fire if an ignition were to occur. FPI component of the CFPD model.
PSPS Mitigation	None	The efforts taken to avoid de-energization including backup generation, backup storage, distribution microgrid, islanding, patrols, sectionalization, switching, temporary substation microgrid, Transmission switching and vegetation management (expedite priority trees that prevent circuit from being removed from scope).

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
Public Safety Partner	None	First/emergency response providers at the federal, state and local levels including, water, wastewater and communication service providers, affected community choice aggregators, publicly owned utilities/electrical cooperatives, the CPUC, the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (OES) and the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. The term “emergency response providers” includes federal, state, and local governmental and nongovernmental public safety, fire, law enforcement, emergency response, emergency medical services providers (including hospital emergency facilities), and related personnel, agencies and authorities.
Rate of Spread Chhr 8hr	Chains/Hour – Max (Threshold, Forecast Factor)	Rate of fire spread in chains per hour for first eight hours of fire spread simulation from Technosylva. No observed value is available for this factor.
Red Flag Warning (RFW)	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	Red Flag Warning from the Federal National Weather Service.
Relative Humidity (RH)	Percentage – Min (Threshold, Forecast, Observed Factor)	Relative Humidity in percent at two meters above ground level. For observed values, this is the minimum relative humidity recorded by all weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated All-Clear time.
Self-Identified Vulnerable (SIV)	None	Customers who have indicated they are “dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology” as well as customers that are not enrolled or qualify for the MBL Program and “certify that they have a serious illness or condition that could become life threatening if service is disconnected.” In accordance with D.21-06-034, PG&E includes customers who have indicated they are “dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology” in an effort to identify customers “above and beyond those in the medical baseline population” to include persons reliant on electricity to maintain necessary life functions including for durable medical equipment and assistive technology. This designation remains on their account for one year, at which a customer can recertify their SIV Status.
Site Visit	None	A continuous session that begins when a user arrives on a site and ends after either 30 minutes of inactivity or 12 hours of continuous activity.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
SIV Program	None	A PG&E program inclusive of customers who have indicated they are “dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology” as well as customers that are not enrolled or qualify for the MBL Program and “certify that they have a serious illness or condition that could become life threatening if service is disconnected.” In accordance with D.21-06-034, PG&E includes customers who have indicated they are “dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology” in an effort to identify customers “above and beyond those in the medical baseline population” to include persons reliant on electricity to maintain necessary life functions including for durable medical equipment and assistive technology. This designation remains on their account for one year, at which a customer can recertify their SIV Status.
Sustained Wind	None	The average observed wind speed value over a two-minute period.
Tabletop Exercise (TTX)	None	A discussion-based exercise in response to a scenario, intended to generate a dialogue of various issues to facilitate a conceptual understanding, identify strengths and areas for improvement, and/or achieve changes in perceptions about plans, policies, or procedures.
Time Place (TP)	None	A portion of the PG&E grid that is electrically and geographically coherent and is forecast to experience consistent timing for severe fire weather. TPs are identified for each PSPS and receive consistent treatment for notifications and de-energization. Once actual weather conditions occur, Weather “All-Clear” and service restoration times may vary due to actual weather conditions across various TPs as well as within a TP.
Transmission (Tx) Impacts	Yes/No During PSPS (Qualitative Factor)	Distribution lines that would have been de-energized due to de-energization of upstream Transmission lines, regardless of whether those Distribution lines would have also been de-energized due to direct Distribution PSPS.
Vulnerable Populations	None	Individuals who have physical, developmental, intellectual disabilities; chronic conditions or injuries, are limited English proficient or non-English speaking; older adults, children, people living in institutionalized settings, low-income, homeless and/or transportation-disadvantaged (i.e., dependent on public transit) and pregnant women. This term is also used interchangeable with AFN.
Weather “All-Clear”	None	When severe weather has passed, the OIC gives approval to start patrols and restoration for all impacted areas at once or for specific areas.

Term	Unit/Value	Definition
Wind Gust	None	A rapid fluctuation of wind speed with variations of ten knots or more between peaks and lulls, typically, determined by averaging observed values over a three-second period.
WS MPH	MPH – Max (Threshold, Forecast, Observed Factor)	Sustained windspeed in miles per hour at 10 meters above ground level. The observed values show the maximum sustained wind speed recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated All-Clear time.

VERIFICATION


I, undersigned, say:

I am an officer of PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, a corporation, and am authorized to make this verification for that reason.

I have read the foregoing “PG&E Public Safety Power Shutoff Report to the CPUC” for the July 15, 2026 PSPS and I am informed and believe the matters stated therein to be true.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed at Oakland, California this 30th day of July 2026.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Abranches", is written over a horizontal line.

ANDREW ABRANCHES
VICE PRESIDENT
WILDFIRE MITIGATION