Susan C. Martinez
Director of Liaison, Regulatory
Operations and Engagement
300 Lakeside Drive
Oakland, CA 94612
Tel: 415-513-3871
Susan.Martinez@pge.com

June 2, 2026

VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL

Leslie Palmer
Deputy Executive Director, Safety and Enforcement
California Public Utilities Commission
505 Van Ness Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94102

Dear Mr. Palmer:

As required by Resolution ESRB-8 and in accordance with Ordering Paragraph 1 of California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Decision (D.) 19-05-042, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) respectfully submits this report for the May 17 – 18, 2026 PSPS. This report has been verified by a PG&E officer in accordance with Rule 1.11 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure.

Members of the public may submit both formal and informal comments on this report to the CPUC by following instructions on the CPUC's website (www.cpuc.ca.gov). The CPUC's Public Advisor's Office has established procedures for providing such comments, including via online form. Comments may also be submitted directly to the Director of the Safety and Enforcement Division (SED) of the CPUC using the contact information below.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

Susan C. Martinez
Director of Liaison, Regulatory Operations and Engagement

Enclosures

cc: Anthony Noll, SED
ESRB_ComplianceFilings@cpuc.ca.gov
EnergyDivisionCentralFiles@cpuc.ca.gov

Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E)
Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) Report to the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)
May 17 – 18, 2026 De-energization

Table of Contents

Section 1 – Executive Summary

Section 1.1 - Brief description of the PSPS event starting from the time when the utility's Emergency Operation Center is activated until service to all customers has been restored. *(D.21-06-014, page 286, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
High winds can cause tree branches and debris to contact energized electric lines and potentially lead to a wind-driven wildfire. As a result, we may need to turn off power during severe weather to help prevent wildfires. This is called a Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS). We recognize that it is disruptive for our customers to be without power, therefore, we initiate a PSPS when the weather forecast is so severe that public safety, lives, homes and businesses may be in danger of wildfires. It is not a decision we take lightly. For the safety of our customers and communities, PSPS continues to be a necessary tool as a last resort.

This report follows the updated California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) template effective on May 1, 2026. We reached out to the CPUC's Safety Enforcement Division (SED) on April 2, 2026, for clarification on the updates. We have received some clarifications and feedback. We will continue to work with SED on further clarifications needed. Therefore, our responses are based on our current understanding of the recently updated prompts.

Timeline
On May 13, 2026, PG&E's Meteorology Team identified weather that could indicate potential for wildfire conditions in forecast models and notified the Emergency response leadership.

On May 14, we entered readiness posture and activated our EOC for a potential PSPS between May 17 – 18. Our teams began notifying Public Safety Partners in the areas anticipated to be impacted, readied the grid, and prepared Community Resource Centers (CRCs) and other customer support.

On Friday, May 15, we further refined the PSPS scope based on changing weather and updated meteorological forecasts, adding additional Time Places (TPs)[1] near Mt Vaca, inland East Bay/Altamont, and along the west side of the San Joaquin Valley as well as began notifying customers in the areas anticipated to be impacted.

We closely monitored weather conditions across 15 TPs, as shown in Figure 1, and on May 17 at 05:40 PDT, we made the decision to move forward with de-energizing customers for safety, due to increased fire potential conditions resulting from gusty north winds, low humidity, output from fire spread models, and real-time Hazard Awareness and Warning Center (HAWC) reports of multiple fire ignitions. At this time, we approved de-energization to our assets and customers to mitigate catastrophic wildfire risk along the west side of the Sacramento Valley, elevated portions of the North Bay, inland areas of the East Bay/Altamont Pass, and along the west side of

[1] A Time-Place (TP) is a portion of the PG&E grid that is electrically and geographically coherent and is forecast to experience consistent timing for severe fire weather. Time-Places are identified for each PSPS and receive consistent treatment for notifications and de-energization. Once actual weather conditions occur, Weather "All-Clear" and service restoration times may vary due to actual weather conditions across various TPs as well as within a TP.

the San Joaquin Valley. During this PSPS, we de-energized 4,583 customers[2] across 15 counties and TPs.

Once winds subsided on May 18, at 07:12 PDT, the first Weather All-Clear was issued for all circuit segments in TPs 11, 13, 14, and 15. Winds gradually diminished across the Sacramento Valley and elevated portions of the northern and eastern Bay Area through the early afternoon and the last Weather All-Clear was declared on May 18 for the remaining TPs at 14:45 PDT.

Through various mitigation efforts, we avoided the de-energization of approximately 32,276 customers in the final scope for de-energization. See Section 10 for more information regarding our mitigation efforts for this PSPS.

Inspections
During patrol and inspections, we identified three damages and one hazard caused by weather. See Section 2.2 for more information regarding the Technosylva fire spread simulation and Section 4 for more information regarding damages and hazards.

Following patrol and inspections, customers were restored safely and as quickly as possible. Within 24 hours of the Weather All-Clear service to 100% of customers had been restored. The average restoration time was approximately three hours.

Figure 1: PSPS Timeline



[2] Customers refers to active service points (meters).

Section 1.2 - A table including the maximum numbers of customers notified and actually de-energized; number of counties de-energized; number of tribes de-energized; number of Medical Baseline customers de-energized; number of transmission and distribution circuits de-energized; damage/hazard count; number of critical facilities and infrastructure de-energized. Hazards are conditions discovered during restoration patrolling or operations that might have caused damages or posed an electrical arcing or ignition risk had PSPS not been executed. Table 1 must contain unique data counts from event. *(D.21-06-034, Appendix A, page A15, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
Table 1 identifies the maximum number of customers notified, de-energized and canceled; number of Medical Baseline (MBL) customers de-energized; number of counties de-energized; number of Tribes de-energized; number of Critical Facilities and Infrastructure (CFI) de-energized; number of Transmission lines and Distribution circuits de-energized; and damage/hazard count.

Table 1: PSPS Event Summary[3]

Total Customers Notified	Total Customers De-energized	Total Customers Canceled	MBL Customers De-energized	Counties De-energized	Tribes De-energized	CFI De-energized	Transmission De-energized	Unique Distribution Circuits in Scope	Distribution Circuits De-energized	Damage/ Hazard Count
7,440[4]	4,583[5]	2,802	232	15	2	220	0	31	31	3 damages 1 hazard

[3] The information, times, and figures referenced in this report are based on the best available information available at the time of this report's submission. The information, times, and figures herein are subject to revision based on further analysis and validation.
[4] Of the 7,440 customers who received notifications that their power may be de-energized, one customer did not receive a cancelation notice after being removed from scope, four customers remained in the final scope but were mitigated by backup generation, and 74 customers remained in the final scope but avoided a long PSPS outage. See Section 5.5 and Section 5.7 for more information.
[5] Of the 4,583 customers de-energized, 24 customers did not receive any notifications regarding planned de-energization, and one customer received this notification after de-energization began. See Section 5.3 and Section 5.5 for more information.

Section 1.3 - A PDF map depicting the de-energized area(s) *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
During the May 17 – 18, 2026 PSPS, we de-energized 4,583 customers in 15 TPs across 15 counties. The final de-energization footprint is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: PSPS De-Energization Footprint Map

Section 2 – Decision Making Process

Section 2.1 - A table showing all factors considered in the decision to shut off power for each circuit de-energized, including but not limited to, sustained and gust wind speeds, temperature, humidity, and moisture in the vicinity of the de-energized circuits *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, Appendix A-1.1 in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260517*" provides a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope for the May 17 – 18, 2026 PSPS.

Section 2.2 - Use the following format to provide decision-making criteria detailing circuit level analysis and comparison between threshold, forecast, and actual readings utilized during the scoping process and de-energization process. Also include a PSPS decision-making diagram(s)/flowchart(s) or equivalent along with narrative description *(D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A22, D.21-06-014, page 284, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
As the Commission noted in ESRB-8, the decision to de-energize electric facilities for public safety is complex and dependent on many factors including but not limited to fuel moisture, aerial and ground firefighting capabilities, active fires that indicate fire conditions, situational awareness provided by fire agencies, the National Weather Service (NWS) and the United States Forest Service, and local meteorological conditions of humidity and winds.[6]

Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, this section provides an overview of our decision-making criteria and threshold evaluation process that were used in the decision to de-energize customers during the May 17 – 18, 2026 PSPS. See Appendix A-1.1 in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260517*" for event-specific thresholds and a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope for the May 17 – 18, 2026 PSPS.

PSPS Preparation and Scoping Process
At a high level, Figure 3 shows the process used to prepare for a PSPS. PG&E utilized and referenced the following protocols and tools during the May 17 – 18, 2026 PSPS to determine the latest forecasted weather parameters versus actual weather. Appendix A-1.1 in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260517*" includes anticipated parameters based on the latest forecast used to develop the planned de-energization scope versus actual weather parameters for each circuit.

[6] ESRB-8, pp. 8-9.

Figure 3: PG&E's High-Level PSPS Process Steps



PG&E considers executing a PSPS when strong gusty winds, critically low humidity levels, and low fuel moisture levels pose an unacceptable risk of causing fast-spreading, catastrophic wildfires. Assessments begin several days before the weather event is forecasted to take place.

We identify weather conditions that could create high fire potential by using a combination of high outage and ignition potential, high-resolution internal and external weather forecasting models and data from federal agencies that include the following:

- *Ignition Probability Weather (IPW)*: Determines the potential of an outage due to weather conditions, and then for that outage to lead to an ignition.
- *Fire Potential Index (FPI)*: Assists with fire model development and calibration.
- *Technosylva*: Provides fire spread modeling via data inputs.

Through partnerships with external experts, we developed our machine learning models using historic datasets and advanced forecast models that provide a better understanding of historical weather events and improve our weather forecasting. These models use the following:

- Data storage and processing via the PG&E-Amazon Web Services Cloud.
- Hourly weather data such as temperature, relative humidity, wind speed, precipitation, pressure, and dead and live fuel moisture.
- Over 100 trillion data points of historical weather and fuel.
- Precise location data points across our service territory to conduct hourly weather analyses using high-resolution, historical data.

Our thresholds and guidance for identifying critical fire risk and outage/ignition potential are determined by analyzing and rigorously testing our current PSPS protocols and criteria against decades of historical weather data in and around California.

External forecast information from the NWS (e.g., Red Flag Warnings (RFWs)) and other forecast agencies are examined carefully. Furthermore, we coordinate with these agencies during high-risk periods via daily conference calls to ultimately decide whether to de-energize portions of the grid for public safety.

Tools and Technology

PG&E partners with Technosylva, an external expert in the wildfire modeling field to test and deploy cloud-based wildfire spread model capabilities. This helps us to better understand where we might need to turn off power.

Each day, PG&E delivers our wildfire condition datasets to Technosylva, who then perform over 100 million fire spread simulations to provide fire spread scenarios that help to identify circuits

that may be at risk during dry, windy weather. These are done every three hours, for the five days ahead.

Figures 4 – 7 shows the Technosylva fire spread simulation demonstrating what a wildfire might have looked like, and the potential damages or impacts caused, if the May 17 – 18, 2026 PSPS had not been initiated. See Section 4 for more information regarding damages and hazards.

Figure 4: Fire Spread Simulation Hazard to Equipment (Napa County)



Impact Analysis

Size (ac)	17,734.55
Initial Attack Assessment	5 - Extreme
No. of Buildings	20
Total Population	2
No. of Places	24

Figure 5: Fire Spread Simulation Damage to Equipment (San Joaquin County)



Impact Analysis

Size (ac)	115,658.95
Initial Attack Assessment	5 - Extreme
No. of Buildings	599
Total Population	940
No. of Places	44

Figure 6: Fire Spread Simulation Damage to Equipment (Colusa County)



Impact Analysis

Size (ac)	86,137.69
Initial Attack Assessment	4 - Very High
No. of Buildings	158
Total Population	47
No. of Places	65

Figure 7: Fire Spread Simulation Damage to Equipment (Glenn County)



Impact Analysis

Size (ac)	71,868.21
Initial Attack Assessment	4 - Very High
No. of Buildings	746
Total Population	642
No. of Places	15

Decision Criteria and Thresholds for Distribution PSPS Protocols
We begin determining whether to turn off power for safety by first evaluating the Distribution system. These powerlines are closer to communities and are generally more susceptible to dry, windy weather threats. Our process is outlined in Figure 8. The values presented in Figure 8 were developed using 31 years of PG&E's high-resolution climate data to help understand wildfire risk and the potential customer impacts of PSPS. We evaluate within a small geographic area (700 square kilometers) and if any of the measures are forecasted to be met, we scope the circuit segments within that region for de-energization. There is no single criterion or threshold that will require turning off power to a Distribution circuit. See Appendix A-1.1 in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260517*" for event-specific thresholds and a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope.

Figure 8: PSPS Protocols for Distribution



Step 1: Minimum Fire Potential Conditions (mFPC)
The first step to determine the scope of a PSPS is evaluating the mFPC. This ensures that PSPS is only executed during wind events when atmospheric conditions and fuels are dry. A PSPS is evaluated if the mFPC noted in Step 1 of Figure 8 above is met.

These values were established from a combination of analyses including:

- Historical fire occurrence in our service area.
- PSPS sensitivity studies how PSPS criteria impacted the frequency of PSPS events and total customer impact.
- Information published by federal agencies regarding fire behavior and criteria used to issue warnings to the public.

Step 2: In-Depth Review of Fire Risk
If all minimum fire conditions are met, we conduct an in-depth review of fire risk using three separate measures. If the criteria for any of these measures are met, we may need to turn off power for safety. We evaluate all the factors below together, rather than isolating any specific factor to assess fire risk against the potential harms of de-energization. See Appendix A-1.1 in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260517*" for event-specific thresholds

and a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope for the May 17 – 18, 2026 PSPS.

- *Catastrophic Fire Probability (CFP_D)*: This model combines the probability of fire ignitions due to weather impacting the electric system with the probability that a fire will be catastrophic if it starts. It is the combination of the IPW and the FPI. The CFP_D model accounts for changes over time based on actual performance data. Thus, the model will address positive and negative trends in grid performance and reliability year-over-year, incorporating grid improvements such as system hardening, and enhanced vegetation management based on their performance at mitigating outages over time.
    - IPW Model: A system comprised of two machine learning models. These models are used to evaluate the probability of outages across several outage classes (Outage Probability Weather (OPW) model) and the probability of that outage becoming an ignition (Ignition Given Outage Probability Weather Model (IOPW)). These models are combined for each location at each hour to ascertain the ignition probability. These machine learning models use 17 years of weather data to correlate approximately 650,000 outages occurring on PG&E's Distribution grid. The model analyzes the potential for several types of power outages in each weather event, as well as the potential for that outage to be the source of an ignition. IPW learns from and accounts for changes on the grid from year-to-year.
    - FPI Model: This model outputs the probability that a fire will become large or catastrophic and is used as a daily and hourly tool to drive operational decisions to reduce the risk of utility caused fires. It was enhanced in 2024 with additional data and improved analytic capabilities.
- *Tree Stike Considerations*: Our PSPS protocols utilize a machine learning model to integrate the potential for trees to strike the lines into our OPW Model and IPW Model. This helps our Meteorology Team more accurately analyze risk posed by trees and how that translates to increased ignition probability. See Figure 9 for more information regarding OPW modeling. Scenarios with a high risk of an IPW and a high FPI value will always warrant a PSPS. However, power may be turned off in other scenarios to avoid catastrophic wildfires.

Figure 9: Incorporation of Tree Strike Potential into PSPS Modeling



- *Catastrophic Fire Behavior (CFB)*: We also evaluate areas that are meeting mFPC (windy and dry conditions) but are not meeting our CFP guidance values by utilizing dynamic wildfire spread simulations from Technosylva. This allows us to consider potential ignition events that are rarer and more difficult to forecast such as animal and third-party contacts, or external debris impacting electrical lines. These locations are only considered once the mFPC are met, ensuring that conditions are sufficiently windy and dry.
- *Fireline Intensity*: The U.S. Forest Service Rocky Mountain Research Station did a study of fire line intensity which is determined by the size and components of flames. It is measured as the rate of heat energy released (Btu) per unit length of the fire line (ft) per unit(s). It is also calculated by estimating the flame length, the distance measured from the average flame tip to the middle of the fire's base. Internal studies that evaluated historical fire simulation outputs to actual fire events, damages, and fatalities showed that outputs of flame length and rate of spread were best correlated to historical fire outcomes. Studies, as mentioned above, have shown that more intense fires with higher flame lengths and higher rates of spread are more difficult to control. Thus, we evaluate fire simulation data that indicates where fast-spreading and intense fires could manifest and incorporate that into our PSPS decision making process.
- *Vegetation and Electric Asset Criteria Considerations*: We review locations from recent inspections where high-priority trees or electric compliance issues may increase the risk of ignition. If an area is forecasted to experience minimum fire conditions and there are known issues with equipment or vegetation that have not yet been addressed, we may need to turn off power.

PSPS Protocols for Transmission

In addition to analyzing Distribution circuits that may need to be de-energized for safety, we also review the Transmission lines and structures in areas experiencing dry and windy weather conditions. Transmission lines are like the freeways of the electric system, carrying high voltage energy across long distances. Similar to our Distribution protocols, there is no single factor or threshold that will require turning off power to a Transmission line.

Step 1: mFPC

When determining whether to turn off power for safety on Transmission lines, we review the same mFPC as with Distribution circuits. If these conditions are met, we will review the criteria below to determine whether a Transmission line must be turned off.

Step 2: In-Depth Review of Fire Risk

Once PG&E identifies the initial scope, we work with the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) to ensure the initial scope is appropriate. This includes analyzing whether it will compromise the power supply to other jurisdictions, utilities or facilities connected to our system. This important step can last several hours, which is why the potential scope of a PSPS may change as we get closer to the forecasted weather event.

- *Catastrophic Fire Probability – Asset (CFP_T – Asset)*: We use computer models to assess the likelihood of equipment failure during a given weather event, and the subsequent risk of catastrophic wildfires if a failure occurs. This model uses a combination of the Operability Assessment (OA) and FPI Models, both in time and space, at every Transmission structure to form the Transmission CFP_T model for asset failures. The OA Model combines historical wind speeds for each structure, historical outage activity,

Bayesian updating, and the condition of assets based on inspection programs to help understand the wind-related failure probability of each structure. The OA Model can be driven with forecast wind speeds to output the probability of failure at the structure level.

- *Catastrophic Fire Probability – Vegetation (CFP_T – Veg)*: The Transmission-specific vegetation risk model is a calibrated probability of vegetation risk built internally using data collected and managed by PG&E vegetation management and external contractors such as NV5 and Formation Environmental. This model leverages aerial LiDAR data to map the location and attributes of trees near Transmission lines. The Transmission vegetation risk model is based on several factors such as overstrike, the amount of unobstructed fall paths to a wire, the slope between a tree and a conductor, and tree exposure. The Transmission vegetation risk model is combined with the FPI Model in space and time to form CFP_T – Veg.
- *CFB*: We may de-energize customers where the consequence of a potential wildfire ignition would be extreme, even if the probability of a power line or equipment failure is low.
- *Vegetation and Electric Asset Criteria Considerations*: We review locations from recent inspections where high-priority trees or electric compliance issues are present that may increase the risk of ignition. Figure 10 provides a quantitative summary of our PSPS Protocols for Transmission.

Figure 10: PSPS Protocols for Transmission



Step 3: Determining the Outage Area

Transmission lines meeting the criteria above pass to the next stage of review. We conduct a Power Flow Analysis on the in-scope Transmission lines (if applicable) to analyze any potential downstream impacts of load shedding.

Reviewing Impact and Forecasted Weather

After determining the outage area both for Distribution and Transmission, PG&E reviews the forecasted customer impacts of each circuit against the forecasted wildfire risk of each circuit. If

there is reasonable risk for ignition on the Distribution circuits or Transmission lines during the forecasted weather event, it is included in the PSPS scope. During key decision-making points, we internally share this analysis to inform PSPS decision-making and further risk modeling.

Starting 12 hours before the forecasted PSPS de-energization time, we transition from evaluating forecast data to observing the weather in real-time. Based on real-time observations and analysis, we continually evaluate all the outage areas identified in the previous steps and use external tools and analysis to determine whether to initiate PSPS de-energization.

Decision-Making and Analysis to Validate if PSPS is Necessary
During high-risk periods, PG&E Meteorologists participate in daily interagency conference calls that commonly include multiple NWS local offices, the NWS western region headquarters, and representatives from the Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC), also known as Predictive Services. This call is hosted by the Northern California and/or Southern California GACC offices.

During these calls, the external agencies present their expert assessment on the upcoming periods and locations of risk, wind speeds and fuel moisture levels, and any other relevant factors to consider.

During a PSPS, our Lead Meteorologist, called the Meteorologist-in-Charge (MIC), summarizes these forecasts and discussions for the Officer-in-Charge (OIC), who ultimately makes the decision to execute a PSPS.

The following sources and tools are considered before initiating a PSPS by the MIC:

- Daily interagency conference call with agencies during high-risk periods;
- External weather model data;
- Field observer information;
- Fire Weather Watches and RFW (NWS - Federal);
- Live weather data from weather stations;
- Location of existing fires;
- Significant fire potential for wind (GACC - Federal) and;
- Storm Prediction Center (SPC) (part of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) - Federal).

Based on the analyses above, we can determine how many customers may be subject to de-energization, and further investigate mitigation options, such as advanced switching solutions, sectionalization, the use of islanding, alternative grid solutions and temporary generation, to support customers who could lose upstream power sources but are in areas that may be safe to keep energized.

We monitor and forecast weather over a multi-day horizon, so we can anticipate when a PSPS may be needed and activate our EOC as far in advance as possible. Our internal weather model and external modeling are updated multiple times per day. Our Meteorology Team constantly evaluates both internal and external weather models for changes in weather timing, strength, and potential locations impacted. We then incorporate these changes into a new weather scope generally once per day.

Weather shifts may force changes to PSPS scope and impacts at any point in time during PSPS planning and execution; this may allow us to avoid de-energization in some areas if fire-critical conditions lessen but can also cause some areas and customers to move into de-energization scope late in the process if forecasted fire-critical weather footprints change or increase. Possible changes in PSPS scope and impact are driven by the inherent uncertainty in weather forecast models.

Section 2.3 - A thorough and detailed description of the quantitative and qualitative factors it considered in calling, sustaining, or curtailing each de-energization event including any fire risk or PSPS risk modeling results and information regarding why the de-energization event was a last resort, and a specification of the factors that led to the conclusion of the de-energization event. *(D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 9, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
The quantitative factors that were used to determine de-energizing customers for safety are provided in Appendix A-1.1 in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260517*." Below, we outline a detailed description of the qualitative factors provided by our Meteorology Team when we were determining whether to de-energize customers.

Our Meteorology Team evaluates both internal and external weather model data and guidance from the NWS to determine how many customers may be subject to de-energization. As forecast weather models do not provide absolute certainty of the future, meteorologists evaluate several external forecasts, external models and machine learning wind speed modeling at a station-by-station basis to determine PSPS scope. Other factors include forecasts by the NWS such as RFWs.

PG&E Meteorology Team Review
On Wednesday, May 13, 2026, weather models indicated potential for gusty north winds developing between May 17 – 18. On May 14, our Meteorology Team, Emergency Planning and Response Team, and EOC Commander met to discuss the potential need for a PSPS.

Based on the emerging risk of weather conditions, we entered readiness posture at 12:00 PDT on May 14 and activated the EOC at 18:00 PDT on May 14.

The initial PSPS scope was developed on May 14, reflecting the risk of dry, gusty winds along the west side of the Sacramento Valley and higher terrain of the North Bay mountains, where grasses and finer fuels were cured or in the process of rapidly drying. We continued to monitor the weather forecast and PSPS models.

On May 14, federal forecast agencies began to highlight the upcoming weather conditions. The Sacramento and Hanford National Weather Service offices issued a Fire Weather Watch for Central Valley locations below 1000 feet beginning at 05:00 PDT on May 16 through 20:00 PDT on May 18 citing gusty winds, low humidity and potential for fires to grow in size and intensity.

Additionally, North Ops Predictive Services forecast noted "Moderate Risk" for significant fire potential for their Sacramento Valley/Foothills and Diablo/Santa Cruz Mountains Predictive Service Areas between May 16 – 18 due to strong winds, low humidity and cured or rapidly curing grass.

On May 15, NWS offices upgraded the Fire Weather Watch to a Red Flag Warning.

As a result of changing conditions, the scope was further increased on May 15 with the addition of TPs along the western San Joaquin Valley as well as across elevated portions of the Northern and Eastern Bay Area.

The Storm Prediction Center fire weather outlook called for critical risk across the Sacramento Valley and elevated risk for the San Joaquin Valley on May 17, followed by elevated risk for the Sacramento Valley on May 18. Additionally, NWS Hanford published a weather story highlighting major fire danger risk for the Coast Range and San Joaquin Valley during the estimated PSPS time period (Figure 11).

All federal agencies kept this posture throughout the period of concern. See "External PSPS Decision Inputs" below for external agency forecasts.

Figure 11: Fire Danger Coverage from the NWS Hanford

High Resolution PSPS Models Guidance

The tools and models outlined in Section 2.2 are part of the decision criteria that our Meteorologists consider when determining PSPS scope. Longer range weather forecast model data are used to determine the location and timing of a PSPS. Typically, these weather forecasts are less certain the farther the observed date. This is akin to the well-known hurricane "cone of uncertainty" in which the potential track of a hurricane is represented by an area that expands farther out in time, which resembles an expanding cone. Thus, there is an inherent tradeoff between the further out the forecasts are for a PSPS and the uncertainty in the PSPS scope and waiting until forecasts become more certain. Forecast uncertainty leads to changes in PSPS scope as weather forecast models are updated, and the scope is refined closer to the period of concern.

As the PSPS unfolds in real-time, our Meteorologists transition to real-time observations of weather stations, satellite data, pressure gradients, and live feeds from Alert Wildfire Cameras.

These observations help to evaluate if the weather is behaving as expected. In many instances, models trend stronger or weaker with each model iteration leading up to a PSPS.

External PSPS Decision Inputs

Meteorological analyses establish that high winds in California create significant fire threat and exacerbate fire spread. The NWS issues a RFW to indicate critical fire weather conditions under which any fire that develops will likely spread rapidly. California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) states, "the types of weather patterns that cause a watch or warning include low relative humidity, strong winds, dry fuels, the possibility of dry lightning strikes, or any combination of the above." As noted previously, our decision to initiate a PSPS consistently occur during periods and in areas where federal, state, and local authorities have identified as having extreme fire risk including the presence of strong winds.

As discussed above and in Section 2.2, we compare our fire risk forecasts against those of external agencies to validate that there is shared recognition of high fire risk across the California meteorology community. Between May 17 – 18, our analysis of fire risk justifying a PSPS were validated by several sources and warnings:

- NWS Sacramento and NWS Hanford issued RFWs (Figure 12).
- NOAA's SPC's Fire Weather Outlooks indicated critical and elevated fire-weather conditions across California (Figure 13).

Figure 12: RFW Coverage from the NWS Sacramento and NWS Hanford Weather Offices.



Figure 13: NOAA – SPC Forecasts of Elevated and Critical Fire Weather Conditions.



We also review forecasted wind speeds in the potentially impacted counties to evaluate the need for a PSPS. Figure 14 shows the Utility FPI Ratings for Fire Index Areas (FIAs) in our service area between May 17 – 18. We determine the scope for a PSPS within those FIAs with fire risk rating R5-Plus from PG&E's FPI model. Additionally, Figure 15 compares the PSPS scope with other agencies to vet the fire weather risk.

Figure 14: PG&E's Utility Fire Potential Index Ratings



Figure 15: Comparison of Federal Agency Fire Weather Warning and Final PSPS Scope

NWS RFW **NOAA Fire Weather Outlook**



Section 2.4 - An explanation of how the utility determined that the benefit of de-energization outweighed potential public safety risks, and analysis of the risks of de-energization against not de-energizing for each circuit or segment. The utility must identify and quantify customer, resident, and the general public risks and harms from de-energization and clearly explain risk models, risk assessment processes, and provide further documentation on how the power disruptions to customers, residents, and the general public is weighed against the benefits of a proactive de-energization *(D.19-05- 042, Appendix A, page A24, D.21-06-014, page 284, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
For the May 17 – 18, 2026 PSPS, we used our PSPS Risk Model with the latest scope prior to making the decision to de-energization. See Appendix A-1.1 in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260517*" for a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope, including risk factors, for the May 17 – 18, 2026 PSPS.

As discussed below, our PSPS Risk Model supported initiating a PSPS based on the May 17 – 18, 2026 PSPS scope and forecasted impact information. The model indicated that all 31 of the Distribution circuits in the latest scope surpassed the analysis threshold of "one" to support a PSPS. The model's calculations are based on forecasted conditions.

PG&E's PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool addresses the CPUC's requirements presented in the 2019 PSPS OII.[7] This decision states California investor-owned utilities (IOUs) are required to quantify the risk/benefits associated with initiating or not initiating a PSPS for our customers.

PG&E incorporated the aforementioned risk-benefit analysis into our PSPS execution process to help inform our PSPS decision-making process. Our Risk-Benefit Tool aligns with the California IOUs Cost Benefit Approach (CBA) framework, as defined through the Safety Modeling Assessment Proceeding (SMAP), CPUC's Risk Based Decision-Making Framework (R.20-07-013), which specifies how various consequences are factored into a risk calculation. Utilizing this framework, we incorporate PSPS forecast information into the tool, which is further described in the "Risk Assessment" section below.

The output of the tool is a ratio that compares the calculated PSPS potential benefit from initiating de-energization (i.e., mitigation of catastrophic wildfire consequence) to the risks associated with PSPS (i.e., impact to customers resulting from a PSPS). Key inputs in the risk-benefit analysis include results from Technosylva wildfire simulations specific to the Distribution circuit and Transmission lines in scope for a potential de-energization, the number of customers forecasted to be de-energized, and the forecasted number of customer minutes across each identified circuit in scope for a potential de-energization.

After the potential de-energization scope is determined, including the potentially impacted circuits identified for the potential PSPS, this scope and the Technosylva wildfire simulation outputs are used as inputs into the Risk-Benefit Tool, which quantifies the potential public safety risk and wildfire risk resulting from the forecasted impacts of the pending PSPS. Note that the Wildfire Risk Score is based on an 8-hour simulation from Technosylva and while useful, in some cases this can significantly understate the risk. Thus, the MIC may still recommend to de-energize circuits where the Risk-Benefit Tool shows higher PSPS risk than wildfire risk.

[7] D. 21-06-014

Risk Assessment

As referenced above, PG&E's PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool follows California IOU agreed approach to utilize the CBA framework that captures the safety, reliability, and financial impact of identified potential risk events, as outlined in our Enterprise Risk Register.[8] The tool's calculations use a non-linear scaling of consequences reflecting our focus on low-frequency/high-consequence risk events without neglecting high-probability/low-consequence risk events. Developed by the PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool, CBA scores are used to compare the potential de-energization risk from a forecasted PSPS to the potential risk of catastrophic wildfires from keeping the circuits energized, specific to the potentially impacted circuits being considered for a PSPS.

The following inputs are used in calculations to build CBA risk scores for a PSPS and wildfires, which are ultimately weighed against one another:

- *Customer Category and Critical Customer Adjustment Factor*: The type of customer (e.g., MBL Program, etc.) using a "critical customer adjustment factor." This is applied to the customer outage duration to reflect a higher risk score for customers who are at a greater adverse risk of a potential PSPS.
- *Customers Impacted*: Forecasted number of customers anticipated to be impacted by the potential PSPS.
- *Customer Minutes*: Forecasted outage duration the customers will experience during the potential PSPS.
- *Forecasted Circuits*: The final list of the Distribution circuits and Transmission lines identified to be in scope for a potential PSPS.
- *Technosylva Wildfire Simulation Data*: Fire simulation forecasts on the consequence of a potential wildfire's impact on customers, wildlife, and infrastructures on each circuit for every three hours. These values are based on Technosylva's wildfire modeling, using real-time weather, state-of-the-art fuel, and 8-hour fire spread modeling.

Once the data above is made available and incorporated into the tool, the modeling considerations described in Table 2 are used to estimate the consequence of the potential wildfire risk and PSPS risk at the per-circuit level. Within the tool, a variety of modeling considerations are made to facilitate calculations, included in Table 2 and summarized in Figure 16.

[8] Full details of the CBA methodology are provided through the 2024 RAMP and 2027 GRC filings.

Table 2: 2026 PG&E's PSPS Risk-Benefit Consequence Modeling Considerations

Consequence Type	Wildfire Consequence Considerations	PSPS Consequence Considerations
Safety	Calculated based on maximum population impacts derived from Technosylva wildfire simulation models and a fatality ratio based on National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) data.	Calculated from an estimate of Equivalent Fatalities (EF) per Million Customer Minutes Interrupted (MMCI). The EF/MMCI ratio is estimated from previous PG&E PSPS outages and other large external outages.[9]
Reliability	None	Calculated directly from the potential number of customers impacted and outage duration based on customer minutes interrupted.
Financial	Calculated based on maximum building impacts derived from Technosylva wildfire simulation models and a cost per structure burned previously evaluated in 2024 RAMP Report.[10]	Calculated based on two financial estimates, 1) distribution of a lump sum cost of execution across all relevant circuits and 2) an estimated proxy cost per customer in scope per PSPS.[11]

Potential Wildfire Risk
Wildfire consequence impacts are calculated based on the outputs of the Technosylva simulations. Variables include 1) population impacted by wildfire and 2) structures impacted by wildfire used to calculate natural unit values for two consequence components:

- Wildfire Safety Consequence: EF
- Wildfire Financial Consequence: Financial Cost of Wildfire (in dollars)

Potential PSPS Risk
PSPS consequence impacts are based on the following values: duration of de-energization by circuit, and number of customers impacted by de-energization on each circuit. These input values are used to calculate natural unit values for three consequence components:

- PSPS Safety Consequence: EF as an output of Customer Minutes interrupted
- PSPS Electric Reliability Consequence: Customer Minutes Interrupted × Critical Customer Adjustment Factor
- PSPS Financial Consequence: Financial Cost of PSPS (in dollars) × Critical Customer Adjustment Factor

Once the consequence values (safety, reliability, financial) are estimated they are converted into CBA risk scores. Once the Risk-Benefit Tool calculates the impacts between the PSPS and a wildfire, it is summarized in Figure 16 and 17 by indicating if the adverse impact from a PSPS outweighs the risk of a wildfire.

[9] Includes 2019-2021 PSPS outages, the 2003 Northeast Blackout in New York City, 2011 Southwest Blackout in San Diego, 2012 Derecho Windstorms, 2012 Superstorm Sandy, 2017 Hurricane Irma, and 2021 Blackout event.
[10] A.24-05-008.
[11] The assumptions used in these calculations, including the proxy cost per customer per PSPS, are subject to be updated and are not intended to prejudge or create precedent with regard to the development of more precise values of resiliency or cost of PSPS metrics being considered in other ongoing proceedings at the California Public Utilities Commission, such as the Risk-Based Decision-Making Rulemaking [R.20.07.013] and the Microgrid and Resiliency Strategies.

Figure 16: Representation of PG&E's PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool



Figure 17: PSPS Potential Benefit Versus PSPS Potential Risk Consequence

PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	72.5
PSPS Potential Benefit (Wildfire Mitigation)	23,670.6
Potential Benefit : Potential Risk	322.4
Recommended Approach	Indicates potential PSPS benefit outweighs risk
Risk Ratio Per Circuit (>1, PSPS Benefit Outweighs Risk) As defined in PLAN_D-02_Rev02	Dx Circuits: 31 (of 31) [1]

Aggregated to event-level

[1]*Oro Loma 1118 is included in the PSPS situation report due to abnormal switching and is fully within HFTD Tier 1 boundary and has no wildfire risk based on the Technosylva simulations for this event.*

$\frac{PSPS\ Potential\ Benefit\ (wildfire\ risk)}{PSPS\ Potential\ Risk} > 1$ **Indicates potential PSPS benefit outweighs risk**

$\frac{PSPS\ Potential\ Benefit\ (wildfire\ risk)}{PSPS\ Potential\ Risk} < 1$ **Indicates potential risk may outweigh potential benefit**

Key Factors

- **PSPS Consequence**
  - Safety consequence factors in planned and unplanned widespread outage events across the US.
  - Reliability consequence based on customer minutes interrupted
  - Financial consequence based on execution and fixed customer cost per event
  - Assumes maximum duration for each customer per circuit
- **PSPS Benefit (Wildfire Mitigation)**
  - Safety consequence based on population impacted from fire spread simulation
  - Reliability consequence not considered
  - Financial consequence based on buildings impacted from fire spread simulation
  - Assumes an ignition on each circuit based on the maximum consequence modeled by Technosylva

Section 2.5 - Explanation of alternatives considered and evaluation of each alternative.
(D.19-05-042 Appendix A, page A22.)

Response:
After reviewing the meteorological information that indicated potential for catastrophic wildfire and the impacts on customers through de-energization, we considered whether alternatives to de-energizing, such as additional vegetation management and disabling automatic reclosers, could adequately reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire thus lowering the need for de-energization. We determined these measures alone did not reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire in areas within the PSPS scope sufficiently to protect public safety.

Section 3 – De-energized Time, Place, Duration and Customers

Section 3.1 - The summary of time, place and duration of the event, broken down by phase if applicable *(Resolution ESRB-8 page 3, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
The PSPS occurred between May 17 – 18, 2026 in 15 TPs across 15 counties.

Section 3.2 –A consolidated zipped geodatabase (.gdb) file that includes all PSPS event data requested in Section 3.2 and Section 4.3. Use WGS 1984 Web Mercator Auxiliary Sphere projected coordinate system (WKID: Esri 3857) for the geodatabase. The geodatabase must include PSPS polygon feature classes of de-energized areas with items that are required in Section 3.3. In addition, the geodatabase must contain one consolidated event single polygon feature class with the following exact fields (dates will be formatted XX/XX/XX): (SED Additional Information.)

- **Event Name: [same PSPS Event Name used during the event and shared with public safety partners]**
- **First Date of POC: [first date of initial period of concern]**
- **IOU: [PGE, SCE, SDGE, Liberty, PacifiCorp, or BVES]**
- **De-energization Start Date: [XX/XX/XX]**
- **Full Restoration Date: [XX/XX/XX]**
- **Customers De-energized: [unique count matching Table 1]**
- **De-energization: [Yes or No]**

Response:
Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, attachment *"PGE_ PSPS_Polygons_of_De-energized_Areas_and_Damage_Hazard_Points_20260517.gdb.zip*" provides a consolidated zipped geodatabase file that includes PSPS polygons of final de-energized areas combined with PSPS data as well as damages and hazards.

Section 3.3 - A list of circuits de-energized, with the following information for each circuit. If a circuit is de-energized multiple times during an event, the following information must be provided for each de-energization. This information should be provided in both a PDF and excel spreadsheet *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.)*

- **County**
- **De-energization date/time**
- **Restoration date/time**
- **"All Clear" declaration date/time**
- **General Order (GO) 95, Rule 21.2-D Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 classification or non-High Fire Threat District**
- **Total customers de-energized**
- **Residential customers de-energized**
- **Commercial/Industrial Customers de-energized**
- **Medical Baseline (MBL) customers de-energized**
- **AFN other than MBL customers de-energized**
- **Other Customers**
- **Distribution or transmission classification**

Response:
Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, Appendix B provides a list of de-energized circuits and the relevant information relating to each circuit. There were no Transmission lines de-energized during this PSPS.

Section 4 – Damages and Hazards to Overhead Facilities

Section 4.1 – Description of all found wind-related damages or hazards to the utility's overhead facilities in the areas where power was shut off. *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
During this PSPS, weather stations near the areas in scope recorded wind gusts as high as 73 mph. These are shown in Table 16 and Figure 28 in Section 12.

During patrols of the de-energized circuits prior to restoring power, PG&E found three incidents of wind-related damages and one hazard. Damages are conditions that occurred during the PSPS, likely wind-related, necessitating repair or replacement of PG&E's asset, such as a wire down or a fallen pole. Hazards are conditions that might have caused damages or posed an electrical arcing or ignition risk had PSPS not been executed, such as a tree limb found suspended in electrical wires. The damage and hazard locations are illustrated in Figure 18 – 21 and mapped in Figure 22.

Figure 18: Foreign Object Hazard in Napa County – Balloon on line

Figure 19: Wind Related Damage in San Joaquin County – Ground wire detached from pole and bird nest on pole

Figure 20: Wind Related Damage in Colusa County – Broken crossarm

Figure 21: Wind Related Damage in Glenn County – Broken insulator

Section 4.2 - A table showing circuit name and structure identifier (if applicable) for each damage or hazard, County that each damage or hazard is located in, whether the damage or hazard is in a High Fire-Threat District (HFTD) or non-HFTD, Type of damage/hazard of damage. *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
See Appendix C for a list of damages and hazards within the de-energized areas.

Section 4.3 - The consolidated zipped geodatabase file from Section 3.2 must include the PSPS event damage and hazard points, if applicable. The file should include items that are required in Section 4.2. *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
See attachment, *"PGE_ PSPS_Polygons_of_De-energized_Areas_and_Damage_Hazard _Points_20260517.gdb.zip"* for a zipped geodatabase file that includes the PSPS damage and hazard points.

Section 4.4 - A PDF map identifying the location of each damage or hazard. *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
See Figure 22 for a map identifying the location of the damages and hazards.

Figure 22: Damages and Hazards Incidents Map

Section 5 – Notifications

Section 5.1 - A description of the notice to California Independent System Operator (as needed), public safety partners, local/tribal governments, paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a community resource center, multi-family building account holders/building managers in the AFN community, and all customers, including the means by which utilities provide notice to customers of the locations/hours/services available for CRCs, and where to access electricity during the hours the CRC is closed. *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 3 D19-05-042, page A26, D21-06-034, Appendix A, page A2, A9-A10, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
Throughout the PSPS, we followed the Notification Plan included in our 2025 PSPS Pre-Season Report, Appendix C, pp. 57 – 67 and made significant efforts to notify Tribal and Local Governments, Public Safety Partners, Community Based Organizations (CBOs) (including paratransit agencies) and impacted customers in accordance with the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines.[12] See Table 3 for a description of the notifications we sent to stakeholders in accordance with the minimum timelines set forth by the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines.[13]

In accordance with D.21-06-034, CRC information is provided to customers in PSPS notifications via hyperlink to the PSPS updates page which includes detailed information on CRC locations, services available, hours of operation, how to find local CRCs via the PSPS outage map and where to access electricity during the hours CRCs are closed. Given the volume of CRC information, text message character constraints, and the dynamic nature of CRCs information, our notifications effectively direct agencies, customers, and the general public to PSPS updates page through automated notifications, news releases, social media, CBOs, and other avenues. This multi-layered notification approach ensures that all impacted customers and local agencies have access to the most current CRC information. See Section 9 for more information on CRCs.

Multi-family building account holders/building managers in the AFN community are considered part of our All Customers (including MBL customers and Self-Identified Vulnerable (SIV) 14 customers) recipient group. For information on our outreach and community engagement with master-metered owners, property managers, and building account holders, see PG&E's AFN Quarterly Progress Reports for activities between October 1, 2025, and December 31, 2025.

Apart from providing direct notifications to stakeholders, PG&E alerted the public in advance of de-energization via the media and PG&E's website.

[12] D.19-05-042.
[13] D.19-05-042.
[14] SIV Program is inclusive of customers who have indicated they are "dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology" as well as customers that are not enrolled or qualify for the MBL Program and "certify that they have a serious illness or condition that could become life threatening if service is disconnected." In accordance with D.21-06-034, PG&E includes customers who have indicated they are "dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology" in an effort to identify customers "above and beyond those in the medical baseline population" to include persons reliant on electricity to maintain necessary life functions including for durable medical equipment and assistive technology. This designation remains on their account indefinitely.

Media Engagement

From the time we publicly announced the PSPS until power was restored, we engaged with the public through the media by:

- Proactively issuing two local news releases and updates directly to news outlets.
- Responding to approximately 40 media inquiries, either from media outlets that contacted PG&E's 24-hour media line, or direct calls/emails to field media.
- Participating in ten media interviews (i.e. live, recorded or unrecorded phone interviews) to provide situational updates and preparedness messages.

As of May 26, we identified 70 unique print, online, and broadcast stories.

PG&E Website

We placed an Informational Alert on the pge.com home page that directed the public to PG&E's PSPS site. From the start of the PSPS to full restoration, the PSPS emergency website received a total of 401,941 site visits[15] and 1,043,357 page views.[16]

Among other resources noted throughout this report, PG&E's PSPS emergency website includes information regarding Electric Vehicle (EV), American Sign Language (ASL), Independent Living Centers (ILCs), Backup Power, AFN customer resources, MBL Program information and more. Additionally, the Address look-up tool and Address-level alerts, are available on our website, in 16 languages, that allow non-PG&E-account holders to receive notifications for any address where they do not receive a bill (e.g., workplace, child's school, renters, mobile home parks, etc.).

We remain committed to the continuous improvement of our websites to better meet the needs of customers. As we launch new features to pge.com and to pgealerts.alerts.pge.com, we test to ensure compliance with WCAG 2.1AA standards and improve customer experience. Where possible, we remediate accessibility issues that customers or stakeholders have brought to our attention.

Table 3: Notification Descriptions

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
PRIORITY NOTIFICATION: 48-72 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization	Public Safety Partners and CBOs[17]	On May 14, our Meteorology Team noted a potential PSPS and updated the weather forecast on pge.com/weather to "elevated" in certain parts of the service area. At this time, agency representatives called each County Office of Emergency Services (OES) in PG&E's electrical service area and select Tribes and cities to inform them that PG&E was monitoring an increased potential for a PSPS. We also notified CAISO of a potential PSPS on May 13 at 19:34 PDT.

[15] A site visit is a continuous session that begins when a user arrives on a site and ends after either 30 minutes of inactivity or 12 hours of continuous activity.
[16] A page view is the number of times a page was viewed by individual users.
[17] D.21-06-034, Appendix A, page A9, Section G. MBL Program and AFN Communities, No. 4, Each electric investor-owned utility must provide proactive notification and impacted zip code information to paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a CRC during a PSPS.

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description

		Following the EOC activation, we completed the following:
		• Submitted a PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E's EOC has been activated and that PG&E is monitoring for a potential PSPS.
		• Agency representatives called potentially impacted County OES and select Tribes and cities to inform them that PG&E is monitoring a potential PSPS.
		• Sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners,[18] via call, text and e-mail, which included:
		  ○ Estimated window of the de-energization time.
		  ○ When weather is anticipated to pass.
		  ○ Estimated Time of Restoration (ETOR).
		  ○ Links to the PSPS Portal where PSPS-specific maps and information are available.

WATCH NOTIFICATION: 24-48 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL and SIV customers)	During this time, we completed the following:
		• Submitted a PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an email to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E's EOC has been activated and that PG&E is monitoring for potential PSPS.
		• Sent notifications to Public Safety Partners and customers, via call, text message and e-mail, which included:
		  ○ Estimated window of the de-energization time.
		  ○ When weather is anticipated to pass.
		  ○ ETOR.
		  ○ For Public Safety Partners Only: Links to the PSPS Portal.
		  ○ For customers only: Potentially impacted addresses, links to PSPS emergency website with CRC information, and resources for AFN customers, including but not limited to information on the MBL Program, language support, and the Portable Battery Program[19] (PBP).
		• Sent notifications to MBL customers, including tenants of master metered accounts, and SIV customers. See Section 5.3 for more information regarding MBL Program notifications.
		• Sent Cancellation Notifications to Public Safety Partners and customers within, two hours of being

[18] Other Public Safety Partners refers to first/emergency responders at the local, state, and federal level, water, wastewater, and communication service providers, affected CCAs, publicly owned utilities/electrical cooperatives, the CPUC, the California Governor's Office of Emergency Services, and the CAL FIRE.
[19] See PG&E's 2026 AFN Plan for more information about the PBP Program.

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
		removed from scope, to inform them that their power would not be shut off. Customer notifications are provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications are provided in English.
WARNING NOTIFICATION: 1-4 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization, if possible	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL customers, SIV customers)	During this time, we completed the following: • Submitted a PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E has made the decision to de-energize. • Sent notifications to Public Safety Partners and customers which included the same key information and resources as Watch Notifications. • Sent notifications to MBL customers, including tenants of master metered accounts, and SIV customers. See Section 5.3 for more information regarding MBL Program notifications. • Sent Cancellation Notifications to Public Safety Partners and customers within two hours of being removed from scope to inform them that their power would not be shut off. Customer notifications are provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications are provided in English.

POWER OFF NOTIFICATION: When de-energization is initiated	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL and SIV customers)	When de-energization was initiated, we completed the following:
		• Submitted a PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC to notify them that de-energization has been initiated.
		• Sent notifications to Public Safety Partners and customers, via call, text messages, and e-mail, which included:
		  ○ De-energization time.
		  ○ When weather is anticipated to pass.
		  ○ For customers only: Impacted addresses.
		  ○ For customers only: Links to the PSPS emergency website with CRC information, and resources for AFN customers, including but not limited to information on the MBL Program, Meals on Wheels, language support, and the PBP.

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
		• Sent notifications to MBL customers, including tenants of master metered accounts, and SIV customers. See Section 5.3 for more information regarding MBL Program notifications. Customer notifications are provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications are provided in English.

WEATHER "ALL-CLEAR"/ETOR UPDATE NOTIFICATION: Immediately before re-energization begins	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL and SIV customers)	After weather conditions had passed and areas were deemed safe to begin patrols and restoration, we completed the following:
		• Submitted a PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E is initiating re-energization patrols.
		• Sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners and customers, via call, text message and e-mail, which included the ETOR.
		• Sent "update" notifications to customers if their ETOR changed. Two ways that an ETOR may change include:
		  ○ New field or meteorology conditions.
		  ○ Damage found during patrols and repair was needed.
		
		Customer notifications are provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications are provided in English.

RESTORATION NOTIFICATION: When re-energization is complete	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL and SIV customers)	Once all customers were restored, we completed the following: • Submitted the final PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES. • Sent an e-mail to the CPUC confirming restoration of PSPS outages and reclassification of customers if applicable. • Sent a notification to Public Safety Partners via call, text, and e-mail. Once customers, including MBL and SIV customers, were restored, they received automated notifications via call, text, and e-mail. Customer notifications are provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
		translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications are provided in English.

Section 5.2 – Notification timeline including prior to de-energization or Period of Concern (if no de-energization), initiation, restoration, and cancellation, if applicable, for each circuit or circuit segment. The timeline should include the required minimum timeline and approximate time notifications were sent for each de-energization if a circuit was de-energized multiple times. *(D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A8-A9, D.21-06-034, page A11)*

Response:
Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, Table 4 in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260517*" provides the time notifications were sent in accordance with the minimum timelines set forth by the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines,[20] to Tribal/Local Governments, Public Safety Partners, and all customers prior to de-energization, initiation, cancellation, and restoration. The advanced notification guidelines set forth in the Phase 1 Guidelines are not based on a strict liability standard and state that "recognizing that there may be times when advanced notice is not possible due to emergency conditions beyond the electric investor owned utilities' control, the electric investor-owned utilities should, whenever possible, provide advance notification to all populations potentially affected by a de-energization event."[21]

Table 4: Notification Timeline Summary
See Table 4 in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260517.*"

Section 5.3 - For those customers where positive or affirmative notification was attempted, use the following template to report the accounting of the customers (which tariff and/or access and functional needs population designation), the number of notification attempts made, the timing of attempts, who made the notification attempt (utility or public safety partner) and the number of customers for whom positive notification was achieved. *(D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A23, SED Additional Information.)*
"Notification attempts made" and "Successful positive notification" must include the unique number of customer counts. When the actual notification attempts made is less than the number of customers in scope, the utility must explain the reason. In addition, the utility must explain the reason of any unsuccessful positive notifications. Utilities may not mark N/A and must answer 5.3 regardless if the utility did not de-energize customers. *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
Based on our understanding of the information requested in this prompt, Table 5 includes metrics associated with notifications PG&E provided to customers where positive or affirmative notification was attempted. PG&E interprets the number of customers that need positive or affirmative notification as customers the company seeks confirmation from, namely MBL and SIV customers. PG&E tracks positive confirmation from MBL/SIV customers via text, phone call, email, doorbell rings, live agent phone calls or door hanger at all stages of notifications. If a notification is acknowledged at any stage and/or a door hanger is left, that is considered a

[20] D.19-05-042.
[21] D.19-05-042, Appendix A

successful positive notification. See PG&E's 2026 AFN Plan and AFN Quarterly Progress Reports for more information.

Table 5: Positive Notification

Designation	Total Number of customers	Number of Notification Attempts Made[22]	Timing of Attempts	Who made the Notification Attempt	Successful Positive Notification
MBL in scope[23]	298	298	Daily	PG&E	298
SIV	103	102	Daily	PG&E	100

As shown in Table 5, out of the MBL and SIV customers in scope for this PSPS, one SIV customer did not receive an attempted notification prior to de-energization and three SIV customers are not counted as a successful positive notifications prior to de-energization. See below for explanations:

- One SIV customer did not receive notification attempts and successful positive notification prior to de-energization. PG&E eventually established positive contact with this customer with a live call after the PSPS de-energization had already began. We are still investigating why notification attempts and successful positive notification did not occur prior to de-energization and will report our findings in the 2026 PSPS Post-Season Report.
- One SIV customer received notification attempts prior to de-energization via email, phone calls, and SMS, but these attempts did not establish successful positive notification. PG&E eventually established positive contact with this customer with a live call after the PSPS de-energization had already began. We are still investigating why successful positive notification did not occur prior to de-energization, and will report our findings in the 2026 PSPS Post-Season Report.
- One SIV customer received notification attempts prior to de-energization via email, phone calls, and SMS, but these attempts did not establish successful positive notification. A PG&E representative then visited this customer to conduct a door knock notification but was unable to access the front door due to a locked outside gate. Since we could not access the customer's front door to leave a door hanger, we do not consider this a successful positive confirmation. However, we also do not consider this a notification failure as this was outside of our control.

For this PSPS, MBL and SIV customers received automated calls, texts and emails at the same intervals as the general customer notifications. PG&E provided unique PSPS Watch and PSPS Warning Notifications to MBL customers[24] and SIV customers.

These customer groups also received additional calls and texts at hourly intervals until the customer confirmed receipt of the automated notifications by either answering the phone,

[22] Count of "Notification Attempts Made" includes doorbell rings and Live Agent phone calls.
[23] Residential tenants of master-metered customers can also qualify for MBL quantities. The MBL category for the purposes of Table 5 includes MBL customers who are master meter tenants.
[24] Including MBL customers who are master-metered tenants (e.g., renters or tenants in mobile home park).

responding to the text, or opening the email. If confirmation was not received, a PG&E representative visited the customer's home to check on the customer (referred to as the "doorbell ring" process) while hourly notification retries continued. If the customer did not provide confirmation to PG&E following the check-in, the PG&E representative left a door hanger providing additional PSPS notification and information at the home to indicate PG&E had visited. In each case, the additional door hanger notification was considered a positive successful notification.[25]

At times, PG&E also made Live Agent phone calls in parallel to the automated notifications and doorbell rings, as an additional attempt to reach the customer prior to and/or after de-energization.

PG&E shared the lists of the MBL and SIV customers who had not confirmed receipt of their notifications with the appropriate county and Tribal emergency managers twice daily via the PSPS Portal. PG&E proactively notified agencies that the data was available on the PSPS Portal and encouraged them to inform these customers of the resources available to them. PG&E is unable to track and report on notifications made by Public Safety Partners, as notification systems and/or platforms used by Public Safety Partners are out of PG&E's purview; PG&E encourages Public Safety Partners to include PSPS messages on all of their platforms. PG&E describes its engagement with Public Safety Partners in Section 6.

Section 5.4 - A copy or scripts of all notifications with a list of all languages that each type of notification was provided in, the timing of notifications, the methods of notifications and who made the notifications (the utility or local public safety partners). *(D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A23, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
See attachment "*PGE_PSPS_ Notifications_20260517.pdf*" for a copy of the notification templates, the timing of the notifications and methods of notifications that PG&E sent during the May 17 – 18, 2026 PSPS. See Table 4 in the attachment *"PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260517"* for additional information on the timing of notifications sent during this PSPS.

PG&E provides Tribal, county, city, CCAs, Public Safety Partner and Transmission-level customer notifications in English only. All other customer notifications are delivered in-language if a customer's language preference is on file. If there is no language preference on file, the notification is delivered in English, with information on how to access and receive PSPS information in translated languages. Non-English languages requested for this PSPS were Arabic, Cantonese, Mandarin, Hindi, Korean, Portuguese, Punjabi, Spanish and Vietnamese.

[25] For MBL and SIV customers, an in-person door ring visit where a door hanger is left, but no contact is made with the customer is considered "successful contact," but not "received." If the PG&E representative makes contact with the customer, then it is considered "received."

Section 5.5 - If the utility fails to provide notifications according to the minimum timelines set forth in D.19-05-042 and D.21-06-034, using the following template to report a breakdown of the notification failure and an explanation of what caused the failure. This applies to both de-energization and non de-energization events. For non-de-energization event, the starting time of the first Period of Concern is the anticipated de-energization time to assess notification failure. If a circuit is de-energized multiple times during an event, the utility must include notification failures for the multiple de-energizations. The explanation must be specific. *(D.21-06-014 page 286, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
PG&E makes a substantial effort to provide notifications whenever possible and to the extent it is operationally feasible in accordance with the PSPS Phase 1, Phase 3 and 2019 PSPS OII guidelines within the CPUC's minimum timeline requirements, weather and other factors permitting.[26] The notification guidelines set forth in the Phase 1 Guidelines are not a strict liability standard and state that "the electric investor owned utilities should, whenever possible, adhere to the following minimum notification timeline…" Additionally, pursuant to ESRB-8, the CPUC has stated that it is not practicable to have an absolute requirement that electric IOUs provide advanced notifications to customers prior to a PSPS and that "it is an impossible feat of anticipating every emergency situation resulting in pro-active de-energization."[27]

Table 6: Breakdown of Notification Failure

Notifications Sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Account	Explanation of Failure
Public Safety Partners excluding CFI[28]	**Entities who did not receive 48-to 72-hour priority notification**	64	See Table 6A for explanations.
	Entities who did not receive 24-48 hour advance notification	0	No failures.
	Entities who did not receive 1-4-hour imminent notification	0	No failures.
	Entities who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	0	No failures.
	Entities who were not notified at de-energization initiation	5	See Table 6E for explanations.
	Entities who were not notified immediately before re-energization	5	See Table 6F for explanations.
	Entities who were not notified when re-energization is complete	37	See Table 6G for explanations.
	Entities who did not receive cancellation notification	0	No failures.

[26] D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.
[27] ESRB-8, p. 5, D.19-05-042, pp. 84-86, Finding of Fact 22 at p. 118.
[28] Only includes Tribes, cities, counties, and CCAs.

Notifications Sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Account	Explanation of Failure
	within two hours of the decision to cancel		
CFI[29]	**Facilities who did not receive 48-72-hour priority notification**	124	See Table 6A for explanations.
	Facilities who did not receive 24-48 hour advance notification	4	See Table 6B for explanations.
	Facilities who did not receive 1-4-hour imminent notification	2	See Table 6C for explanations.
	Facilities who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	0	No failures.
	Facilities who were not notified at de-energization initiation	6	See Table 6E for explanations.
	Facilities who were not notified immediately before re-energization	9	See Table 6F for explanations.
	Facilities who were not notified when re-energization is complete	3	See Table 6G for explanations.
	Facilities who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	0	No failures.
All other affected customers	**Customers who did not receive 24-48-hour advance notifications**	107	See Table 6B for explanations.
	Customers who did not receive 1-4-hour imminent notifications	35	See Table 6C for explanations.
	Customers who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	25	See Table 6D for explanations.
	Customers who were not notified at de-energization initiation	111	See Table 6E for explanations.
	Customers who were not notified immediately before re-energization	34	See Table 6F for explanations.
	Customers who were not notified when re-energization is complete	45	See Table 6G for explanations.

[29] Includes Public Safety Partners who are CFI customers.

Notifications Sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Account	Explanation of Failure
	Customers who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	1	See Table 6H for explanations.

Table 6A: Explanation of Failures for Agency Entities and CFI Who Did Not Receive 48-to 72-Hour Priority Notification

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Explanation
64	124	Due to changes in forecasted weather, these agency entities and critical facilities entered into scope after this notification window had passed. Therefore, it was not possible for these agencies and customers to receive Priority Notifications.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as the agencies and customers were not within scope during the applicable notification timeframe due to weather factors outside of PG&E's control. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Table 6B: Explanation of Failures for CFI and Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive 24-to 48-Hour Watch Notification

Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Explanation
4	80	Due to operational feedback, these critical facilities and other customers entered into scope after this notification window had passed.
0	27	These customers did not receive 24-48 hour Watch Notification because our system indicated there was no valid contact information provided to PG&E.* We are still investigating to validate this information, and we will report our findings in the 2026 PSPS Post-Season Report.

*If it is confirmed that no valid contact information was provided, PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Table 6C: Explanation of Failures for CFI and Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive 1-4-Hour Imminent Notifications

Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Explanation
2	10	These critical facilities and other customers were all COL who did not receive 1-4 Hour Imminent Notification because they were not included in the notification files due to human error.
0	25	These customers did not receive 1-4 hour Imminent Notification because our system indicated there was no valid contact information provided to PG&E.* We are still investigating to validate this

		information, and we will report our findings in the 2026 PSPS Post-Season Report.

*If it is confirmed that no valid contact information was provided, PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Table 6D: Explanation of Failures for All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive Any Notifications Before De-Energization

Total	Explanation
25	These customers did not receive any notification before de-energization because our system indicated there was no valid contact information provided to PG&E.* We are still investigating to validate this information, and we will report our findings in the 2026 PSPS Post-Season Report.

*If it is confirmed that no valid contact information was provided, PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Table 6E: Explanation of Failures for Agency Entities, CFI, and All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive Power Off Notification

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Explanation
5	0	0	These agency entities did not receive any notifications at or after de-energization initiation. This occurred because our system used for automatically generating in-outage notifications intentionally suppressed notifications to these agency entities. This suppression occurred due to a system logic error where suppression from past events was incorrectly applied to this PSPS. We will be correcting this logic in our systems to prevent a recurrence.
0	4	84	These critical facilities and other customers received a notification at de-energization initiation, however their notification was delayed due to human error – the manual step to trigger these notifications was delayed.
0	2	2	These critical facilities and other customers did not receive any notifications at or after de-energization initiation due to incorrect information in our data systems. As a result, the system did not recognize the customer as impacted by PSPS and therefore did not generate the notifications.
0	0	25	These customers did not receive any notifications at or after de-energization initiation because our system indicated there was no valid contact information provided to PG&E.* We are still investigating to validate this information, and we will report our findings in the 2026 PSPS Post-Season Report.

*If it is confirmed that no valid contact information was provided, PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Table 6F: Explanation of Failures for Agency Entities, CFI, and All Other Affected Customers Not Notified Immediately Before Re-energization

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Explanation
5	0	0	These agency entities did not receive any notifications at or after de-energization initiation. This occurred because our system used for automatically generating in-outage notifications intentionally suppressed notifications to these agency entities. This suppression occurred due to a system logic error where suppression from past events was incorrectly applied to this PSPS. We will be correcting this logic in our systems to prevent a recurrence.
0	7	7	These critical facilities and other customers were not notified immediately before re-energization due to a gap in coordination between the local emergency centers that manage the outages – the manual step to trigger these notifications was either not performed for these outages, or was performed late, leaving insufficient time to notify customers before the end of the outage.
0	2	2	These critical facilities and other customers did not receive any notifications at or after de-energization initiation due to incorrect information in our data systems. As a result, the system did not recognize the customer as impacted by PSPS and therefore did not generate the notifications.
0	0	25	These customers did not receive any notifications at or after de-energization initiation because our system indicated there was no valid contact information provided to PG&E.* We are still investigating to validate this information, and we will report our findings in the 2026 PSPS Post-Season Report.

*If it is confirmed that no valid contact information was provided, PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Table 6G: Explanation of Failures for CFI and All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive Restore Notification

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Explanation
32	0	0	These agency entities received a delayed notification after restoration was complete in their jurisdictions. These delays occurred because a manual categorization step was delayed in their jurisdictions. Our automatic in-outage notification system generates Restore Notifications for agencies when all customers within their jurisdiction are

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Explanation
			either restored from PSPS or their remaining outage duration is re-categorized to non-PSPS.[30]
5	0	0	These agency entities did not receive any notifications at or after de-energization initiation. This occurred because our system used for automatically generating in-outage notifications intentionally suppressed notifications to these agency entities. This suppression occurred due to a system logic error where suppression from past events was incorrectly applied to this PSPS. We will be correcting this logic in our systems to prevent a recurrence.
0	1	18	These critical facilities and other customers received a Restore notification after re-energization was complete, however it was delayed. During the patrol and restoration process, crews found damage caused by a third-party vehicle which prevented these customers from being restored. To reflect the new cause for delayed restoration, the outage categorization for these customers was manually changed from PSPS cause code into a non-PSPS cause code, which resulted in these customers receiving delayed PSPS Restore Notifications.
0	2	2	These critical facilities and other customers did not receive any notifications at or after de-energization initiation due to incorrect information in our data systems. As a result, the system did not recognize the customer as impacted by PSPS and therefore did not generate the notifications.
0	0	25	These customers did not receive any notifications at or after de-energization initiation because our system indicated there was no valid contact information provided to PG&E.* We are still investigating to validate this information, and we will report our findings in the 2026 PSPS Post-Season Report.

*If it is confirmed that no valid contact information was provided, PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

[30] These agencies contained COL customers which require special patrol and restoration procedures involving elements outside of PG&E's control – although PG&E can patrol and ensure the safety of our own facilities prior to restoration, COL customers must perform their own patrol and confirm with PG&E that their lines are safe to re-energize prior to re-energization.

Table 6H: Explanation of Failures for All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive Cancelation Notification

Total	Explanation
1	This customer stopped service prior to their removal from scope so they could not be notified of cancellation.*

*PG&E does not consider these to be notification failures as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Section 5.6 - Explain how the utility will correct the notification failures. *(D.21-06-014, page 286.)*

Response:
We have reviewed the notification failures and false communications for this PSPS and determined the need to reinforce training for Power Off Notification and All-Clear Notification triggers. Since delivering these notifications involves multiple teams within PG&E, we will coordinate internally on the correct procedures and update training materials to standardize management of outage cause codes for teams supporting the EOC.

We are in the process of identifying additional corrective actions for other notification failures and false communications identified in Section 5.5 and Section 5.7 and will be included this information in our 2026 PSPS Post-Season Report.

Section 5.7 - Enumerate and explain the cause of any false communications citing the sources of changing data. Describe the situations at-issue, which involve the level of perceived defect in notice, in specific detail. *(D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 4.)*

Response:
For this PSPS, we identified 362 cases of false positive communications and 31 cases of false negative communications.

See Table 7 and 8 for explanations of false positive and negative communications.

Table 7: Explanations of False Positive Communications

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Explanation
2	0	0	These agency entities were incorrectly notified of active PSPS de-energization for their jurisdiction because a data issue caused a de-energized streetlight to be incorrectly assigned to their city. This issue only impacted agency entities and did not result in any false communications to customers. These agency entities were notified of active PSPS impact but their jurisdiction did not experience an actual PSPS outage.

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Explanation
			Once this issue was identified, PG&E took action to prevent further PSPS notifications from being sent to these agency entities. We also sent emails and made live calls to correct our false positive communications – these were sent 2.3 hours after the initial false positive communication.
0	1	3	These critical facilities and other customers were mitigated from PSPS de-energization using PG&E-provided backup generation. However, these customers received PSPS notifications both prior to and during their avoided PSPS de-energization. These backup generation recipients were notified of PSPS but did not experience a PSPS outage. However, PG&E does not believe this is a compliance violation because the recipients of backup generation would be aware of their mitigation from PSPS and thus would not be negatively impacted by the PSPS pre-outage and in-outage notifications.
0	0	3	These customers were removed from scope and notified of cancellation within two hours of their removal from scope. However, PG&E performs additional automated notification attempts for customers requiring successful positive notifications and the additional notification attempts for a prior Watch Notification extended past the time of the Cancellation Notification. Thus, the last notification received by these customers was a Watch notification informing them of planned PSPS impact, despite PG&E's intention to notify them of cancellation. These customers' last communication from PG&E was advising of planned PSPS impact but these customers were ultimately not de-energized for PSPS.
0	0	1	This customer did not receive a notification of Cancellation, as reported in Table 6H. This customer's last communication from PG&E was advising of planned PSPS impact but this customer was ultimately not de-energized for PSPS.*
9	7	170	These critical facilities and other customers were impacted by a non-PSPS outage. However, their outage was incorrectly manually classified as PSPS in PG&E's internal outage management platform. As a result, these customers and agency entities for their jurisdiction received PSPS template notifications including those sent at de-energization initiation for PSPS outages

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Explanation
			which inform recipients of active PSPS impact. Subsequently, these customers and agency entities received PSPS Restore Notifications approximately 1.1 hours after their false positive communication. The short duration between the false communication and this subsequent notification may mitigate the impact caused by the false positive communication. These customers and agency entities were notified of active PSPS impact but did not experience an actual PSPS outage. PG&E also took additional action to mitigate the impact of these false positive communications by making live calls to impacted agency entities to explain that their jurisdiction and not yet been de-energized and re-energized from PSPS, and that the forecasted PSPS outages would still occur later. These live calls were made 3.2 hours after the initial false positive communication.
0	0	74	These customers were located outside of the area directly scoped for PSPS but were downstream of the device that would be used to isolate their circuit segment for PSPS. As a result, these customers were planned to experience PSPS impacts and thus notified prior to de-energization. They also received PSPS notifications upon de-energization initiation. However, these customers were re-energized approximately 1.3 hours after the start of their outage: the planned isolation device for their circuit segment was reenergized early, and the PSPS outage for the rest of their circuit segment was instead sustained using unplanned downstream devices. Due to the short duration of their outage, PG&E does not consider these customers to be PSPS impacts. However, this is considered false positive communications because they were informed of PSPS impact but did not experience a long PSPS outage.
0	4	88	These critical facilities and other customers were not planned for PSPS impact. Prior to the start of PSPS de-energization, a non-PSPS outage occurred on their circuit because a third-party vehicle struck a pole. To keep these customers energized while this non-PSPS damage was being repaired, their circuit segment was temporarily reconfigured to energize them from a neighboring circuit. However, this neighboring circuit was in-scope for PSPS. Specifically, these customers were fed from the same

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Explanation
			portion of circuit as the 74 customers with false communications explained above. When that neighboring circuit was de-energized for PSPS, these customers also lost power and were grouped into the same outage in our internal outage management platform. That combined outage was manually categorized as PSPS, resulting in PSPS notifications upon de-energization initiation. Since these customers were not in scope for PSPS, they did not need to wait until Weather All Clear for restoration. These customers were restored approximately 1.3 hours after their outage began, at the same time as the 74 customers with false communications explained above. Due to the short duration of their outage, PG&E does not consider these customers to be PSPS impacts. However, these are considered false positive communications because they were informed of active PSPS impact but did not experience a long PSPS outage.

*PG&E does not consider these to be false communications as we operated within the discretionary parameters prescribed in the CPUC's PSPS guidelines for utilities. (See D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.)

Table 8: Explanations of False Negative Communications

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Explanation
9	0	0	In the explanations of false positive communications above, we reported false positive communications to nine agency entities, seven critical facilities, and 170 other customers due to human error. We also reported that the impacted entities and customers subsequently received PSPS Restore Notifications. While those 177 customers were never truly de-energized for PSPS, the nine agency entities would later experience actual PSPS de-energization in their jurisdiction. Thus, when the PSPS Restore Notification was sent prior to the jurisdiction's actual PSPS de-energization, this created false negative communications for those nine agency entities because this notification prematurely communicated the end of the PSPS for that jurisdiction. As reported in our explanations of false positive communications above, PG&E made live calls to impacted

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Explanation
			agency entities to explain that their jurisdiction had not yet been de-energized and re-energized from PSPS, and that the forecasted PSPS outages would still occur later. These live calls were made 3.2 hours after the initial false positive communication and 2.1 hours after the subsequent false negative communication. Critically, these corrections were communicated before the actual start of PSPS de-energization for that jurisdiction.
0	0	7	These customers were de-energized for PSPS. However, due to manual actions performed in PG&E's internal outage management platform, these customers were incorrectly and prematurely marked as restored from PSPS. They were then added to a new outage in our internal outage management platform, but that new outage was not categorized as PSPS. This generated a Restore Notification to these customers prior to the actual restoration time. Once this false negative communication was realized, PG&E took steps to mitigate the impact from this false communication. We updated the categorization of their new outage to PSPS which generated PSPS Power Off Notifications to these customers approximately 2.5 hours after the false negative communication, which informed these customers that they are still impacted by an active PSPS outage. PG&E also attempted live calls to avoid confusion caused by the premature PSPS Restore Notification.
0	2	13	These critical facilities and other customers were de-energized for PSPS as part of the same outage as the 74 non-critical customers and the four critical and 88 other customers with false positive notifications in the table above. However, unlike those customers which only experienced a short outage, these 15 critical customers and other customers experienced the full length of the planned PSPS. When restoring the 166 customers with shorter outage durations, the entire outage was manually marked as restored in our internal outage management platform. A new outage identifier was then created in our platform to manage notifications to these 15 customers for the rest of their PSPS outage duration. This new outage identifier was classified as PSPS. Those actions caused these 15 customers to be prematurely marked as restored from PSPS and generated

Total (Agency Entities)	Total (CFI)	Total (Other Customers)	Explanation
			Restore Notifications to these customers prior to their actual restoration time. Because these customers were quickly added to a new PSPS outage in our internal platform, they received PSPS Power Off Notifications only a few minutes after their false negative communication, which informed these customers that they are still impacted by an active PSPS outage. PG&E took further actions to correct our false communications and to clarify any potential confusion from the overlapping PSPS Restore and PSPS Power Off Notifications, PG&E launched custom messaging to the two critical facilities and 11 of the 13 non-critical customers.

Section 6 – Local and State Public Safety Partner Engagement

Section 6.1 – List the organization names of public safety partners including, but not limited to, local governments, tribal representatives, first responders and emergency management, and critical facilities and infrastructure the utility contacted in anticipation to de-energization of Period of Concern, the date and time on which they were contacted, and whether the areas affected by the de-energization are classified as Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 as per the definition in CPUC General Order 95, Rule 21.2-D. *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
See Appendix D in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260517*" for a list of Public Safety Partners including Tribal representatives, local governments, first responders and emergency management, and critical facilities notified with the date and time of the initial notification, and whether the areas affected by the de-energization
are classified as Zone 1, Tier 2 or Tier 3.

We use a High Fire Risk Area (HFRA) classification which PG&E utilizes in addition to HFTD to determine PSPS scope. In Appendix D in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260517,*" we begin by identifying HFTD area assigned to Public Safety Partners. Any area outside of HFTD is re-classified as HFRA. PG&E's circuits can run miles long and span across multiple jurisdictions. Some Public Safety Partners outside of HFRA and HFTD were also in the potentially impacted scope in order to de-energize areas within HFRA and HFTD for safety.

Section 6.2 - List the names of all entities invited to the utility's Emergency Operations Center for a PSPS event, the method used to make this invitation, and whether a different form of communication was preferred by any entity invited to the utility's emergency operation center. *(D.21-06-014, page 289.)*

Response:
PG&E invited the CPUC via email to virtually embed in the EOC for the duration of the activation on May 14, 2026 at 18:15 PDT.

Additionally, telecommunications service providers are appointed a dedicated 24/7 PG&E contact in the EOC, the Critical Infrastructure Lead (CIL), who shared up-to-date PSPS information and answered individual questions. PG&E proactively reached out to nine telecommunications service providers[31] via email or phone as weather changes or new information regarding the PSPS became available.

As part of our PSPS Pre-Season outreach,[32] PG&E provides water infrastructure entities and communication services in PG&E's electrical service area with information on how to request representation at PG&E's Emergency Operations Center, when activated for PSPS. Alternatively, some partners may also request PG&E representation at their jurisdiction's activated Operations Emergency Center (OEC).[33]

[31] American Tower, AT&T, Frontier, Crown Castle, Ducor, Verizon, Mediacom, Pinnacle, and T-Mobile.
[32] See PG&E's 2025 PSPS Pre-Season Report, pp 59 – 60.
[33] D.19-05-042.

None of the entities invited to embed into our EOC indicated a preference for a different form of communication other than the ones already utilized.

Section 6.3 - A statement verifying the availability to public safety partners of accurate and timely geospatial information, and real time updates to the GIS shapefiles in preparation for an imminent PSPS event and during a PSPS event. In addition, list any accuracy or timeliness issues in making available the GIS shapefiles to public safety partners during the PSPS event from activation to full restoration. *(D.21-06-014, page 289.)*

Response:
In preparation for a potential PSPS, PG&E sent automated notifications with links to the PSPS Portal, which provides PDF maps and GIS data to Public Safety Partners at the times outlined in Table 4 in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260517.*" In addition, when PDF maps and GIS data were updated on the PSPS Portal due to scope changes, users were notified via e-mail at the times outlined in Table 9.

PDF maps and GIS data on the PSPS Portal were determined to be accurate and updated in a timely manner following changes to geographic scope or customer impacts.

Table 9: PSPS Portal Map Sharing (Date and Time)

Date	Time PDF and GIS Maps Shared (PDT)
5/14/2026	22:00
5/15/2026	17:30
5/16/2026	15:00
5/16/2026	23:00

Section 6.4 - A description and evaluation of engagement with local and state public safety partners in providing advanced outreach and notification during the PSPS event. *(D.19-05-042, Appendix, page A23.)*

Response:
Below is a description of the engagement with state CPUC, Cal OES, CAL FIRE, and local (i.e., Tribes, cities, counties) Public Safety Partners:

- Submitted the PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES twice a day (07:00 PDT and 15:00 PDT), if there was a significant change to scope and at least once for each of the five PSPS stages: Activating PSPS Protocols/Potential to De-energize (Stage 1), Decision to De-energize (Stage 2), De-energization Initiated (Stage 3), Initiating Re-energization Patrols (Stage 4) and All PSPS Lines Re-energized (Stage 5). See Table 10 for the date and time of notifications submitted to Cal OES.

Table 10: Notifications Submitted to Cal OES (Date and Time)

Date	Time PDF and GIS Maps Shared (PDT)
5/14/2026	18:15
5/14/2026	19:40
5/15/2026	07:14
5/15/2026	15:18
5/15/2026	18:06

Date	Time PDF and GIS Maps Shared (PDT)
5/16/2026	06:11
5/16/2026	15:13
5/17/2026	06:16
5/17/2026	11:46
5/17/2026	15:07
5/17/2026	16:15
5/17/2026	16:36
5/18/2026	07:23
5/18/2026	15:29
5/18/2026	22:39
5/18/2026	23:08
5/18/2026	23:35

- Sent e-mails to the CPUC at least once for each of the five PSPS stages listed above. See Table 11 for the date and time of notifications submitted to the CPUC.

Table 11: Notifications Submitted to CPUC (Date and Time)

Date	Time PDF and GIS Maps Shared (PDT)
5/14/2026	18:15
5/15/2026	16:21
5/16/2026	14:12
5/17/2026	01:01
5/17/2026	06:03
5/17/2026	11:25
5/17/2026	13:25
5/17/2026	13:47
5/17/2026	15:36
5/17/2026	16:10
5/18/2026	07:20
5/18/2026	22:57

- Hosted daily State Executive Briefings with invitees including Cal OES, CPUC, CAL FIRE, the Governor's Office, and other state and federal agencies to provide the latest PSPS information and answer questions. A presentation deck with key PSPS information was provided to participants.
- Hosted a daily Systemwide Cooperators Call, where all Public Safety Partners in the service area were invited to join for situational awareness.
- Hosted Tribal Cooperators Calls with potentially impacted Tribes to provide the latest PSPS information and answer questions.
- Hosted Operational Areas Cooperators Communication Calls to provide situational awareness updates and answer questions.[34]

[34] May vary in cadence and type based on County OES.

- Conducted ongoing coordination with Tribal and local county OES contacts through dedicated Agency Representatives. This includes but is not limited to providing the latest PSPS information, coordinating CRC locations, and resolving local issues in real-time.
- Provided links to the PSPS Portal that included planning and event-specific maps, situation reports, critical facility lists and MBL customer lists at each notification and when scope changed. Note that the Situation Report was provided twice a day and at scope changes prior to de-energization and hourly once restoration began.
- Sent automated and live call notifications to agency partners before, during and after de-energization.
- Offered local and state agencies to be embedded in PG&E's EOC, as well as offered PG&E Agency Representatives to be embedded virtually in local EOCs.

Our evaluation of the level of engagement on advanced outreach and notification to local and state Public Safety Partners during this EOC activation was considered to be successful and we continue to look for opportunities for improvement. This is based on the number and various types of outreach conducted (see list above), the feedback received from Public Safety Partners through the post-PSPS survey and the success rate of automated agency notifications. The following is a subset of comments PG&E received from in-scope Public Safety Partners regarding PSPS outreach:

- "PG&E does a great job at supporting impacted communities to the level of need."
- "The over-notification by way of multiple e-mails and automated phone calls and texts is WAY TOO MUCH. We have a great agency rep that keeps us informed. However, receiving information in the middle of the night for an event that impacts 8 customers--OR for an event that hasn't changed since the last notification during reasonable hours AND that does not have immediate threat to life is beyond ridiculous. Let the agency reps you pay do their job and our agency to agency relationship will be much better off for it."

Figure 23 shows the post-PSPS survey results when Public Safety Partners were asked to "evaluate PG&E engagement with your agency during the outage." We received three responses to the survey. We will report any late submissions to the survey in our 2026 PSPS Post-Season Report and continue to refine agency notifications to ensure accuracy and timely information sharing.

Figure 23: Evaluation of Public Safety Partner Engagement



Section 6.5 - Specific engagement with local communities regarding the notification and support provided to the AFN community. *(D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 8, SED Additional Information)*

Response:
To ensure PG&E provides adequate support to AFN customers, we engage with local communities through paratransit agencies, media partnerships and CBOs to share coordination efforts, notifications plans, CRC information, PSPS-specific information and more. See below for details on this engagement.

Engagement with Paratransit Agencies
In accordance with the Phase 3 Guidelines,[35] PG&E provided proactive notifications and impacted zip code information to paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a CRC during the PSPS. All notifications included a link to PG&E's PSPS emergency website, and an "Additional Resources" link to maps showing potentially affected areas. See Section 9 for more information on Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) compliant CRC locations.

Community Engagement
We engaged with approximately 400 "information-based" CBOs during this PSPS, sharing courtesy notification updates, fact sheets, and other relevant information to share with their constituents to expand our reach of communications, including videos, social media and other relevant PSPS support services, that organizations could use to educate their consumers. CBO resource partners were invited to the daily cooperator calls for Public Safety Partners, hosted by members from PG&E who provided a situational update about the latest scope of the PSPS and an overview of the services available to customers. We hosted additional daily coordination calls with the CBO resource partners supporting the PSPS to provide an open forum to answer questions, offer suggestions regarding how they can best support their consumer supports and facilitate more localized coordination among the partners.

Programs/Support for AFN Customers
PG&E is dedicated to providing a variety of resources and programs to AFN customers before and during a PSPS through several partnerships and contracts maintained by PG&E. See the 2026 AFN Plan for more information about these resources and partnerships.

Resources and programs provided for the May 17 – 18, 2026 PSPS are included in Table 12.

Table 12: AFN Customer Programs and Support

Resource/Program	Information/Quantity of Resources Provided
Disability Disaster Access and Resource Program (DDAR)[36]	Partnered with seven local ILCs across 15 counties to provide aid to 904 customers who rely on power for medical or independent living needs, including: • 4 hotel accommodations • 2 food voucher(s) • 2 generator fuel voucher(s)

[35] D.21-06-034.
[36] For more information on the types of aid ILCs provided and how the delivery of aid was coordinated among DDAR, ILCs and the customers, see PG&E's 2026 AFN Plan.

Resource/Program	Information/Quantity of Resources Provided
	• 0 accessible transportation[37] • 84 batteries were previously distributed in impacted counties. • 3 batteries were delivered during the activation to potentially impacted customers.
PBP[38]	67 customers in scope were supported by batteries received through the PBP. Since July 2020, a total of approximately 28,073 battery units has been delivered through the PBP across PG&E's service area.
Food Bank Partnerships	Partnered with 11 local food banks that serve all impacted counties to provide boxes of food for families.
Meals on Wheels Partnerships[39]	Partnered with 15 Meals on Wheels Organizations in 10 counties to provide services to customers in scope for the de-energization.
CA 211 Providers Network[40]	Partnered with 14 CA 211 network centers across 15 counties to assist 116 customers with resources. The direct assistance resources provided during this activation included: • 24 food voucher(s) • 6 hotel accommodations • 1 water bladder • 1 generator fuel voucher(s) • 0 accessible transportation[41]
Accessible Transportation Partnerships	Partnered with three organizations across six counties in preparation for the possibility of any transportation needs.[42] However, we did not receive any transportation requests for this PSPS. Any area that was not in scope for our accessible transportation partners is deferred as AFN transportation requests to our DDAR and CA 211 Network Providers, who also provide transportation assistance.

Communications to Customers with Limited English Proficiency
PG&E provided translated customer support through its customer notifications, website, call center, social media, engagement with CBOs, and multicultural media partnerships. Customers with their language preference set received in-language (translated) notifications. For customers with no language preference set, notifications were provided in English with information on how to receive PSPS information in 16 non-English languages. Customers with limited English proficiency have access to translation phone numbers on our PSPS website, highlighting that translation services are available in over 200 languages.

During this PSPS, we received requests for information in 15 languages supported by our Call Center Translation Services resulting in 255 calls between May 17 – 18.

[37] Although PG&E partners with DDAR to provide accessible transportation, we did not receive any transportation requests for this PSPS.
[38] For more information on the PBP, see PG&E's 2026 AFN Plan.
[39] For more information on PG&E's partnership with the Meals on Wheels Organizations, see PG&E's 2026 AFN Plan.
[40] For more information on PG&E's partnership with CA 211, see PG&E's 2026 AFN Plan.
[41] Although PG&E partners with CA 211 to provide accessible transportation, we did not receive any transportation requests for this PSPS.
[42] PG&E partnered with Fresno Economic Opportunities Commission, Dignity Health Connected Living, and Vivalon during this PSPS.

PG&E continued support and engagement with multi-cultural media organizations and in-language CBOs to maximize the reach of in-language communications to the public. Prior to the PSPS, we reached out to 35 multicultural media organizations to provide outreach in translated languages throughout the impacted counties. Additionally, we shared information and updates on PSPS with these media outlets, including news releases and social media infographics in English, translated languages and ASL, for their use and distribution. We also shared our new PSPS Language Resources page (available in 16 languages) with organizations to share with their constituents.

Section 6.6 - Provide the following information on backup power (including mobile backup power) with the name and email address of a utility contact for customers for each of the following topics: (D.21-06-014, page 300.)

Response:
The information requested is included in Sections 6.6a – 6.6f. For questions related to backup power, customers can email TempGenPSPSSupport@pge.com.

Section 6.6a. Description of the backup generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

Response:
Table 13 lists the generators available for CFI customers before and during this PSPS.

Table 13: Generators Available for CFI Customers

Number of Units	Individual Size (MW)	Run Time (Hrs.)[43]	Description
2	0.032	37.6	2 units on reserve in Sacramento
1	0.036	37.6	1 unit on reserve in Sacramento
4	0.065	31.0	4 units on reserve in San Leandro
6	0.100	25.3	6 units on reserve in San Leandro
2	0.125	25.0	2 units on reserve in Sacramento
1	0.150	30.3	1 unit on reserve in Sacramento
6	0.200	22.9	6 units on reserve in San Leandro
2	230	22.9	2 units on reserve in San Leandro
3	0.275	26.0	3 units on reserve in Sacramento
4	0.500	24.1	4 units on reserve in Sacramento

[43] Estimated based on a 75% load. Barring mechanical failure and refueling the temporary generators have the ability to operate continuously throughout a typical PSPS.

Number of Units	Individual Size (MW)	Run Time (Hrs.)[43]	Description
2	0.570	24.1	2 units on reserve in San Leandro
7	1.000	35.0	7 units on reserve in Sacramento
15	1.140	24.0	15 units on reserve in San Leandro
7	1.500	10.0	7 units on reserve in Benecia
11	2.000	27.7	8 units on reserve in Sacramento, 3 units on reserve in San Leandro

6.6b. The capacity and estimated maximum duration of operation of the backup generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

Response:
Table 13 lists the power capacity and maximum duration of operation of the generators available for CFI customers before and during this PSPS.

6.6c. The total number of backup generators provided to critical facility and infrastructure customer's site immediately before and during the PSPS.

Response:
During and immediately before the PSPS, no backup generators were requested by CFI customers that did not have an existing mitigation plan in place.

6.6d. How the utility deployed this backup generation to the critical facility and infrastructure customer's site.

Response:
As a general policy, PG&E does not offer backup generation to individual facilities. However, PG&E's policy grants exceptions for critical facilities when a prolonged outage could have a significant adverse impact to public health or safety.

Deployment of temporary generation is contingent upon the following circumstances: the expected duration to perform permanent repairs is significantly longer than the expected duration to install backup generation, the expected customer outage is 50,000 or more customer minutes, and the outage affects a Distribution circuit serving multiple customers without a functional back-tie.[44]

PG&E has pre-arranged commitments with critical facility and infrastructure customers to provide temporary generation in case of a PSPS and evaluated requests received during this PSPS according to the prioritization described in Section 6.6e.

[44] 50,000 customer minutes is approximately equivalent to 100 customers for about eight hours.

6.6e. An explanation of how the utility prioritized how to distribute available backup generation.

Response:
PG&E prioritizes the deployment of available generation by first meeting existing commitments to individual facilities in the following order:

- High Risk to Public Safety (Examples):
    - Facilities that support public safety such as but not limited to First/emergency responders at the Tribal, local, state, and federal level, water, wastewater assets, and City or county EOC.
- High Risk of Environmental Hazard (Examples):
    - Chemical plant which may risk spilling into a local river.
    - High Risk to Essential Emergency Response and Supporting Facilities (Examples).
    - 911 call center.
    - Water pump availability compromises active firefighting by emergency service personnel.
    - Critical telecommunications equipment or other support businesses that directly affect emergency services provisions.
    - Affected community choice aggregators, publicly owned utilities/electrical cooperatives, the CPUC, the California Governor's Office of Emergency Services, City or county EOC, and the CAL FIRE.

Deployment of available generation is then followed by customers with special needs in the following order:

- Life support, MBL Program, and temperature sensitivity.
- Large customers, economic damage customers, and danger to health and safety customers.

Deployment of available generation is then followed by other customers based on maximizing relief based on the number of customers times expected duration.

6.6f. Identify the critical facility and infrastructure customers that received backup generation.

Response:
During and immediately before the PSPS, no backup generators were requested by CFI customers that did not have an existing mitigation plan in place.

Section 7 – Complaints & Claims

Section 7.1 - The number and nature of complaints received as the result of the de-energization event and claims that are filed against the utility because of de-energization. The utility must completely report all the informal and formal complaints, meaning any expression of grief, pain, or dissatisfaction, from various sources, filed either with CPUC or received by the utility as a result of the PSPS event. *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, D.21-06-014, page 304.)*

Response:
Table 14 provides the number and nature of complaints received from customers and Public Safety Partners, submitted to both the CPUC and PG&E, for the May 17 – 18, 2026 PSPS.[45] Any complaints received after May 29 will be included in the 2026 PSPS Post-Season Report.

Table 14: Number and Nature of Complaints

Nature of Complaints	Number of Complaints
Communications/Notifications Including, but not limited to complaints regarding lack of notice, excessive notices, confusing notice, false alarm notice, problems with getting up-to-date information, inaccurate information provided, not being able to access information in the prevalent languages and/or information accessibility, complaints about website, Public Safety Partner Portal, Representational State Transfer (REST)/Digital Asset Manager (DAM) sites (as applicable).	5
PSPS Frequency/Duration Including, but not limited to complaints regarding the frequency and/or duration of PSPS, including delays in restoring power, scope of PSPS and dynamic of weather conditions.	3
Safety/Health Concern Including, but not limited to complaints regarding difficulties experienced by AFN/MBL populations, traffic accidents due to non-operating traffic lights, inability to get medical help, well water or access to clean water, inability to keep property cool/warm during outage raising health concern.	4
General PSPS Dissatisfaction/Other Including, but not limited to complaints about being without power during PSPS and related hardships such as food loss, income loss, inability to work/attend school, plus any PSPS-related complaints that do not fall into any other category.	7
Outreach/Assistance Including, but not limited to complaints regarding CRCs, community crew vehicles, backup power, hotel vouchers, and other assistance provided by utility to mitigate impact of PSPS.	2

Claims
As of May 26, we did not receive any claims for the May 17 – 18, 2026 PSPS.

[45] PG&E's PSPS Post-Event Reports are based on the required CPUC-issued template. Additional information regarding complaints and claims will be provided in subsequent PSPS Post-Season Reports.

Section 8 – Power Restoration

Section 8.1 - A detailed explanation of the steps the utility took to restore power *(Resolution ESRB-8 page 5)*

Response:
During this PSPS, the PG&E EOC Command and Meteorology teams monitor real-time and forecasted weather conditions based on weather models, weather station data, and field observations while patrol crews and helicopters are pre-positioned in anticipation of the Weather All-Clear to begin patrols. Weather All-Clears are called based on circuit segments.

This allows PG&E to call Weather All-Clears more granularly, thereby restoring power more quickly in areas less prone to wind gusts or adverse conditions. PG&E monitors the conditions for each impacted circuit segment and as they fall below our mFPC to consider areas for restoration.

As Weather All-Clears are issued, restoration crews patrol electrical facilities to identify and repair or clear any damage or hazard before restoring power. Using the Incident Command System (ICS) as a base response framework, each circuit is assigned a taskforce consisting of supervisors, crews, trouble men, and inspectors. This structure allows PG&E to patrol and perform step restoration in alignment with the centralized control centers.

During restoration, PG&E issued seven Weather All-Clears and deployed approximately 206 personnel and nine helicopters to patrol the lines in advance of restoration. Patrols were conducted on approximately 1,051 miles of Distribution circuits and that had been de-energized. Power was restored to customers as patrol completion verified the safe condition of each line.

Section 8.2 - The timeline for power restoration, broken down by phase if applicable *(D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A24, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
See Appendix B for detailed information on restoration on each circuit, including restoration date, restoration time, and total customer count on each circuit.

Section 8.3 - For any circuits that require more than 24 hours to restore, the utility shall use the following template to explain why it was unable to restore each circuit within this timeframe, using the format below. *(D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 6.)*

Response:
PG&E was able to restore all impacted customers within 24 hours of the Weather All-Clear.

Table 15: Circuits Requiring More than 24 Hours to Restore

Circuit Name	Reason the Utility was Unable to Restore the Circuit Within 24 Hours
None	None

Section 9 – Community Resource Centers

Section 9.1 - The address (including city and zip code) of each location during a de-energization event, the location (in a building, a trailer, etc.), the assistance available at each location, the days and hours that it was open, and attendance (i.e., number of visitors) *(Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
During the May 17 – 18, 2026 PSPS, PG&E opened six CRCs that were visited by 1,252 people and provided 400 Grab and Go bags to Tracy Hills Fire Station in Tracy, CA (San Joaquin County). A list of CRC locations, assistance available, operating days and hours, and attendance are reported in Appendix E in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260517.*"

Visitors were provided with PSPS information by dedicated staff, ADA-compliant restrooms, tables and chairs, power strips to meet basic charging needs for personal medical devices and other electronics, snacks, bottled water, Wi-Fi, and cellular service access. Bags of ice and privacy screens were also available at indoor locations.

Visitors who did not wish to remain on site, were provided "Grab and Go" bags with a PSPS information card, water, non-perishable snacks, a mobile battery charger, and a blanket.

Some visitors may request and are provided with information regarding hotel vouchers. However, PG&E does not provide hotel vouchers at CRC locations.

PG&E coordinates with county Offices of Emergency Management to determine the best locations for CRCs for all PSPS events. During this PSPS event, and in collaboration with county officials, CRCs were not activated in Contra Costa, Fresno, Lake, Merced, Napa, Solano, Sonoma, or Yolo counties, as the customer impact in these areas was minimal.

For our CRC Plan and more information regarding CRC operations, including coordination with Tribal and local governments, CRC types and resources, see PG&E's 2025 PSPS Pre-Season Report, Appendix A, pp. 37 – 50.

Section 9.2 - Any deviations and explanations from the CRC requirement including operation hours, ADA accessibility, and equipment. *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
On May 17, the CRC location in Glenn County at Elk Creek Junior Senior High School closed 11 minutes earlier than planned due to an unexpected swarm of mosquitoes that created a safety concern. To ensure the well-being of CRC staff (no visitors were present), the decision was made to close early. This site was opened the next day with no issues or concerns.

Section 9.3 - A map identifying the location of each CRC and the de-energized areas *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
See Figure 24 for a map of CRC locations opened during this PSPS. Based on the CRC survey conducted for this PSPS, most respondents traveled approximately less than five miles to the nearest CRC location.

Additional CRC location information can be found at PG&E Emergency Site – View Outage Map where customers can find specific information using the 'Address Search' or 'City/County Search' functions.

Figure 24: CRC Locations Map

Section 10 – Mitigations to Reduce Impact

Section 10.1 - A description of how sectionalization, i.e. separating loads within a circuit, was considered and implemented and the extent to which it impacted the size and scope of the de-energization event (D.19-05-042, page A23).

Response:
PG&E employed multiple measures to avoid de-energizing approximately 32,276 customers during the May 17 – 18, 2026 PSPS including sectionalization and backup power support.

Backup Power Support
Backup power support provides temporary generation to select devices (i.e. medical equipment) or limited areas. However, it does not mitigate PSPS impacts completely given its segmented scope. See pge.com/backuppowersafety for more information on backup power support.

During this PSPS, temporary generation was considered and utilized to mitigate approximately four stand-alone customers based on the PSPS scope and available resources.

Distribution Sectionalization
During this PSPS, Distribution sectionalization was considered and utilized on 27 circuits to mitigate approximately 32,272 customers based on PSPS scope and available resources.

PG&E has installed new Distribution sectionalization devices near the borders of the CPUC-designated HFTD Tier 2 and Tier 3 to reduce the number of customers affected by PSPS.

Community Microgrids
For this PSPS, PG&E did not deploy community microgrids as there were not any identified opportunities to serve our customers within the PSPS scope.

A community microgrid is a group of customers and Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) within clearly defined electrical boundaries with the ability to disconnect from and reconnect to the grid. These microgrids are typically designed to serve the portions of communities that include community resources, like hospitals, police and fire stations, and gas stations and markets. PG&E continues to own and operate the Distribution system within the microgrid. More information about PG&E's microgrid solutions or how to begin developing a community microgrid can be found at www.pge.com/cmep.

Transmission Line Sectionalization
For this PSPS, PG&E did not utilize Transmission line sectionalization as there weren't any identified opportunities to serve our customers within the PSPS scope.

Transmission lines are segmented using switches enabled with Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), when possible, if only a portion of a line is required to be de-energized due to PSPS. Leaving segments of Transmission lines energized allows PG&E to still reduce fire risk where needed and provide service to stations fed off the non-impacted segments during this PSPS.

Distribution Switching
For this PSPS, PG&E did not deploy Distribution switching as there weren't any identified opportunities to serve our customers within the PSPS scope. This was primarily due to the small scope of the PSPS.

Depending on fire risk patterns, Distribution switch locations and switching plans maintain service to customers on lines that fall outside the high-risk area but are served by lines that pass through the fire risk area. Depending on PSPS scope, we may be able to use back-tie switching to bypass the Distribution circuits that pass through the de-energization area to keep customers energized from a different set of lines.

Transmission Islanding
In some cases, PG&E can leverage islanding capabilities to keep some customers islanded apart from the rest of PG&E's Transmission system and energized by generation located within the island.

For this PSPS, PG&E did not utilize Transmission islanding as there were not any identified opportunities to serve our customers within the PSPS scope.

Temporary Substation Generation
For this PSPS, PG&E did not utilize Temporary substation generation as there weren't any identified opportunities to serve our customers within the PSPS scope.

Temporary substation generation can enable some community resources to continue serving the surrounding population during a PSPS at Distribution substations resulting from Transmission line outages. An interconnection is made at the substation, energizing entire circuits where downstream assets are not at weather risk and generator capacity is sufficient. If there are downstream assets at risk, this mitigation is combined with Distribution sectionalization to energize only safe areas. For reporting purposes, customers mitigated in the latter case will be documented in this category and not in sectionalization to avoid duplication. On average, customers served by temporary substation generation experience de-energization periods of under 30 minutes.

Temporary Microgrids
PG&E temporary Distribution microgrids were not in scope for this PSPS. The objective of temporary microgrids is to enable some community resources to continue serving the surrounding population during PSPS where it is safe to do so, using pre-installed interconnection hubs to safely and rapidly interconnect temporary generation.

Twelve temporary microgrid sites are currently ready for immediate operation in PG&E's service area.

Temporary microgrids can enable some community resources to continue serving the surrounding population during a PSPS where it is safe to do so, using pre-installed interconnection hubs to safely and rapidly interconnect temporary generation. While temporary microgrids do not often support large numbers of customers, the community resources served by temporary microgrids include fire stations, local water and waste companies, markets, post offices, and medical facilities. On average, when utilized, customers served by temporary

microgrids experience de-energization periods of under 30 minutes. PG&E's service area currently has 12 temporary microgrid sites available for immediate operation.

Covered Conductor
The effects of grid-hardening and covered conductors are accounted for in our IPW model, which predicts the probability of utility-caused ignitions. Overhead system hardening is expected to reduce the probability of outages and ignitions in recently hardened sections. The IPW model more heavily weighs ignition and outage rates in recent years which will result in areas with fewer ignitions (e.g., areas that may have been recently hardened, being less likely to be de-energized for PSPS as there is a lower chance of ignition based on historical ignitions and outages).

Section 10.2 - Mitigation actions and impacts (both waterfall graph and map) including: sectionalization devices, temporary generation, microgrids, permanent backup generation, transmission switching, covered conductor, and any other grid hardening that mitigated the impact of the event *(D.21-06-014, page 285, SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
Figure 25 depicts the impact each mitigation measure had on the total number of customers. Customer locations where mitigation efforts were utilized are mapped in Figure 26.

Figure 25: Reduction of Impacted Customers Due to Mitigation Efforts



Figure 26: Mitigation Utilization Map



Section 11 – Lessons Learned from this Event

Section 11.1 - Threshold analysis and the results of the utility's examination of whether its thresholds are adequate and correctly applied in the de-energized areas. The utility must include specific information pertaining to the event. *(D.21-06-014, page 305-306.)*

Response:
This section addresses our examination of the adequacy of our PSPS protocols, criteria and guidance thresholds. As a preliminary matter, the CPUC recognizes the statutory authority of the IOUs to de-energize electric facilities when necessary for public safety and further acknowledges that such decision-making is complex and dependent on many factors.[46] As prescribed in ESRB-8, the decision to de-energize electric facilities for public safety is based on the best judgment of the IOU and is dependent on many factors including but not limited to fuel moisture, aerial and ground firefighting capabilities, active fires that indicate fire conditions, situational awareness provided by agencies and local meteorological conditions of humidity and winds.[47] Therefore, the CPUC has declined to establish a minimum windspeed threshold below which an IOU would be prohibited from shutting off power and instead left the decision-making to the IOU's discretion on the basis that the IOU has the detailed knowledge of its facilities necessary to make this decision in real time given contemporaneous weather conditions.[48]

Based on our current PSPS modeling, guidance and criteria as applied in this PSPS and explained in Section 2.3, our current PSPS guidance continues to be adequate and was effectively applied for the May 17 – 18, 2026 PSPS. For detailed information on our PSPS criteria and thresholds, see Appendix A-1.1 in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260517.*"

For each PSPS, we begin our threshold evaluation with a robust historical analysis that is described in detail below. This analysis establishes the guidance values to be applied for a PSPS, which has been optimized to capture data from past catastrophic fires to mitigate customer impacts. To do so, our Meteorology Team use internal and external tools and subject matter expertise to support their recommendations on when and where to de-energize for public safety. For the May 17– 18, 2026 PSPS, our Meteorologists observed conditions including gusty north winds, low humidity, and grassland fuels which were receptive to ignition and fire spread. These additional factors were evaluated through advanced weather modeling systems from our network of more than 1,500 weather stations that forecasted and tracked weather conditions in real-time.

Before de-energization, customer risk was also evaluated against wildfire risk on a per circuit basis to further evaluate the adequateness of the PSPS. See Section 2.4 above for more information.

Establishing Threshold through Historical Analysis
Our PSPS guidance was established by calibrating a granular, historical dataset. We built our verification dataset by creating, or "backcasting," the PSPS guidance through our historical dataset. We extracted values for all recent fires that have occurred in PG&E's service area from 2012 to 2023. We aimed to capture as many historical fires as possible that were caused by PG&E equipment during high wind events (e.g., Camp, Nuns, Kincade, Zogg) while limiting the

[46] ESRB-8
[47] See Resolution ESRB-8, p. 8-9.
[48] D.12-04-024

number of historical PSPS outages to minimize customer impacts. Our analysis included:

- Hourly review of past incidents
- Verification of hypothetical PSPS dates
- PSPS guidance values testing
- A robust guidance sensitivity and calibration analysis

Historical Analysis: CFP_D Quantification

Based on this historical analysis and as described in Section 2.3 above, PG&E uses a CFP_D value of seven as the quantitative threshold guidance value to consider for PSPS on PG&E's Distribution system.

To establish the CFP_D threshold of seven, we performed multiple sensitivity studies in "backcast" mode for calibration and validation. This involved running 68 different versions of the combined Distribution PSPS guidance through hourly historical data throughout multiple years to calibrate PSPS guidance. This included simulating and learning from more than 2,500 virtual PSPS outages. Through this "lookback" analysis, we evaluated:

- Potential customer impacts
- The potential size, scope, and frequency of PSPS outages
- The days PSPS outages would have occurred
- Whether utility infrastructure would have qualified for de-energization

The mFPC and CFP_D guidance that is determined from Technosylva was also evaluated using this process.

The CFP_D guidance value of six is shown in Figure 27 with respect to recent large fires since 2012. Fires to the right of the CFP_D6 line tend to be wind driven fires, while non-wind driven fires tend to exist left of the CFP_D6 line. Any fires above six that meet mFPC indicate PSPS would have been executed, had these models and guidance been in use during these historic events. The results show that deployment of this model could have prevented such wildfires as the Camp, Nuns, Atlas, and Zogg, if implemented in 2012.[49]

[49] Note that the inclusion of a fire in this analysis does not indicate that PG&E is directly responsible for or caused a fire. Instead, the fires are included for the purpose of analyzing the impact of PG&E's current PSPS Protocols.

Figure 27: CFP_D Guidance



This analysis was a critical step to ensure the most catastrophic historical incidents are identified by PSPS guidance while considering the significant impacts to customers from PSPS outages across multiple dimensions (e.g., duration and frequency). This ensures that future PSPS outages will capture conditions similarly during the most catastrophic fires while also balancing impacts to customers.

Historical Analysis: Execution
To execute the analysis at this scale, we utilized cloud computing resources to run PSPS model guidance for every hour at every 2 x 2 km grid cell across the historical data set to determine the number of times and locations PSPS guidance is exceeded. Each location exceeding guidance is then grouped into events to determine the location and size of each PSPS given the weather and fuels present at that time under the parameters of the study version. This allows us to determine if synoptic-driven events (e.g., Diablo wind events) are being identified, and if historical fires attributable to PG&E equipment may have been mitigated.

Verification of PSPS Protocols
In addition to these sensitivity studies, PG&E performed extensive verification of the PSPS protocols using several internal and external datasets. The goal of these analyses was to first determine if certain weather events are being captured (e.g., Diablo and offshore wind events), and second, to determine if power lines that have been implicated in historic catastrophic fires would have been identified by the guidance.

The following internal datasets were used in the analysis:

- Climatology of Diablo wind events
- Distribution and Transmission outage history
- Exploratory and dynamic dashboards created with internal and external data
- Hourly high-resolution wind maps from the climatology data set
- The weather signal database

The following external datasets were used in the analysis:

- High risk of potential large fires due to wind from the GACC
- Historical fire occurrence data compiled by federal agencies
- National Center for Environmental Prediction (NCEP) North American Regional Reanalysis Archive (NARR) synoptic weather maps
- RFWs from NWS

The paragraphs below explain how we leveraged external and internal data to verify our PSPS protocols guidance thresholds.

NARR Archive
PG&E has acquired the NARR archive data dating back to 1995 and produced over two million maps that can be utilized to study past events. These maps are also useful to study the past conditions leading up to a PSPS, such as the extent of precipitation events and heat waves. When the PSPS models are run through the climatology, each PSPS identified is compared against the NARR archive by our Meteorology Team to determine the large-scale atmospheric features present for each event.

Climatology of Diablo Wind Events
PG&E also leverages the latest academic research on Diablo wind events that use surface-based observations to create a climatology of Diablo wind events. We adapted the criteria and processed it hour-by-hour through the 31-year weather climatology to determine the frequency, magnitude, and timing of Diablo winds. The output of this analysis was a 31-year calendar of Diablo wind events experienced in the PG&E service area. As it relates to PSPS directly, the strongest Diablo wind events were evaluated to verify if PSPS guidance also selects these days for potential PSPS outages. Using the days identified by PSPS guidance and the Diablo PSPS list, a high-level comparison was completed to evaluate overlap of the events.

Any events that did not meet PSPS guidance were further evaluated using additional data sources described in this section. For example, the NARR archive proved useful, as antecedent conditions such as rainfall before a PSPS and the magnitude of the PSPS could be evaluated.

PG&E's Weather Signal Database
PG&E's Meteorology Team built, and continues to maintain, a 'weather signal' database that flags each day from January 1, 1995, to present that experienced any weather-related outages on the Distribution system. It also lists the main weather driver (e.g., heat, low-elevation snow, northeast wind, winter storm, etc.) for these outages. If Distribution outage activity is not driven by weather, the day is classified as a "Blue Sky"[50] day. This dataset combines weather and Distribution outage activity that allows rapid filtering of events based on the main weather drivers. To validate PSPS guidance, we used a combination of "Northeast" wind days and "Blue-Sky" days.

The PSPS guidance was validated against all Northeast wind days in the database. This is similar, but complementary to the Diablo PSPS analysis as it also accounts for outage activity observed on those days. Events were also compared against "Blue Sky" days to ensure that PSPS would not be recommended for a high percentage of non-weather-impact days where little to no outage activity was observed.

[50] A "Blue Sky Day" is defined the same as a non-weather impact day (no or very limited impacts due to weather).

RFWs from the NWS
PG&E also validated PSPS guidance against RFWs from the NWS. RFWs mean warm temperatures, very low humidity, and stronger winds are expected to combine and produce an increased risk of fire danger. These RFWs were collected between 2015 – 2020 in shapefile format and used to evaluate the timing and spatial extent of historical RFWs against our PSPS guidance. It should be noted that each NWS office in the PG&E service area has different RFW criteria, making direct and quantifiable comparison challenging. However, this dataset is used to evaluate whether RFWs were issued when PSPS guidance was met. Based on historical PSPS analysis, RFWs are expected to occur more frequently and cover a broader area than the area covered by PSPS outages.

High Risk of Potential Large Fires due to Wind from GACC
PG&E also validated PSPS guidance against historical "High Risk" days from the GACC. The GACCCs issues High Risk Day alerts when fuel and weather conditions are predicted which historically have resulted in a significantly higher than normal chance for a new large fire or for significant growth on existing fires. Examples of critical weather conditions are high winds, low humidity, an unstable atmosphere, and very hot weather. Similar to the RFW analysis, this dataset was used to evaluate if High Risk days were issued when PSPS guidance was high. Blue Sky Day is defined as "The same as a non-weather impact day (no or very limited impacts due to weather)." Similar to RFWs, based on historical PSPS analysis, High Risk Days are expected to occur more frequently and cover a broader area than PSPS.

Hourly High-Resolution Wind Maps from PG&E Climatology Data Set
PG&E created hourly maps from high-resolution climatology and a web-based application to display any hour across 30 years. For each PSPS that meets PSPS guidance in the climatology, these maps were evaluated by a Meteorologist to better understand the nature of the event, wind speeds, antecedent conditions, and the spatial extent of strong winds. It's important to note forecast wind speeds are available in the same exact format, allowing Operational Meteorologists to put forecast events in perspective with historical events using the same model.

Detailed PSPS Dashboards
To evaluate the PSPS thresholds, our Meteorology Team and data scientists utilized the data sources described above to evaluate historical PSPS hour-by-hour to verify the locations and times that are being flagged as meeting PSPS guidance. These dashboards determine if historical fire events would have been flagged by PSPS guidance. Our Meteorologists evaluated these data sources hourly to verify model performance of the IPW model and suitability for operations. The PSPS guidance can be evaluated spatially using the dashboard map integration, while the size and timing of the PSPS can be evaluated using the time series integration.

The analysis described above includes evaluating locations that were just below verbatim PSPS protocols as determined and reported by our high-resolution forecast model and data set included in this PSPS Post-Event Report. For example, this may include evaluating areas where the wind speed is -2 mph below guidance if all other mFPC or RFW are met. It is well documented that high resolution weather model forecasts of wind speed from Weather Research and Forecasting model (WRF) tend to underpredict at high wind speeds.[51] Thus it is within reason to anticipate that the actual wind speed could be 1 mph higher than model forecast. If these areas are not scoped for PSPS and the winds materialize stronger than forecast, it could lead to PSPS

[51] https://doi.org/10.1016/j.atmosres.2021.105673; https://doi.org/10.3390/atmos15050533; https://doi.org/10.3390/atmos15101244; https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoinf.2024.102898

execution with very little to no advanced notifications to customers and Public Safety Partners. Therefore, as explained in detail above, not one single factor or threshold is determinative of our final PSPS scoping. Based on multiple factors, data and analysis, the final PSPS scope is ultimately based on the judgement of our OIC.

Section 11.2 - Use the below format to report any lessons learned that will lead to future improvement for the utility *(SED Additional Information.)*

Response:
PG&E collects lessons learned input from staff during and after every PSPS EOC activation to identify best practices and opportunities for improvement. See Table 16 for lessons learned from the May 17 – 18, 2026 PSPS.

Table 16: Lessons Learned

Issue	Discussion	Resolution
Customer Notification	During this PSPS, certain triggers for post-de-energization notifications were not completed properly due to incorrectly categorized cause codes. This impacted our notification performance (see Section 5.5 for more information).	During this PSPS, we leveraged an enhanced dashboard to more closely monitor occurrences of incorrect cause codes to address this issue in real-time. In addition to the corrective actions discussed in Section 5.6, we are continuing to identify opportunities to mitigate reoccurrence of this in the future.

Section 12 – Other Relevant Information

Response:
Table 17 and Figure 28 show the maximum wind gust speeds recorded by weather stations in each county within PSPS scope.

Table 17: Maximum Wind Gusts Recorded During May 17 – 18, 2026

County	Maximum Wind Gust (mph)	Station Name
Alameda	60	Mt Allison
Colusa	54	Wadleigh Road
Contra Costa	63	Los Vaqueros
Glenn	60	Road 65
Fresno	69	Upper Providence
Lake	73	Santa Fe Geothermal
Napa	57	Summit Lake
San Benito	58	Lone Tree Towers
San Joaquin	43	SR-99-SR-26 Fremont Street
Solano	59	Sky Ranch Lane
Sonoma	73	Mt St Helena West
Stanislaus	56	Mt Oso
Tehama	70	Ponderosa Sky
Merced	41	SR-99 – Le Grand Road
Yolo	59	Bald Mountain Tower

Figure 28: Maximum Wind Gusts Recorded Map Between May 17 – 18, 2026



APPENDIX

APPENDIX A
SECTION 2 – DECISION MAKING PROCESS

Appendix A: DECISION MAKING PROCESS

See Appendix A-1.1: Factors Considered in the Decision to Shut Off Power for Each Distribution Circuit De-energized During the May 17 – 18, 2026 PSPS in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260517.*"

Note: PSPS decision making on Distribution does not occur at a per-circuit level, and instead occurs at the level of our 2 x 2 km weather and fuels model grid. These outputs are used in a GIS system to visualize the areas of concern by area, which meteorologists and Distribution Assets Health Specialists review to scope the event. The data provided here is representative of our high-resolution weather model data, which is driven by the Weather Research and Forecasting model. It is not inclusive of other model information reviewed by meteorologists that include external, public global and high-resolution weather models. This temporal and areal review of the risk, the operational timeline required to create the scope as well as any areas that were added based on subject matter expertise of meteorologists may lead to some circuits being de-energized that do not strictly exceed PSPS guidance.

See Appendix A-1.2 for the description of each column header, as well as the unit and value provided.

Appendix A-1.2: Description, Units, and Value provided for Factors Considered in the Decision to Shut Off Power for Each Distribution Circuit De-energized During the May 17 – 18, 2026 PSPS

Category	Value	Name	Unit	Value Provided	Description
Threshold, Forecast, Observed	**WS MPH**	Sustained Wind Speeds	mph	max	Sustained windspeed in miles per hour at 10 meters above ground level. The observed values show the maximum sustained wind speed recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated All-Clear time.
Threshold, Forecast, Observed	**Flame Length ft 8hr**	Flame Length	ft	max	Flame length in feet on fire front for first 8 hours of fire spread simulation from Technosylva. No observed value is available for this factor.
Threshold, Forecast, Observed	**Rate of Spread Chhr 8hr**	Rate of Spread	chains/hr	max	Rate of fire spread in chains per hour for first 8 hours of fire spread simulation from Technosylva. No observed value is available for this factor.
Threshold, Forecast, Observed	**RH %**	Relative Humidity	%	min	Relative Humidity in percent at 2 meters above ground level. For observed values, this is the minimum relative humidity recorded by all weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated All-Clear time.
Threshold, Forecast, Observed	**Prob Cat**	Fire Potential Index (FPI)	probability outputs	max	Fire Potential Index (FPI) Model Output - Probability of a catastrophic fire if an ignition were to occur. FPI component of the CFP_D model.
Threshold, Forecast, Observed	**DFM 10hr**	Dead Fuel Moisture Content 10 hrs	fuel moisture fraction	min	Dead Fuel Moisture in 10-hour fuel moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100.
Threshold, Forecast, Observed	**DFM 100hr**	Dead Fuel Moisture Content 100 hrs	fuel moisture fraction	min	Dead Fuel Moisture in 100-hour moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100. No observed value is available for this factor.
Threshold, Forecast, Observed	**CFPD**	Catastrophic Fire Probability (CFPD)	Scaled Probability	max	The product of probability of catastrophic fire (Prob Cat) and IPW - probability of ignition (Prob Ignition). This product is called the (CFPD) Catastrophic Fire Probability distribution. Scaled by 1000 to convert to an integer value.
Threshold, Forecast, Observed	**NDVI**	Normalized Difference Vegetation Index	fraction	min	Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI), is the difference between near-infrared (NIR) and red reflectance from the Earth's surface, divided by their sum.
Threshold, Forecast,	**Benefit to Risk Ratio**	Threshold, Forecast,	fraction	max	Adverse impact to customers due to a catastrophic fire prevented by PSPS de-

Category	Value	Name	Unit	Value Provided	Description
Observed		Observed			energization divided by adverse impact to customers due to PSPS de-energization. No observed value is available for this factor.
Qualitative Factors	**NOAA (Yes/No)**	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration	N/A	Yes/No During Event	NOAA (SPC) Fire Weather Outlook forecast.
Qualitative Factors	**RFW (Yes/No)**	Red Flag Warning	N/A	Yes/No During Event	Red Flag Warning from the Federal National Weather Service.
Qualitative Factors	**Open PSPS Tags**	Open PSPS Qualified Tags	N/A	Yes/No During Event	PSPS-Qualified Tags include P1 (tree represents an immediate risk) and P2 (tree is damaged or diseased and could fall into nearby power lines) tree tags and Electric Corrective tags (Priority A - emergency, B - urgent, and E/F - risk-based).
Qualitative Factors	**Tx Impacts (Yes/No)**	Impacted by Transmission	N/A	Yes/No During Event	Distribution lines that would have been de-energized due to de-energization of upstream Transmission lines, regardless of whether those Distribution lines would have also been de-energized due to direct Distribution PSPS.

APPENDIX B

SECTION 3 – DE-ENERGIZED TIME, PLACE, DURATION AND CUSTOMERS

Appendix B: DE-ENERGIZED TIME, PLACE, DURATION AND CUSTOMERS

Circuits De-Energized During the May 17 – 18, 2026 PSPS

Circuits labeled as "non-HFTD" are located outside of the CPUC High Fire-Threat District (HFTD). We use a High Fire Risk Area (HFRA) classification which PG&E utilizes in addition to HFTD to determine PSPS scope – these circuits intersected PG&E's HFRA despite not entering HFTD Tier 2 or Tier 3.

Circuits with an asterisk (*) were sectionalized during the PSPS to further reduce customer impact. The de-energization date and time represents the time the first customer was de-energized on the circuit and the restoration time represents the date and time of the last customer restored on a circuit by circuit.

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PDT)	All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)	Restoration Date and Time (PDT)	Key Communities	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers[1]	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	BRENTWOOD 2105*	2026-05-17 12:49:00	2026-05-18 08:38:00	2026-05-18 13:51:00	CONTRA COSTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	84	45	30	9	5	9
Distribution	CALISTOGA 1101*	2026-05-17 13:43:00	2026-05-18 13:14:00	2026-05-18 13:58:00	NAPA, SONOMA	Tier 3	9	0	8	0	0	1
Distribution	CALPINE 1144	2026-05-17 13:41:00	2026-05-18 13:14:00	2026-05-18 17:59:00	SONOMA, LAKE	Tier 3, Tier 2	7	2	5	0	0	0
Distribution	CALPINE 1146	2026-05-17 13:54:00	2026-05-18 13:14:00	2026-05-18 18:00:00	LAKE	Tier 3	1	0	1	0	0	0
Distribution	CANTUA 1102*	2026-05-17 13:45:00	2026-05-18 07:12:00	2026-05-18 11:07:00	FRESNO	Outside HFTD	1	0	1	0	0	0
Distribution	CANTUA 1103*	2026-05-17 13:58:00	2026-05-18 07:12:00	2026-05-18 12:33:00	FRESNO	Outside HFTD	14	2	5	0	0	7
Distribution	CARBONA 1101*	2026-05-17 10:54:00	2026-05-18 08:38:00	2026-05-18 11:14:00	ALAMEDA, SAN JOAQUIN	Outside HFTD	175	98	42	8	12	35
Distribution	CAYETANO 2109*	2026-05-17 12:50:00	2026-05-18 12:33:00	2026-05-18 14:04:00	CONTRA COSTA, ALAMEDA	Tier 3, Tier 2	174	129	35	11	11	10
Distribution	COALINGA NO 2 1105*	2026-05-17 14:07:00	2026-05-18 07:12:00	2026-05-18 09:59:00	FRESNO	Outside HFTD	14	1	10	0	1	3

Distribution	COALINGA NO 2 1107*	2026-05-17 13:51:00	2026-05-18 07:12:00	2026-05-18 12:09:00	FRESNO	Outside HFTD	51	8	27	0	0	16
Distribution	CORNING 1101*	2026-05-17 10:00:00	2026-05-18 09:33:00	2026-05-18 12:22:00	TEHAMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	804	745	57	83	408	2
Distribution	CORNING 1102*	2026-05-17 09:58:00	2026-05-18 09:33:00	2026-05-18 13:05:00	TEHAMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	274	221	44	14	75	9
Distribution	CORTINA 1101*	2026-05-17 10:54:00	2026-05-18 08:38:00	2026-05-18 11:05:00	COLUSA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	18	7	10	0	2	1
Distribution	DUNNIGAN 1103*	2026-05-17 10:51:00	2026-05-18 08:38:00	2026-05-18 10:41:00	COLUSA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	13	9	3	0	3	1
Distribution	ELK CREEK 1101*	2026-05-17 06:00:00	2026-05-18 11:34:00	2026-05-18 15:48:00	COLUSA, GLENN	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	821	680	116	52	178	25
Distribution	GLENN 1101*	2026-05-17 05:54:00	2026-05-18 11:34:00	2026-05-18 15:00:00	GLENN, TEHAMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	147	83	40	3	18	24
Distribution	GUSTINE 1102*	2026-05-17 15:27:00	2026-05-18 07:12:00	2026-05-18 11:46:00	MERCED	Outside HFTD	24	10	11	0	2	3
Distribution	HAMMONDS 1102	2026-05-17 16:07:00	2026-05-18 07:12:00	2026-05-18 12:44:00	FRESNO	Outside HFTD	220	34	52	0	1	134
Distribution	HERDLYN 1102*	2026-05-17 12:47:00	2026-05-18 08:38:00	2026-05-18 13:20:00	CONTRA COSTA, ALAMEDA	Outside HFTD	30	15	7	0	6	8
Distribution	LOGAN CREEK 2102*	2026-05-17 05:55:00	2026-05-18 11:34:00	2026-05-18 17:43:00	COLUSA, GLENN	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	501	238	116	7	58	147
Distribution	MADISON 2101*	2026-05-17 10:53:00	2026-05-18 08:38:00	2026-05-18 10:47:00	YOLO	Tier 2	11	0	11	0	0	0
Distribution	MAXWELL 1102*	2026-05-17 06:00:00	2026-05-18 11:34:00	2026-05-18 18:31:00	COLUSA	Outside HFTD	146	60	23	7	2	63
Distribution	MAXWELL 1105*	2026-05-17 06:01:00	2026-05-18 11:34:00	2026-05-18 18:29:00	COLUSA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	151	68	39	1	11	44
Distribution	MONTICELLO 1101*	2026-05-17 10:50:00	2026-05-18 08:38:00	2026-05-18 19:59:00	YOLO	Tier 2	8	0	7	0	0	1

Distribution	NORTH DUBLIN 2103*	2026-05-17 12:51:00	2026-05-18 12:33:00	2026-05-18 15:45:00	CONTRA COSTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	170	128	30	11	13	12
Distribution	PANOCHE 1103*	2026-05-17 16:13:00	2026-05-18 07:12:00	2026-05-18 13:30:00	SAN BENITO, FRESNO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	202	96	87	6	12	19
Distribution	SANTA NELLA 1103	2026-05-17 15:50:00	2026-05-18 07:12:00	2026-05-18 12:46:00	MERCED	Outside HFTD	107	62	40	3	20	5
Distribution	SANTA NELLA 1104*	2026-05-17 15:38:00	2026-05-18 07:12:00	2026-05-18 12:47:00	MERCED	Outside HFTD	26	0	20	0	0	6
Distribution	VACAVILLE 1108*	2026-05-17 10:51:00	2026-05-18 14:45:00	2026-05-18 16:08:00	NAPA, SOLANO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	207	154	44	15	17	9
Distribution	WESTLEY 1101*	2026-05-17 11:03:00	2026-05-18 08:38:00	2026-05-18 20:15:00	STANISLAUS, SAN JOAQUIN	Outside HFTD	148	39	57	2	15	52
Distribution	WESTLEY 1103*	2026-05-17 11:07:00	2026-05-18 08:38:00	2026-05-18 12:18:00	STANISLAUS	Outside HFTD	25	3	20	0	0	2
						Total	**4583**	**2937**	**998**	**232**	**870**	**648**

APPENDIX C

SECTION 4 – DAMAGE AND HAZARDS TO OVERHEAD FACILITIES

Appendix C: DAMAGE AND HAZARDS TO OVERHEAD FACILITIES

Damages & Hazards Found Within the De-Energized Areas

Circuit Name	County	Structure Identifier	Tier 2/3 or Non-HFTD	Damage / Hazard	Type of Damage/ Hazard	Description of Damage/Hazard
Monticello 1101	Napa	103928743	Tier 2	Hazard	Foreign object	Other - balloon on line
Westley 1101	San Joaquin	103370873	Non-HFTD	Damage	Wind related	Other - ground wire detached from pole and bird nest on pole
Maxwell 1105	Colusa	101617522	Non-HFTD	Damage	Wind related	Broken crossarm
Glenn 1101	Glenn	100369467	Non-HFTD	Damage	Wind related	Broken insulator

APPENDIX D

SECTION 6 – PUBLIC SAFETY PARTNERS CONTACTED

See Appendix D in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260517*."

APPENDIX E

SECTION 9 – COMMUNITY RESOURCE CENTER LOCATIONS

See Appendix E in the attachment "*PGE_PSPS Post-Event Report Tables_20260517*."

VERIFICATION

I, undersigned, say:

I am an officer of PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, a corporation, and am authorized to make this verification for that reason.

I have read the foregoing "PG&E Public Safety Power Shutoff Report to the CPUC" for the May 17 – 18, 2026 PSPS and I am informed and believe the matters stated therein to be true.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed at Oakland, California this 2nd day of June 2026.



ANDREW ABRANCHES
VICE PRESIDENT
WILDFIRE MITIGATION