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July 21, 2025 **VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL**

Leslie Palmer
Director, Safety and Enforcement Division
California Public Utilities Commission
505 Van Ness Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94102

Dear Mr. Palmer:

As required by Resolution ESRB-8 and in accordance with Ordering Paragraph 1 of California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Decision (D.) 19-05-042, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) respectfully submits this report for the June 19 – 22, 2025 PSPS. This report has been verified by a PG&E officer in accordance with Rule 1.11 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure.

Members of the public may submit both formal and informal comments on this report to the CPUC by following instructions on the CPUC's website (www.cpuc.ca.gov). The CPUC's Public Advisor's Office has established procedures for providing such comments, including via online form. Comments may also be submitted directly to the Director of the Safety and Enforcement Division (SED) of the CPUC using the contact information below.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

Susan C. Martinez
Director of Liaison, Regulatory Operations and Engagement

Enclosures

cc: Anthony Noll, SED
ESRB_ComplianceFilings@cpuc.ca.gov
EnergyDivisionCentralFiles@cpuc.ca.gov

Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E)
Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) Report to the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)
June 19 – 22, 2025 De-energization

Contents

PG&E PSPS Report to the CPUC
June 19 – 22, 2025 De-energization

Section 1 – Summary and Overview

Section 1.1 - Brief description of the PSPS event starting from the time when the utility's Emergency Operation Center is activated until service to all customers have been restored. *(D.21-06-014, page 286, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
High winds can cause tree branches and debris to contact energized electric lines, and potentially lead to a wind-driven wildfire. As a result, we may need to turn off power during severe weather to help prevent wildfires. This is called a Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS). We recognize that it is disruptive for our customers to be without power, therefore, we initiate a PSPS when the weather forecast is so severe that public safety, lives, homes and businesses may be in danger of wildfires. It is not a decision we take lightly. For the safety of our customers and communities, PSPS continues to be a necessary tool as a last resort.

Timeline
On June 17, 2025, PG&E entered readiness posture and activated its Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to prepare for a potential PSPS. Between June 19 – 22, 2025, PG&E executed three de-energizations during an extended period of concern for two wind-related weather conditions (offshore and onshore) identified by PG&E's Meteorology Team. As a result of the concurrent weather conditions, a total of 16,223 customers were de-energized across 32 Time Places (TPs),[1] as shown in Figure 1. Due to the extreme onshore weather conditions, some customers experienced a back-to-back wave of de-energization between June 18 at 19:20 PDT to June 20 at 18:16 PDT.

On June 17, 2025, PG&E's Meteorology Team identified onshore weather conditions in fire forecast models and notified the EOC Commander. On Wednesday, June 18, the PSPS scope was refined based on updated meteorological forecasts, our teams readied the grid, and prepared Community Resource Centers (CRCs) and other customer support.

On June 18, PG&E's Meteorology Team extended the period of concern due to offshore weather condition forecasted between June 21 – 22. The forecast indicated that the onshore and offshore weather conditions would happen concurrently in some areas of the region. Upon this development, we closely monitored weather across multiple TPs. As a result, the EOC remained activated throughout the duration of both the onshore and offshore weather conditions.

On June 18, at 21:59 PDT, PG&E made the decision to approve de-energization of its assets and customers that were in scope for the June 19 – 20 time period due to onshore weather conditions to mitigate catastrophic wildfire risk across the Altamont, Northwest Sacramento Valley, and Salinas Valley foothills. On June 19 at 04:47 PDT, PG&E began de-energization of its assets and customers that were in scope in these areas.

In addition to the ongoing PSPS de-energization, PG&E's electric grid experienced increased demand and a simultaneous supply loss on June 19, requiring PG&E mitigation to avoid

[1] A Time-Place (TP) is a portion of the PG&E grid that is electrically and geographically coherent and is forecast to experience consistent timing for severe fire weather. Time-Places are identified for each PSPS and receive consistent treatment for notifications and de-energization. Once actual weather conditions occur, Weather "All-Clear" and service restoration times may vary due to actual weather conditions within a TP.

violating system operating limits which could lead to a potential cascading outage event. Although parts of San Joaquin County were de-energized during this PSPS, the grid emergency impacted a separate set of customers not within scope of the PSPS.[2]

On June 20, at 07:53 PDT, once winds subsided in parts of Shasta, San Joaquin, Alameda and Contra Costa, an opportunity was identified to issue All-Clear for a portion of the customers in scope impacted by the onshore weather conditions.

On June 21, at 10:15 PDT, PG&E began de-energizing customers across the western portions of the Central Valley and the inner portions of the Central Coast between June 21 – 22 due to a separate but concurrent offshore weather condition.

The last All-Clear was declared for the remaining All-Clear circuit segments for both the onshore and offshore weather conditions on June 22 at 07:08 PDT.

Throughout this PSPS, forecasted weather materialized faster than anticipated which resulted in multiple changes in scope.

For example, the scope established on June 18 for the de-energization expected on June 19 continued to change as the weather conditions materialized, with approximately, 2,000 customers added into scope across Colusa, Glenn, Monterey, Tehama and Shasta counties and 2,000 customers descoped in San Joaquin County. Shortly after, approximately 2,300 were added into scope across Tehama County and approximately 300 customers were descoped across Stanislaus, Colusa, Monterey, and Merced counties.

For the anticipated de-energization occurring on June 21, approximately 7,000 customers were added into scope across San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, Shasta, Tehama, Monterey, and Kern counties and approximately 300 customers were descoped across Glenn and Tehama. The escalated weather conditions and scope changes caused some missed notifications as discussed in Section 5.5.

However, PG&E avoided the de-energization of approximately 61,492 customers in the final scope with the use of mitigation efforts.

Inspections

During patrol inspections, we identified two instances of damage and one hazard caused by weather. See Section 2.2 for more information regarding the Technosylva fire spread simulation and Section 4 for more information regarding damages and hazards.

Following patrol inspections, customers were re-energized safely and as quickly as possible. Within 24 hours of the Weather All-Clear, 100% of customers' power had been restored. The average restoration time for this PSPS was five hours.

[2] Although there was no overlap in customer impacts between this PSPS and the grid emergency, a separate set of customers experienced an outage as a result of the supply loss to the grid.

Customer Outreach

Additionally, we coordinated with Southern California Edison (SCE) as some of their customers served by a PG&E circuit were in scope for de-energization. These customers are referred to as "shared customers." Throughout this EOC activation, we were in constant contact with SCE related to scope and notifications for customers in these areas.

Figure 1: PSPS Timeline



Section 1.2 - A table including the maximum numbers of customers notified and actually de-energized; number of counties de-energized; number of Tribes de-energized; number of Medical Baseline customers de- energized; number of transmission and distribution circuits de- energized; damage/hazard count; number of critical facilities and infrastructure de-energized. Hazards are conditions discovered during restoration patrolling or operations that might have caused damages or posed an electrical arcing or ignition risk had PSPS not been executed *(D.21-06-034, Appendix A, page A15, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
Table 1 identifies the maximum number of customers notified and de-energized; number of Tribes de-energized; number of counties and Tribes de-energized; number of Medical Baseline (MBL) Program customers de-energized; number of transmission and distribution circuits de-energized; damage/hazard count; and number of Critical Facilities and Infrastructure (CFI) de-energized.

Table 1: Customers Notified and De-energized[3,4]

Total Customers			MBL Program Customers	Counties	Tribes	Circuits			Damage/ Hazard Count	CFI De-energized
Notified	De-energized	Cancelled	De-energized	De-energized	De-energized	Transmission De-energized	Unique Distribution Circuits in Any Version of Scope	Distribution Circuits De-energized		
18,730	16,223	2,567	804	19	1	22	47	60	2 damages 1 hazard	522

[3] The information, times, and figures referenced in this report are based on the best available information available at the time of this report's submission. The information, times, and figures herein are subject to revision based on further analysis and validation.
[4] Number of customers de-energized and notified is a unique count. Customers who experienced multiple waves of de-energization are included as a single customer impact.

Section 1.3 - A PDF map depicting the de-energized area(s) *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
During the June 19 – 22, 2025 PSPS, we de-energized 16,223 customers in 32 TPs. The final de-energization footprint is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: De-energization Footprint Map

Section 2 – Decision Making Process

Section 2.1 - A table showing all factors considered in the decision to shut off power for each circuit de-energized, including sustained and gust wind speeds, temperature, humidity, and moisture in the vicinity of the de-energized circuits *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
See Appendix A for a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope for the June 19 – 22, 2025 PSPS.

Section 2.2 - Decision criteria and detailed thresholds leading to de-energization including the latest forecasted weather parameters versus actual weather. Also include a PSPS decision-making diagram(s)/flowchart(s) or equivalent along with narrative description *(D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A22, D.21-06-014, page 284, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
This section provides an overview of the criteria and threshold evaluation process that were used in the decision to de-energize customers during the June 19 – 22, 2025 PSPS.

PSPS Preparation and Scoping Process
At a high-level, Figure 3 shows the process used to prepare for a PSPS. PG&E utilized and referenced the following protocols and tools during the June 19 – 22, 2025 PSPS to determine the latest forecasted weather parameters versus actual weather. Appendix A includes anticipated parameters based on the latest forecast used to develop the planned de-energization scope versus actual weather parameters for each circuit.

Figure 3: PG&E's High-level PSPS Process Steps



PG&E considers executing a PSPS when strong gusty winds, critically low humidity levels, and low fuel moisture levels pose an unacceptable risk of causing fast-spreading, catastrophic wildfires. Assessments begin several days before the weather event is forecasted to take place.

We identify weather conditions that could create high fire potential by using a combination of high outage and ignition potential, high-resolution internal and external weather forecasting models and data from federal agencies that include the following:

- Ignition Probability Weather (IPW): Determines the potential of an outage due to weather conditions, and then for that outage to lead to an ignition.
- Fire Potential Index (FPI): Assists with fire model development and calibration.
- Technosylva: Provides fire spread modeling via data inputs.

Through partnerships with external experts, we developed our machine learning models using historic datasets and advanced forecast models that provide a better understanding of historical weather events and improve our weather forecasting. These models use the following:

- Precise location data points across our service territory to conduct hourly weather analyses using high-resolution, historical data.
- Over 100 trillion data points of historical weather and fuel.
- Hourly weather data such as temperature, relative humidity, wind speed, precipitation, pressure, and dead and live fuel moisture.
- Data storage and processing via the PG&E-Amazon Web Services Cloud.

Our thresholds and guidance for identifying critical fire risk and outage/ignition potential are determined by analyzing and rigorously testing our current PSPS protocols and criteria through decades of historical weather data in and around California.

External forecast information from the National Weather Service (NWS) (e.g., Red Flag Warnings (RFWs)) and other forecast agencies are examined carefully. Furthermore, we coordinate with these agencies during high-risk periods via daily conference calls to ultimately decide whether to de-energize portions of the grid for public safety.

Tools and Technology

PG&E partners with Technosylva, an external expert in the wildfire modeling field to test and deploy cloud-based wildfire spread model capabilities. This helps us to better understand where we might need to turn off power.

Each day, PG&E delivers our wildfire condition datasets to Technosylva, who then perform over 100 million fire spread simulations to provide fire spread scenarios that help to identify circuits that may be at risk during dry, windy weather. These are done every three hours, for the five days ahead.

Figures 4 – 6 show the Technosylva fire spread simulation demonstrating what a wildfire might have looked like, and the potential damages or impacts caused, if the June 19 – 22, 2025 PSPS had not been initiated. See Section 4 for more information regarding damages and hazards.

Figure 4: Fire Spread Simulation Damage to Equipment (Monterey County)



Impact Analysis

Size (ac)	81,902.7
Initial Attack Assessment	5 - Extreme
No. of Buildings	158
Total Population	88
No. of Places	19

Figure 5: Fire Spread Simulation Damage to Equipment (Monterey County)



Impact Analysis

Size (ac)	64,477.09
Initial Attack Assessment	5 - Extreme
No. of Buildings	340
Total Population	153
No. of Places	25

Figure 6 Fire Spread Simulation Hazard to Equipment (Shasta County)





Impact Analysis

Size (ac)	158.53
Initial Attack Assessment	1 - Low
No. of Buildings	80
Total Population	75
No. of Places	0

Decision Criteria and Thresholds for Distribution PSPS Protocols

When determining whether to turn off power for safety, we start with the distribution system. These powerlines are closer to communities and are generally more susceptible to dry, windy weather threats. The values presented in Figure 7 were developed using 10 years of PG&E's high-resolution climate data to help understand wildfire risk and the potential customer impacts of PSPS. We evaluate within a small geographic area (700 square kilometers) and if any of the measures are forecasted to be met, we scope the circuit segments within that region for de-energization. There is no single criterion or threshold that will require turning off power to a

distribution circuit. For event-specific thresholds, see Appendix A. Our process is outlined in Figure 7 below.

Figure 7: PSPS Protocols for Distribution



Step 1: Minimum Fire Potential Conditions (mFPC)
The first step to determine the scope of a PSPS is evaluating the mFPC. This ensures that PSPS is only executed during wind events when atmospheric conditions and fuels are dry. A PSPS is evaluated if the mFPC noted in Step 1 of Figure 7 above is met.

These values were established from an examination of historical fire occurrence in the PG&E service area, PSPS sensitivity studies using historical data viewed through the lens of both customer impacts and wildfire risk mitigated, as well as information published by federal agencies regarding fire behavior and criteria used to issue warnings to the public.

Step 2: In-Depth Review of Fire Risk
If all minimum fire conditions are met, we conduct an in-depth review of fire risk using three separate measures. If the criteria for any of these measures are met, we may need to turn off power for safety. We evaluate all the factors below together, rather than isolating any specific factor to assess fire risk against the potential harms of de-energization. For event-specific factors, see Appendix A.

- Catastrophic Fire Probability (CFPD): This model combines the probability of fire ignitions due to weather impacting the electric system with the probability that a fire will be catastrophic if it starts. It is the combination of the IPW and the FPI. The CFPD model accounts for changes over time based on actual performance data. Thus, the model will address positive and negative trends in grid performance and reliability year-over-year, incorporating grid improvements such as system hardening, and enhanced vegetation management based on their performance at mitigating outages over time.
    - IPW Model: A system comprised of two machine learning models. These models are used to evaluate the probability of outages across several outage classes (Outage Probability Weather (OPW) model) and the probability of that outage becoming an ignition (Ignition Given Outage Probability Weather Model (IOPW)). These models are combined for each location at each hour to ascertain

the ignition probability. These machine learning models use 10 years of weather data to correlate approximately 500,000 outages occurring on PG&E's distribution grid. The model analyzes the potential for several types of power outages in each weather event, as well as the potential for that outage to be the source of an ignition. IPW learns from and accounts for changes on the grid from year-to-year.

  - FPI Model: This model outputs the probability that a fire will become large or catastrophic and is used as a daily and hourly tool to drive operational decisions to reduce the risk of utility caused fires. It was enhanced in 2024 with additional data and improved analytic capabilities.

- Tree Strike Considerations: Our PSPS protocols utilize a machine learning model to integrate the potential for trees to strike the lines into our OPW Model and IPW Model. This helps our Meteorology Team more accurately analyze risk posed by trees and how that translates to increased ignition probability. See Figure 8 below explaining OPW modeling. Scenarios with a high risk of an IPW and a high FPI value will always warrant a PSPS. However, power may be turned off in other scenarios to avoid catastrophic wildfires.

Figure 8: Incorporating Tree Strike Potential into PSPS Modeling



- Catastrophic Fire Behavior (CFB): We also evaluate areas that are meeting mFPC (windy and dry conditions) but are not meeting our CFP guidance values by utilizing dynamic wildfire spread simulations from Technosylva. This allows us to consider potential ignition events that are rarer and more difficult to forecast such as animal and third-party contacts, or external debris impacting electrical lines. These locations are only considered once the mFPC are met, ensuring that conditions are sufficiently windy and dry.
- Fireline Intensity: The U.S. Forest Service Rocky Mountain Research Station did a study of fire line intensity which is determined by the size and components of flames. It is measured as the rate of heat energy released (Btu) per unit length of the fire line (ft) per unit(s). It is also calculated by estimating the flame length, the distance measured from the average flame tip to the middle of the fire's base. Internal studies that evaluated historical fire simulation outputs to actual fire events, damages, and fatalities showed that

outputs of flame length and rate of spread were best correlated to historical fire outcomes. Studies, as mentioned above, have shown that more intense fires with higher flame lengths and higher rates of spread are more difficult to control. Thus, we evaluate fire simulation data that indicates where fast-spreading and intense fires could manifest and incorporate that into our PSPS decision making process.

- Vegetation and Electric Asset Criteria Considerations: We review locations from recent inspections where high-priority trees or electric compliance issues may increase the risk of ignition. If an area is forecasted to experience minimum fire conditions and there are known issues with equipment or vegetation that have not yet been addressed, we may need to turn off power.

PSPS Protocols for Transmission

In addition to analyzing distribution circuits that may need to be de-energized for safety, we also review the transmission lines and structures in areas experiencing dry and windy weather conditions. Transmission lines are like the freeways of the electric system, carrying high voltage energy across long distances. Similar to our distribution protocols, there is no single factor or threshold that will require turning off power to a transmission line.

Step 1: mFPC

When determining whether to turn off power for safety on transmission lines, we review the same mFPC as with distribution circuits. If these conditions are met, we will review the criteria below to determine whether a transmission line must be turned off.

Step 2: In-Depth Review of Fire Risk

Once PG&E identifies the initial scope, we work with the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) to ensure the initial scope is appropriate. This includes analyzing whether it will compromise the power supply to other jurisdictions, utilities or facilities connected to our system. This important step can last several hours, which is why the potential scope of a PSPS may change as we get closer to the forecasted weather event.

- Catastrophic Fire Probability – Asset (CFP_T – Asset): We use computer models to assess the likelihood of equipment failure during a given weather event, and the subsequent risk of catastrophic wildfires if a failure occurs. This model uses a combination of the Operability Assessment (OA) and FPI Models, both in time and space, at every transmission structure to form the Transmission CFP_T model for asset failures. The OA Model combines historical wind speeds for each structure, historical outage activity, Bayesian updating, and the condition of assets based on inspection programs to help understand the wind-related failure probability of each structure. The OA Model can be driven with forecast wind speeds to output the probability of failure at the structure level.
- Catastrophic Fire Probability – Vegetation (CFP_T – Veg): The transmission-specific vegetation risk model is a calibrated probability of vegetation risk built internally using data collected and managed by PG&E vegetation management and external contractors such as NV5 and Formation Environmental. This model leverages aerial LiDAR data to map the location and attributes of trees near transmission lines. The transmission vegetation risk model is based on several factors such as overstrike, the amount of unobstructed fall paths to a wire, the slope between a tree and a conductor, and tree exposure. The transmission vegetation risk model is combined with the FPI Model in space and time to form CFP_T – Veg.

- CFB: We may de-energize customers where the consequence of a potential wildfire ignition would be extreme, even if the probability of a power line or equipment failure is low.
- Vegetation and Electric Asset Criteria Considerations: We review locations from recent inspections where high-priority trees or electric compliance issues are present that may increase the risk of ignition. Figure 9 provides a quantitative summary of our PSPS Protocols for Transmission.

Figure 9: PSPS – Protocols for Transmission



Step 3: Determining the Outage Area

Transmission lines meeting the criteria above pass to the next stage of review. We conduct a Power Flow Analysis on the in-scope transmission lines (if applicable) to analyze any potential downstream impacts of load shedding.

Reviewing Impact and Forecasted Weather

After determining the outage area both for Distribution and Transmission, PG&E reviews the forecasted customer impacts of each circuit against the forecasted wildfire risk of each circuit. If there is reasonable risk for ignition on the distribution circuits or transmission lines during the forecasted weather event, it is included in the PSPS scope. During key decision-making points, we internally share this analysis to inform PSPS decision-making and further risk modeling.

Starting 12 hours before the forecasted PSPS de-energization time, we transition from evaluating forecast data to observing the weather in real-time. Based on real-time observations and analysis, we continually evaluate all the outage areas identified in the previous steps and use external tools and analysis to determine whether to initiate PSPS de-energization.

Decision-Making and Analysis to Validate if PSPS is Necessary

During high-risk periods, PG&E Meteorologists participate in daily interagency conference calls that commonly include multiple NWS local offices, the NWS western region headquarters, and representatives from the Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC), also known as

Predictive Services. This call is hosted by the Northern California and/or Southern California GACC offices.

During these calls, the external agencies present their expert assessment on the upcoming periods and locations of risk, wind speeds and fuel moisture levels, and any other relevant factors to consider.

During a PSPS, PG&E's Lead Meteorologist, called the Meteorologist-in-Charge (MIC), summarizes these forecasts and discussions for the PG&E Officer-in-Charge (OIC), who ultimately makes the decision to execute a PSPS.

The following sources and tools are considered before initiating a PSPS by the MIC:

- Fire Weather Watches and RFW (NWS - Federal)
- Significant fire potential for wind (GACC - Federal)
- Storm Prediction Center (SPC) (part of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) - Federal)
- Daily interagency conference call with agencies during high-risk periods
- Field observer information
- Live weather data from weather stations
- Location of existing fires
- External weather model data

Based on the above analyses, we can determine how many customers may be subject to de-energization, and further investigate mitigation options, such as advanced switching solutions, sectionalization, the use of islanding, alternative grid solutions, and temporary generation, to support customers who could lose upstream power sources but are in areas that may be safe to keep energized.

We monitor and forecast weather over a multi-day horizon, so we can anticipate when a PSPS may be needed and activate our EOC as far in advance as possible. Our internal weather model and external modeling are updated multiple times per day. PG&E's Meteorology Team constantly evaluates both internal and external weather models for changes in weather timing, strength, and potential locations impacted. We then incorporate these changes into a new weather scope generally once per day.

Weather shifts may force changes to PSPS scope and impacts at any point in time during PSPS planning and execution; this may allow us to avoid de-energization in some areas if fire-critical conditions lessen but can also cause some areas and customers to move into de-energization scope late in the process if forecasted fire-critical weather footprints change or increase. Possible changes in PSPS scope and impact are driven by the inherent uncertainty in weather forecast models.

Section 2.3 - A thorough and detailed description of the quantitative and qualitative factors it considered in calling, sustaining, or curtailing each de-energization event including any fire risk or PSPS risk modeling results and information regarding why the de-energization event was a last resort, and a specification of the factors that led to the conclusion of the de-energization event. *(D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 9, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
The quantitative factors that were used in the decision to de-energize customers for safety are provided in Appendix A. Below, we outline a detailed description of the qualitative factors provided by our Meteorology Team when we were determining whether to de-energize customers.

PG&E Meteorology Team Review
On June 17, 2025, weather models indicated strong onshore winds developing between June 19 – 20. The same day, PG&E's Meteorology Team, Emergency Planning and Response Team, and EOC Commander met to discuss the potential PSPS.

Based on the emerging risk of weather conditions, we entered EOC readiness posture at 12:00 PDT on June 17 and activated the EOC at 18:00 PDT for onshore winds expected between June 19 – 20.

The initial scope for de-energization between June 19 – 20 was developed on June 17, reflecting the risk of dry winds in sea-breeze gaps and passes in the Eastern Bay Area, Northwest Sacramento Valley and Salinas Valley foothills. We continued to monitor the weather forecast and PSPS models. As a result of changing conditions, the scope was further adjusted again in the evenings of June 17 and June 18.

As the forecasted onshore winds continued to develop, on June 18, PSPS weather models indicated strong offshore weather developing between June 21 – 22. Due to the extended period of concern, the EOC remained activated throughout both onshore and offshore weather conditions.

The scope for de-energization between June 21 – 22 was developed on June 18 aligning with the dry and northerly wind gusts impacting the western Central Valley, its surrounding terrain, and elevated areas of the Central Coast. The scope was further adjusted on Thursday afternoon, June 19.

Although PG&E maintained its monitoring efforts due to the severe weather conditions, NWS offices did not issue Fire Weather Watches or RFWs for onshore weather conditions for June 19 – 20. Instead, they limited their signaling to indicate "elevated or near-critical" fire weather conditions and included fire weather discussions in area forecast discussions.

On June 19, NWS Sacramento began to highlight the upcoming offshore weather conditions between June 21 – 22 by issuing a Fire Weather Watch for portions of the Central Valley and surrounding foothills below 3,000 ft.

On June 20, federal forecast agencies continued to highlight upcoming weather conditions. All federal agencies kept this posture throughout the period of concern.

- NWS Sacramento upgraded their Fire Weather Watch to a RFW.

- NWS Hanford issued a RFW in effect on June 21 for the San Joaquin Valley and surrounding terrain.
- NWS Los Angeles issued a RFW in effect on June 21 for the Tehachapi Mountains.

High Resolution PSPS Models Guidance

The tools and models outlined in Section 2.2 are part of the decision criteria that PG&E's Meteorologists consider when determining PSPS scope. Longer range weather forecast model data are used to determine the location and timing of a PSPS. Typically, these weather forecasts are less certain the farther the observed date. This is akin to the well-known hurricane "cone of uncertainty" in which the potential track of a hurricane is represented by an area that expands farther out in time, which resembles an expanding cone. Thus, there is an inherent tradeoff between the further out the forecasts are for a PSPS and the uncertainty in the PSPS scope and waiting until forecasts become more certain. Forecast uncertainty leads to changes in PSPS scope as weather forecast models are updated, and the scope is refined closer to the period of concern.

As the PSPS unfolds in real-time, PG&E's Meteorologists transition to real-time observations of weather stations, satellite data, pressure gradients, and live feeds from Alert Wildfire Camera. These observations help to evaluate if the weather is behaving as expected. In many instances, models trend stronger or weaker with each model iteration leading up to a PSPS.

External PSPS Decision Inputs

Meteorological analyses establish that high winds in California create significant fire threat and exacerbate fire spread. The NWS issues a RFW to indicate critical fire weather conditions under which any fire that develops will likely spread rapidly. California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) states, "the types of weather patterns that cause a watch or warning include low relative humidity, strong winds, dry fuels, the possibility of dry lightning strikes, or any combination of the above." As noted previously, PG&E's PSPS outages consistently occur during periods and in areas where federal, state, and local authorities have identified as having extreme fire risk including the presence of strong winds.

We compare our fire risk forecasts against those of external agencies, for validation that there is shared recognition of high fire risk across the California meteorology community. Between June 17 and June 21, our analysis of fire risk justifying a PSPS were validated by multiple sources and warnings:

- RFWs from the NWS were issued from three local NWS offices: NWS Sacramento, NWS Hanford, and NWS Oxnard (Figure 10).
- NOAA's SPC's Fire Weather Outlooks indicating elevated fire-weather conditions across California (Figure 11 and 12).

Figure 10: NWS RFW Coverage from the NWS Sacramento, Hanford, and Oxnard Weather Offices for the June 21 – 22, 2025 Offshore Weather Event

Figure 11: NOAA – SPC Forecasts of Elevated and Critical Fire Weather Conditions for the June 19 – 20, 2025 Onshore Weather Event



Figure 12: NOAA – SPC Forecasts of Elevated and Critical Fire Weather Conditions for the June 21 – 22, 2025 Offshore Weather Event



We also review forecasted wind speeds in the potential PSPS-impacted counties to evaluate the need for a PSPS. Figure 13 also shows the Utility FPI Ratings for Fire Index Areas (FIAs) in PG&E's service area for June 19, 2025. We determine the scope for PSPS outages within those FIAs with fire risk rating R5-Plus from PG&E's FPI model. In Figure 14, the PSPS scope can be compared with other agencies to vet the fire weather risk.

Figure 13: PG&E Utility Fire Potential Index Ratings for June 19 – 22, 2025



Figure 14: Federal Agency Sever Fire Weather Warning Footprints to Final PSPS Scope

NWS RFW



NOAA Fire Weather Outlook



Section 2.4 - An explanation of how the utility determined that the benefit of de-energization outweighed potential public safety risks, and analysis of the risks of de-energization against not de-energizing. The utility must identify and quantify customer, resident, and the general public risks and harms from de-energization and clearly explain risk models, risk assessment processes, and provide further documentation on how the power disruptions to customers, residents, and the general public is weighed against the benefits of a proactive de-energization *(D.19-05- 042, Appendix A, page A24, D.21-06-014, page 284, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
For the June 19 – 22, 2025 PSPS, PG&E used the PSPS Risk Model with the latest scope prior to the first de-energization. As discussed in detail below, based on the scoping of this PSPS, our Risk Model supported initiating a PSPS based on the forecasted impact information indicating that each of the 60 distribution circuits and 22 transmission lines in the latest scope surpassed the analysis threshold of one to support a PSPS. The PSPS Risk Model calculations are based on forecasted conditions.

PG&E's PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool, which is further detailed below, addresses the CPUC's requirements presented in the 2019 PSPS OII.[5] This decision requires California investor-owned utilities (IOUs) to quantify the risk/benefits associated with initiating or not initiating a PSPS for our customers.

PG&E incorporated the aforementioned risk-benefit analysis into our PSPS execution process to help inform our PSPS decision-making process. Our risk-benefit tool aligns with California IOUs Multi-Attribute Value Function (MAVF) framework, as defined through the Safety Modeling Assessment Proceeding (SMAP), which specifies how various consequences are

[5] D. 21-06-014

factored into a risk calculation. Utilizing this framework, we incorporate PSPS forecast information into our PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool, which is further described under the "Risk Assessment" section below.

The output of the tool is a ratio that compares the calculated PSPS potential benefit from initiating de-energization (i.e., mitigation of catastrophic wildfire consequence) to the risks associated with PSPS (i.e., impact to customers resulting from a PSPS outage). Key inputs in the risk-benefit analysis include results from Technosylva wildfire simulations specific to the distribution circuit and transmission lines in scope for a potential de-energization, the number of customers forecasted to be de-energized, and the forecasted number of customer minutes across each identified circuit in scope for a potential de-energization.

After the potential de-energization scope is determined, including the identification of potentially impacted circuits for the potential PSPS in question, this scope and the Technosylva wildfire simulation outputs are used as inputs into the Risk-Benefit tool, which quantifies the potential public safety risk and wildfire risk resulting from the forecasted impacts of the pending PSPS. Note that the Wildfire Risk Score is based on an 8-hour simulation from Technosylva and while useful, in some cases this can significantly understate the risk. Thus, the MIC may still recommend to de-energize circuits where the Risk-Benefit tool shows higher PSPS risk than Wildfire risk.

Risk Assessment

As referenced above, PG&E's PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool utilizes California IOU agreed approach utilizing the MAVF framework that captures the safety, reliability, and financial impact of identified potential risk events, as outlined in our Enterprise Risk Register.[6] The tool's calculations use a non-linear scaling of consequences reflecting our focus on low-frequency/high-consequence risk events without neglecting high-probability/low-consequence risk events. Developed by the PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool, MAVF scores are used to compare the potential de-energization risk from a forecasted PSPS to the potential risk of catastrophic wildfires from keeping the circuits energized, specific to the potentially impacted circuits being considered for PSPS de-energization.

The following inputs are used in calculations to build MAVF risk scores for PSPS outages and wildfires, which are ultimately weighed against one another:

- Technosylva Wildfire Simulation Data: Fire simulation forecasts on the consequence of a potential wildfire's impact on customers, wildlife, and infrastructures on each circuit for every three hours. These values are based on Technosylva's proprietary and sophisticated wildfire modeling, using real-time weather models, state-of-the-art fuel, and 8-hour fire spread modeling.
- Forecasted Circuits: The final list of the distribution circuits and transmission lines identified to be in-scope for a potential PSPS.
- Customer Minutes**:** Forecasted outage duration the customers will face by the potential PSPS.
- Customers Impacted: Forecasted number of customers anticipated to be impacted by the potential PSPS.
- Customer Category and Critical Customer Adjustment Factor: The type of customer (e.g., MBL Program, etc.) is incorporated into the analysis through the use of a "critical

[6] Full details of the MAVF methodology are provided through the RAMP Report, pp. 3-3 to 3-15 and General Rate Case (GRC) workpapers in response to Energy Division GRC-2023-PhI_DR_ED_001_Q01Supp01.

customer adjustment factor," which is applied to the customer outage duration to reflect a higher risk score for customers who are at a greater adverse risk of a potential de-energization event.

Once the above data are made available and incorporated into the tool, the modeling considerations described below are used to estimate the consequence of the: 1) potential wildfire risk and 2) PSPS risk at the per-circuit level. Throughout the tool, a variety of modeling considerations are made to facilitate calculations which are included in Table 2 and summarized in Figure 15.

Table 2: 2025 PSPS Risk-Benefit Consequence Modelling Considerations

Consequence Type	Wildfire Consequence Considerations	PSPS Consequence Considerations
Safety	Calculated based on maximum population impacts derived from Technosylva wildfire simulation models and a fatality ratio based on National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) data.	Calculated from an estimate of Equivalent Fatalities (EF) per Million Customer Minutes Interrupted (MMCI). The EF/MMCI ratio is estimated from previous PG&E PSPS outages and other large external outage events.[7]
Reliability	N/A	Calculated directly from the potential number of customers impacted and outage duration based on customer minutes interrupted.
Financial	Calculated based on maximum building impacts derived from Technosylva wildfire simulation models and a cost per structure burned previously evaluated in 2020 RAMP Report.[8]	Calculated based on two financial estimates, 1) distribution of a lump sum cost of execution across all relevant circuits and 2) an estimated proxy cost per customer in scope per PSPS.[9]

Potential Wildfire Risk

Wildfire consequence impacts are calculated based on the outputs of the Technosylva simulations. Variables include 1) population impacted by wildfire and 2) structures impacted by wildfire used to calculate natural unit values for two consequence components:

- Wildfire Safety Consequence: EF
- Wildfire Financial Consequence: Financial Cost of Wildfire (in dollars)

Potential PSPS Risk

PSPS consequence impacts are based on the following values: duration of de-energization by circuit, and number of customers impacted by de-energization on each circuit. These input values are used to calculate natural unit values for three consequence components:

[7] Previous PG&E PSPS include 2019-2021 events, and other large external outage events include the 2003 Northeast Blackout in New York City, 2011 Southwest Blackout in San Diego, 2012 Derecho Windstorms, 2012 Superstorm Sandy, 2017 Hurricane Irma, 2021 Blackout event.

[8] See A.20-06-012.

[9] The assumptions used in these calculations, including the proxy cost per customer per PSPS, are subject to be updated and are not intended to prejudge or create precedent with regard to the development of more precise values of resiliency or cost of PSPS metrics being considered in other ongoing proceedings at the California Public Utilities Commission, such as the Risk-Based Decision-Making Rulemaking [R.20.07.013] and the Microgrid and Resiliency Strategies.

- PSPS Safety Consequence: EF as an output of Customer Minutes interrupted
- PSPS Electric Reliability Consequence: Customer Minutes Interrupted × Critical Customer Adjustment Factor
- PSPS Financial Consequence: Financial Cost of PSPS (in dollars) × Critical Customer Adjustment Factor

Once the consequence values (safety, reliability, financial) are estimated they are converted into MAVF risk scores. Once the Risk-Benefit tool calculates the impacts between the PSPS and a wildfire, it is summarized in Figure 16 and 17 by indicating if the adverse impact from a PSPS outweighs the risk of a wildfire.

Figure 15: Visual Representation of PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool



Figure 16: PSPS Potential Benefit Versus PSPS Potential Risk Consequence: Onshore Weather Conditions

PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	156
PSPS Potential Benefit (Wildfire Mitigation)	120,875
Potential Benefit : Potential Risk	771.72
Recommended Approach	Indicates potential PSPS benefit outweighs risk
Risk Ratio Per Circuit (>1, PSPS Benefit Outweighs Risk) As defined in PLAN_D-03	Dx Circuits: 46 (of 46)[1] Tx Circuits: 21 (of 21)

Aggregated to event-level

[1] *Includes two circuits that each occur in two TPs, and hence these circuits are counted twice for circuit count in PSPS Situation Report.*

$\frac{PSPS\ Potential\ Benefit\ (wildfire\ risk)}{PSPS\ Potential\ Risk} > 1$ **Indicates potential PSPS benefit outweighs risk**

$\frac{PSPS\ Potential\ Benefit\ (wildfire\ risk)}{PSPS\ Potential\ Risk} < 1$ **Indicates potential risk may outweigh potential benefit**

Key Factors

- **PSPS Consequence**
  - Safety consequence factors in planned and unplanned widespread outage events across the US.
  - Reliability consequence based on customer minutes interrupted
  - Financial consequence based on execution and fixed customer cost per event
  - Assumes maximum duration for each customer per circuit
- **PSPS Benefit (Wildfire Mitigation)**
  - Safety consequence based on population impacted from fire spread simulation
  - Reliability consequence not considered
  - Financial consequence based on buildings impacted from fire spread simulation
  - Assumes an ignition on each circuit based on the maximum consequence modeled by TechnoSylva

Figure 17: PSPS Potential Benefit Versus PSPS Potential Risk Consequence: Offshore Weather Conditions



Section 2.5 - Explanation of alternatives considered and evaluation of each alternative.
(D.19-05-042 Appendix A, page A22.)

Response:
After reviewing the meteorological information that indicated potential for catastrophic wildfire and the impacts on customers through de-energization, we considered whether alternatives to de-energizing, such as additional vegetation management and disabling automatic reclosers, could adequately reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire thus lowering the need for de-energization. We determined these measures alone did not reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire in areas within the PSPS scope sufficiently to protect public safety.

Section 3 – De-energized Time, Place, Duration and Customers

Section 3.1 - The summary of time, place and duration of the event, broken down by phase if applicable *(Resolution ESRB-8 page 3, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
The PSPS occurred over the timeframe of June 19 – 22, 2025 in 32 TPs located in 19 counties.

Section 3.2 - A zipped geodatabase file that includes PSPS event polygons of de-energized areas. The file should include items that are required in Section 3.3. (SED Additional Information.)

Response:
A zipped geodatabase file that includes PSPS polygons of final de-energized areas combined with the PSPS data can be found in the attachment "*PGE_ PSPS_Polygons_of_De-energized_Areas_20250721.gdb.zip.*"

Section 3.3 - A list of circuits de-energized, with the following information for each circuit. This information should be provided in both a PDF and excel spreadsheet *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.)*

- **County**
- **De-energization date/time**
- **Restoration date/time**
- **"All Clear" declaration date/time**
- **General Order (GO) 95, Rule 21.2-D Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 classification or non- High Fire Threat District**
- **Total customers de-energized**
- **Residential customers de-energized**
- **Commercial/Industrial Customers de-energized**
- **Medical Baseline (MBL) customers de-energized**
- **AFN other than MBL customers de-energized**
- **Other Customers**
- **Distribution or transmission classification**

Response:
A total of 16,223 customers were de-energized during this PSPS. Of the customers de-energized, 12,526[10] were residential, 2,488 were commercial/industrial, 2,692 AFN other than MBL, 1,200 were customers in the "Other"[11] category and 804 were MBL Program customers. Additionally, 22 PG&E defined transmission-level[12] customers were de-energized. Appendix B lists de-energized circuits and the relevant information relating to each circuit.

[10] MBL Program and AFN customers are included within the count of residential customers affected.
[11] 'Other' includes customers that do not fall under the residential or commercial/industrial categories such as governmental agencies, traffic lights, agricultural facilities, and prisons.
[12] PG&E defines transmission-level customers as customers being served by 60 kV assets or higher.

Section 4 – Damages and Hazards to Overhead Facilities

Section 4.1 – Description of all found wind-related damages or hazards to the utility's overhead facilities in the areas where power is shut off. *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
During this PSPS, weather stations near the areas in scope recorded wind gusts as high as 61 mph. These are shown in Table 15 and Figure 30 in Section 12.

During patrols of the de-energized circuits prior to restoring power, PG&E found two incidents of wind-related damages and one hazard. Damages are conditions that occurred during this PSPS, likely wind-related, necessitating repair or replacement of PG&E's asset, such as a wire down or a fallen pole. Hazards are conditions that might have caused damage or posed an electrical arcing or ignition risk had PSPS not been executed, such as a tree limb found suspended in electrical wires. The damage and hazard locations are illustrated in Figure 18 – 20 and mapped in Figure 21.

Figure 18: Vegetation hazard in Shasta County –Tree fell on service line

Figure 19: Wind related damage in Monterey County – Broken transformer bushings



Figure 20: Wind related damage in Monterey County – Broken crossarm

Section 4.2 - A table showing circuit name and structure identifier (if applicable) for each damage or hazard, County that each damage or hazard is located in, whether the damage or hazard is in a High Fire-Threat District (HFTD) or non-HFTD, Type of damage/hazard of damage. *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
A table of damages and hazards within the de-energized areas can be found in Appendix C.

Section 4.3 - A zipped geodatabase file that includes the PSPS event damage and hazard points. The file should include items that are required in Section 4.2. *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
A zipped geodatabase file that includes the PSPS damage and hazard points can be found in attachment "*PGE_PSPS_Damage_Hazard_Points_20250721.gdb.zip.*"

Section 4.4 - A PDF map identifying the location of each damage or hazard. *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
See Figure 21 below for a map identifying the location of the damages and hazard.

Figure 21: Map of Damage/Hazard Incidents During the June 19 – 22, 2025 PSPS

Section 5 – Notifications

Section 5.1 - A description of the notice to public safety partners, local/tribal governments, paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a community resource center, multi-family building account holders/building managers in the AFN community, and all customers, including the means by which utilities provide notice to customers of the locations/hours/services available for CRCs, and where to access electricity during the hours the CRC is closed. *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 3. D21-06-034, Appendix A, page A2, A9-A10, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:

Throughout the PSPS, PG&E followed the Notification Plan included in our 2025 Pre-Season Report, Appendix C: Notification Plan, pp. 59-67, and made significant efforts to notify Tribal/Local Governments, Public Safety Partners, CBOs (including paratransit agencies) and impacted customers in accordance with the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines.[13] See Table 3**.** for a description of the notifications PG&E sent to stakeholders in accordance with the minimum timelines set forth by the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines.[14]

PG&E's notifications direct stakeholders to the PSPS updates page via each PSPS notification, which includes a link to CRC information. This website prominently highlights the dedicated CRC page, which includes locations, hours of operation, services available at each site, information regarding how to find local CRCs via the PSPS outage map and where to access electricity during the hours CRCs are closed. See Section 9 for more information on CRCs.

Multi-family building account holders/building managers in the AFN community are considered part of our All Customers (including MBL Program customers and Self-Identified Vulnerable (SIV)[15] Program customers) recipient group. For information on PG&E's outreach and community engagement with master-metered owners, property managers, and building account holders, see PG&E's AFN Quarterly Progress Report of activities between January 1, 2025 and March 31, 2025.

Additionally, we collaborated closely with SCE as PG&E identified one shared customer (non-residential) on the Mist Circuit to ensure that SCE could successfully execute PSPS notifications to these customers.

Apart from providing direct notifications to stakeholders, PG&E alerted the public in advance of de-energization, via the media and PG&E's website.

[13] D.19-05-042.
[14] D.19-05-042.
[15] SIV Program is inclusive of customers who have indicated they are "dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology" as well as customers that are not enrolled or qualify for the MBL Program and "certify that they have a serious illness or condition that could become life threatening if service is disconnected." In accordance with D.21-06-034, PG&E includes customers who have indicated they are "dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology" in an effort to identify customers "above and beyond those in the medical baseline population" to include persons reliant on electricity to maintain necessary life functions including for durable medical equipment and assistive technology. This designation remains on their account indefinitely.

Media Engagement

From the time PG&E publicly announced the PSPS until power was restored, PG&E engaged with the public through the media:

- Proactively issued 29 local news releases and updates directly to news outlets.
- Responded to 75 media inquiries, either from media outlets that contacted PG&E's 24-hour media line, or direct calls/emails to field media.
- Participated in 42 media interviews (i.e. live, recorded or unrecorded phone interviews) to provide situational updates and preparedness messages.
- As of June 26, 2025, identified 382 unique print, online, and broadcast stories.

PG&E Website

PG&E placed an Informational Alert on the pge.com home page that directed to PG&E's PSPS site. From PSPS start to full restoration, the emergency website saw a total of 423,546 visits and 1,227,879 page views.

Among other resources noted throughout this report, PG&E's PSPS updates pages include information regarding Electric Vehicle (EV), American Sign Language (ASL), Independent Living Centers (ILCs), Backup Power, AFN customer resources, MBL Program information and more. Additionally, the Address look-up tool and Address-level alerts, are available on our website, in 16 languages, that allow non-PG&E-account holders to receive notifications for any address where they do not receive a bill (e.g., workplace, child's school, renters, mobile home parks, etc.).

We remain committed to the continuous improvement of our websites to better meet the needs of customers. As we launch new features to pge.com and to pgealerts.alerts.pge.com, we test to ensure compliance with WCAG 2.1AA standards and improve customer experience. Where possible, we remediate accessibility issues that customers or stakeholders have brought to our attention.

Table 3: Notification Descriptions

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
PRIORITY NOTIFICATION: 48-72 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization	Public Safety Partners and CBOs,[16] transmission-level customers, and municipal utilities	On June 17, 2025, PG&E's Meteorology Team observed that forecast models had strengthened and weather materialized faster than anticipated for a potential PSPS. As a result, weather forecast on pge.com/weather was updated to "elevated" in certain parts of the service area. Simultaneously, local PG&E representatives called each County Office of Emergency Services (OES) in PG&E's electrical service area and select Tribes and cities to inform them that PG&E was monitoring an increased potential for a PSPS. PG&E was also in contact with local agency representatives and alerted Public Safety Partners of the

[16] Phase 3 D.21-06-034, Appendix A, page A9, Section G. MBL Program and AFN Communities, No. 4, Each electric investor-owned utility must provide proactive notification and impacted zip code information to paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a CRC during a PSPS.

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
PRIORITY NOTIFICATION: 48-72 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization		potential PSPS as meteorological conditions developed. Once PSPS scope was approved and materials were established for potential de-energization, the Priority Notification window had already passed, therefore, Priority Notifications were not sent to some Public Safety Partners in the initial scope.

WATCH NOTIFICATION: 24-48 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers), transmission-level customers, and municipal utilities	During this time, the following was completed:
		• PG&E submitted a PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an email to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E's EOC has been activated and that PG&E is monitoring for potential PSPS.
		• PG&E sent notifications to Public Safety Partners, transmission-level customers, municipal utilities, and all customers via call, text message and e-mail; these notifications included the following information:
		  ○ Estimated window of the de-energization time.
		  ○ When the adverse weather is anticipated to pass.
		  ○ ETOR.
		  ○ For Public Safety Partners only: Links to the PSPS Portal.
		  ○ For Customers only: Potentially impacted addresses, links to PSPS Updates webpage with CRC information, and resources for AFN customers, including but not limited to information on the MBL Program, language support, and the Portable Battery Program[17] (PBP).
		  ○ For transmission-level customers only: Transmission Substation Name and Line name serving substation.
		• PG&E sent notifications to MBL Program customers, including tenants of master metered accounts, and SIV Program customers every hour until the customer confirmed receipt of the notification.
		
		Customer notifications were provided in English, with information on how to get PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications were provided in English.

WARNING NOTIFICATION: 1-4 hours in advance of	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers	During this time, the following was completed: • PG&E submitted a PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E has made the decision to de-energize.

[17] For more information about the PBP Program, see PG&E's 2025 AFN Plan.

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
anticipated de-energization, if possible	(including MBL Program customers, SIV Program customers), transmission-level customers, and municipal utilities	• PG&E sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners, transmission-level customers, and customers; these notifications included the same key PSPS timing information and resource links as the "Watch Notification." • PG&E sent notifications to MBL Program customers, including tenants of master metered accounts, and SIV Program customers every hour until the customer confirmed receipt of the notification. ○ PG&E also sent Cancellation Notifications to Public Safety Partners and customers within two hours of being removed from scope to inform them that power would not be shut off. Customer notifications were provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications were provided in English.
CANCELLATION NOTIFICATION: Within 2-hours of decision to cancel	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, All Customers (including MBL program customers, SIV customers)	When it was determined that de-energization was not needed for safety, the following was completed: • PG&E submitted a PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC. • PG&E sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners, customers and MBL Program customers, including tenants of master metered accounts, and SIV Program customers; these notifications included confirmation that they would no longer be de-energized, along with PG&E information resource links. Customer notifications were provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications were provided in English.
POWER OFF NOTIFICATION: When de-energization is initiated	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers), transmission-	When shut off was initiated, the following was completed: • PG&E submitted a PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC to notify them that de-energization has been initiated. • Agency Representatives of PG&E conducted a live call and/or sent an e-mail, as appropriate, to County OES representatives that were within the potential PSPS scope area and select Tribes and cities to inform them that customers within their jurisdiction were beginning to be de-energized.

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description

POWER OFF NOTIFICATION: When de-energization is initiated	level customers[18], and municipal utilities	• PG&E Grid Control Center (GCC) conducted live agent calls to impacted transmission-level customers.
		• PG&E sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners municipal utilities, transmission-level customers and customers via call, text messages, and e-mail, which included:
		  ○ Impacted addresses (for customers only).
		  ○ De-energization time.
		  ○ When the adverse weather is anticipated to pass.
		  ○ For Customers Only: Links to the PSPS Updates webpage with CRC information, and resources for AFN customers, including but not limited to information on the MBL Program, Meals on Wheels, language support, and the PBP.
		
		Customer notifications were provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications were provided in English.

WEATHER "ALL-CLEAR"/ETOR UPDATE NOTIFICATION: Immediately before re-energization begins	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers), transmission-level customers, and municipal utilities	After the weather event had passed and the area was deemed safe to begin patrols and restoration, PG&E completed the following:
		• Submitted a PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E is initiating re-energization patrols.
		• Sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners, transmission-level customers[19], municipal utilities and customers via call, text message and e-mail; these notifications included the ETOR.
		• Sent "PSPS update" notifications to customers if their ETOR changed; two ways that an ETOR may change include:
		  ○ New field or meteorology conditions.
		  ○ Damage was found during patrols and repair is needed.
		
		Customer notifications were provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-

[18]Transmission-level customers receive a GCC live call before de-energization and prior to re-energization.
[19]Transmission lines serving impacted Transmission-level Customers and Municipal Utilities may cut across multiple FIAs and will only be notified when all those FIAs that the line cuts across have been given the All-Clear.

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
		language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications were provided in English.
RESTORATION NOTIFICATION: When re-energization is complete	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers), transmission-level customers, and municipal utilities	GCC conducted live agent calls to notify impacted transmission-level customers of restoration. Once customers, including MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers, were restored, they received notifications via call, text, and e-mail. This was done using an automated process that issued customer notifications every 15 minutes upon restoration of service. Customer notifications were provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Once all customers were restored, PG&E submitted the final PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES, sent an e-mail to the CPUC confirming restoration of PSPS outages and reclassification of customers if applicable, and sent a notification to Public Safety Partners via call, text, and e-mail. Public Safety Partner notifications were provided in English.

Section 5.2 – Notification timeline including prior to de-energization, initiation, restoration, and cancellation, if applicable. The timeline should include the required minimum timeline and approximate time notifications were sent. *(D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A8-A9, D.21-06-034, page A11)*

Response:
Table 4 describes notifications and the time the notification was sent in accordance with the minimum timelines set forth by the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines,[20] to Tribal/Local Governments, Public Safety Partners, and all customers prior to de-energization, initiation, and restoration. The advanced notification guidelines set forth in the Phase 1 Guidelines are not based on a strict liability standard and state that "the electric investor-owned utilities should, whenever possible, adhere to following minimum notification timeline…"[21]

PG&E was in contact with local agency representatives and alerted Public Safety Partners of the potential PSPS as meteorological onshore wind conditions developed. As forecast models strengthened and the real-time weather materialized faster than forecasted, the approved initial PSPS scope was established for de-energization after the (72-48hr) Priority Notification window had already passed. Therefore, Priority Notifications were not sent to some of the Public Safety Partners in the initial scope, due to factors outside our control, in accordance with Phase 1 Guidelines. However, four net new counties were added to a revised scope for a later anticipated de-energization time who received Priority Notifications within the 72-48hr window.

[20] D.19-05-042.
[21] See D.19-05-042, Appendix A

Table 4: Customer Notification Timeline Summary

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
Pre-De-energization (Prior)	72-48 hours	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	Not sent	Priority	Priority Notifications were not sent for initial scope See Section 5.2 and 5.5 for more information.	None
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/19/2025 1:53	Priority		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	Not sent	Priority	Priority Notifications were not sent for initial scope. See Section 5.2 and 5.5 for more information.	None
		Public Safety Partners**	6/19/2025 3:01	Priority		PG&E
	48-24 hours	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/17/2025 21:03	Watch		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/18/2025 7:16	Watch		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/18/2025 23:27	Watch		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/19/2025 17:28	Watch		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/20/2025 5:44	Watch		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	6/18/2025 7:42	Watch		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	6/19/2025 18:30	Watch		PG&E

[22] D.19-05-042, Appendix A, Timing of Notification.

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
Pre-De-energization (Prior)		Public Safety Partners**	6/20/2025 5:44	Watch		PG&E
		All Customers***	6/18/2025 7:27	Watch		PG&E
		All Customers***	6/19/2025 18:30	Watch		PG&E
		All Customers***	6/20/2025 5:44	Watch		PG&E
		All Customers***	6/20/2025 6:50	Watch		SCE
	24-12 hours[23]	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/20/2025 21:16	Watch		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	6/19/2025 00:46	Watch		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	6/20/2025 21:16	Watch		PG&E
		All Customers***	6/19/2025 00:45	Watch		PG&E
		All Customers***	6/20/2025 21:10	Watch		SCE
		All Customers***	6/20/2025 21:13	Watch		PG&E
	4-1 hours	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/19/2025 6:56	Warning		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/19/2025 14:39	Warning		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/20/2025 10:12	Warning		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/20/2025 12:26	Warning		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 4:38	Warning		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 5:35	Warning		PG&E

[23] While not a CPUC requirement, PG&E provides an additional 24-12 hour notification to Tribal/Local Governments, Public Safety Partners and Customers.

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 7:35	Warning		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 9:34	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	6/19/2025 7:31	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	6/19/2025 14:26	Warning		PG&E
Pre-De-energization (Prior)		Public Safety Partners**	6/20/2025 10:13	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	6/20/2025 12:36	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	6/21/2025 4:47	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	6/21/2025 7:51	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	6/21/2025 5:42	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	6/21/2025 9:59	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	6/19/2025 7:24	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	6/19/2025 14:21	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	6/20/2025 10:11	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	6/20/2025 12:36	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	6/21/2025 4:47	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	6/21/2025 5:41	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	6/21/2025 7:47	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	6/21/2025 9:56	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	6/21/2025 10:06	Warning		SCE
Initiation (During)	When De-energization is initiated (Power Off)	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/19/2025 9:08	Power Off		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/19/2025 9:45	Power Off		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
Initiation (During)		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/19/2025 9:48	Power Off		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/19/2025 9:48	Power Off		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/19/2025 9:56	Power Off		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/19/2025 9:57	Power Off		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/19/2025 10:19	Power Off		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/19/2025 10:24	Power Off		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/19/2025 10:28	Power Off		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/19/2025 13:13	Power Off		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/19/2025 13:14	Power Off		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/19/2025 14:13	Power Off		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/19/2025 17:35	Power Off		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/19/2025 18:59	Power Off		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/20/2025 13:51	Power Off		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/20/2025 13:59	Power Off		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/20/2025 15:46	Power Off		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
Initiation (During)		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/20/2025 15:50	Power Off		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/20/2025 16:34	Power Off		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 5:28	Power Off		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 10:39	Power Off		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 10:43	Power Off		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 11:07	Power Off		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 14:14	Power Off		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 14:22	Power Off		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 15:24	Power Off		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 15:31	Power Off		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 17:03	Power Off		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 17:13	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 09:08	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 09:45	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 09:56	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 10:19	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 10:31	Power Off		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
Initiation (During)		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 10:52	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 13:12	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 13:25	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 14:12	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 14:27	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 14:45	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 15:11	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 17:36	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 18:59	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 19:13	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 19:24	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 20:16	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/20/2025 05:16	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/20/2025 05:26	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/20/2025 13:52	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/20/2025 15:46	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/20/2025 16:01	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/20/2025 16:34	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/20/2025 16:44	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/20/2025 18:19	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/20/2025 19:54	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 10:39	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 11:07	Power Off		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 11:17	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 12:00	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 14:14	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 14:33	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 14:48	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 15:14	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 15:24	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 16:48	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 17:00	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 17:11	Power Off		PG&E
Initiation (During)		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 17:21	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 17:33	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 19:23	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 07:21	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 09:08	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 09:45	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 09:56	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 10:19	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 10:31	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 10:52	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 13:12	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 13:25	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 14:12	Power Off		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 14:27	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 14:45	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 15:11	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 17:36	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 18:59	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 19:13	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 19:24	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 20:16	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/20/2025 05:16	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/20/2025 05:26	Power Off		PG&E
Initiation (During)		All Customers***	06/20/2025 13:52	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/20/2025 15:46	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/20/2025 16:01	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/20/2025 16:34	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/20/2025 16:44	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/20/2025 18:19	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/20/2025 19:54	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 10:39	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 11:07	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 11:17	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 12:00	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 14:14	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 14:33	Power Off		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 14:48	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 15:14	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 15:24	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 16:35	Power Off		SCE
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 16:48	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 17:00	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 17:11	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 17:21	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 17:33	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 19:23	Power Off		PG&E
Initiation (During)		All Customers***	06/22/2025 07:21	Power Off		PG&E
	Immediately before re-energization (All-Clear)	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/20/2025 11:03	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear	First All-Clear Notification Sent	PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/20/2025 11:09	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/20/2025 11:10	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 5:37	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 5:38	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 5:39	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 6:24	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
Initiation (During)		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 6:24	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 6:34	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 6:39	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 6:50	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 6:53	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 7:03	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 7:37	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 7:40	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 7:41	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 7:41	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 7:56	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 8:11	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/22/2025 7:42	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/22/2025 7:43	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/22/2025 7:50	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
Initiation (During)		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/22/2025 7:52	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/22/2025 7:52	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/22/2025 8:32	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/22/2025 8:34	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/22/2025 8:34	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/22/2025 8:47	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear	Last All-Clear Notification Sent	PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/20/2025 11:03	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear	First All-Clear Notification Sent	PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/20/2025 12:05	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 05:37	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 05:47	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 06:24	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 06:34	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 06:50	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 07:07	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
Initiation (During)		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 07:19	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 07:37	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 07:54	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 08:06	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 08:34	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 09:06	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 07:42	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 07:52	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 08:22	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 08:32	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 08:42	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 09:00	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear	Last All-Clear Notification Sent	PG&E
		All Customers***	06/20/2025 11:03	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear	First All-Clear Notification Sent	PG&E
		All Customers***	06/20/2025 12:05	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
Initiation (During)		All Customers***	06/21/2025 05:37	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 05:47	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 06:24	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 06:34	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 06:50	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 07:07	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 07:19	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 07:37	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 07:54	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 08:06	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 08:34	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 09:06	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 07:42	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 07:52	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 08:22	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
Initiation (During)		All Customers***	06/22/2025 08:32	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 08:42	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 08:57	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear		SCE
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 09:00	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear	Last All-Clear Notification Sent	PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 09:48	ETOR Update	First ETOR Update Notification Sent	PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 10:00	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 10:20	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 10:32	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 11:07	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 13:18	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 14:02	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 14:17	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 14:34	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 14:49	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 17:39	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/20/2025 05:16	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/20/2025 11:12	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/20/2025 11:25	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/20/2025 14:01	ETOR Update		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		Public Safety Partners**	06/20/2025 14:17	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/20/2025 16:07	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/20/2025 16:35	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/20/2025 16:45	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/20/2025 20:04	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 05:53	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 07:21	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 07:43	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 08:04	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 08:22	ETOR Update		PG&E
Initiation (During)		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 08:35	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 09:02	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 09:13	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 09:27	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 09:59	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 10:01	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 10:11	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 10:31	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 10:41	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 10:51	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 11:02	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 11:15	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 11:26	ETOR Update		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 11:36	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 12:11	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 12:32	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 12:44	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 13:24	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 15:14	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 15:27	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 15:39	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 17:15	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 17:25	ETOR Update		PG&E
Initiation (During)		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 17:35	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 17:46	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 08:12	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 08:25	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 08:39	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 08:52	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 09:05	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 09:19	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 09:31	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 09:50	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 10:01	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 10:20	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 10:31	ETOR Update		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
Initiation (During)		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 10:42	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 10:52	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 11:02	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 11:15	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 11:44	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 12:09	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 12:24	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 14:19	ETOR Update	Last ETOR Update Notification Sent	PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 09:48	ETOR Update	First ETOR Update Notification Sent	PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 10:00	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 10:20	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 10:32	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 11:07	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 13:18	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 14:02	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 14:17	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 14:34	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 14:49	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 17:39	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/20/2025 05:16	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/20/2025 11:12	ETOR Update		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		All Customers***	06/20/2025 11:25	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/20/2025 14:01	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/20/2025 14:17	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/20/2025 16:07	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/20/2025 16:35	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/20/2025 16:45	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/20/2025 20:04	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 05:53	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 07:21	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 07:43	ETOR Update		PG&E
Initiation (During)		All Customers***	06/21/2025 08:04	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 08:22	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 08:35	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 09:02	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 09:13	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 09:27	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 09:59	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 10:01	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 10:11	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 10:31	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 10:41	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 10:51	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 11:02	ETOR Update		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 11:15	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 11:26	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 11:36	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 12:11	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 12:32	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 12:44	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 13:24	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 15:14	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 15:27	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 15:39	ETOR Update		PG&E
Initiation (During)		All Customers***	06/21/2025 17:15	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 17:25	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 17:35	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 17:46	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 08:12	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 08:25	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 08:39	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 08:52	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 09:05	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 09:19	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 09:31	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 09:50	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 10:01	ETOR Update		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
Initiation (During)		All Customers***	06/22/2025 10:20	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 10:31	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 10:42	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 10:52	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 11:02	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 11:15	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 11:44	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 12:09	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 12:24	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 14:19	ETOR Update	Last ETOR Update Notification Sent	PG&E
Restoration (After)	After re-energization was completed	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/20/2025 13:50	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/20/2025 18:09	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 8:19	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 8:45	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 9:13	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 9:36	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 9:48	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 10:02	Restore		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
Restoration (After)		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 10:15	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 10:51	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 11:01	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 11:07	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 11:13	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 11:16	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 11:22	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 11:23	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 11:53	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 12:22	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 12:41	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 12:45	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 13:40	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 13:50	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/21/2025 14:43	Restore		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
Restoration (After)		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/22/2025 9:31	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/22/2025 10:18	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/22/2025 10:38	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/22/2025 11:01	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/22/2025 11:27	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/22/2025 11:46	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/22/2025 11:47	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/22/2025 12:18	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/22/2025 12:27	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/22/2025 12:42	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/22/2025 13:20	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/22/2025 14:58	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/22/2025 19:50	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/22/2025 19:54	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/23/2025 9:26	Restore		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 14:19	Restore	First initial Restoration Notification sent.	PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 14:37	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 16:45	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/19/2025 17:48	Restore		PG&E
Restoration (After)		Public Safety Partners**	06/20/2025 12:26	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/20/2025 13:37	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/20/2025 13:48	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/20/2025 14:05	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/20/2025 16:20	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/20/2025 18:16	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/20/2025 20:05	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 07:38	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 07:51	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 08:05	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 08:11	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 08:45	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 09:02	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 09:12	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 09:31	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 09:44	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 09:59	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 10:14	Restore		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 10:31	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 10:44	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 10:55	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 11:05	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 11:16	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 11:28	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 11:41	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 11:53	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 12:03	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 12:15	Restore		PG&E
Restoration (After)		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 12:34	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 12:44	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 13:13	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 13:23	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 13:34	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 13:46	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 14:03	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 14:16	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 14:29	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 14:41	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 15:25	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 15:51	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 16:07	Restore		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 16:23	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 17:08	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 17:25	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/21/2025 17:29	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 08:12	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 08:31	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 08:45	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 08:55	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 09:23	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 09:46	Restore		PG&E
Restoration (After)		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 09:56	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 10:13	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 10:24	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 10:34	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 10:45	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 10:59	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 11:10	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 11:23	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 11:33	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 11:46	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 12:17	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 12:27	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 12:38	Restore		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
Restoration (After)		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 13:00	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 13:24	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 13:37	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 13:48	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 14:00	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 14:27	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 14:58	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 15:15	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 15:50	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 16:30	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	06/22/2025 17:03	Restore	Last initial Restoration Notification sent.	PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 14:19	Restore	First Restoration Notification sent.	PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 14:37	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 16:45	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/19/2025 17:48	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/20/2025 12:26	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/20/2025 13:37	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/20/2025 13:48	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/20/2025 14:05	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/20/2025 16:20	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/20/2025 18:16	Restore		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
Restoration (After)		All Customers***	06/20/2025 20:05	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 07:38	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 07:51	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 08:05	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 08:11	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 08:45	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 09:02	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 09:12	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 09:31	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 09:44	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 09:59	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 10:14	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 10:31	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 10:44	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 10:55	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 11:05	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 11:16	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 11:28	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 11:41	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 11:53	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 12:03	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 12:15	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 12:34	Restore		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 12:44	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 13:13	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 13:23	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 13:34	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 13:46	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 14:03	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 14:16	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 14:29	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 14:41	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 15:25	Restore		PG&E
Restoration (After)		All Customers***	06/21/2025 15:51	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 16:07	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 16:23	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 17:08	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 17:25	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/21/2025 17:29	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 08:12	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 08:31	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 08:45	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 08:55	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 09:23	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 09:46	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 09:56	Restore		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 10:13	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 10:24	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 10:34	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 10:45	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 10:59	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 11:10	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 11:23	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 11:33	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 11:46	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 12:17	Restore		PG&E
Restoration (After)		All Customers***	06/22/2025 12:27	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 12:38	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 13:00	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 13:24	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 13:37	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 13:48	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 14:00	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 14:27	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 14:58	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 15:15	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 15:50	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 16:30	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 17:03	Restore	Last Restoration	PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline[22]	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
					Notification sent.	
		All Customers***	06/22/2025 12:13	Restore		SCE
Cancellation	Within 2-hours of decision to cancel	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	06/22/2025 10:27	Cancel		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	6/18/2025 22:51	Cancel		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	6/20/2025 5:17	Cancel		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	6/20/2025 20:33	Cancel		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	6/21/2025 5:17	Cancel		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	6/22/2025 10:42	Cancel		PG&E
		All Customers***	6/18/2025 22:51	Cancel		PG&E
		All Customers***	6/20/2025 5:17	Cancel		PG&E
		All Customers***	6/20/2025 20:33	Cancel		PG&E
		All Customers***	6/21/2025 5:17	Cancel		PG&E
		All Customers***	6/22/2025 10:42	Cancel		PG&E

*A subset of Public Safety Partners, including Tribes, cities, counties, and community choice aggregators.
**A subset of Public Safety Partners, including water, wastewater, and communication service providers.
***All Customers, including MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers.

Section 5.3 - For those customers where positive or affirmative notification was attempted, use the following template to report the accounting of the customers (which tariff and/or access and functional needs population designation), the number of notification attempts made, the timing of attempts, who made the notification attempt (utility or public safety partner) and the number of customers for whom positive notification was achieved. *(D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A23, SED Additional Information.)*
"Notification attempts made" and "Successful positive notification" must include the unique number of customer counts. When the actual notification attempts made is less than the number of customers that need positive notifications, the utilities must explain the reason. In addition, the utilities must explain the reason of any unsuccessful positive notifications. *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
Table 5 includes metrics associated with PG&E notifications provided to customers where positive or affirmative notification was attempted. PG&E interprets the number of customers that need positive or affirmative notification as customers the company seeks confirmation from, namely MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers. PG&E tracks positive confirmation from MBL/SIV Program customers via text, phone call, email, doorbell rings, live agent phone calls or door hanger at all stages of notifications. If a notification is acknowledged at any stage and/or a door hanger is left, that is considered a successful positive notification. See PG&E's 2025 AFN Plan and AFN Quarterly Progress Reports for more information.

Table 5: Notifications to Customers where Positive or Affirmative Notification was Attempted[24]

Designation	Total Number of customers	Notification Attempts Made[25]	Timing of Attempts	Who made the Notification Attempt	Successful Positive Notification
MBL[26]	978	18,598	Daily	PG&E	978
MBL behind a master meter[27]	3	35	Daily	PG&E	2
SIV	350	5,487	Daily	PG&E	349

[24]Counts of Notification Attempts Made will not reflect the actual total of customers notified as both MBL Program and SIV Program customers can appear in both subset groups.
[25] Count of Attempts Made includes doorbell rings and Live Agent phone calls.
[26] Residential tenants of master-metered customers can also qualify for MBL quantities. The MBL category for the purposes of Table 5 does not include MBL Program customers who are master meter tenants.
[27] PG&E has additional processes in place to ensure MBL Program customers are notified. Master meter tenants are contacted directly to be considered a positive notification. Contacting the property or building manager does not count as a positive notification.

For this PSPS, MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers received automated calls, texts, and emails at the same intervals as the general customer notifications. PG&E provided unique PSPS Watch and PSPS Warning Notifications to MBL Program customers[28] and SIV Program customers.

These customer groups also received additional calls and texts at hourly intervals until the customer confirmed receipt of the automated notifications by either answering the phone, responding to the text, or opening the email. If confirmation was not received, a PG&E representative visited the customer's home to check on the customer (referred to as the "doorbell ring" process) while hourly notification retries continued. If the customer did not provide confirmation to PG&E following the check-in, the PG&E representative left a door hanger providing additional PSPS notification and information at the home to indicate PG&E had visited. In each case, the additional door hanger notification was considered successful.[29]

At times, PG&E also made Live Agent phone calls in parallel to the automated notifications and doorbell rings, as an additional attempt to reach the customer prior to and/or after de-energization.

PG&E shared the lists of the MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers who had not confirmed receipt of their notifications with the appropriate county and Tribal emergency managers twice daily via the PSPS Portal. PG&E proactively notified agencies that the data was available on the PSPS Portal and encouraged them to inform these customers of the resources available to them. PG&E is unable to track and report on notifications made by Public Safety Partners, as notification systems and/or platforms used by Public Safety Partners are out of PG&E's purview; PG&E encourages Public Safety Partners to include PSPS messages on all of their platforms. PG&E describes its engagement with Public Safety Partners in Section 6.

Section 5.4 - A copy or scripts of all notifications with a list of all languages that each type of notification was provided in, the timing of notifications, the methods of notifications and who made the notifications (the utility or local public safety partners). *(D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A23, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
See "*PGE_PSPS_Notifications_20250619.pdf*" for a copy of the notification templates, the timing of the notifications and methods of notifications that PG&E sent during the June 19 – 22, 2025 PSPS. See Section 5.2 for additional information on the timing of notifications sent during this PSPS.

PG&E provides Tribal, city, county, CCAs, Public Safety Partner and transmission-level customer notifications in English only. All other customer notifications are delivered in-language if a customer's language preference is on file. If there is no language preference on file, the notification is delivered in English, with information on how to access and receive PSPS information in translated languages. Non-English languages requested for this PSPS were Spanish, Chinese and Vietnamese.

[28] Including MBL Program customers who are master-metered tenants (e.g., renters or tenants in mobile home park).
[29] For MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers, the in-person door ring visit where a door hanger is left, but no contact made with the customer is considered "successful contact," but not confirmed as "received." If the representative makes contact with the customer, then it is considered "received."

Section 5.5 - If the utility fails to provide notifications according to the minimum timelines set forth in D.19-05-042 and D.21-06-034, using the following template to report a breakdown of the notification failure and an explanation of what caused the failure. *(D.21-06-014 page 286, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
PG&E makes a substantial effort to provide notifications whenever possible and to the extent it is operationally feasible in accordance with the PSPS Phase 1, Phase 3 and 2019 PSPS OII guidelines within the CPUC's minimum timeline requirements, weather and other factors permitting.[30] The notification guidelines set forth in the Phase 1 Guidelines are not a strict liability standard and state that "the electric investor owned utilities should, whenever possible, adhere to the following minimum notification timeline…" Additionally, pursuant to ESRB-8, the CPUC has stated that it is not practicable to have an absolute requirement that electric IOUs provide advanced notifications to customers prior to a PSPS and that "it is an impossible feat of anticipating every emergency situation resulting in pro-active de-energization."[31]

As mentioned in Section 5.2, PG&E was in contact with local agency representatives and alerted Public Safety Partners of the potential PSPS as meteorological onshore wind conditions developed. As forecast models strengthened and the real-time weather materialized faster than forecasted, the approved initial PSPS scope was established for de-energization after the (72-48hr) Priority Notification window had already passed. Therefore, Priority Notifications were not sent to some of the Public Safety Partners in the initial scope, due to factors outside our control, in accordance with Phase 1 Guidelines. However, four net new counties were added to a revised scope for a later anticipated de-energization time who received Priority Notifications within the 72-48hr window.

Table 6: Notification Failure Causes

Notifications Sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Account	Explanation of Failure
Public Safety Partners excluding CFI[32]	**Entities who did not receive 48-to 72-hour priority notification**	141	Priority Notifications were not sent for initial scope. PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as it was due to weather factors outside of PG&E's control. See above and Section 5.2 for explanation.
	Entities who did not receive 1–4-hour imminent notification	3	Due to human error, two entities were not included in the proper notification materials created prior to deploying these notifications. Therefore, these entities did not receive a 1-4 hour (Warning) Imminent Notification. One other entity did not receive this notification due to a technical

[30] D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.
[31] ESRB-8, p. 5, D.19-05-042, pp. 84-86, Finding of Fact 22 at p. 118.
[32] Only includes Tribes, cities, counties, and CCAs.

Notifications Sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Account	Explanation of Failure
			failure with their contact information entry.
	Entities who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	1	This entity did not receive any notifications due to a technical failure with their contact information entry.
	Entities who were not notified immediately before re-energization	2	Due to a technical error, our notification automation system did not launch one of these entities' Inspect Notifications (notification immediately before re-energization). The other entity did not receive this notification due to a technical failure with their contact information entry.
	Entities who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	13	Due to human error, these entities were not included in the proper notification materials created prior to deploying these notifications. Therefore, these entities did not receive a Cancel Notification.
CFI[33]	**Facilities who did not receive 48-to 72-hour priority notification**	484	PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures due to weather factors outside of PG&E's control. See Table 6A for explanations.
	Facilities who did not receive 1–4-hour imminent notification	30	See Table 6C for explanations.
	Facilities who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	0	No failures.
	Facilities who were not notified at de-energization initiation	13	See Table 6E for explanations.
	Facilities who were not notified immediately before re-energization	26	See Table 6F for explanations.

[33] Includes Public Safety Partners who are CFI customers.

Notifications Sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Account	Explanation of Failure
	Facilities who were not notified when re-energization is complete	3	See Table 6G for explanations.
	Facilities who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	2	See Table 6H for explanations.
All other affected customers	**Customers who did not receive 24–48-hour advance notifications**	544	Of this total, PG&E considers three to be notification failures and the remaining 541 not to be notification failures. See Table 6B for explanations.
	Customers who did not receive 1–4-hour imminent notifications	84	Of this total, PG&E considers 83 to be notification failures and one not to be notification failures. See Table 6C for explanations.
	Customers who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	3	See Table 6D for explanations.
	Customers who were not notified at de-energization initiation	268	See Table 6E for explanations.
	Customers who were not notified immediately before re-energization	667	See Table 6F for explanations.
	Customers who were not notified when re-energization is complete	51	See Table 6G for explanations.
	Customers who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	7	See Table 6H for explanations.

Table 6A: Explanation of Failures for CFI Who Did Not Receive 48-to 72-Hour Priority Notification

Total	Explanation
484	These critical facilities did not receive a 48-72 hour Priority Notification. As the forecast models strengthened and weather materialized faster than anticipated, they entered into scope after this notification window had passed. The total count reflects critical facilities in-scope for their first and/or the second wave of planned de-energization between June 19-20. PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as the customers were not within scope during the applicable notification timeframe due to weather factors outside of PG&E's control.

Table 6B: Explanation of Failures for All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive 24-to 48-Hour Watch Notification

Total	Explanation
1	One non-critical customer did not receive any notifications prior to de-energization due to inconsistencies between our scoping processes and grid models. Our scoping process did not account for an abnormal grid condition where this customer's power was sourced. Therefore, we were not aware that this customer would be impacted by this PSPS until after de-energization.
2	Two non-critical customers marked PG&E's notifications as spam, therefore they did not receive any notifications. Our notifications vendor honored this setting and did not send notifications to these customers. We have coordinated with our vendor to revise their logic so PSPS notifications are delivered, regardless of customer preferences as these are considered emergency notifications.
326	These non-critical customers did not receive the standard 24–48 hour Watch Notification prior to de-energization. As the forecast models strengthened and weather materialized faster than anticipated, they entered into scope after this notification window had passed. The total count provided reflects critical facilities that were in scope for either the first and/or second wave of planned de-energization between June 19–20. PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as the customers were not within scope during the applicable notification timeframe due to weather factors outside of PG&E's control.
215	These non-critical customers did not receive a Watch notification within the standard 24–48 hour window prior to potential de-energization. However, these customers were sent a Watch Notification before the start of the 24-48 hour window. They did not receive a subsequent notification during the 24–48 hour period as they were removed from scope partway through this timeframe. The total count provided reflects critical facilities that were in scope for either the first and/or second wave of the planned de-energization occurring between June 19 – 20. PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures due to weather factors outside of PG&E's control.

Table 6C: Explanation of Failures for CFI and Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive 1-4-Hour Imminent Notifications

Total (CFI)	Total (Customers)	Explanation
0	1	Due to a data error, this customer was incorrectly identified as an inactive customer for a portion of the PSPS. PG&E can only notify active customers, therefore this customer did not receive 1-4 hour notifications.
0	1	One non-critical customer did not receive any notifications prior to de-energization due to inconsistencies between our scoping processes and grid models. Our scoping process did not account for an abnormal grid condition altering where this customer's power was sourced. Therefore, we were not aware that this customer would be impacted by this PSPS until after de-energization.
10	19	These critical facilities and customers were not included in the proper notification materials created prior to deploying these notifications. Therefore, they did not receive 1-4 hour notifications prior to de-energization due to human error.
0	1	This customer was in process of a mobile home park conversion during the PSPS which caused an upstream data change in our system. Therefore, this customer did not receive the 1-4 hour notification prior to de-energization.
7	59	These critical facilities and customers received a delayed 1-4 hour notification due to real time weather materializing faster than forecasted, which required de-energization to occur significantly earlier than initially scoped. Due to the change in de-energization timing, these critical facilities and customers received this notification after their outage began. PG&E considers these to be notification failures despite alignment with the notification windows based on planned de-energization times.
1	0	This transmission-level critical facility was not included in the proper notification materials created prior to deploying 1-4 hour notifications, due to human error. Therefore, they received a delayed notification after their planned de-energization time. However, due to de-energization timing delays, this notification was delivered before their actual outage began.
10	0	A subset of transmission-level critical facilities received delayed notification due to a human error during the creation and deployment of the notification file. As a result, the notifications were issued 4 hours and 50 minutes after the scheduled de-energization time. Despite the delay, four of these facilities were ultimately not de-energized, as they were successfully mitigated through switching to alternative transmission sources.

Total (CFI)	Total (Customers)	Explanation
1	0	This transmission-level critical facility did not receive the 1–4 hour notification before de-energization due to a system error for creating notifications. As a result, our notification materials included a different facility who was notified instead of this facility (false positive). See Section 5.7 for the false positive notification explanation.
1	0	This transmission-level critical facility did not receive the 1-4 hour notification prior to de-energization due to a limitation with our scoping models used to identify transmission customers.
0	2	Two non-critical customers marked PG&E's notifications as spam, therefore they did not receive any notifications. Our notifications vendor honored this setting and did not send notifications to these customers. We have coordinated with our vendor to revise their logic so PSPS notifications are delivered regardless of customer preferences as these are considered emergency notifications.
0	1	This customer experienced a change in ownership while we were identifying customers to notify 1-4 hours before de-energization. As a result, this customer was temporarily inactive in our system. PG&E does not consider this a notification failure as the customer was inactive during scoping.

Table 6D: Explanation of Failures for All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive Any Notifications Before De-Energization

Total	Explanation
1	One non-critical customer did not receive any notifications prior to de-energization due to inconsistencies between our scoping processes and grid models. Our scoping process did not account for an abnormal grid condition altering where this customer's power was sourced. Therefore, we were not aware that this customer would be impacted by this PSPS until after de-energization.
2	Two non-critical customers marked PG&E's notifications as spam, therefore they did not receive any notifications. Our notifications vendor honored this setting and did not send notifications to these customers. We have coordinated with our vendor to revise their logic so PSPS notifications are delivered regardless of customer preferences as these are considered emergency notifications.

Table 6E: Explanation of Failures for CFI and All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive Power Off Notification

Total (CFI)	Total (Customer)	Explanation
0	1	Due to a data error, this customer was incorrectly identified as an inactive customer for a portion of the PSPS. PG&E can only notify active customers, therefore this customer did not receive a Power Off Notification.

Total (CFI)	Total (Customer)	Explanation
7	59	These critical facilities and customers received a delayed Power Off Notification around four hours after de-energization due to a human error which delayed the system in creating the notifications. As a result, the first batch of notifications could not be launched by our notification vendor. Once alerted, we corrected this error and successfully re-launched the batch.
4	158	These critical facilities and customers received a significantly delayed Power Off Notification after their outage had already been restored. The significant length of this delay also resulted in a false positive communication, as explained in Section 5.7. The root cause of these failures have not been identified and are still under investigation. We will report our findings in the 2025 PSPS Post-Season Report.
2	0	These critical facilities did not receive any notifications between Power Off and Restoration. They were impacted by a non-PSPS outage prior to the start of their planned PSPS de-energization. Once their PSPS de-energization began, it overlapped with their ongoing non-PSPS outage and they should have been sent PSPS notifications. The root cause of these failures have not been identified and are still under investigation. We will report our findings in the 2025 PSPS Post-Season Report.
0	43	These non-critical customers did not receive any notifications between Power Off and Restoration due to incorrect information in our data systems. The system had incorrectly marked these customers as already de-energized for a non-PSPS outage before the PSPS began. As a result, they were not identified as being impacted by this PSPS and therefore not sent any PSPS notifications.
0	4	These non-critical customers did not receive Power Off Notifications due to a system error for automated notifications. They received all other required notifications for this PSPS. The root cause of these failures have not been identified and are still under investigation. We will report our findings in the 2025 PSPS Post-Season Report.
0	1	These non-critical customers did not receive any notifications between Power Off and Restoration due to incorrect information in our data systems. As a result, the system did not recognize the customer as impacted by PSPS and therefore did not generate the notifications.
0	2	Two non-critical customers marked PG&E's notifications as spam, therefore they did not receive any notifications. Our notifications vendor honored this setting and did not send notifications to these customers. We have coordinated with our vendor to revise their logic so PSPS notifications are delivered regardless of customer preferences as these are considered emergency notifications.

Table 6F: Explanation of Failures for CFI and All Other Affected Customers Not Notified Immediately Before Re-energization

Total (CFI)	Total (Customers)	Explanation
0	1	Due to a data error, this customer was incorrectly identified as an inactive customer for a portion of the PSPS. PG&E can only notify active customers, therefore this customer was not notified immediately before re-energization.
19	377	These critical facilities and customers were not notified immediately before re-energization due to a system logic error that resulted from the multiple waves of de-energization that occurred during this PSPS. We are continuing to update our processes to prevent this type of issue from occurring in future PSPS events.
3	8	These critical facilities and customers were not notified immediately before re-energization as a manual categorization step that triggers this notification was not performed in our data system.
2	235	These critical facilities and customers were not notified immediately before re-energization because this notification was delayed until after re-energization. This was due to a manual categorization step that triggers this notification that was performed too late in our data system.
2	0	These critical facilities did not receive any notifications between Power Off and Restoration. They were impacted by a non-PSPS outage prior to the start of their planned PSPS de-energization. Once their PSPS de-energization began, it overlapped with their ongoing non-PSPS outage and they should have been sent PSPS notifications. The root cause of these failures have not been identified and are still under investigation. We will report our findings in the 2025 PSPS Post-Season Report.
0	43	These non-critical customers missed all notifications from Power Off to Restoration due to incorrect data in our internal outage management platform. The system had incorrectly marked these customers as already de-energized for non-PSPS reasons before the PSPS began. As a result, they were not identified as new PSPS impacts and did not receive appropriate PSPS notifications.
0	1	These non-critical customers did not receive any notifications between Power Off and Restoration due to incorrect information in our data systems. As a result, the system did not recognize the customer as impacted by PSPS and therefore did not generate the notifications.
0	2	Two non-critical customers marked PG&E's notifications as spam; therefore, they did not receive any notifications. Our notifications vendor honored this setting and did not send notifications to these customers. We have coordinated with our vendor to revise their logic, so PSPS notifications are delivered, regardless of customer preferences as these are considered emergency notifications.

Table 6G: Explanation of Failures for CFI and All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive Restore Notification

Total (CFI)	Total (Customer)	Explanation
0	1	Due to a data error, this customer was incorrectly identified as an inactive customer for a portion of the PSPS. PG&E can only notify active customers. Therefore, this customer did not receive a Restoration Notification.
2	0	These critical facilities did not receive any notifications between Power Off and Restoration. They were impacted by a non-PSPS outage prior to the start of their planned PSPS de-energization. Once their PSPS de-energization began, it overlapped with their ongoing non-PSPS outage and they should have been sent PSPS notifications. The root cause of these failures have not been identified and are still under investigation. We will report our findings in the 2025 PSPS Post-Season Report.
0	43	These non-critical customers did not receive any notifications between Power Off and Restoration due to incorrect information in our data systems. The system had incorrectly marked these customers as already de-energized for a non-PSPS outage before the PSPS began. As a result, they were not identified as being impacted by this PSPS and therefore not sent any PSPS notifications.
0	3	These non-critical customers were not notified when re-energization was complete because their outage was prematurely marked as restored in our data system which triggered automation to launch a Restoration Notification for these customers. As a result, these customers received this notification prior to re-energization.
1	1	This critical facility and non-critical customer were not notified when re-energization was complete because their notification files were not launched. The root cause is still under investigation with our notification vendor. We will report our findings in the 2025 PSPS Post-Season Report.
0	1	This non-critical customer did not receive any notifications from Power Off to Restoration due to incorrect information in our data system. As a result, the system did not recognize the customer as impacted by PSPS and therefore did not generate the notifications.
0	2	Two non-critical customers marked PG&E's notifications as spam; therefore, they did not receive any notifications. Our notifications vendor honored this setting and did not send notifications to these customers. We have coordinated with our vendor to revise their logic, so PSPS notifications are delivered, regardless of customer preferences as these are considered emergency notifications.

Table 6H: Explanation of Failures for CFI and All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive Cancelation Notification

Total (CFI)	Total (Customer)	Explanation
2	7	These four customers and two critical facilities, who are all COLs, were not included in the proper notification materials created prior to deploying the notifications. Therefore, they did not receive Cancelation Notifications due to human error.

Section 5.6 - Explain how the utility will correct the notification failures. *(D.21-06-014, page 286.)*

Response:
We have reviewed the notifications for this PSPS and have identified or are in the process of identifying corrective actions.

Contact information that was incorrectly entered by one agency, leading to notifications not being processed correctly, has been updated for the single contact and corrected in our database.

Additional planned corrective actions will be included in the 2025 PSPS Post-Season Report.

Section 5.7 - Enumerate and explain the cause of any false communications citing the sources of changing data. *(D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 4.)*

Response:
We are still investigating to identify cases of false negative communications. So far, we have identified no cases of false negative communications caused by sending a Cancelation Notification to a customer then subsequently de-energizing them. However, we are still investigating potential false negative communications from prematurely communicating outage restoration to customers. If any are identified, we will report our count of false negative communications and their root causes in the 2025 Post-Season Report.

For this PSPS, we identified 3,918 cases of false positive communications including:

- 60 Public Safety Partner agencies within 25 jurisdictions who received false positive communications due to an error with a new automation process. This did not affect any customers. We are currently reviewing the error to determine a root cause and apply corrective actions. We will report our findings in the 2025 Post-Season Report.
- Six transmission-level critical facilities who received false positive communications due to the following causes:
    - Four transmission-level critical facilities were able to avoid de-energization by switching to an alternative source. However, these mitigation opportunities were not detected in our pre-outage scoping. As a result, we notified these facilities that they would be de-energized, however, we did not notify them that they would no longer be impacted.
    - One transmission-level critical facility was not in scope to be de-energized but was incorrectly notified of planned de-energization in lieu of a different facility that was in scope. As explained in Section 5.5, the intended facility did not receive their notification due to a system error when creating notifications.

    - One transmission-level critical facility was not in scope to be de-energized despite planned de-energization of their PG&E source line, as they would continue to receive power from a non-PG&E line. This situation was identified during our scoping process, therefore, they did not receive any notifications through our normal notification processes. However, PG&E informed this customer on a direct call that this facility would be de-energized for PSPS, and no subsequent statements were made to correct this false positive communication.
- 56 distribution-level critical facilities and 3,796 other affected customers who received false positive communications due to the following causes:
    - As explained in Table 6H, seven Non- CFI customers and two critical facilities, who are all COLs, were not included in the notification materials created prior to deploying Cancelation Notifications. Therefore, they did not receive this notification. Since these customers had previously been notified that they were in scope and were not subsequently de-energized, this notification failure is also false positive communication.
    - 48 critical facilities and 3,382 other affected customers were incorrectly notified of an active PSPS de-energization despite being impacted by non-PSPS outages. This was due to human error when performing a manual categorization step in our data system.
    - Six critical facilities and 408 other affected customers were notified of an active PSPS de-energization despite not being impacted by any outage. This false positive communication occurred due to a significant delay in launching the Power Off Notification generated at de-energization initiation for a previous PSPS outage impacting these customers, as discussed in Table 6E. By the time this notification was sent to these customers, it was nearly two days after their PSPS restoration. That Power Off Notification would appear to warn about a second PSPS outage starting, causing the false positive communication.

Section 6 – Local and State Public Safety Partner Engagement

Section 6.1 - List the organization names of public safety partners including, but not limited to, local governments, tribal representatives, first responders and emergency management , and critical facilities and infrastructure the utility contacted prior to de-energization, the date and time on which they were contacted, and whether the areas affected by the de-energization are classified as Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 as per the definition in CPUC General Order 95, Rule 21.2-D. *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
Please see Appendix D for a list of Public Safety Partners including Tribal representatives, local governments, first responders and emergency management, and critical facilities notified with the date and time of the initial notification, and whether the areas affected by the de-energization are classified as Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3.

We use a High Fire Risk Area (HFRA) classification which PG&E utilizes in addition to HFTD to determine PSPS scope. In Appendix D, we begin by identifying HFTD area assigned to Public Safety Partners. Any area outside of HFTD is re-classified as HFRA. PG&E's circuits can run miles long and span across multiple jurisdictions. Some Public Safety Partners outside of HFRA and HFTD were also in the potentially impacted scope in order to de-energize areas within HFRA and HFTD for safety.

Section 6.2 - List the names of all entities invited to the utility's Emergency Operations Center for a PSPS event, the method used to make this invitation, and whether a different form of communication was preferred by any entity invited to the utility's emergency operation center. *(D.21-06-014, page 289.)*

Response:
PG&E invited the CPUC via email to virtually embed in the EOC for the duration of the activation on June 17 at 19:13 PDT.

Filsinger Energy Partners, Inc., an energy advisory firm, embedded two consultants, a county monitor and an operational observer, into PG&E's EOC from June 18 – 22, 2025. Other entities preferred to work with their PG&E point of contact directly and not embed in the EOC.

Telecommunications service providers are appointed a dedicated 24/7 PG&E contact in the EOC, the Critical Infrastructure Lead (CIL), who shared up-to-date PSPS information and answered individual questions. Additionally, PG&E proactively reached out to 14 telecommunications service providers[34] via email or phone as weather changes or new information regarding the PSPS became available.

As part of our PSPS Pre-Season outreach,[35] PG&E provides water infrastructure and communication services in PG&E's electrical service area with information on how to request

[34] American Tower Corporation, AT&T Corporation, California Internet LP, CenturyLink, Charter Communications, Comcast Corporation, Crown Castle International, Dish Wireless, Frontier Communications Corp, SBA Towers, TDS Telecom, T-Mobile – Sprint, Verizon Wireless, and Western State Teleport.
[35] See 2024 PSPS Pre-Season Report, pp 70-71.

representation at PG&E EOC's. Alternatively, some partners may also request PG&E representation at their jurisdiction's activated Operations Emergency Center (OEC).[36]

Section 6.3 - A statement verifying the availability to public safety partners of accurate and timely geospatial information, and real time updates to the GIS shapefiles in preparation for an imminent PSPS event and during a PSPS event. *(D.21-06-014, page 289.)*

Response:
In preparation for a potential PSPS, PG&E sent automated notifications with links to the PSPS Portal, which provides PDF maps and GIS data to Public Safety Partners at the times outlined in Table 4. In addition, when PDF maps and GIS data were updated on the PSPS Portal due to scope changes, Portal users were notified via e-mail at the times outlined in Table 7.

After the EOC was activated, PDF maps and GIS data on the PSPS Portal were determined accurate and updated in a timely manner following changes to geographic scope or customer impacts.

Table 7: PSPS Portal Time & Date for Map Sharing

Date	Time PDF and GIS Maps Shared (PDT)
6/18/2025	01:15
6/18/2025	07:32
6/18/2025	22:25
6/19/2025	16:26
6/19/2025	05:21
6/20/2025	20:45

Section 6.4 - A description and evaluation of engagement with local and state public safety partners in providing advanced outreach and notification during the PSPS event. *(D.19-05-042, Appendix, page A23.)*

Response:
Below is a description of the engagement with state CPUC, Cal OES, CAL FIRE, and local (i.e., Tribes, cities, counties) Public Safety Partners:

- Submitted the PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES twice a day (07:00 PDT and 15:00 PDT), if there was a significant change to scope and at least once for each of the five PSPS stages: Activating PSPS Protocols/Potential to De-energize (Stage 1), Decision to De-energize (Stage 2), De-energization Initiated (Stage 3), Initiating Re-energization Patrols (Stage 4) and All PSPS Lines Re-energized (Stage 5). See Table 8 below.

Table 8: PSPS Notifications Submitted to Cal OES

Date	Time PDF and GIS Maps Shared (PDT)
06/17/2025	18:13
06/18/2025	06:24
06/18/2025	07:27
06/18/2025	15:20

[36] D.19-05-042.

Date	Time PDF and GIS Maps Shared (PDT)
06/18/2025	21:09
06/19/2025	05:22
06/19/2025	08:50
06/19/2025	10:59
06/19/2025	15:00
06/19/2025	16:17
06/19/2025	18:52
06/20/2025	07:00
06/20/2025	07:40
06/20/2025	10:53
06/20/2025	14:34
06/20/2025	16:23
06/20/2025	23:34
06/21/2025	06:58
06/21/2025	14:56
06/21/2025	19:07
06/22/2025	06:45
06/22/2025	10:21
06/22/2025	14:43

- Sent e-mails to the CPUC at least once for each of the five PSPS stages listed above. See Table 9 below.

Table 9: PSPS Notifications Submitted to CPUC

Date	Time PDF and GIS Maps Shared (PDT)
06/17/2025	19:13
06/18/2025	08:24
06/19/2025	01:40
06/19/2025	06:53
06/20/2025	05:48
06/20/2025	13:16
06/20/2025	21:26
06/21/2025	04:56
06/21/2025	05:02
06/21/2025	11:11
06/21/2025	17:46
06/22/2025	07:40
06/22/2025	10:21
06/22/2025	14:58

- Hosted daily State Executive Briefings with invitees including Cal OES, CPUC, CAL FIRE, Governor's Office, and other state and federal agencies to provide the latest PSPS information and answer questions. A presentation deck with key PSPS information was provided to participants.
- Hosted a daily Systemwide Cooperators Call, where all Public Safety Partners in the service area were invited to join for situational awareness.

- Hosted Tribal Cooperators Calls with potentially impacted Tribes to provide the latest PSPS information and answer questions.
- Hosted Operational Areas Cooperators Communication Calls to provide situational awareness updates and answer questions.[37]
- Conducted ongoing coordination with Tribal and local county OES contacts through dedicated Agency Representatives. This includes but is not limited to providing the latest PSPS information, coordinating CRC locations, and resolving local issues in real-time.
- Provided links to the PSPS Portal that included planning and event-specific maps, situation reports, critical facility lists and MBL Program customer lists at each notification and when scope changed. Note that the Situation Report was provided twice a day and at scope changes prior to de-energization and hourly once restoration began.
- Sent automated and live call notifications to agency partners before, during and after de-energization.
- Offered local and state agencies to be embedded in PG&E's EOC, as well as offered PG&E Agency Representatives to be embedded virtually in local EOCs.
- A dedicated State Operations Center Agency Representative provided ongoing support to Cal OES to ensure all questions were addressed.

PG&E considers the level of engagement on advanced outreach and notification with local and state Public Safety Partners during this EOC activation successful and we continue to look for opportunities for improvement. This is based on the number and various types of outreach conducted (see list above), the feedback received from Public Safety Partners through the post-PSPS survey and the success rate of automated agency notifications. The following is a subset of comments PG&E received from in-scope Public Safety Partners regarding PSPS outreach:

- "Great communication from our rep"
- "The program continues to improve with usage!"
- "If and when the next PSPS is implemented, create exceptions for hospitals, fire stations, dispatch centers, and large car facilities to be excluded or have supplementary power offered to them. Either through PG&E or other providers like OES or county offices"
- "No other state does this type of activity when there is a breeze coming through the mountains power must be shut off."

Leading up to potential de-energization, we sent 99.9% of our automated notifications to Tribal and local governments within the required timeframes. Figure 22 below shows the post-PSPS survey results when Public Safety Partners were asked to "evaluate PG&E engagement with your agency during the outage." We received ten responses to the survey.

PG&E will continue to refine the agency notification process to ensure accurate and timely information sharing.

[37] May vary in cadence and type based on County OES.

Figure 22: Evaluation of Public Safety Partner Engagement



Section 6.5 - Specific engagement with local communities regarding the notification and support provided to the AFN community. *(D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 8, SED Additional Information)*

Response:
To ensure PG&E provides adequate support to AFN customers, we engage with local communities through paratransit agencies, media partnerships and CBOs to share coordination efforts, notifications plans, CRC information, PSPS-specific information and more. See below for details on this engagement.

Engagement with Paratransit Agencies
In accordance with the Phase 3 Guidelines,[38] PG&E provided proactive notifications and impacted zip code information to paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a CRC during a PSPS. PG&E provided proactive notifications[39] to paratransit agencies for the June 19 – 22, 2025 PSPS. All notifications included a link to the PSPS emergency website updates page, and an "Additional Resources" link to a map showing potentially affected areas. For more information on Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) compliant CRC locations, see Section 9.

Community Engagement
We engaged with approximately 500 "information-based" CBOs during this PSPS, sharing courtesy notification updates, fact sheets, and other relevant information that they could share with their constituents to expand our reach of communications, including infographic videos with relevant PSPS updates in 16 languages and ASL that the organizations could use to educate their consumers.

CBO resource partners were invited to daily cooperator calls for Public Safety Partners, which was hosted by PG&E to provide a situational update about the latest scope of the PSPS and an overview of the services available to customers. We hosted additional daily coordination calls with the CBO resource partners supporting the PSPS to provide an open forum to answer

[38] D.21-06-034.
[39] For this PSPS, paratransit agencies received the Watch, Warning, Cancellation, and Restoration Notification. A list of zip codes was provided seven times.

questions, offer suggestions regarding how they can best support their consumers and facilitate more localized coordination among the partners.

Programs/Support for AFN Customers

PG&E provided a variety of resources to AFN customers before and during this PSPS. These resources include:

- Ad-Hoc AFN Backup Generation Solutions: During the June 19 – 22, 2025 PSPS, PG&E granted temporary generation exceptions to two AFN customers experiencing critical circumstances. This included transportation limitations and medical device requirements that CBO resources were unable to resolve during this PSPS. After exploring all viable options to support these customers, PG&E delivered backup generation for these individuals who rely on power for their health and safety. These specific situations do not meet our typical temporary generation process and procedures standards. However, given the unique circumstances, we went beyond our usual practices to ensure safety for our customers.
- Disability Disaster Access and Resource Program (DDAR):[40] We continued our collaboration with the CFILC to implement the DDAR Program for this PSPS. Through DDAR, we have supported AFN customers with the delivery of backup portable batteries (since July 2020) to qualify customers who need power during a PSPS. Through DDAR, 11 local ILCs provided aid to 546 customers who rely on power for medical or independent living needs. Resources provided include 19 food vouchers, three generator fuel vouchers, and 13 hotel accommodations. PG&E is evaluating intervenor comments regarding how the ILCs aided customers reliant on power and will update the 2025 AFN Plan accordingly.
- PBP:[41] Our PBP provides free portable battery systems for customers who live in Tiers 2 and 3 HFTDs and are enrolled in the MBL Program. For this PSPS, 145 customers in scope were supported by batteries received through the PBP (delivered in 2020, 2021, 2022, and year to date 2025). Since July 2020, a total of approximately 27,046 battery units have been delivered through the PBP across PG&E's service area.
- Food Bank Partnerships: We continued to fund local food banks to provide food replacements to families during and after the PSPS. We partnered with 10 local food banks that serve 13 of the 19 impacted counties to provide boxes of food for families. Local food bank partnerships included:
    - Alameda County Food Bank
    - Central California Food Bank
    - Community Action Agency of Butte County
    - Community Food Bank of San Benito
    - Dignity Health Connected Living
    - Food Bank for Monterey County
    - Food Bank of Contra Costa & Solano
    - Merced County Food Bank
    - Second Harvest Food Bank of Silicon Valley
    - Second Harvest Food Bank San Joaquin & Stanislaus
- Meals on Wheels Partnerships: We continued our partnership with Meals on Wheels to provide additional support and services to customers in need during this PSPS. We

[40] For more information on the types of aid ILCs provided and how the delivery of aid was coordinated among DDAR, ILCs and the customers, see PG&E's 2025 AFN Plan.

partnered with eight Meals on Wheels Organizations[42] to provide services to customers in scope for the de-energization in 19 counties. Meals on Wheels Organization partnerships included:

  - Dignity Health Connected Living
  - J-Sei
  - Meals on Wheels Diablo Region
  - Meals on Wheels Monterey Peninsula
  - Service Opportunity for Seniors
  - Spectrum Community Services
  - Tehama County Community Action Agency
  - West Contra Costa Meals on Wheels

- CA 211 Providers Network: PG&E has a long-standing relationship with CA 211 through our charitable grant program. As of August 13, 2021, PG&E has a partnership with the California network of 211s to connect customers with resources before, during, and after a PSPS. For this PSPS, PG&E worked with 211 to assist 285 customers with resources.[43] The direct assistance resources provided during this activation were food vouchers for 87 customers, generator fuel vouchers for 16 customers, accessible transportation for two customers and hotel accommodations for 28 customers.
- Accessible Transportation Partnerships: We are partnered with Accessible Transportation organizations to provide customers with transportation to and from PG&E's CRCs. For this PSPS, we successfully partnered with two organizations in preparation for the possibility of any transportation needs.[44]

Communications to Customers with Limited English Proficiency

PG&E provided translated customer support through its customer notifications, website, call center, social media and engagement with CBOs, and multicultural media partnerships. Customers with their language preference set received in-language (translated) notifications. For customers with no language preference set, notifications were provided in English with information on how to receive PSPS information in 15 non-English languages.

Customers with limited English proficiency have access to translation phone numbers on our PSPS website, highlighting that translation services are available in over 240 languages. We received requests for information in five languages supported by our Call Center Translation Services resulting in 735 total calls between June 17 – 22, 2025.

PG&E continued support and engagement with multi-cultural media organizations and in-language CBOs to maximize the reach of in-language communications to the public. Prior to the PSPS, we reached out to 38 multicultural media organizations to provide outreach in translated languages throughout the impacted counties. These organizations covered the translated languages above and languages spoken by communities that occupy significant roles in California's agricultural economy (e.g., Nahuatl). Additionally, we shared PSPS information and updates, news releases, social media infographics and our new PSPS Language Resources page (available in English, translated languages and ASL) with these media outlets for their distribution. Highlights from our coordination with multicultural media organizations and CBOs during this PSPS include coverage from KSTS Telemundo Interview in Spanish, PAMA Media

[43] Additional information on 211s is not available within the PSPS Post-Event Report timeline. More information will be available in the 2025 AFN Plan.
[44] PG&E partnered with Dignity Health Connected Living and Fresno Economic Opportunities Commission during this PSPS.

Radio social media update in Portuguese and KTSF-TV PSPS update in Chinese. See Figures 23 – 25 below.

Figure 23: KSTS Telemundo Interview on PSPS update in Spanish

Figure 24: PAMA Media Radio social media update in Portuguese

Figure 25: KTSF-TV PSPS update in Chinese



Section 6.6 - Provide the following information on backup power (including mobile backup power) with the name and email address of a utility contact for customers for each of the following topics: (D.21-06-014, page 300.)

Response:
The information requested is included in Sections 6.6a – 6.6f. For questions related to backup power, customers can email TempGenPSPSSupport@pge.com.

Section 6.6a. Description of the backup generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

Response:
Table 10 lists the generators available for CFI customers before and during this PSPS.

Table 10: Generators Available for CFI Customers

Generator Type	Number of Units	Individual Size (MW)	Run Time (Hrs.)[45]	Description
Diesel Generator	2	0.32	37.6	13 units on reserve in Sacramento.
Diesel Generator	1	0.65	31.0	One unit on reserve in San Leandro.
Diesel Generator	7	0.100	25.3	Seven units on reserve in Sacramento.
Diesel Generator	1	0.125	25.0	One unit on reserve in San Leandro.
Diesel Generator	7	0.200	22.9	Seven units on reserve in San Leandro.

[45] Estimated based on a 75% load. Barring mechanical failure and refueling the temporary generators have the ability to operate continuously throughout a typical PSPS.

Generator Type	Number of Units	Individual Size (MW)	Run Time (Hrs.)[45]	Description
Diesel Generator	3	0.275	26.0	Three units on reserve in Sacramento.
Diesel Generator	4	0.500	24.1	Four units on reserve in Sacramento.
Diesel Generator	2	0.570	24.1	Two units on reserve in San Leandro.
Diesel Generator	1	1.0	35.0	One unit on reserve in Sacramento.
Diesel Generator	15	1.140	24.0	15 units on reserve in San Leandro.
Diesel Generator	7	1.500	10.0	Seven units on reserve in Benecia.
Diesel Generator	18	2.000	27.7	Eight units on reserve in Sacramento. 10 units on reserve in San Leandro.

6.6b. The capacity and estimated maximum duration of operation of the backup generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

Response:
Table 10 lists the power capacity and maximum duration of operation of the generators available for CFI customers before and during this PSPS.

6.6c. The total number of backup generators provided to critical facility and infrastructure customer's site immediately before and during the PSPS.

Response:
During and immediately before the PSPS, one backup generator was activated to energize the CFI customers that did not have an existing mitigation plan in place.

6.6d. How the utility deployed this backup generation to the critical facility and infrastructure customer's site.

Response:
As a general policy, PG&E does not offer backup generation to individual facilities. However, PG&E's policy grants exceptions for critical facilities when a prolonged outage could have a significant adverse impact to public health or safety.

Deployment of temporary generation is contingent upon the following circumstances: the expected duration to perform permanent repairs is significantly longer than the expected duration

to install backup generation, the expected customer outage is 50,000 or more customer minutes, and the outage affects a distribution circuit serving multiple customers without a functional back-tie.[46]

PG&E has pre-arranged commitments with critical facility and infrastructure customers to provide temporary generation in case of a PSPS and evaluated requests received during this PSPS according to the prioritization described in Section 6.6e.

6.6e. An explanation of how the utility prioritized how to distribute available backup generation.

Response:
PG&E prioritizes the deployment of available generation by first meeting existing commitments to individual facilities in the following order.

- Intensive Care Unit (ICU) hospitals, pre-identified by PG&E in partnership with the California Hospital Association (CHA) and Hospital Council of Northern and Central California (HC).
- Pandemic Response sites are classified as medical stations and shelters. Additional facilities are prepared to support public safety such as but not limited to First/emergency responders at the Tribal, local, state, and federal level, water, wastewater, and communication service providers, affected community choice aggregators, publicly-owned utilities/electrical cooperatives, the CPUC, the California Governor's Office of Emergency Services and the CAL FIRE.[47]

Deployment of available generation is then followed by customers with special needs in the following order:

- Life support, MBL Program, and temperature sensitive
- Large customers, economic damage customers, and danger to health and safety customers

Deployment of available generation is then followed by other customers based on maximizing relief based on the number of customers times expected duration.

6.6f. Identify the critical facility and infrastructure customers that received backup generation.

Response:
During this PSPS, PG&E utilized its rental fleet of temporary generators to mitigate the impacts of PSPS on its customers. This fleet was used to support one stand-alone facilities serving public safety. CFI customers that received backup generation are listed in Table 11.

Table 11: CFI Customers that Received Backup Generation

County	Site Type	Generation Deployed (MW)	Duration of Operation (Hours)	Reason Deployed
Glenn	Water District	0.230	50:59	High risk to environment or public safety.

[46] 50,000 customer minutes is approximately equivalent to 100 customers for about 8 hours.
[47] 50,000 customer minutes is approximately equivalent to 100 customers for about eight hours.

Section 7 – Complaints & Claims

Section 7.1 - The number and nature of complaints received as the result of the de-energization event and claims that are filed against the utility because of de-energization. The utility must completely report all the informal and formal complaints, meaning any expression of grief, pain, or dissatisfaction, from various sources, filed either with CPUC or received by the utility as a result of the PSPS event. *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, D.21-06-014, page 304.)*

Response:

Table 12 provides the number and nature of complaints received from customers and Public Safety Partners, submitted to both the CPUC and PG&E, for the June 19 – 22, 2025 PSPS.[48] Any complaints received after June 20, 2025 for this PSPS will be included in the 2025 PSPS Post-Season Report.

Table 12: Number and Nature of Complaints due to the June 19 – 22, 2025 PSPS

Nature of Complaints	Number of Complaints
Communications/Notifications Including, but not limited to complaints regarding lack of notice, excessive notices, confusing notice, false alarm notice, problems with getting up-to-date information, inaccurate information provided, not being able to access information in the prevalent languages and/or information accessibility, complaints about website, Public Safety Partner Portal, Representational State Transfer (REST)/Digital Asset Manager (DAM) sites (as applicable).	74
PSPS Frequency/Duration Including, but not limited to complaints regarding the frequency and/or duration of PSPS, including delays in restoring power, scope of PSPS and dynamic of weather conditions.	83
Safety/Health Concern Including, but not limited to complaints regarding difficulties experienced by AFN/MBL populations, traffic accidents due to non-operating traffic lights, inability to get medical help, well water or access to clean water, inability to keep property cool/warm during outage raising health concern.	58
General PSPS Dissatisfaction/Other Including, but not limited to complaints about being without power during PSPS and related hardships such as food loss, income loss, inability to work/attend school, plus any PSPS-related complaints that do not fall into any other category.	207
Outreach/Assistance Including, but not limited to complaints regarding CRCs, community crew vehicles, backup power, hotel vouchers, and other assistance provided by utility to mitigate impact of PSPS.	8

[48] PG&E Post-Event Reports are based on the CPUC template. Additional information regarding complaints and claims will be provided in the PSPS Post-Season Report.

Claims

As of June 26, 2025, PG&E received 28 claims for the June 19 – 22, 2025 PSPS.

Table 13: Count and Type of Claim(s) Received

Description of Claims	Number of Claims
Business Interruption / Economic Loss	0
Food Loss Only	26
Property Damage	2

Section 8 – Power Restoration

Section 8.1 - A detailed explanation of the steps the utility took to restore power *(Resolution ESRB-8 page 5)*

Response:
During this PSPS, the PG&E EOC Command and Meteorology Teams monitor real-time and forecasted weather conditions based on weather models, weather station data, and field observations while patrol crews and helicopters are pre-positioned in anticipation of the Weather All-Clear to begin patrols. Weather All-Clears are called based on circuit segments.

This allows PG&E to call Weather All-Clears more granularly, thereby, restoring power more quickly in areas less prone to wind gusts or adverse conditions. PG&E monitors the conditions for each impacted circuit segment and as they fall below our mFPC to consider areas for restoration.

As Weather All-Clears are issued, restoration crews patrol electrical facilities to identify and repair or clear any damage or hazard before re-energizing. Using the Incident Command System (ICS) as a base response framework, each circuit is assigned a taskforce consisting of supervisors, crews, trouble men, and inspectors. This structure allows PG&E to patrol and perform step restoration in alignment with the centralized control centers.

During restoration, PG&E issued five Weather All-Clears in two waves and deployed up to 171 personnel and 26 helicopters to patrol the lines in advance of restoration. Patrols were conducted on approximately 1,830 miles of distribution circuits and 381 miles of transmission lines that had been de-energized during the first wave and approximately 1,626 miles of distribution and 20 miles of transmission lines in the second wave. Power was restored to customers as patrol completion verified the safe condition of each line.

Section 8.2 - The timeline for power restoration, broken down by phase if applicable *(D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A24, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
For detailed information on restoration on each circuit, including restoration date, restoration time, and total customer count on each circuit please refer to Appendix B.

Section 8.3 - For any circuits that require more than 24 hours to restore, the utility shall explain why it was unable to restore each circuit within this timeframe. *(D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 6.)*

Response:
PG&E was able to restore all impacted customers within 24 hours of the Weather All-Clear.

Section 9 – Community Resource Centers

Section 9.1 - The address of each location during a de-energization event, the location (in a building, a trailer, etc.), the assistance available at each location, the days and hours that it was open, and attendance (i.e., number of visitors) *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
During the June 19 – 22, 2025 PSPS, PG&E opened 20 CRCs which were visited by 14,060 people. A list of CRC locations, assistance available, operating days and hours, and attendance is reported in Appendix E.

Visitors were provided with PSPS information by dedicated staff, ADA-compliant restrooms, physically distanced tables and chairs, power strips to meet basic charging needs for personal medical devices and other electronics, snacks, bottled water, Wi-Fi and cellular service access. Bags of ice and privacy screens were also available at indoor locations. During this PSPS, 98 visitors stayed onsite. In total, visitors received:

- 16,644 snacks
- 9,285 bottled waters
- 7,808 device chargers
- 122 bags of ice
- 3,718 blankets

Three visitors requested and were provided information regarding hotel vouchers.[49]

Visitors who did not wish to remain on site, "Grab and Go" bags with a PSPS information card, water, non-perishable snacks, a mobile battery charger and a blanket were available. During this PSPS, 13,962 visitors did not remain on site and were provided "Grab and Go." Additionally, San Joaquin, Santa Clara and Sutter Counties requested and received "Grab and Go" bags for their respective counties.

During all PSPS events, PG&E coordinates with county Offices of Emergency Management to determine the best locations for CRCs. For this PSPS, in agreement with counties, CRCs were not opened in Glenn, Fresno, Kings, Merced, Napa, San Joaquin, Santa Clara, San Benito, Shasta, Sonoma, and Trinity county due to low customer impact.

Additional information about our CRC operations, including coordination with Tribal and local governments, CRC types and resources, and more is available in the CRC Plan located in Appendix A of PG&E's 2024 Pre-Season Report, pp. 47-61.

[49] PG&E does not provide hotel vouchers at CRC locations. For more information on vouchers, see Section 6.5.

Section 9.2 - Any deviations and explanations from the CRC requirement including operation hours, ADA accessibility, and equipment. *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
Due to the timing of de-energization and restoration, CRC hours of operation, listed in Appendix E, deviated from the standard operating hours of 08:00 to 22:00 PDT from de-energization through full restoration.

Section 9.3 - A map identifying the location of each CRC and the de-energized areas *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
See Figure 26 below for a map of the CRC location. Based on the CRC survey conducted for this PSPS, most respondents traveled approximately less than five miles to the nearest CRC location. Additional CRC location information can be found at PG&E Emergency Site – View Outage Map. Customers can find specific information using the 'Address Search' or 'City/County Search' functions.

Figure 26: Location of CRCs Readied During June 19 – 22, 2025 PSPS

Section 10 – Mitigations to Reduce Impact

Section 10.1 - Mitigation actions and impacts (both waterfall graph and map) including: sectionalization devices, temporary generation, microgrids, permanent backup generation, transmission switching, covered conductor, and any other grid hardening that mitigated the impact of the event *(D.21-06-014, page 285, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:

PG&E employed multiple measures to avoid de-energizing approximately 61,492 customers. Figure 27 depicts the impact each mitigation measure had on the total number of customers. Customer locations where mitigation efforts were utilized are mapped in Figure 28.

Figure 27: Reduction of Impacted Customers Driven by Mitigation Efforts



Figure 28: Map of Where Mitigation Was Utilized During the June 19 – 22, 2025 PSPS



Community Microgrids

A community microgrid is a group of customers and Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) within clearly defined electrical boundaries with the ability to disconnect from and reconnect to the grid. These microgrids are typically designed to serve the portions of communities that include community resources, like hospitals, police and fire stations, and gas stations and markets. PG&E continues to own and operate the distribution system within the microgrid. More information about PG&E's microgrid solutions or how to begin developing a community microgrid can be found at www.pge.com/cmep.

Community microgrids were not utilized during this PSPS.

Transmission Line Sectionalization

Transmission lines are segmented using switches enabled with Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), when possible, if only a portion of a line is required to be de-energized due to PSPS. Leaving segments of transmission lines energized allows PG&E to still reduce fire risk where needed and provide service to stations fed off the non-impacted segments during this PSPS.

During this PSPS, transmission line sectionalization enabled one distribution substation which reduced impacts by approximately 168 customers.

Transmission Switching

Depending on fire risk patterns, transmission switch locations and switching plans maintain service to customers on lines that fall outside of the high-risk area but are served by lines that pass through the fire risk area. Based on PSPS scope, we may be able to reconfigure the transmission grid so that customers may remain energized by an alternative source.

During this PSPS, transmission switching was used to mitigate approximately four customers.

Distribution Switching

Depending on fire risk patterns, distribution switch locations and switching plans maintain service to customers on lines that fall outside the high-risk area but are served by lines that pass through the fire risk area. Depending on PSPS scope, we may be able to use back-tie switching to bypass the distribution circuits that pass through the de-energization area to keep customers energized from a different set of lines.

Distribution switching was not used as a mitigation during this PSPS.

Distribution Sectionalization

PG&E has installed new distribution sectionalization devices near the borders of the CPUC-designated HFTD Tier 2 and Tier 3 to reduce the number of customers affected by PSPS outages.

PG&E used distribution sectionalization devices on 52 circuits which reduced impacts by approximately 61,315 customers during this PSPS.

Islanding

In some cases, PG&E can leverage islanding capabilities to keep some customers islanded apart from the rest of PG&E's transmission system and energized by generation located within the island.

Transmission islanding was not utilized during this PSPS.

Temporary Substation Generation

Temporary substation generation can enable some community resources to continue serving the surrounding population during a PSPS at distribution substations resulting from transmission line outages. An interconnection is made at the substation, energizing entire circuits where downstream assets are not at weather risk and generator capacity is sufficient. If there are downstream assets at risk, this mitigation is combined with distribution sectionalization to energize only safe areas. For reporting purposes, customers mitigated in the latter case will be documented in this category and not in sectionalization to avoid duplication. On average, customers served by temporary substation generation experience de-energization periods of under 30 minutes.

Temporary substation generation was not utilized during this PSPS.

Temporary Microgrids

Temporary microgrids can enable some community resources to continue serving the surrounding population during a PSPS where it is safe to do so, using pre-installed interconnection hubs to safely and rapidly interconnect temporary generation. While temporary microgrids do not often support large numbers of customers, the community resources served by temporary microgrids include fire stations, local water and waste companies, markets, post offices, and medical facilities. On average, when utilized, customers served by temporary microgrids experience de-energization periods of under 30 minutes. PG&E's service area currently has 12 temporary microgrid sites available for immediate operation.

Temporary distribution microgrids were not in scope during this PSPS.

Backup Power Support:

Backup power support provides temporary generation to select devices (i.e. medical equipment) or limited areas. However, it does not mitigate PSPS impacts completely given its segmented scope. For more information on backup power support, see pge.com/backuppowersafety.

During this PSPS, PG&E used temporary generation to support five stand-alone customers, including one critical facilities customer as listed in Table 11.

Covered Conductor:

The effects of grid-hardening and covered conductors are accounted for in our IPW model, which predicts the probability of utility-caused ignitions. Overhead system hardening is expected to reduce the probability of outages and ignitions in recently hardened sections. The IPW model more heavily weighs ignition and outage rates in recent years which will result in areas with fewer ignitions (e.g., areas that may have been recently hardened, being less likely to be de-energized for PSPS as there is a lower chance of ignition based on historical ignitions and outages).

Section 11.1 - Threshold analysis and the results of the utility's examination of whether its thresholds are adequate and correctly applied in the de-energized areas. *(D.21-06-014, page 305-306.)*

Response:
This section addresses our examination of the adequacy of our PSPS protocols and guidance thresholds. As prescribed in ESRB-8, the decision to de-energize electric facilities for public safety is based on the best judgment of the IOU and is dependent on many factors including and not limited to fuel moisture; aerial and ground firefighting capabilities; active fires that indicate fire conditions; situational awareness provided by agencies; and local meteorological conditions of humidity and winds.[50] Based on our current PSPS modeling and thresholds, as applied in this PSPS and explained in Section 2, we believe our current PSPS thresholds continue to be adequate and were correctly applied for the June 19 – 22, 2025 PSPS. See Appendix A for detailed information on our PSPS criteria and thresholds.

PG&E begins its threshold evaluation with a robust historical analysis that is described in detail below. This analysis establishes the guidance values to be applied for a PSPS, which has been optimized to capture data from past catastrophic fires to mitigate customer impacts. To do so, Meteorologists use internal and external tools and subject matter expertise to decide.

Typically, before de-energization, the PSPS customer risk is also evaluated against the wildfire risk on a per circuit basis to further evaluate the adequateness of the event. During this PSPS, the advanced weather modeling systems from our network of more than 1,300 weather stations can forecast and track weather conditions in real-time. Finally, data and post-PSPS analysis results are collected and provided as part of the PSPS Post-Event Report.

<u>Establishing Threshold through Historical Analysis</u>
Our PSPS guidance was established by calibrating a granular, historical dataset. We built our verification dataset by creating, or "backcasting," the PSPS guidance through our historical dataset. We extracted values for all recent fires that have occurred in PG&E's service area from 2012 to 2023 We aimed to capture as many historical fires as possible that were caused by PG&E equipment during high wind events (e.g., Camp, Nuns, Kincade, Zogg) while limiting the number of historical PSPS outages to minimize customer impacts. Our analysis included:

- Hourly review of past incidents
- Verification of hypothetical PSPS dates
- PSPS guidance values testing
- A robust guidance sensitivity and calibration analysis

<u>Historical Analysis: CFP_D Quantification</u>
Based on this historical analysis, PG&E uses a CFP_D value of seven as the quantitative threshold guidance value to consider for PSPS on PG&E's distribution system.

To establish the CFP_D threshold of seven, we performed multiple sensitivity studies in "backcast" mode for calibration and validation. This involved running 68 different versions of the combined distribution PSPS guidance through hourly historical data throughout multiple years to calibrate PSPS guidance. This included simulating and learning from more than 2,500 virtual PSPS outages. Through this "lookback" analysis, we evaluated:

- The potential size, scope, and frequency of PSPS outages

[50] See Resolution ESRB-8, p. 8-9.

- Potential customer impacts
- The days PSPS outages would have occurred
- Whether utility infrastructure would have qualified for de-energization

The mFPC and CFP_D guidance that is determined from Technosylva was also evaluated using this process.

The CFP_D guidance value of seven is shown in Figure 29 with respect to recent large fires since 2012. Fires above the CFP_D7 curve tend to be wind driven fire, while non-wind driven fires tend to exist below the CFP_D7 curve. Any fires above seven that meet mFPC indicate a PSPS would have been executed, had these models and guidance been in use during these historic events. The results show that deployment of this model could have prevented wildfires, such as Camp, Tubbs, Nuns, Atlas, Kincade and Zogg fires, if implemented in 2012.[51]

Figure 29: CFP_D Guidance



This analysis was a critical step to ensure the most catastrophic historical incidents are identified by PSPS guidance while considering the significant impacts to customers from PSPS outages across multiple dimensions (e.g., duration and frequency). This ensures that future PSPS outages will capture conditions similarly during the most catastrophic fires while also balancing impacts to customers.

Historical Analysis: Execution

To execute the analysis at this scale, we utilized cloud computing resources to run PSPS model guidance for every hour at every 2 x 2 km grid cell across the historical data set to determine the number of times and locations PSPS guidance is exceeded. Each location exceeding guidance is then grouped into events to determine the location and size of each PSPS given the weather and fuels present at that time under the parameters of the study version. This allows us to determine if synoptic-driven events (e.g., Diablo wind events) are being identified, and if historical fires attributable to PG&E equipment may have been mitigated.

[51] Note that the inclusion of a fire in this analysis does not indicate that PG&E is directly responsible for or caused a fire. Instead, the fires are included for the purpose of analyzing the impact of PG&E's current PSPS Protocols.

Verification of PSPS Protocols

In addition to these sensitivity studies, PG&E performed extensive verification of the PSPS protocols using several internal and external datasets. The goal of these analyses was to first determine if certain weather events are being captured (e.g., Diablo and offshore wind events), and second, to determine if lines that have been implicated in historic catastrophic fires would have been identified by the guidance.

The following internal datasets were used in the analysis:

- Climatology of Diablo wind events
- Hourly high-resolution wind maps from the climatology data set
- Distribution and transmission outage history
- The weather signal database
- Exploratory and dynamic dashboards created with internal and external data

The following external datasets were used in the analysis:

- National Center for Environmental Prediction (NCEP) North American Regional Reanalysis Archive (NARR) synoptic weather maps
- Historical fire occurrence data compiled by federal agencies
- RFWs from NWS
- High risk of potential large fires due to wind from the GACC

The paragraphs below explain how we leveraged external and internal data to verify our PSPS protocols guidance thresholds.

NARR Archive

PG&E has acquired the NARR archive data dating back to 1995 and produced over two million maps that can be utilized to study past events. These maps are also useful to study the past conditions leading up to a PSPS, such as the extent of precipitation events and heat waves. When the PSPS models are run through the climatology, each PSPS identified is compared against the NARR archive by a Meteorologist to determine the large-scale atmospheric features present for each event.

Climatology of Diablo Wind Events

PG&E also leverages the latest academic research on Diablo wind events that use surface-based observations to create a climatology of Diablo wind events. We adapted the criteria and processed it hour-by-hour through the 31-year weather climatology to determine the frequency, magnitude, and timing of Diablo winds. The output of this analysis was a 31-year calendar of Diablo wind events experienced in the PG&E service area. As it relates to PSPS directly, the strongest Diablo wind events were evaluated to verify if PSPS guidance also selects these days for potential PSPS outages. Using the days identified by PSPS guidance and the Diablo PSPS list, a high-level comparison was completed to evaluate overlap of the events.

Any events that did not meet PSPS guidance were further evaluated using additional data sources described in this section. For example, the NARR archive proved useful, as antecedent conditions such as rainfall before a PSPS and the magnitude of the PSPS could be evaluated.

PG&E's Weather Signal Database

PG&E's Meteorology Team built, and continues to maintain, a 'weather signal' database that flags each day from January 1, 1995, to present that experienced any weather-related outages on the distribution system. It also lists the main weather driver (e.g., heat, low-elevation snow, northeast wind, winter storm, etc.) for these outages. If distribution outage activity is not driven by weather, the day is classified as a "Blue Sky"[52] day. This dataset combines weather and distribution outage activity that allows rapid filtering of events based on the main weather drivers. To validate PSPS guidance, we used a combination of "Northeast" wind days and "Blue-Sky" days.

The PSPS guidance was validated against all Northeast wind days in the database. This is similar, but complementary to the Diablo PSPS analysis as it also accounts for outage activity observed on those days. Events were also compared against "Blue Sky" days to ensure that PSPS would not be recommended for a high percentage of non-weather-impact days where little to no outage activity was observed.

RFWs from the NWS

PG&E also validated PSPS guidance against RFWs from the NWS. RFWs mean warm temperatures, very low humidity, and stronger winds are expected to combine and produce an increased risk of fire danger. These RFWs were collected between 2015 – 2020 in shapefile format and used to evaluate the timing and spatial extent of historical RFWs against PSPS guidance. It should be noted that each NWS office in the PG&E service area has different RFW criteria, making direct and quantifiable comparison challenging. However, this dataset is used to evaluate whether RFWs were issued when PSPS guidance was met. Based on historical PSPS analysis, RFWs are expected to occur more frequently and cover a broader area than the area covered by PSPS outages.

High Risk of Potential Large Fires due to Wind from the Geographic Area Coordination Center (GAAC)

PG&E also validated PSPS guidance against historical "High Risk" days from the GACC. The GACCs issue High Risk Day alerts when fuel and weather conditions are predicted which historically have resulted in a significantly higher than normal chance for a new large fire or for significant growth on existing fires. Examples of critical weather conditions are high winds, low humidity, an unstable atmosphere, and very hot weather. Similar to the RFW analysis, this dataset was used to evaluate if High Risk days were issued when PSPS guidance was high. Blue Sky Day is defined as "The same as a non-weather impact day (no or very limited impacts due to weather)." Similar to RFWs, based on historical PSPS analysis, High Risk Days are expected to occur more frequently and cover a broader area than PSPS.

Hourly High-Resolution Wind Maps from PG&E Climatology Data Set

PG&E created hourly maps from high-resolution climatology and a web-based application to display any hour across 30 years. For each PSPS that meets PSPS guidance in the climatology, these maps were evaluated by a Meteorologist to better understand the nature of the event, wind speeds, antecedent conditions, and the spatial extent of strong winds. It's important to note forecast wind speeds are available in the same exact format, allowing Operational Meteorologists to put forecast events in perspective with historical events using the same model.

[52] The definition of a Blue Sky Day is as follows: "Blue Sky Day is defined the same as a non-weather impact day (no or very limited impacts due to weather)".

Detailed PSPS Dashboards

To evaluate the thresholds, Meteorologists and data scientists utilized the data sources described above to evaluate historical PSPS hour-by-hour to verify the locations and times that are being flagged as meeting PSPS guidance. These dashboards determine if historical fire events would have been flagged by PSPS guidance. Meteorologists evaluated these data sources hourly to verify model performance of the IPW model and suitability for operations. The PSPS guidance can be evaluated spatially using the dashboard map integration, while the size and timing of the PSPS can be evaluated using the time series integration.

Section 11.2 - Any lessons learned that will lead to future improvement for the utility *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:

PG&E collects lessons learned input from staff during and after every PSPS EOC activation to identify best practices and biggest opportunities for improvement. See Table 14 below for lessons learned from the June 19 – 22, 2025 PSPS.

Table 14: Lessons Learned from the PSPS

Issue	Discussion	Resolution
Customer Notification	While PG&E implemented grounding of a transmission line to mitigate induction risk, there were coordination challenges that resulted in a customer being de-energized earlier than the time previously communicated in a notification.	During the PSPS, the customer was notified prior to shutdown, however prior notifications communicated a different initial outage time. We plan to strengthen our controls related to the timing and execution of lines which require grounding.

Section 12 – Other Relevant Information

Response:
Table 15 and Figure 30 show the maximum wind gust speeds recorded by weather stations in each county within PSPS scope.

Table 15: Maximum Wind Gusts Recorded Between June 19 – 22, 2025

County	Maximum Wind Gust (mph)	Station ID	Station Name
Alameda	61	AATC1	Altamont
Colusa	39	PG697	Colusa Hills
Contra Costa	56	234PG	Black Diamond Mines
Fresno	39	PG684	San Joaquin Ridge
Glenn	38	PG574	Diamond Ranch Road
Kern	42	PG649	Beartrap Road
Kings	39	KNLC	Lemoore Naval Air Station
Merced	42	SLRC1	Los Banos
Monterey	50	PG622	Old Coast Tower
San Benito	42	PG534	San Juan Grade
San Joaquin	45	CF138	I-580 – Hansen Road
San Luis Obispo	43	PG715	Mt. Lowe
Santa Barbara	61	GVTC1	Gaviota
Santa Clara	37	PG608	Mt. Umunhum
Shasta	49	PG299	Beegum Gorge
Stanislaus	33	045PG	Mt. Oso
Sutter	29	553PG	Harter Parkway
Tehama	43	TCKC1	Thomes Creek
Trinity	39	437PG	Weaverville

Figure 30: Map of Maximum Wind Gusts Recorded Between June 19 – 22, 2025



APPENDIX

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

APPENDIX A

SECTION 2 – DECISION MAKING PROCESS

Appendix A: DECISION MAKING PROCESS

Table A-1.1: Factors Considered in the Decision to Shut Off Power for Each Distribution Circuit De-energized During the June 19 – 22, 2025 PSPS

Please see Table A-1.2 for the description of each column header, as well as the unit and value provided.
Note: PSPS decision making on Distribution does not occur at a per-circuit level, and instead occurs at the level of our 2 x 2 km weather and fuels model grid. These outputs are used in a GIS system to visualize the areas of concern by area, which meteorologists and Distribution Assets Health Specialists review to scope the event. The data provided here is representative of our high-resolution weather model data, which is driven by the Weather Research and Forecasting model. It is not inclusive of other model information reviewed by meteorologists that include external, public global and high-resolution weather models. This temporal and areal review of the risk, the operational timeline required to create the scope as well as any areas that were added based on subject matter expertise of meteorologists may lead to some circuits being de-energized that do not strictly exceed PSPS guidance.

Circuit Name	Time Place	Forecast										Agency		Observed										PSPS Risk vs. Benefit	
		WS MPH	Temp 2MF	Flame Length ft 8hr	Rate of Spread Chhr 8hr	RH 2M	Prob Cat	DFM 10hr	DFM 100 hr	LFM Chamise New	CFPD	NOAA (Yes/ No)	RFW (Yes/ No)	WS MPH	WG MPH	Temp F	RH %	WS MPH AC	WG MPH AC	Temp F AC	RH% AC	Open PSPS Tags (Yes/ No)	Tx Impacts (Yes/ No)	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	PSPS Potential Benefit
ANTELOPE 1101	TP15_6/21	23	89	13	183.5	12.9	0.33	0.03	0.05	75	1.39	Yes	Yes	24	30	83	11	21	28	71	19	No	No	0.2	60.1
AVENAL 2101	TP15_6/21	22	95	10.7	122	9.3	0.39	0.03	0.05	70	2.32	Yes	Yes	No*	No*	No*	No*	No*	No*	No*	No*	No	No	0.2	18.1
BRENTWOOD 2105	TP01_6/19	32	101	11.3	153.4	14.1	0.32	0.04	0.06	79	4.23	Yes	Yes	43	53	84	21	20	30	60	52	Yes	No	1.8	609.3
BUELLTON 1101	TP14_6/21	28	79	28.5	57.3	23.1	0.35	0.06	0.09	89	11.81	Yes	No	36	54	77	25	32	42	65	44	Yes	No	1.2	456.0
CANTUA 1103	TP12_6/21	21	95	10.4	133.1	7	0.38	0.02	0.04	67	3.08	Yes	Yes	No*	No*	No*	No*	No*	No*	No*	No*	Yes	No	0.2	18.1
CARBONA 1101	TP02_6/19	33	101	15.6	263.1	7.6	0.34	0.03	0.05	74	10.18	Yes	Yes	49	61	92	5	28	38	62	47	Yes	No	3.0	No[1]
CAYETANO 2109	TP01_6/19	28	97	13.1	203.2	16.2	0.40	0.04	0.06	92	3.92	No	No	40	53	77	31	16	23	57	58	Yes	No	2.5	1041.2
CHOLAME 1101	TP11_6/21	26	87	11	143.4	15.1	0.23	0.04	0.08	76	2.10	Yes	Yes	26	34	82	14	22	29	72	27	Yes	No	1.0	912.9
CLAYTON 2213	TP03_6/19	20	95	10.2	122.7	18.2	0.43	0.04	0.07	89	2.89	No	No	43	56	84	7	27	40	58	58	Yes	No	0.1	939.0
COALINGA NO 2 1105	TP12_6/21	30	94	9.7	111.1	5.9	0.36	0.03	0.05	66	13.22	Yes	Yes	25	39	78	15	25	38	74	22	Yes	No	0.2	116.8
CORNING 1102	TP11_6/19	23	103	10.9	135.4	7.8	0.57	0.03	0.05	89	4.16	No	Yes	21	43	80	20	16	32	62	31	Yes	No	3.3	338.9
COTTONWOOD 1101	TP16_6/19	21	103	8.7	93.7	7.5	0.53	0.03	0.05	92	5.67	No	Yes	18	40	77	22	12	26	59	40	Yes	No	4.7	831.8
COTTONWOOD 1103	TP16_6/19	19	104	7.3	54.3	7.5	0.54	0.03	0.05	92	4.25	No	Yes	21	40	83	22	8	16	65	43	Yes	No	9.2	689.6

[1] PSPS Potential Benefit data is not available for Carbona 1101 and is currently under review. We will provide an update in the 2025 PSPS Post-Season Report.

Circuit Name	Time Place	Forecast										Agency		Observed									PSPS Risk vs. Benefit	
		WS MPH	Temp 2MF	Flame Length ft 8hr	Rate of Spread Chhr 8hr	RH 2M	Prob Cat	DFM 10hr	DFM 100 hr	LFM Chamise New	CFPD	NOAA (Yes/ No)	RFW (Yes/ No)	WS MPH	WG MPH	Temp F	RH %	WS MPH AC	WG MPH AC	Temp F AC	RH% AC	Open PSPS Tags (Yes/ No)	Tx Impacts (Yes/ No)	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	PSPS Potential Benefit
DEVILS DEN 1101	TP15_6/21	25	94	13.2	181.8	10.7	0.37	0.03	0.05	69	2.60	Yes	Yes	23	36	79	14	11	15	69	22	No	No	0.2	18.1
ELK CREEK 1101	TP12_6/19	27	103	11.3	137.9	7.4	0.57	0.03	0.05	90	5.21	No	Yes	22	38	82	14	16	24	62	29	Yes	No	12.4	319.0
ELK CREEK 1101	TP02_6/21	27	97	10	116.7	7.6	0.54	0.03	0.05	90	6.30	No	Yes	22	30	88	16	13	19	77	19	Yes	Yes	13.9	310.9
FRENCH GULCH 1101	TP06_6/19	22	93	7.8	24.3	7.5	0.47	0.04	0.07	112	5.13	No	No	25	40	89	17	13	22	48	62	Yes	No	4.6	84.3
FRENCH GULCH 1102	TP06_6/19	23	95	8.5	58.3	9.3	0.47	0.03	0.06	108	4.56	No	No	27	41	94	11	16	28	57	46	Yes	No	1.4	20.0
GIRVAN 1101	TP06_6/19	26	103	9.1	88.3	7.1	0.49	0.03	0.05	93	9.82	No	No	27	41	96	9	14	29	59	40	Yes	No	5.9	311.5
GIRVAN 1102	TP06_6/19	20	102	7.7	57.7	7.8	0.51	0.03	0.05	102	5.85	No	No	26	43	96	9	13	27	59	40	Yes	No	8.4	535.2
GLENN 1101	TP12_6/19	21	104	11	133.3	7.6	0.54	0.03	0.05	89	6.05	Yes	Yes	21	43	81	17	18	25	63	29	Yes	No	0.9	196.4
GLENN 1101	TP02_6/21	21	98	10.1	114.5	7.1	0.52	0.03	0.05	89	5.63	Yes	Yes	27	34	81	13	7	12	78	19	Yes	No	6.7	180.4
GUSTINE 1102	TP04_6/19	32	103	12.6	185.1	11.3	0.41	0.03	0.05	73	11.94	Yes	Yes	27	42	90	15	18	34	61	42	Yes	No	0.3	291.2
HERDLYN 1102	TP01_6/19	38	101	15.7	300.1	12.6	0.36	0.03	0.06	75	7.74	Yes	Yes	49	61	91	7	28	38	62	48	No	No	11.0	710.0
HOLLISTER 2102	TP04_6/19	23	92	10.5	140.9	14.3	0.45	0.05	0.09	90	2.86	Yes	Yes	27	37	75	29	18	26	55	68	Yes	No	1.8	169.3
JOLON 1102	TP10_6/21	25	86	7.7	82.8	17.2	0.33	0.03	0.06	80	4.38	No	No	21	32	79	11	21	30	72	29	Yes	No	1.2	374.1
KESWICK 1101	TP06_6/19	25	101	10.6	41.3	8.2	0.51	0.03	0.05	103	12.18	No	No	27	43	94	9	16	28	60	42	Yes	No	7.6	311.8
KING CITY 1102	TP07_6/19	27	94	12.9	200.2	12.2	0.33	0.04	0.07	78	2.77	Yes	No	18	32	75	38	8	15	53	77	No	No	0.7	317.3
KING CITY 1106	TP07_6/19	26	100	14.4	241.8	9.1	0.42	0.03	0.06	77	4.09	Yes	No	19	32	88	9	8	15	55	61	Yes	No	0.9	342.6
KING CITY 1102	TP09_6/21	27	88	12.8	205	18.6	0.27	0.04	0.07	78	2.52	Yes	No	16	31	76	26	10	19	66	42	No	No	0.5	311.0
KING CITY 1106	TP09_6/21	27	88	13.1	209.3	17.3	0.34	0.03	0.06	77	2.43	Yes	No	23	33	76	21	14	21	68	36	Yes	No	0.7	342.6
LAS POSITAS 2108	TP02_6/19	22	92	14.8	265.6	20	0.37	0.06	0.09	90	2.20	No	No	28	37	81	17	13	17	54	69	Yes	No	1.5	1551.9
LAURELES 1111	TP15_6/19	26	92	10	51.4	6.6	0.50	0.03	0.06	96	8.44	No	No	25	45	81	6	25	45	50	55	Yes	No	2.3	68.3
LOGAN CREEK 2102	TP12_6/19	23	105	11.5	141.4	8.4	0.43	0.03	0.05	88	4.14	Yes	Yes	17	26	81	20	11	17	61	35	Yes	No	1.3	156.1
LOGAN CREEK 2102	TP02_6/21	21	98	10.5	123.9	7.2	0.41	0.03	0.05	87	2.18	Yes	Yes	28	36	88	15	12	16	77	19	Yes	No	1.3	124.1
LOS OSITOS 2101	TP07_6/19	27	99	12	162.4	6.9	0.47	0.03	0.05	78	3.92	Yes	No	26	36	91	5	8	16	53	41	Yes	No	2.4	270.5
LOS OSITOS 2102	TP09_6/21	27	87	12.5	191.4	19	0.24	0.06	0.11	79	2.33	No	No	25	34	76	23	20	26	66	40	Yes	No	1.3	500.4
LOS OSITOS 2103	TP15_6/19	28	98	9.4	83	11	0.66	0.04	0.06	80	12.69	No	No	29	45	91	6	25	45	51	55	Yes	No	4.6	314.8
MAXWELL 1102	TP03_6/21	18	98	8.8	87.8	7.8	0.36	0.03	0.05	86	1.84	Yes	Yes	21	29	79	18	8	11	77	21	Yes	No	1.3	86.0
MAXWELL 1105	TP03_6/21	18	98	9.8	105.2	7.7	0.41	0.03	0.05	87	2.07	Yes	Yes	25	35	82	15	12	16	76	21	Yes	No	0.9	88.2

Circuit Name	Time Place	Forecast										Agency		Observed									PSPS Risk vs. Benefit	
		WS MPH	Temp 2MF	Flame Length ft 8hr	Rate of Spread Chhr 8hr	RH 2M	Prob Cat	DFM 10hr	DFM 100 hr	LFM Chamise New	CFPD	NOAA (Yes/ No)	RFW (Yes/ No)	WS MPH	WG MPH	Temp F	RH %	WS MPH AC	WG MPH AC	Temp F AC	RH% AC	Open PSPS Tags (Yes/ No)	Tx Impacts (Yes/ No)	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	PSPS Potential Benefit
MERIDIAN 1102	TP04_6/21	20	97	9.2	97.5	8.6	0.34	0.03	0.06	86	2.40	Yes	Yes	No*	No*	No*	No*	No*	No*	No*	No*	Yes	No	0.7	0.0
OILFIELDS 1102	TP08_6/19	26	99	12.9	185	10.8	0.34	0.05	0.08	74	3.51	Yes	No	33	46	89	10	14	22	54	59	No	No	1.0	621.2
OILFIELDS 1102	TP10_6/21	27	90	11.9	169.3	15.7	0.29	0.04	0.08	74	3.69	Yes	No	26	40	78	24	18	27	69	34	No	No	0.7	568.9
OILFIELDS 1103	TP10_6/21	31	88	11.2	153.2	15	0.51	0.03	0.06	75	3.35	Yes	No	21	34	85	8	21	30	74	27	Yes	No	15.8	425.8
OREGON TRAIL 1102	TP06_6/19	20	102	9.7	43.3	7.1	0.47	0.03	0.05	102	10.66	No	No	27	43	94	11	16	28	60	42	Yes	No	7.7	288.6
OREGON TRAIL 1103	TP06_6/19	20	102	9.6	29.6	7.5	0.46	0.03	0.05	102	9.07	No	No	27	43	94	11	16	28	60	42	Yes	No	9.1	518.5
PEASE 1103	TP04_6/21	19	96	9.2	103.7	9.1	0.42	0.03	0.06	89	2.71	Yes	Yes	No*	No*	No*	No*	No*	No*	No*	No*	Yes	No	0.6	0.0
RED BLUFF 1103	TP17_6/19	20	104	8.3	81.8	9.4	0.56	0.03	0.05	92	6.89	No	Yes	25	40	81	19	17	27	61	39	Yes	No	2.0	972.7
SAN ARDO 1101	TP08_6/19	25	98	12.6	170.8	13.1	0.38	0.05	0.09	74	2.38	Yes	No	24	34	82	20	14	25	53	77	Yes	No	1.4	305.8
SAN ARDO 1102	TP08_6/19	29	97	12.1	172	8.2	0.46	0.03	0.05	77	3.56	Yes	No	24	34	88	6	14	25	57	28	Yes	No	5.8	478.1
SAN ARDO 1101	TP09_6/21	26	90	12.9	195	15.9	0.33	0.05	0.09	74	2.36	No	No	19	31	78	16	11	20	68	33	Yes	No	0.9	303.4
SAN ARDO 1102	TP09_6/21	30	90	13.1	197	14.1	0.38	0.03	0.05	74	2.62	No	No	26	40	78	22	18	27	69	29	Yes	No	5.8	478.1
SAN MIGUEL 1106	TP09_6/19	32	101	12.4	170.6	8.9	0.43	0.04	0.06	72	3.03	Yes	No	26	43	90	10	14	23	54	59	Yes	No	4.2	700.6
SAN MIGUEL 1107	TP09_6/19	26	101	13	179	8.1	0.39	0.03	0.06	75	3.56	Yes	No	25	38	93	7	23	26	53	65	Yes	No	5.5	321.1
SAN MIGUEL 1105	TP11_6/21	27	89	9.4	107.3	16.1	0.28	0.04	0.08	73	2.40	No	No	23	37	79	19	23	35	70	31	Yes	No	1.4	1040.8
SAN MIGUEL 1106	TP11_6/21	33	89	12	177.2	14.5	0.36	0.03	0.06	72	2.43	Yes	No	23	37	81	14	23	35	70	31	Yes	No	2.3	544.6
SAN MIGUEL 1107	TP11_6/21	28	87	12.1	172.4	13.6	0.32	0.03	0.06	74	2.67	Yes	No	26	37	82	14	23	35	72	27	Yes	No	2.9	311.1
SANTA NELLA 1103	TP04_6/19	36	100	13.5	204.6	12.2	0.34	0.03	0.06	77	7.16	Yes	Yes	27	42	86	18	16	34	60	57	No	No	1.2	0.0
SANTA NELLA 1104	TP04_6/19	36	97	10.4	118.5	12.6	0.27	0.04	0.07	82	1.94	Yes	Yes	27	42	86	18	16	34	60	57	Yes	No	0.1	410.1
SANTA YNEZ 1102	TP14_6/21	27	81	25.3	63.4	20.5	0.48	0.05	0.07	87	13.07	Yes	No	34	50	79	29	16	26	66	41	Yes	No	2.1	446.0
SOLEDAD 2101	TP07_6/19	29	92	12.4	182.8	16.5	0.40	0.04	0.07	79	5.43	No	No	34	44	90	6	19	27	59	65	Yes	No	5.0	431.8
TEJON 1102	TP13_6/21	32	85	24.7	148.2	13.4	0.37	0.04	0.06	96	8.99	Yes	Yes	29	50	69	20	25	41	63	25	Yes	No	4.9	649.0
TIDEWATER 2106	TP03_6/19	29	96	11.6	158.1	17.4	0.38	0.04	0.06	89	3.10	No	No	43	56	84	17	27	40	58	58	Yes	No	1.6	1321.7
TYLER 1105	TP17_6/19	24	104	10.4	122.9	9.6	0.56	0.03	0.05	90	7.34	No	Yes	27	40	81	19	21	30	61	38	Yes	No	7.5	1135.6
VASCO 1102	TP02_6/19	30	94	15.8	301.2	7.3	0.43	0.03	0.05	87	2.54	Yes	Yes	49	61	81	11	28	38	54	66	Yes	No	6.6	1589.3
VASCO 1103	TP02_6/19	32	94	14.6	253.2	16.5	0.24	0.05	0.08	85	1.61	No	No	49	61	74	29	28	38	54	70	No	No	0.4	1249.2
WESTLEY 1101	TP02_6/19	24	102	11.8	155.2	5.6	0.34	0.03	0.05	72	3.62	Yes	Yes	23	26	92	5	16	19	61	47	No	No	1.5	0.0

Circuit Name	Time Place	Forecast										Agency		Observed										PSPS Risk vs. Benefit	
		WS MPH	Temp 2MF	Flame Length ft 8hr	Rate of Spread Chhr 8hr	RH 2M	Prob Cat	DFM 10hr	DFM 100 hr	LFM Chamise New	CFPD	NOAA (Yes/ No)	RFW (Yes/ No)	WS MPH	WG MPH	Temp F	RH %	WS MPH AC	WG MPH AC	Temp F AC	RH% AC	Open PSPS Tags (Yes/ No)	Tx Impacts (Yes/ No)	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	PSPS Potential Benefit
WESTLEY 1103	TP02_6/19	23	101	10.9	133.4	5.8	0.45	0.03	0.04	75	2.91	Yes	Yes	25	43	98	5	20	24	50	44	Yes	No	1.8	332.4
WILDWOOD 1101	TP10_6/19	23	98	27.6	33.2	9.7	0.45	0.03	0.05	96	4.79	No	No	32	49	89	11	21	35	49	56	Yes	No	1.2	334.5
ZACA 1102	TP14_6/21	26	84	9	94.2	12.7	0.51	0.04	0.05	87	7.11	Yes	Yes	28	37	77	17	3	11	58	35	Yes	No	2.2	1286.9

* Due to no nearby weather stations, subject matter expertise was used by the Meteorologist in Charge to determine when to de-energize Avenal 2101, Cantua 1103, Meridian 1102, and Pease 1103.

Table A-1.2: Description, Units, and Value provided for Factors Considered in the Decision to Shut Off Power for Each Distribution Circuit De-energized During the June 19 – 22, 2025 PSPS

Forecast / Agency / Observed	Value	Name	Unit	Value Provided	Description
Forecast	**WS MPH**	Sustained Wind Speeds	mph	max	Sustained windspeed in miles per hour at 10 meters above ground level.
Forecast	**Temp 2MF**	Temperature	degrees F	max	Temperature in Fahrenheit at 2 meters above ground level.
Forecast	**Flame Length ft 8hr**	Flame Length	ft	max	Flame length in feet on fire front for first 8 hours of fire spread simulation from Technosylva.
Forecast	**Rate of Spread Chhr 8hr**	Rate of Spread	chains/hr	max	Rate of fire spread in chains per hour for first 8 hours of fire spread simulation from Technosylva.
Forecast	**RH 2M**	Relative Humidity	%	min	Relative Humidity in percent at 2 meters above ground level.
Forecast	**Prob Cat**	Fire Potential Index (FPI)	probability outputs	max	Fire Potential Index (FPI) Model Output - Probability of a catastrophic fire if an ignition were to occur. FPI component of the CFP_D model.
Forecast	**DFM 10hr**	Dead Fuel Moisture Content 10 hrs	fuel moisture fraction	min	Dead Fuel Moisture in 10-hour fuel moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100.
Forecast	**DFM 100hr**	Dead Fuel Moisture Content 100 hrs	fuel moisture fraction	min	Dead Fuel Moisture in 100-hour moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100.
Forecast	**LMF Chamise New**	Live Fuel Moisture Content-shrub	%	min	Live Fuel Moisture Percentage of Chamise (shrub) plant species. (% of species that is comprised of water).
Forecast	**CFPD**	Catastrophic Fire Probability (CFP_D)	Scaled Probability	max	The product of probability of catastrophic fire (Prob Cat) and IPW - probability of ignition (Prob Ignition). This product is called the (CFP_D) Catastrophic Fire Probability distribution. Scaled by 1000 to convert to an integer value.
Agency	**NOAA (Yes/No)**	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration	N/A	Yes/No During Event	NOAA (SPC) Fire Weather Outlook forecast.
Agency	**RFW (Yes/No)**	Red Flag Warning	N/A	Yes/No During Event	Red Flag Warning from the Federal National Weather Service.
Observed	**WS MPH**	Observed Sustained Wind Speed During Event	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind speed recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated All-Clear time.
Observed	**WG MPH**	Observed Peak Wind Gust During Event	mph	max	The maximum wind gust recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated All-Clear time.
Observed	**Temp F**	Observed Temperature During Event	degrees F	max	The maximum temperature recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated All-Clear time.
Observed	**RH_%**	Observed Relative Humidity During Event	%	min	Minimum relative humidity recorded by all weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated All-Clear time.
Observed	**WS MPH AC**	Observed Sustained Wind Speed at All-Clear	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind speed recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the All-Clear time.
Observed	**WG MPH AC**	Observed Peak Wind Gust at All-Clear	mph	max	The maximum wind gust recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the All-Clear time.
Observed	**Temp F AC**	Observed Temperature at All-Clear	degrees F	max	The maximum temperature recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the All-Clear time.
Observed	**RH % AC**	Observed Relative Humidity at All-Clear	%	min	Minimum relative humidity recorded by all weather stations mapped to each circuit at the All-Clear time.
Observed	**Open PSPS Tags (Yes/No)**	Open PSPS Qualified Tags	N/A	Yes/No During Event	PSPS-Qualified Tags include P1 (tree represents an immediate risk) and P2 (tree is damaged or diseased and could fall into nearby power lines) tree tags and Electric Corrective tags (Priority A - emergency, B - urgent, and E/F - risk-based).
Observed	**Tx Impacts (Yes/No)**	Impacted by Transmission	N/A	Yes/No During Event	Distribution lines that would have been de-energized due to de-energization of upstream transmission lines, regardless of whether those distribution lines would have also been de-energized due to direct distribution PSPS.
Observed	**PSPS Potential Risk Consequence**	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	MAVF Score	Yes/No During Event	Measure of the adverse impact to customers due to de-energization.
Observed	**PSPS Potential Benefit**	PSPS Potential Benefit	MAVF Score	Yes/No During Event	Measure of the adverse impact to customers due to a catastrophic fire.

Table A-2.1: Factors Considered in the Decision to Shut Off Power for Each Transmission Circuit De-energized During the June 19 – 22, 2025 PSPS

Please see Table A-2.2 for the description of each column header, as well as the unit and value provided.
Note: PSPS decision making on Transmission does not occur at a per-circuit level, and instead occurs at the granularity of each transmission structure. These outputs are used in a GIS system and dashboard to visualize the areas of concern by area, which meteorologists and Transmission Asset Health Specialists review to scope the event. This includes a review of lines that have little to no impact to customers and electric grid reliability. The data provided here is representative of our high-resolution weather model data, which is driven by the Weather Research and Forecasting model. It is not inclusive of other model information reviewed by meteorologists that include external, public global and high-resolution weather models. This temporal and areal review of the risk, the operational timeline required to create the scope as well as any areas that were added based on subject matter expertise of meteorologists may lead to some circuits being de-energized that do not strictly exceed PSPS guidance.

Circuit Name	Time Place	Forecast											Agency		Observed									PSPS Risk vs. Benefit	
		WS MPH	Temp 2MF	Flame Length ft 8hr	Rate of Spread Chhr 8hr	RH 2M	Prob Cat	DFM 10hr	DFM 100 hr	LFM Chamise New	OA	CFPT	NOAA (Yes/ No)	RFW (Yes/ No)	WS MPH	WG MPH	Temp F	RH %	WS MPH AC	WG MPH AC	Temp F AC	RH % AC	HFRA (Yes/ No)	High Risk Veg Present on Circuit (Yes/No)	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	PSPS Potential Benefit
TESLA-SCHULTE SW STA #1	TP01_6/19	37	100	15.9	303.9	12.2	0.36	0.03	0.05	77	0.006	12.55	No	No	49	61	91	7	37	46	61	50	No	No	0.1	411.8
TESLA-SCHULTE SW STA #2	TP01_6/19	37	100	15.9	303.9	12.2	0.36	0.03	0.05	77	0.015	12.55	No	No	49	61	91	7	37	46	61	50	No	No	0.1	417.8
AEC SITE #1 TAP	TP01_6/19	37	96	15.8	297.8	13	0.29	0.03	0.05	84	0.028	6.37	No	No	49	61	87	7	37	46	61	50	No	No	0.1	457.8
AEC SITE #2 TAP	TP01_6/19	36	95	15.8	297.8	14.5	0.27	0.04	0.06	85	0.002	0.33	No	No	49	61	87	7	37	46	61	50	No	No	0.1	589.2
SAFEWAY TAP	TP01_6/19	33	99	10.9	144	13	0.32	0.03	0.05	80	0.0014	3.24	No	No	40	45	91	7	6	12	61	51	No	No	0.1	306.9
PITTSBURG-TESLA #2	TP01_6/19	38	101	14.3	257.7	14.1	0.39	0.04	0.06	82	0.004	12.62	No	No	49	61	86	7	37	46	62	40	Yes	No	0.1	1292.2
DELTA SWITCHING YARD-TESLA	TP01_6/19	38	99	14.3	257.7	14.1	0.36	0.04	0.06	81	0.003	12.62	No	No	49	61	86	7	23	27	58	51	No	No	0.1	681.3
ELLIS TAP	TP01_6/19	32	99	7.1	54.8	14	0.35	0.04	0.06	81	0.0007	0.34	No	No	48	61	86	7	19	26	58	51	No	No	0.1	362.6
KELSO-TESLA	TP01_6/19	38	99	14.3	257.7	14.1	0.36	0.04	0.06	81	0.003	7.96	No	No	49	61	86	7	23	27	58	51	No	No	0.1	731.2
RALPH TAP	TP01_6/19	38	97	11.9	183.7	14.7	0.25	0.05	0.08	86	0.0005	0.14	No	No	43	53	79	26	19	24	55	72	No	No	0.1	597.6
TEICHERT TAP	TP01_6/19	22	101	11.1	128.5	5.9	0.32	0.03	0.05	73	0.00005	0.02	No	No	23	26	92	5	10	12	59	51	No	No	0.1	0.0
TESLA-LAWRENCE LAB	TP01_6/19	37	98	14.9	268.8	14.6	0.35	0.04	0.06	82	0.0123	7.96	No	No	49	61	86	7	23	27	58	51	No	No	0.1	1287.6
TESLA-NEWARK #2	TP01_6/19	37	98	14.9	268.8	14.6	0.35	0.04	0.06	82	0.009	12.62	No	No	49	61	86	7	23	27	58	51	Yes	No	0.1	1464.4

Circuit Name	Time Place	Forecast											Agency		Observed									PSPS Risk vs. Benefit	
		WS MPH	Temp 2MF	Flame Length ft 8hr	Rate of Spread Chhr 8hr	RH 2M	Prob Cat	DFM 10hr	DFM 100 hr	LFM Chamise New	OA	CFPT	NOAA (Yes/ No)	RFW (Yes/ No)	WS MPH	WG MPH	Temp F	RH %	WS MPH AC	WG MPH AC	Temp F AC	RH % AC	HFRA (Yes/ No)	High Risk Veg Present on Circuit (Yes/No)	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	PSPS Potential Benefit
TESLA-SALADO #1	TP01_6/19	37	103	15	268.4	5.6	0.38	0.03	0.05	73	0.049	12.62	No	No	49	61	98	4	23	27	64	37	Yes	No	0.1	445.5
TESLA-SALADO-MANTECA	TP01_6/19	37	103	15	268.4	5.5	0.38	0.03	0.05	73	0.049	12.62	No	No	49	61	98	4	23	27	64	37	Yes	No	0.1	363.2
TESLA-STOCKTON COGEN JCT	TP01_6/19	37	100	13.8	249.2	12.2	0.36	0.03	0.05	76	0.033	12.62	No	No	49	61	91	7	23	27	60	48	No	No	0.1	433.5
TESLA-TRACY(115KV)	TP01_6/19	37	99	13.4	238.9	14	0.36	0.04	0.06	81	0.004	7.96	No	No	49	61	86	7	23	27	58	51	No	No	0.1	0.0
TESLA-WESTLEY	TP01_6/19	37	101	15	268.4	5.6	0.36	0.03	0.05	73	0.001	12.62	No	No	49	61	98	4	23	27	64	37	No	No	0.1	463.3
LOS BANOS-MERCY SPRINGS SW STA	TP01_6/19	30	104	14.7	219.9	7.9	0.36	0.03	0.05	70	0.010	2.67	No	No	27	42	92	6	14	17	58	50	No	No	0.1	234.3
COBURN-OIL FIELDS #2	TP01_6/19	26	99	11.5	156.9	11.9	0.29	0.05	0.10	74	0.003	0.92	No	No	33	46	79	25	11	15	51	83	No	No	0.1	594.6
MILLER #1 TAP	TP01_6/19	27	103	13.1	190.8	5.9	0.41	0.03	0.05	74	No[2]	0.22	No	No	20	30	94	4	3	7	63	37	No	No	0.1	186.3
ELK CREEK TAP	TP02_6/21	21	98	10.3	116	7.3	0.45	0.03	0.05	89	0.003	0.52	No	No	20	26	67	30	20	25	67	30	Yes	No	0.1	1028.7

[2] Miller #1 Tap did not meet the required PSPS scoping criteria; therefore, OA is not available.

Table A-2.2: Description, Units, and Value provided for Factors Considered in the Decision to Shut Off Power for Each Transmission Circuit De-energized During the June 19 – 22, 2025 PSPS

Forecast / Agency / Observed	Value	Name	Unit	Value Provided	Description
Forecast	**WS MPH**	Sustained Wind Speed	mph	max	Sustained windspeed in miles per hour at 10 meters above ground level.
Forecast	**Temp 2MF**	Temperature	degrees F	max	Temperature in Fahrenheit at 2 meters above ground level.
Forecast	**Flame Length ft 8hr**	Flame Length	ft	max	Flame length in feet on fire front for first 8 hours of fire spread simulation from Technoslyva.
Forecast	**Rate of Spread Chhr 8hr**	Rate of Spread	chains/hr	max	Rate of fire spread in chains per hour for first 8 hours of fire spread simulation from Technoslyva.
Forecast	**RH 2M**	Relative Humidity	%	min	Relative Humidity in percent at 2 meters above ground level.
Forecast	**Prob Cat**	Fire Potential Index (FPI)	probability outputs	max	FPI Model Output - Probability of a catastrophic fire if an ignition were to occur. FPI component of the CFP_D model.
Forecast	**DFM 10hr**	Dead Fuel Moisture Content 10 hrs (%)	fuel moisture fraction	min	Dead Fuel Moisture in 10-hour fuel moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100.
Forecast	**DFM 100hr**	Dead Fuel Moisture Content 100 hrs (%)	fuel moisture fraction	min	Dead Fuel Moisture in 100-hour moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100.
Forecast	**LFM Chamise New**	Live Fuel Moisture Content-shrub	%	min	Live Fuel Moisture Percentage of Chamise (shrub) plant species (% of species that are comprised of water).
Forecast	**OA**	Transmission Operability Assessment (OA)	Probability	max	IPW Model Output - Probability of Ignition based on the probability of outages by cause. Ignition component of the CFPD model. IPW Model - A model that provides estimates of the probability of an ignition given an outage on an hourly basis.
Forecast	**CPFT**	Catastrophic Fire Potential (CFP_T)	Scaled Probability	max	The product of probability of catastrophic fire (Prob Cat) and IPW - probability of ignition (Prob Ignition). This product is called the (CFP_D) Catastrophic Fire Probability distribution model. Scaled by 1000 to convert to an integer value.
Agency	**NOAA (Yes/No)**	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration	N/A	Yes/No During Event	NOAA (SPC) Fire Weather Outlook forecast.
Agency	**RFW (Yes/No)**	Red Flag Warning	N/A	Yes/No During event	Red Flag Warning from the Federal National Weather Service.
Observed	**WS MPH**	Observed Sustained Wind Speed During Event	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind speed recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from de-energization time to All-Clear time.
Observed	**WG MPH**	Observed Wind Gust During Event	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind gust recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from de-energization time to All-Clear time.
Observed	**Temp F**	Observed Temperature During Event	degrees F	max	The maximum temperature recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from de-energization time to All-Clear time.
Observed	**RH %**	Observed Relative Humidity During Event	%	min	Minimum relative humidity recorded by all weather stations mapped to each circuit from de-energization time to All-Clear time.
Observed	**WS MPH AC**	Observed Sustained Wind Speed at All-Clear	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind speed recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the All-Clear time.
Observed	**WG MPH AC**	Observed Sustained Wind Gust at All-Clear	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind gust recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the All-Clear time.
Observed	**Temp F AC**	Observed Temperature at All-Clear	degrees F	max	The maximum temperature recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the All-Clear time.
Observed	**RH % AC**	Observed Relative Humidity at All-Clear	%	min	Minimum relative humidity recorded by all weather stations mapped to each circuit at the All-Clear time.
Observed	**HFRA (Yes/No)**	High Fire Risk Area	N/A	Yes/No During Event	Labeled 'Yes' when Circuit goes through High Fire Risk Area.
Observed	**High Risk Veg Present on Circuit (Yes/No)**	High Risk Vegetation Present on Circuit	N/A	Yes/No During Event	High risk vegetation present on the circuit.
Observed	**PSPS Potential Risk Consequence**	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	MAVF Score	Yes/No During Event	Measure of the adverse impact to customers due to de-energization.
Observed	**PSPS Potential Benefit**	PSPS Potential Benefit	MAVF Score	Yes/No During Event	Measure of the adverse impact to customers due to a catastrophic fire.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

APPENDIX B

SECTION 3 – DE-ENERGIZED TIME, PLACE, DURATION AND CUSTOMERS

Appendix B: DE-ENERGIZED TIME, PLACE, DURATION AND CUSTOMERS

Table B-1. Circuits De-Energized During the June 19 – 22, 2025 PSPS

Circuits labeled as "non-HFTD" are located outside of the CPUC High Fire-Threat District (HFTD). These circuits or portions of circuits are impacted for one of two reasons: (1) indirect impacts from transmission lines being de-energized or (2) the non-HFTD portion of the circuit are conductive to the HFTD at some point in the path to service.
Circuits with an asterisk (*) were sectionalized during the PSPS to further reduce customer impact. The de-energization date and time represents the time the first customer was de-energized on the circuit and the restoration time represents the date and time of the last customer restored on a circuit by circuit.

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Communities	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	ANTELOPE 1101*	6/21/2025 15:16	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 11:13	KERN	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	7	1	6	0	0	0
Distribution	AVENAL 2101*	6/21/2025 15:13	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 8:27	KINGS	Outside HFTD	3	0	3	0	0	0
Distribution	BRENTWOOD 2105*	6/19/2025 9:41	6/20/2025 10:18	6/20/2025 13:42	CONTRA COSTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	83	44	30	4	4	9
Distribution	BUELLTON 1101*	6/21/2025 15:03	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 10:42	SANTA BARBARA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	162	80	48	1	8	34
Distribution	CANTUA 1103*	6/21/2025 13:55	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 9:50	FRESNO	Outside HFTD	16	2	6	0	0	8
Distribution	CARBONA 1101*	6/19/2025 9:34	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 8:52	ALAMEDA, SAN JOAQUIN	Outside HFTD	177	100	42	7	13	35
Distribution	CAYETANO 2109*	6/19/2025 9:42	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 7:22	CONTRA COSTA, ALAMEDA	Tier 3	59	40	19	6	1	0
Distribution	CHOLAME 1101*	6/21/2025 16:58	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 10:18	SAN LUIS OBISPO	Outside HFTD	160	123	7	4	16	30
Distribution	CLAYTON 2213*	6/19/2025 10:36	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 7:37	CONTRA COSTA	Tier 2	4	0	4	0	0	0
Distribution	COALINGA NO 2 1105*	6/21/2025 14:11	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 9:54	SAN BENITO, MONTEREY, FRESNO	Outside HFTD	19	2	14	0	1	3
Distribution	CORNING 1102*	6/20/2025 18:16	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 11:35	TEHAMA	Partially Outside	282	227	46	14	68	9

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Communities	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
						HFTD, Tier 2						
Distribution	COTTONWOOD 1101*	6/20/2025 15:33	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 10:47	SHASTA, TEHAMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	421	385	22	44	111	14
Distribution	COTTONWOOD 1103*	6/20/2025 15:36	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 9:23	SHASTA, TEHAMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	894	852	29	73	277	13
Distribution	DEVILS DEN 1101*	6/21/2025 15:09	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 10:22	KINGS	Outside HFTD	6	1	5	0	0	0
Distribution	ELK CREEK 1101	6/20/2025 16:18	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 12:39	COLUSA, GLENN	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	817	678	114	45	173	25
Distribution	FRENCH GULCH 1101	6/19/2025 18:42	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 13:59	SHASTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	234	207	27	25	81	0
Distribution	FRENCH GULCH 1102	6/19/2025 18:44	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 14:23	SHASTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	38	10	27	1	1	1
Distribution	GIRVAN 1101*	6/19/2025 18:42	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 12:50	SHASTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	332	288	39	20	52	5
Distribution	GIRVAN 1102*	6/19/2025 18:43	6/20/2025 11:37	6/21/2025 12:53	SHASTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3	590	575	14	47	95	1
Distribution	GLENN 1101*	6/20/2025 16:21	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 10:46	GLENN, TEHAMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	151	84	43	2	16	24
Distribution	GUSTINE 1102*	6/19/2025 10:11	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 9:34	MERCED	Outside HFTD	24	10	11	0	2	3
Distribution	HERDLYN 1102	6/19/2025 9:48	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 12:39	CONTRA COSTA, ALAMEDA, SAN JOAQUIN	Outside HFTD	802	568	179	43	97	55

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Communities	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	HOLLISTER 2102*	6/19/2025 10:04	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 10:37	SAN BENITO, SANTA CLARA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	94	33	49	0	4	12
Distribution	JOLON 1102*	6/21/2025 14:07	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 8:39	MONTEREY	Tier 2	15	2	12	0	0	1
Distribution	KESWICK 1101*	6/19/2025 18:43	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 14:13	SAN LUIS OBISPO, SHASTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	524	432	90	27	121	2
Distribution	KING CITY 1102*	6/19/2025 13:01	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 12:36	MONTEREY	Outside HFTD	60	14	17	0	4	29
Distribution	KING CITY 1106*	6/19/2025 13:13	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 11:56	SAN BENITO, MONTEREY	Outside HFTD	88	42	25	0	5	21
Distribution	LAS POSITAS 2108*	6/19/2025 9:30	6/20/2025 10:18	6/20/2025 12:35	ALAMEDA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	43	11	30	1	0	2
Distribution	LAURELES 1111*	6/20/2025 13:43	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 9:18	MONTEREY	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	221	174	36	7	20	11
Distribution	LOGAN CREEK 2102*	6/20/2025 16:23	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 13:05	GLENN	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	271	106	78	2	17	87
Distribution	LOS OSITOS 2101*	6/19/2025 12:55	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 9:42	SAN BENITO, MONTEREY, FRESNO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 1	129	76	37	3	9	16
Distribution	LOS OSITOS 2102*	6/21/2025 16:58	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 17:22	MONTEREY	Outside HFTD	92	26	40	1	6	26
Distribution	LOS OSITOS 2103*	6/20/2025 13:36	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 12:31	MONTEREY	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	382	324	44	10	50	14
Distribution	MAXWELL 1102*	6/21/2025 10:23	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 12:05	COLUSA	Outside HFTD	145	59	22	5	2	64
Distribution	MAXWELL 1105*	6/21/2025 10:15	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 11:37	COLUSA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	151	70	38	1	9	43
Distribution	MERIDIAN 1102*	6/21/2025 10:58	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 9:12	COLUSA, SUTTER	Outside HFTD	111	40	31	1	2	40

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Communities	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	OILFIELDS 1102*	6/19/2025 14:25	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 16:31	MONTEREY	Outside HFTD	92	34	29	1	7	29
Distribution	OILFIELDS 1103*	6/21/2025 14:08	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 16:03	MONTEREY, SAN LUIS OBISPO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	2446	2168	231	96	264	47
Distribution	OREGON TRAIL 1102*	6/19/2025 18:48	6/20/2025 10:18	6/20/2025 13:27	SHASTA	Tier 2	497	451	46	54	164	0
Distribution	OREGON TRAIL 1103*	6/19/2025 18:56	6/20/2025 10:18	6/20/2025 13:19	SHASTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	634	616	18	51	223	0
Distribution	PEASE 1103*	6/21/2025 10:52	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 8:16	SUTTER	Outside HFTD	90	53	20	2	1	17
Distribution	RED BLUFF 1103*	6/20/2025 15:35	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 11:40	TEHAMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	221	209	11	20	41	1
Distribution	SAN ARDO 1101	6/19/2025 14:03	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 12:29	MONTEREY	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	131	43	42	0	6	46
Distribution	SAN ARDO 1102*	6/19/2025 14:07	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 12:48	MONTEREY, SAN LUIS OBISPO, FRESNO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	439	269	107	3	91	63
Distribution	SAN MIGUEL 1105*	6/21/2025 16:49	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 10:57	SAN LUIS OBISPO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	213	185	14	4	52	14
Distribution	SAN MIGUEL 1106	6/19/2025 14:01	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 10:55	MONTEREY, SAN LUIS OBISPO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	307	174	74	6	22	59
Distribution	SAN MIGUEL 1107*	6/19/2025 13:58	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 10:08	MONTEREY, SAN LUIS OBISPO, SANTA BARBARA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	501	351	79	21	33	71
Distribution	SANTA NELLA 1103*	6/19/2025 10:15	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 8:58	MERCED	Outside HFTD	28	4	19	1	1	5
Distribution	SANTA NELLA 1104*	6/19/2025 10:18	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 9:02	MERCED	Outside HFTD	3	0	1	0	0	2
Distribution	SANTA YNEZ 1102*	6/21/2025 15:04	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 10:57	SANTA BARBARA	Partially Outside	223	151	59	2	8	13

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Communities	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
						HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2						
Distribution	SOLEDAD 2101*	6/19/2025 12:56	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 11:07	MONTEREY	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	396	322	39	9	114	35
Distribution	TEJON 1102*	6/21/2025 16:46	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 10:51	KERN	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	490	418	66	19	163	6
Distribution	TIDEWATER 2106*	6/19/2025 4:47	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 8:05	CONTRA COSTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	66	51	14	2	7	1
Distribution	TYLER 1105*	6/20/2025 15:30	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 10:31	TEHAMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	751	642	63	72	157	46
Distribution	VASCO 1102*	6/19/2025 9:34	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 12:00	ALAMEDA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	480	344	110	26	31	26
Distribution	VASCO 1103*	6/19/2025 9:39	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 7:50	ALAMEDA	Outside HFTD	28	15	12	0	1	1
Distribution	WESTLEY 1101*	6/19/2025 9:44	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 9:59	STANISLAUS, SAN JOAQUIN	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	133	34	49	0	9	50
Distribution	WESTLEY 1103*	6/19/2025 9:52	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 8:41	STANISLAUS	Outside HFTD	26	3	21	0	0	2
Distribution	WILDWOOD 1101*	6/19/2025 17:19	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 16:00	TRINITY, SHASTA, TEHAMA	Tier 2	101	73	25	5	18	3
Distribution	ZACA 1102*	6/21/2025 14:59	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 10:04	SANTA BARBARA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	311	230	55	16	14	26
Transmission	AEC SITE #1 TAP	6/19/2025 9:49	6/20/2025 7:53	6/20/2025 11:13	ALAMEDA, SAN JOAQUIN	Outside HFTD	1	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	AEC SITE #2 TAP	6/19/2025 9:49	6/20/2025 7:53	6/20/2025 11:13	SAN JOAQUIN	Outside HFTD	1	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	COBURN-OIL FIELDS #2	6/19/2025 14:36	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 14:44	MONTEREY	Outside HFTD	0	0	0	0	0	0

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Communities	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Transmission	DELTA SWITCHING YARD-TESLA	6/19/2025 10:23	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 12:23	ALAMEDA	Outside HFTD	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	ELK CREEK TAP	6/21/2025 10:31	6/22/2025 7:08	6/22/2025 9:31	GLENN	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	1	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	ELLIS TAP	6/19/2025 10:34	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 15:05	SAN JOAQUIN	Outside HFTD	1	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	KELSO-TESLA	6/19/2025 10:11	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 11:14	ALAMEDA	Outside HFTD	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	LOS BANOS-MERCY SPRINGS SW STA	6/19/2025 9:30	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 11:49	MERCED	Outside HFTD	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	MILLER #1 TAP	6/18/2025 19:22	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 12:24	STANISLAUS, MERCED	Outside HFTD	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	PITTSBURG-TESLA #2	6/19/2025 9:42	6/20/2025 7:53	6/21/2025 13:43	ALAMEDA, CONTRA COSTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	RALPH TAP	6/19/2025 10:11	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 11:14	ALAMEDA	Outside HFTD	1	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	SAFEWAY TAP	6/19/2025 10:08	6/20/2025 7:53	6/20/2025 11:46	SAN JOAQUIN	Outside HFTD	1	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	TEICHERT TAP	6/18/2025 19:22	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 12:24	SAN JOAQUIN	Outside HFTD	2	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	TESLA-LAWRENCE LAB	6/18/2025 19:44	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 14:31	ALAMEDA	Outside HFTD	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	TESLA-NEWARK #2	6/19/2025 10:17	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 10:57	ALAMEDA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	TESLA-SALADO #1	6/18/2025 19:22	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 12:24	ALAMEDA, STANISLAUS, SAN JOAQUIN	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	TESLA-SALADO-MANTECA	6/19/2025 9:36	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 13:13	ALAMEDA, STANISLAUS, SAN JOAQUIN	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	TESLA-SCHULTE SW STA #1	6/19/2025 9:49	6/20/2025 7:53	6/20/2025 11:13	ALAMEDA, SAN JOAQUIN	Outside HFTD	0	0	0	0	0	0

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Communities	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Transmission	TESLA-SCHULTE SW STA #2	6/19/2025 10:08	6/20/2025 7:53	6/20/2025 11:46	ALAMEDA, SAN JOAQUIN	Outside HFTD	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	TESLA-STOCKTON COGEN JCT (TESLA-VIERRA)	6/18/2025 19:20	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 16:16	ALAMEDA, SAN JOAQUIN	Outside HFTD	1	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	TESLA-TRACY(115KV)	6/19/2025 10:34	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 15:05	ALAMEDA, SAN JOAQUIN	Outside HFTD	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	TESLA-WESTLEY	6/19/2025 10:13	6/21/2025 4:34	6/21/2025 14:00	ALAMEDA, STANISLAUS, SAN JOAQUIN	Outside HFTD	0	0	0	0	0	0
						Total	16223	12526	2488	804	2692	1200

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

APPENDIX C

SECTION 4 – DAMAGE AND HAZARDS TO OVERHEAD FACILITIES

Appendix C: DAMAGE AND HAZARDS TO OVERHEAD FACILITIES

Table C-1. Damages & Hazards Found Within the De-Energized Areas

Circuit Name	County	Structure Identifier	Tier 2/3 or Non-HFTD	Damage / Hazard	Type of Damage/Hazard	Description of Damage/Hazard
King City 1102	Monterey	101764470	Non-HFTD	Damage	Wind Related	Other – broken transformer bushings
Oilfields 1102	Monterey	101764178	Non-HFTD	Damage	Wind Related	Broken crossarm
Keswick 1102	Shasta	101465959	Tier 3	Hazard	Vegetation Contact	Tree leaning into line

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

APPENDIX D

SECTION 6 – PUBLIC SAFETY PARTNERS CONTACTED

Appendix D: PUBLIC SAFETY PARTNERS CONTACTED

Table D-1. Public Safety Partners Contacted

Jurisdiction	Agency/Organization	HFTD or HFRA Tier[3]	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Alameda County	Alameda County Fire Department	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Alameda County	Alameda County Fire Department, OES	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Alameda County	BART	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Alameda County	County Administration	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Alameda County	County Administration, County of Alameda	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Alameda County	EBMUD	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Alameda County	EMS	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Alameda County	Fire Department	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Alameda County	OES	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Alameda County	Office of Education	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Alameda County	Office of Emergency Services	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Alameda County	Sheriff's Department	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Alameda County	Sheriff's Office	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Alameda County CCA	East Bay Community Energy	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Alameda County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Alameda County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc.	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Alameda County Communication Facility	Global Valley Networks	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Alameda County Communication Facility	GTE Mobile Net of California LP	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Alameda County Communication Facility	TCI Cablevision	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
Alameda County Communication Facility	Verizon Wireless	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Alameda County Healthcare - Hospitals Facility	US Department of Veterans Affairs	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Alameda County Other Facility	County of Alameda	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Alameda County Other Facility	T-Mobile USA Inc.	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
Colusa County	Colusa County Board of Supervisors	HFRA, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:16
Colusa County	County Administration	HFRA, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:16
Colusa County	County Public Works	HFRA, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:16
Colusa County	EMS	HFRA, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:17
Colusa County	Fire Department	HFRA, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:16
Colusa County	Fire Department	HFRA, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:17

[3] Catastrophic Fire Behavior runs both in and outside of High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA). The PG&E Meteorology Team evaluates non-HFRA areas for catastrophic wildfire risk in unusual circumstances.

Jurisdiction	Agency/Organization	HFTD or HFRA Tier[3]	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Colusa County	OES	HFRA, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:16
Colusa County	Police Department	HFRA, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:17
Colusa County	Sheriff's Department	HFRA, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:16
Colusa County	US Forest Service Fire	HFRA, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:16
Colusa County Communication Facility	AT&T	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Colusa County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Colusa County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc.	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Colusa County Communication Facility	Citizens Telecommunications of California Inc.	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Colusa County Communication Facility	Frontier Communications Corporation DIP	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Colusa County Communication Facility	GTE Mobile Net of California LP	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Colusa County Communication Facility	Verizon Services Corporation	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
Colusa County Energy Sector Facility	Western Area Power Administration	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	06/19/2025 03:01
Colusa County Emergency Services Facility	California Department of Forestry	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
Colusa County Emergency Services Facility	County of Colusa	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
Colusa County Emergency Services Facility	Indian Valley - Bear Valley Fire Protection District	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
Colusa County Emergency Services Facility	Indian Valley Fire Protection District	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:28
Colusa County Energy Sector Facility	City of Santa Clara	HFRA, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Colusa County Tribal	Cortina Rancheria	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:16
Colusa County Water and Waste Water Facility	California Department of Forestry	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
Colusa County Water and Waste Water Facility	County of Colusa	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Colusa County Williams	Fire Department	HFRA	6/18/2025 7:16
Colusa County Williams	Police Department	HFRA	6/18/2025 7:17
Contra Costa County	BART	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Contra Costa County	City Administration	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Contra Costa County	City Administration	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Contra Costa County	Contra Costa County Fire Protection District	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Contra Costa County	Contra Costa County Sheriff Department	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03

[3] Catastrophic Fire Behavior runs both in and outside of High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA). The PG&E Meteorology Team evaluates non-HFRA areas for catastrophic wildfire risk in unusual circumstances.

Jurisdiction	Agency/Organization	HFTD or HFRA Tier[3]	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Contra Costa County	Contra Costa Office of Emergency Services, OES	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Contra Costa County	County Administration	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Contra Costa County	County Administrator's Office	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Contra Costa County	East Bay Regional Parks Fire Department	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Contra Costa County	EMS	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Contra Costa County	Fire Department	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Contra Costa County	OES	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Contra Costa County	Rodeo Hercules Fire Protection District	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Contra Costa County	San Ramon Valley Fire Protection District	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Contra Costa County CCA	MCE Clean Energy	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc.	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	City of Concord	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	Comcast Fresno LLC	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	County of Contra Costa	Tier 3	6/18/2025 7:27
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	GTE Mobile Net of California LP	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	SBA Towers	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	Sprint Corporation	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West LLC	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	Verizon	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	Verizon Wireless	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Contra Costa County Concord	City Administration	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Contra Costa County Concord	City Administration	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Contra Costa County Concord	City Administration	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Contra Costa County Concord	Contra Costa County Fire Protection District	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Contra Costa County Concord	Contra Costa Fire Protection District	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Contra Costa County Concord	Fire Department	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Contra Costa County Concord	MOTCO Fire Department	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Contra Costa County Concord	Police Department	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03

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Jurisdiction	Agency/Organization	HFTD or HFRA Tier[3]	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Contra Costa County Emergency Services Facility	San Ramon Valley Fire District	Tier 3	6/18/2025 7:27
Contra Costa County Other Facility	Contra Costa Water District	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Contra Costa County Pittsburg	City Administration	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Contra Costa County Pittsburg	Contra Costa County Fire Protection District	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Contra Costa County Pittsburg	Contra Costa Fire Protection District	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Contra Costa County Pittsburg	Police Department	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Fresno County	City Administration	HFRA, Tier 1	6/17/2025 21:03
Fresno County	County Administration	HFRA, Tier 1	6/17/2025 21:03
Fresno County	County Administration	HFRA, Tier 1	6/17/2025 21:03
Fresno County	County Administration, County of Fresno	HFRA, Tier 1	6/17/2025 21:03
Fresno County	EMS	HFRA, Tier 1	6/17/2025 21:03
Fresno County	Fire Department	HFRA, Tier 1	6/17/2025 21:03
Fresno County	Fresno County OES	HFRA, Tier 1	6/17/2025 21:03
Fresno County	Fresno County Office of Emergency Services	HFRA, Tier 1	6/17/2025 21:03
Fresno County	OES	HFRA, Tier 1	6/17/2025 21:03
Fresno County	Sheriff's Department	HFRA, Tier 1	6/17/2025 21:03
Fresno County Communication Facility	Pinnacle Towers INC	HFRA	06/20/2025 05:44
Glenn County	County Administration	HFRA, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:16
Glenn County	Fire Department	HFRA, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:16
Glenn County	Glenn County Office of Emergency Services (OES)	HFRA, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:16
Glenn County	Glenn County Sheriff's Office, Sheriff's Department	HFRA, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:16
Glenn County	Orland Fire Department	HFRA, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:16
Glenn County Communication Facility	American Tower Corporation	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Glenn County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc.	HFRA, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Glenn County Communication Facility	GTE Mobile Net of California LP	HFRA	6/18/2025 7:27
Glenn County Communication Facility	Verizon	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Glenn County Emergency Services Facility	County of Glenn	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Glenn County Emergency Services Facility	Elk Creek Fire District	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Glenn County Other Facility	US Army Corps of Engineers	HFRA	6/18/2025 7:27
Glenn County Tribal	Grindstone Rancheria	HFRA	6/18/2025 7:16
Glenn County Water and Waste Water Facility	Elk Creek Community Service	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Kern County	County Administration	Tier 2	6/20/2025 5:46
Kern County	EMS	Tier 2	6/20/2025 5:46
Kern County	Fire Department	Tier 2	6/20/2025 5:46
Kern County	OES	Tier 2	6/20/2025 5:46

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Jurisdiction	Agency/Organization	HFTD or HFRA Tier[3]	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Kern County	Sheriff's Office	Tier 2	6/20/2025 5:46
Kern County Emergency Services Facility	County of Kern	Tier 2	06/20/2025 05:44
Kern County Water and Waste Water Facility	Lebec Country Water District	Tier 2	06/20/2025 05:44
Merced County	CAL FIRE	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
Merced County	City Administration	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
Merced County	County Administration	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
Merced County	County Administration	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
Merced County	Fire Department	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
Merced County	Merced County OES	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
Merced County	OES	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
Merced County	Sheriff's Department	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
Merced County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc.	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
Merced County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West LLC	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
Merced County Communication Facility	Verizon	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
Merced County Emergency Services Facility	California Department of Forestry	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
Merced County Gustine	City Administration	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
Merced County Gustine	Police Department	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
Merced County Other Facility	Crown Castle USA Inc.	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
Monterey County	Big Sur Fire Department	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Monterey County	Board of Supervisors, County Administration	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Monterey County	California Office of Emergency Services	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Monterey County	County Administration	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Monterey County	County of Monterey Department of Emergency Management (DEM)	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Monterey County	County of Monterey Department of Emergency Management, OES	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Monterey County	County of Monterey EMS Agency, EMS	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Monterey County	Department of Emergency Management, OES	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Monterey County	Fire Department	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Monterey County	Hollister Fire Department	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Monterey County	MHOAC	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Monterey County	Monterey Fire (City of Monterey)	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Monterey County	OES	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Monterey County	Sheriff's Department	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Monterey County CCA	King City Community Power	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03

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Jurisdiction	Agency/Organization	HFTD or HFRA Tier[3]	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Monterey County CCA	King City Community Power, Police Department	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Monterey County CCA	Monterey Bay Community Power	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Monterey County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
Monterey County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc.	HFRA, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Monterey County Communication Facility	Cingular Wireless Services, Inc.	HFRA	6/18/2025 7:27
Monterey County Communication Facility	Crown Castle International	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Monterey County Communication Facility	Department of the Army	Tier 2	06/20/2025 05:44
Monterey County Communication Facility	Frontier Communications Corporation DIP	HFRA, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Monterey County Communication Facility	LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS LLC	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	06/20/2025 05:44
Monterey County Communication Facility	SBA TOWERS	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
Monterey County Communication Facility	Sprint Corporation	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
Monterey County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West A Delaware Corp	HFRA	6/18/2025 7:27
Monterey County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West LLC	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
Monterey County Communication Facility	Verizon	HFRA	6/18/2025 7:27
Monterey County Emergency Services Facility	County of Monterey	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	06/20/2025 05:44
Monterey County Emergency Services Facility	San Ardo Volunteer Fire Department	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	06/20/2025 05:45
Monterey County Emergency Services Facility	South Monterey County FPD	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Monterey County King City	City Administration	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
Monterey County King City	Fire Department	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
Monterey County King City	Police Department	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
Monterey County Other Facility	Crown Castle USA Inc.	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
Monterey County Other Facility	San Ardo Water District	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	06/20/2025 05:44

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Jurisdiction	Agency/Organization	HFTD or HFRA Tier[3]	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Monterey County Other Facility	T-Mobile USA Inc.	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
Monterey County Other Facility	Western States Teleport	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Monterey County Salinas	City Administration	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/17/2025 21:03
Monterey County Salinas	Fire Department	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/17/2025 21:03
Monterey County Salinas	Police Department	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/17/2025 21:03
Monterey County Soledad	City Administration	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Monterey County Soledad	Fire Department	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Monterey County Soledad	Police Department	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Monterey County Water and Waste Water Facility	California Department of Forestry	HFRA	6/18/2025 7:27
Monterey County Water and Waste Water Facility	City of King City	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	06/20/2025 05:44
Monterey County Water and Waste Water Facility	San Ardo Water District	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	06/20/2025 05:44
Monterey County Water and Waste Water Facility	San Lucas Wastewater Treatment Facility	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
San Benito County	County Administration	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
San Benito County	EMS	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
San Benito County	OES	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
San Benito County	OES, Office of Emergency Services	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
San Benito County	San Benito County Office of Emergency Services	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
San Benito County	Sheriff's Department	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
San Benito County	Sheriff's Office	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
San Benito County CCA	Monterey Bay Community Power	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
San Benito County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
San Benito County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc.	HFRA, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
San Benito County Communication Facility	AT&T Wireless Service LLC	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
San Benito County Communication Facility	Frontier Communications Corporation DIP	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
San Benito County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West Corporation	HFRA, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
San Benito County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West LLC	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27

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Jurisdiction	Agency/Organization	HFTD or HFRA Tier[3]	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
San Benito County Communication Facility	Verizon	HFRA, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
San Benito County Hollister	City Administration	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
San Benito County Hollister	Fire Department	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
San Benito County Hollister	Police Department	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
San Joaquin County	Board of Supervisors, County Administration	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
San Joaquin County	Clements Fire District	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
San Joaquin County	Collegeville Fire District	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
San Joaquin County	County Administration	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
San Joaquin County	EMS	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
San Joaquin County	Farmington Fire District	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
San Joaquin County	French Camp McKinley Fire District	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
San Joaquin County	Liberty Fire District	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
San Joaquin County	Linden Peters Fire District	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
San Joaquin County	Mokelumne Fire District	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
San Joaquin County	Montezuma Fire District	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
San Joaquin County	OES, Office of Emergency Services	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
San Joaquin County	Sheriff's Office	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
San Joaquin County	Thornton Fire District	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
San Joaquin County	Waterloo-Morada Fire District	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
San Joaquin County	Woodbridge Fire District	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
San Joaquin County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
San Joaquin County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc.	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
San Joaquin County Communication Facility	AT&T Wireless Service LLC	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
San Joaquin County Communication Facility	Comcast Cable Communications Management, LLC	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
San Joaquin County Communication Facility	GTE Mobile Net of California LP	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
San Joaquin County Communication Facility	Sprint Corporation	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
San Joaquin County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West LLC	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
San Joaquin County Communication Facility	TCI Cablevision	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
San Joaquin County Communication Facility	Verizon	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27

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Jurisdiction	Agency/Organization	HFTD or HFRA Tier[3]	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
San Joaquin County Energy Sector Facility	Pacific Gas & Electric Company	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
San Joaquin County Other Facility	Dish Wireless	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
San Joaquin County Tracy	City Administration	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
San Joaquin County Tracy	City Administration	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
San Joaquin County Tracy	Police Department	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
San Joaquin County Tracy	South San Joaquin County Fire Authority	HFRA	6/17/2025 21:03
San Joaquin County Water and Waste Water Facility	County of San Joaquin	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
San Luis Obispo County	CAL FIRE	HFRA, N/A, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
San Luis Obispo County	CAL FIRE San Luis Obispo County City of Pismo Beach	HFRA, N/A, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
San Luis Obispo County	CAL FIRE / San Luis Obispo County Fire Department	HFRA, N/A, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
San Luis Obispo County	Fire Department	HFRA, N/A, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
San Luis Obispo County	OES	HFRA, N/A, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
San Luis Obispo County	OES, Office of Emergency Services	HFRA, N/A, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
San Luis Obispo County	Sheriff's Department	HFRA, N/A, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
San Luis Obispo County CCA	Monterey Bay Community Power	HFRA, N/A, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
San Luis Obispo County Communication Facility	AT&T Wireless Service LLC	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
San Luis Obispo County Communication Facility	Frontier Communications Corporation DIP	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
San Luis Obispo County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West LLC	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
San Luis Obispo County Communication Facility	Verizon	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
San Luis Obispo County Other Facility	California National Guard	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
San Luis Obispo County Other Facility	Crown Castle USA Inc.	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
San Luis Obispo County San Luis Obispo	Fire Department	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/17/2025 21:03
San Luis Obispo County San Luis Obispo	Police Department	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/17/2025 21:03
San Luis Obispo County Water and Waste Water Facility	County of San Luis Obispo	Tier 2	06/20/2025 05:44
Santa Barbara County	Fire Department	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/20/2025 5:46
Santa Barbara County	OES	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/20/2025 5:46

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Jurisdiction	Agency/Organization	HFTD or HFRA Tier[3]	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Santa Barbara County	Sheriff's Office	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/20/2025 5:46
Santa Barbara County Buellton	Fire Department	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/20/2025 5:46
Santa Barbara County Buellton	Sheriff's Office	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/20/2025 5:47
Santa Barbara County CCA	Monterey Bay Community Power	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/20/2025 5:46
Santa Barbara County Communication Facility	Comcast Cable of Santa Maria	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	06/20/2025 05:44
Santa Barbara County Communication Facility	Comcast Cablevision Communications Inc.	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	06/20/2025 05:44
Santa Barbara County Solvang	Fire Department	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/20/2025 5:47
Santa Barbara County Solvang	Sheriff's Office	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/20/2025 5:47
Santa Barbara County Water and Waste Water Facility	Central Coast Water Authority	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	06/20/2025 05:44
Santa Clara County	BART	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Santa Clara County	County Administration	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Santa Clara County	County Communications 9-1-1 Dispatch	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Santa Clara County	County Emergency Medical System	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Santa Clara County	County Public Health Department	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Santa Clara County	EMS	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Santa Clara County	Fire Department	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Santa Clara County	Los Altos Office of Emergency Services	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Santa Clara County	OEM	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Santa Clara County	OES	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Santa Clara County	OES	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Santa Clara County	Office of Supervisor	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Santa Clara County	Sheriff's Department	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Santa Clara County	Sheriff's Office	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Santa Clara County CCA	City Administration	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Santa Clara County CCA	City Administration	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Santa Clara County CCA	San Jose Clean Energy	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Santa Clara County CCA	Santa Clara City Administration	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Santa Clara County CCA	Silicon Valley Clean Energy	Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Santa Clara County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Santa Clara County Communication Facility	Frontier Communications Corporation DIP	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
Santa Clara County Communication Facility	Sprint Corporation	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Santa Clara County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West LLC	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
Santa Clara County Emergency Services Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Shasta County	Burney Fire District	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Shasta County	CAL FIRE	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Shasta County	City of Shasta Lake Station	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03

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Jurisdiction	Agency/Organization	HFTD or HFRA Tier[3]	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Shasta County	EMS, Sierra-Sacramento Valley EMS Agency	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Shasta County	Office of Emergency Services	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Shasta County	Pit River Tribes	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Shasta County	SHASCOM	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Shasta County	SHASCOM 9-1-1	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Shasta County	Shasta County Sheriff's Office	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Shasta County	Sheriff's Office	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Shasta County	Sheriff's Office OES	Tier 2, Tier 3	6/17/2025 21:03
Shasta County Communication Facility	AT&T	Tier 3	6/18/2025 7:27
Shasta County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc.	Tier 3, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Shasta County Communication Facility	Charter Communications Holding	Tier 3, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Shasta County Communication Facility	GTE Mobile Net of California LP	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Shasta County Communication Facility	Happy Valley Telephone CO	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Shasta County Communication Facility	Metro PCS Inc.	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Shasta County Communication Facility	Verizon	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Shasta County Communication Facility	Verizon Wireless	Tier 3	6/18/2025 7:28
Shasta County Emergency Services Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 3, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Shasta County Emergency Services Facility	County of Shasta	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Shasta County Emergency Services Facility	French Gulch Volunteer Fire	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:28
Shasta County Major Transportation Facility	California Highway Patrol	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Shasta County Water and Waste Water Facility	US Bureau of Reclamation	Tier 3	6/18/2025 7:27
Stanislaus County	County Administration	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Stanislaus County	County Administration	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Stanislaus County	Emergency Management, OES	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Stanislaus County	EMS	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Stanislaus County	Public Health	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Stanislaus County	Sheriff's Department	HFRA, Tier 2	6/17/2025 21:03
Stanislaus County Communication Facility	AT&T Wireless Service LLC	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
Stanislaus County Communication Facility	Federal Bureau of Investigation	HFRA	6/18/2025 7:27
Stanislaus County Communication Facility	Sprint Nextel Corporation	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27

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Jurisdiction	Agency/Organization	HFTD or HFRA Tier[3]	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Stanislaus County Communication Facility	Verizon	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote 3)	6/18/2025 7:27
Sutter County	County Administration	HFRA	6/19/2025 1:54
Sutter County	Office of Emergency Management	HFRA	6/19/2025 1:54
Sutter County	EMS	HFRA	6/19/2025 1:54
Sutter County	OES	HFRA	6/19/2025 1:54
Sutter County	Sheriff's Office	HFRA	6/19/2025 1:54
Sutter County	Sutter County Fire Department	HFRA	6/19/2025 1:54
Tehama County	County Administration	HFRA, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:16
Tehama County	OES and Sheriff's Office	HFRA, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:16
Tehama County	Sheriff's Department	HFRA, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:16
Tehama County	Sheriff's Department, Tehama County Sheriff	HFRA, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:16
Tehama County	Tehama-Colusa Canal Authority	HFRA, Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:17
Tehama County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility	Tier 2	6/19/2025 0:46
Tehama County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 2	6/19/2025 0:46
Tehama County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc.	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Tehama County Communication Facility	Ducor Telephone Co.	Tier 2	06/19/2025 03:01
Tehama County Communication Facility	Ducor Telephone Corporation	Tier 2	06/19/2025 03:01
Tehama County Emergency Services Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Tehama County Emergency Services Facility	County of Tehama	Tier 2	6/19/2025 0:46
Tehama County Government - Jail Facility	California Department of Corrections	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Tehama County Other Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 2	6/19/2025 0:46
Tehama County Other Facility	Tehama County Fire Department	Tier 2	06/19/2025 03:01
Tehama County Red Bluff	City Administration, City of Red Bluff	Tier 2	6/18/2025 23:28
Tehama County Red Bluff	Police Department	Tier 2	6/18/2025 23:28
Trinity County	EMS, Public health	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:16
Trinity County	HHS	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:16
Trinity County	OES	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:16
Trinity County	OES, Office of Emergency Services	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:16
Trinity County Communication Facility	Frontier Communications Corporation DIP	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27
Trinity County Communication Facility	IP Networks Inc.	Tier 2	6/18/2025 7:27

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

APPENDIX E

SECTION 9 – COMMUNITY RESOURCE CENTER LOCATIONS

Appendix E: LIST OF PG&E COMMUNITY RESOURCE CENTERS

Table E-1. Community Resource Centers Provided by PG&E

The table below provided details of the 20 CRCs that PG&E mobilized during the June 19 – 22, 2025 PSPS, including specific locations, dates and times opened and closed, total attendance for each location, and amenities provided.

#	County	Site Name	Address	Operating Hours (PDT)				Total Visitors	Indoor/ Outdoor	Amenities Provided
				Day 1 (June 19)	Day 2 (June 20)	Day 3 (June 21)	Day 4 (June 22)			
1	Alameda	Costco Wholesale Livermore	2800 Independence Dr	08:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 13:00	90	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating
2	Colusa	Stonyford Community Hall	229 Market St	No	11:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 13:00	216	Indoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Cooling/Heating, Seating, Ice
3	Colusa	Williams Community Church	315 9th Street	No	No	0800 - 2200	08:00 - 13:00	199	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating
4	Contra Costa	Balfour-Guthrie Park	1701 Balfour Rd	08:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 12:00	No	527	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating
5	Glenn	Elk Creek Junior Senior High School	3430 Co Rd 309	No	11:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 13:00	86	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating
6	Kern	El Tejon School	4337 Lebec Rd	No	No	12:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 12:30	18	Indoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Cooling/Heating, Seating, Ice
7	Monterey	Carmel Valley Community Park / Carmel Valley Community Youth Center	25 Ford Rd	08:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 10:00	No	56	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating
8	Monterey	Patriot Park Community Center	1351 Oak Ave	08:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 15:00	5409	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating
9	Monterey	Salinas Valley Fairgrounds	625 Division St.	08:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 15:00	2559	Indoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Cooling/Heating, Seating, Ice
10	Monterey	San Antonio Union School	67550 Lockwood Jolon Road	08:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 15:00	219	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating
11	Monterey	Soledad Community Center	560 Walker Drive	08:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 10:00	No	3238	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating
12	San Joaquin	First Christian Reformed Church	305 Boesch Dr	No	No	08:00 - 22:00	No	43	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating
13	San Luis Obispo	Cuesta College, North County Campus	2800 Buena Vista Dr	08:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 16:00	93	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating
14	Santa Barbara	Shepherd of The Valley Lutheran Church	3550 Baseline Ave	No	No	12:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 16:00	34	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating
15	Shasta	Dignity Health Mercy Oaks	100 Mercy Oaks Dr	12:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 22:00	No	36	Indoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Cooling/Heating, Seating, Ice
16	Shasta	Happy Valley Community Center	5400 Happy Valley Rd	No	No	12:00 - 22:00	No	3	Indoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device

										Charging, Snacks, Cooling/Heating, Seating, Ice
17	Stanislaus	Grayson Elementary School	301 Howard Road	08:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 22:00	No	950	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating
18	Tehama	Flournoy Elementary School	15850 Paskenta Rd	No	11:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 22:00	No	87	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating
19	Tehama	Noland Park	19001 Bowman Rd	No	11:00 - 22:00	08:00 - 22:00	No	39	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating
20	Tehama	Rancho Tehama Association	17605 Park Terrace Road	No	No	08:00 - 22:00	No	158	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating

VERIFICATION

I, undersigned, say:

I am an officer of PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, a corporation, and am authorized to make this verification for that reason.

I have read the foregoing "PG&E Public Safety Power Shutoff Report to the CPUC" for the June 19 – 22, 2025 PSPS and I am informed and believe the matters stated therein to be true.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed at Oakland, California this 21st day of July, 2025.



ANDREW ABRANCHES
VICE PRESIDENT
WILDFIRE MITIGATION